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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
Timothy M. Asay
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of English
December 2014
Title: The Phenomenology of Frames in Chaucer, Dante and Boccaccio
When an author produces a frame narrative, she simultaneously makes language 
both a represented object and a representing agent; when we imagine framed speech, we 
imagine both the scene its words represent and a mouth that speaks those words.  Framed 
language is thus perfectly mimetic: the words we imagine being spoken within the 
fictional world are the same we use to effect that fiction’s representation.  Since its first 
function is to represent itself, the framed word acts both to push us out of the frame into 
our own temporality and to draw us into fictional times and spaces. This dissertation 
explores how first Dante and subsequently his successors, Boccaccio and Chaucer, 
deploy this structural feature of frames to engage difficult philosophical and theological 
disputes of their age. In the Divine Comedy, framed language allows Dante to approach 
the perfect presence of God without transgressing into a spatial conception of the divine.  
Intensifying Dante’s procedure in his House of Fame, Chaucer forecloses the possibility 
of representation; he transforms every speech act into an image of its utterer rather than 
its referent, thus violently thrusting us back into the time we pass as we read.  Boccaccio
—first in his Ameto then in the Decameron—eschews this framed temporality in favor of 
the temporality of the fetish: while his narratives threaten to dissolve into their basic 
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linguistic matters, the erotic energy of the people that populate those narratives forces 
them to cohere as fully imagined spaces and times.  Finally the Chaucer who writes the 
Canterbury Tales fuses his initial reading of Dante with Boccaccio’s response to it; he 
constructs the Canterbury pilgrims as grotesques who each open up a limited angle of 
vision on the time and space they collectively inhabit.  These angles overlap and stutter 
over one another, unsettling the easy assignations of identity any given pilgrim would 
enforce on a tale or agent within the narrative.  In doing so, Chaucer makes the 
temporality within his Tales strange and poignant in a way that fully mimics our own 
experience of extra-narrative time.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In many ways, narrative frames are erected around texts in order to avoid the sort 
of theorizing in which I’m about to indulge.  Frames help to bridge the gap between 
reader, author and the characters and events internal to a narrative; they imagine stories, 
and they build responses to those stories directly into their overarching fiction.  Authors 
are thus able to overtly direct readers’ responses to their texts by showing how others, 
who are in virtually the same position, respond to the text.  Though most frames are still 
fictional, they thus possess a mimesis that differs from that of most fiction: by making the
procedures of fiction-making part of their fiction, they seem more proximal to reality;1 
their fiction is designed to resemble our reality, wherein we assemble letters and words 
into imagined spaces and times while self-consciously existing outside of them.  Frames 
are fictional, but they position themselves outside other fictions in the same way we 
position our own reality outside of the fictions we produce within it; realities are those 
nodal points from which multiple fictional spaces can be composed and divergent 
historical trajectories imagined.  It is the flexibility of reality that makes it real: from it, 
we can imagine spaces and times that differ from our own; the real does not insist on its 
own identity, but rather allows itself to be refashioned in the conscious mind to 
something else.  Or rather, it would be more accurate to say that the presence in which 
reality inheres does not insist on its identity; as will become clear in the following 
discussion, presence is presence not by virtue of the things that exist within it, but rather 
on its persistent novelty, its capacity to constantly remake itself as something new.  From 
1  Most Arabic frames, for instance, actually serve an authenticating function—they attempt to link a story 
to a historic personage, and thus make it non-fictional. See Gittes, Framing the Canterbury Tales, 78-79.
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the present moment in which we always read, we can shape any number of imagined 
histories tangential from our own. Framed narratives are one such tangent, but a tangent 
bearing a special relationship to the real reader’s mind from which they proceed, for they 
are the nodes from which further tangents stem; even as they narrate themselves into a 
defined, sensible space and time they simultaneously imagine the malleable present 
moment from which the procedures of fiction making can proceed.  While frames are 
often designed to circumvent the sorts of interpretive problems that critics pose about 
other texts,2 they orient us more directly to the sorts of philosophical—and specifically 
phenomenological—questions that we face about our own reality.  In particular, they 
force us to meditate on the temporal conditions of presence from which we are able to 
compose other spaces and times.
The concept of presence offers one of those strange philosophical problems that 
everyone constantly lives, but nobody can adequately describe.  It is the foundation of 
ontology—anything that “is” is in the present moment—and yet a thing’s being only 
becomes evident as it slurs from that present into the past; present being is, ironically, 
only made legible by a persistence that relies on a past state of being.  As St. Augustine 
famously diagnosed, the past—like the future—has no being in itself;3 it has already been
sloughed through the oculus of presence, and so, even if some vestiges of it remain, the 
totality of circumstances that presence describes has already mutated into something else 
equally fleeting.  Yet though presence is the foundation of being and so the intelligibility 
2  Though, of course, the very means by which frames circumvent interpretive problems can easily be made
the target of the narrative; an author need only betray a self-consciousness about the interpretive work 
being done by the frame in order to shift our attention to it.  Frames are analogous to allegories in this 
sense: whereas, on the surface, allegories are designed to fix a certain interpretation of a body within a text,
many literary allegories self-consciously reflect on the relationship between ideas and bodies.
3  See Book 10 of the Confessions.
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of beings, the concept itself seems incoherent without the past it excludes.  However 
much we shorten the interval of time’s passage, presence seems to always describe 
persistence: the miracle of being is that some object whose moment has passed into 
nonexistence continues into successive moments despite the imminent possibility of its 
unmaking in a present that is always new.  Perfected presence is unimaginable, since it is 
defined by its constant novelty; nothing inhabits it, since it admits no incursions from the 
past, and yet it is the wellspring of ontology.  Much contemporary philosophy on time has
surrendered the present to hermeneutics, arguing that any present moment is dependent 
on the past for its identity. The present is only capable of recombining old discourses, and
it only seems different from the past by means of a semantic trick.  Yet I want to suggest 
here that this attitude is exactly backward: the past is, rather, reliant on the insistent 
novelty of the present for its intelligibility, since persistence would be meaningless 
without the creative unmaking to which presence subjects all of us, all the time.
I will unpack these theories of presence below, first by tracing contemporary 
theories of time from the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl to the present, then by 
exploring some important, predominantly mystical, theories of presence from the 
medieval period, and finally suggesting how frame narratives fully dramatize these 
theories of presence in a semiotic register that resonates with modern philosophy. To 
begin, however, it will suffice to say that this dissertation has two primary contentions: 
first, that medieval concepts of presence offer an important corrective to contemporary 
philosophy on time, which tends to view presence as illusory, as either a mere 
permutation of the past or as an artificially frozen segment of temporal flow.  By allying 
the idea of presence to God, the medieval world allowed presence its fully revolutionary 
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character.  Though presence was the wellspring of history and ontology, in its perfected 
form it effaced the very ontology it enabled; history erupted from the constant, eternal 
novelty of the present, but presence itself transcended history rather than being beholden 
to it. My second contention—and the one that will govern the explication of this 
dissertation—is that the frame narratives of Chaucer, Dante and Boccaccio offer some of 
the most sophisticated elaborations of the Medieval philosophy of presence.  By situating 
language as both a narrating tool and a narrated object within themselves, frame 
narratives thrust us toward the present moment in which language is spoken, a moment 
that transcends the world of objects that language speaks; in doing so, these narratives 
allow us to contemplate the procedures of linguistic differentiation through which we 
forge present meaning from past. This Saussurian pattern of semantic differentiation is—
by the mechanism of narrative—extended to time and history more generally, 
demonstrating how they spill out from the present moment the text thrusts us toward.
Theoretical Genealogy 
Most philosophy on time within the past 100 years has worked to disabuse us of 
facile concepts of presence.  Presence had its last theoretical heyday in the 
phenomenology of the early 20th Century, particularly in that of Edmund Husserl and his 
student, Eugen Fink. In seeking a solid ground for scientific reasoning, phenomenologists
like Husserl argued that natural sciences could not provide the justification for their own 
practice; they rely on their own preconceptions about the world to produce more 
particular knowledge about that world and the way it works.  Science thus remains locked
in a hermeneutic circle, unable to explore its own underpinnings and find a firm rationale 
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for its practice and methodology.  For Husserl, natural sciences are useful, but only as 
subordinated to a different sort of philosophical imperative that he termed 
phenomenology. The goal of phenomenology is—insofar as possible—to eliminate the 
preconceptions that we bring to any particular moment and simply experience its 
sensations as they are, in their fullness.  Any form of human knowing has its justification 
and grounding in this experience of astonishment or wonder that provides us with the 
most bare and essential experience of being.  
The task of the philosopher, then, is to practice what Husserl calls the 
“phenomenological reduction,” which has two parts: the epoché and the reduction proper.
In the epoché, the philosopher essentially brackets the various schema we use to 
understand the world.  For Husserl, we normally live in what he calls a “captivation-in-
an-acceptedness”—we regard as dogmatic not just cultural customs, but also the essential
patterns through which we perceive the world.4  Our basic experience of the world is 
colored over by preformed beliefs that we perpetuate by performing them for subsequent 
generations.  The unconscious acceptance of these beliefs hold us in thrall to them, such 
that we become incapable of seeing the world any other way; these beliefs fool us into 
thinking we have exhaustive knowledge of the objects and phenomena we encounter in 
the world when, in reality, they cause us to understand only certain limited facets of those
objects.  This captivation-in-an-acceptedness is, in a sense, endemic to perception—our 
bodies and their sensory organs are equipped to perceive only a fragment of the 
phenomena that occupy the world around us. Our situation within the partial world we 
are birthed into inhibits our ability to understand that anything lies outside of that world.
4  The clearest articulation of this concept from Husserl’s thought is in Fink’s Sixth Cartesian Meditation, 
41.
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In his Sixth Cartesian Meditation, Fink suggests that we can bracket this world 
through careful philosophical meditation; the very act of inquiring into what might lie 
beyond our perceptual faculties and cultural assumptions signals that the epoché has 
already begun.  It signifies a movement toward the transcendent that lies behind and 
shapes the partial world to which we are accustomed.  Thus, “the transcendental tendency
that awakens in man and drives him to inhibit all acceptednesses nullifies man himself; 
man un-humanizes [entmenscht] himself in performing the epoché, that is, he lays bare 
the transcendental onlooker in himself, he passes into him” (39-40, emphasis in original). 
Fink is careful to note that the epoché does not deny the existence of the world—the 
world is, in fact, the object phenomenology hopes to study more clearly; however, it 
struggles toward an indifference to the existence of the world we have known prior to the 
epoché, which indifference is the necessary prerequisite for really understanding anything
within that world.  As a person sloughs off the hold of an acceptedness, she becomes 
something other than human, since human being is the product of what we have accepted 
about the world.  
Now, such a seemingly naive optimism should raise the hackles of even the most 
indifferent student of modern hermeneutics; the fervor with which hermeneutics has been
practised in the past century is largely a reaction against the type of philosophical 
perspective Husserl and Fink imagine here.  Hermeneutics, in its various forms, 
essentially argues that the acceptedness phenomenology seeks to excise is inextricable 
from perception.  Acceptedness, in fact, produces perception; there is no objective 
position outside of an acceptedness from which we might perceive the world within it, 
and even if such a perspective could be imagined, it would lack access to the world, since
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to witness anything within the world would require a subject position inside it.  The only 
way to produce knowledge within such conditions is to study one’s own subjective 
perspective on a phenomenon and catalogue its influence along with data about the 
phenomenon itself.  While the hermeneutic objection to the epoché has some force, in 
reality it is not so different from what Husserl and Fink propose.  The epoché can only be 
performed coincidentally with the second part of the reduction, the “reduction proper.”  
In this moment, the philosopher gazes back, as it were, at the acceptedness from which 
she has freed herself and recognizes it as an acceptedness.  Whereas modern 
hermeneutics often leaves us lodged within an inevitable subjectivity, phenomenology 
works to account for the paradoxical objectivity that hermeneutics offers: in saying that 
we are the captives of our past experiences, we have already discovered some 
transcendental agency that can understand our captivity.  This insight into our preexisting 
beliefs, itself, lessens the hold of any acceptedness on us; we might say that there are 
always further, more subterranean beliefs that still color our perception even after we 
have rooted out more surface ones, but any such belief still remains susceptible to the 
liberating effect that self-reflection offers.  The irony of hermeneutics is that when we 
recognize our captivity to subjectivity, we liberate ourselves by viewing that subjectivity 
objectively. For Husserl and Fink, then, the recognition of our prior captivity already 
begins to liberate us from it: the reduction proper enables the epoché even as the epoché 
exposes the “transcendental onlooker” that gazes back.  Each movement of the reduction 
is a prerequisite for the other; they build incrementally, with progressive realizations of 
our captivity preparing us for increasingly substantial liberations from it.
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The philosopher who performs the phenomenological reduction is essentially 
liberated from history, but only so that she can return to the world with new eyes; the 
movement toward transcendence that Husserl and Fink describe is a movement toward a 
perfectly present moment and so a fuller experience of whatever being inhabits that 
presence.  By divesting ourselves of what our personal histories have taught us about the 
world, we become more capable of seeing the radical dimensions of an object’s being, or 
at least of acknowledging that those dimensions exist and are integral to the object’s 
identity.  Husserl never entirely sheds idealism to find the objective world his reduction 
thrusts him toward: ultimately, the phenomenologist is concerned with describing 
conscious life in order to discover its possibilities and its limitations.5  But the purpose of 
knowing those limitations is to gain some awareness of what lies beyond them in the 
unreachable depths of the phenomenal world. The phenomenologist renders herself aware
of these dimensions by shrugging off the partial modes of vision the world trains us to 
deploy so that we can function within it; she thus increasingly approximates an 
experience of the full presence of a thing, an experience of all the infinitely varied effects 
that emanate from it.  Her experience never exhausts the richness of an object—if 
consciousness was capable of fully knowing a thing, it would become the thing itself; but 
the recognition of its inexhaustibility produces the wonder that Husserl and Fink believe 
lie at the heart of any scientific enterprise.  
Wonder is precisely an experience of presence, when our attention is rapt upon a 
thing whose most minute movement holds the deepest fascination.  In so fixing our 
attention, we begin to move outside of lived, historical time by burrowing more deeply 
into an object we encounter in time; we refuse to summarize the object into an event that 
5  On Husserl’s latent idealism, see Harman 24-34.
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can be easily digested into the motions of history.  As we will explore further in the 
discussion of Bergson that follows, though we normally ignore the indifferent 
intermediate movements of an object—the time required to move from one posture that 
interests us to another, however minute that interval might be—in wonder, every 
indifferent movement becomes itself the focus of our attention. We thus move toward an 
experience of the full presence of an object, unconstrained by the captivation of our self-
selection; we begin to witness the object as it is in itself, deeper even than what the object
is to itself, since self-consciousness maintains the partiality of any other act of vision. Of 
course, we never actually move outside of lived time, even when we are rapt in wonder—
as the necessary language of motion implies, so long as we are perceiving, we are still 
operating within time and so fail to achieve the presence that is the limit point of 
phenomenology. But we do hurtle toward the presence that transcends historical time by 
perceiving objects with an increasing fullness.  Though we usually think of presence as 
the simple waypoint of history, phenomenology demonstrates that presence transcends 
history by exceeding the partial perceptual schema with which history equips us.
Phenomenology thrusts the philosopher toward this radical presence where 
restrictive preconceptions give way to a fuller picture of the objects that populate the 
world; Husserl and Fink share this movement toward an ineffable presence with earlier 
generations of mystics, but with one central difference that ultimately undoes their 
project: at the apex of the reduction, when the observer arrives at a pure presence, she 
retains her capacity to perceive and question.  The philosophical rigor of the reduction—
while appealing for its comprehensibility—ultimately betrays what the philosopher finds 
in the present moment, the paradoxical self-dissolution that the mystics found at the fount
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of ontology.  Phenomenology attempts to clarify the consciousness of a subject, but 
consciousness itself is fraught with the history and partiality that the reduction was 
supposed to reduce.  Consciousness always entails a grammar, however expansive, that 
organizes an experience first, into a horizontal temporal sequence, and second, into a 
vertical catalogue of perceptions.  The reduction proposed to purify this grammar, but the 
idea of grammar itself is foreign to perfect presence—the perceptual grammar that we 
apply to any experience is exactly what turns it into history.  To pose the problem another
way, consciousness necessarily relies on one’s past history to produce the field of 
experience from which the present moment differs.  This is not a problem of hermeneutic 
inevitability, it is a problem inherent in even the purest, hypothetical form of perception; 
even if the specific character of one’s past is bracketed, the form of historical experience 
itself persists into the present moment and so taints the very thing that makes it present: 
its transcendent being that admits nothing not present.  Consciousness avoids the priority 
of presence by making it a product of history rather than the other way around; it trains us
to believe that the present is contingent upon history when history is the incidental 
product of presence.  Even as we approach presence, so long as our perception continues 
to be a question answered by some object, we remain capable of only partial and 
fragmented vision.  Presence must put to rest the perpetual questioning inherent in the 
directedness of perception; presence is rather, a perpetual answer that refuses the form of 
an answer since no question can inhere within it.  I will dwell on these points at some 
length and from several angles, as they are central to the concept of presence I want to 
advance here; for now it suffices to say that phenomenology was the last philosophical 
school to strenuously advance a theory of presence, but it ultimately undermined the 
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radical capacity of presence to unmake the identity of both philosopher and object at that 
limit point.  The thinkers who followed after Husserl tended to criticize the concept of 
presence in its entirety, but their conclusions ultimately signal phenomenology’s failure to
be birthed into a fully mystical science.  
The first, and most substantive critique lodged against Husserlian phenomenology
came from Husserl’s most gifted student, Martin Heidegger.  At its simplest, Heidegger’s 
philosophy denies the capacity of consciousness to ever exhaust its object.  When we 
direct our deliberate attention to some object, Heidegger says that it becomes “present-to-
hand;” we see however many facets of it we are capable of seeing and record them in the 
storehouse of memory.  We think that, through our perception, we have somehow 
completed the object, bringing it into the presence that only cognition really apprehends; 
yet Heidegger’s tool-analysis critiques the primacy we offer perception in believing it 
gives us access to the phenomenal world. As Graham Harman summarizes, Heidegger 
argued that present perception is not our most characteristic way of interacting with 
objects; more often we interact with them in the mode of a tool, “ready-to-hand.”6 We 
interact with tools in a fundamentally different manner than objects of direct perception.  
Tools are an essential part of our experience, yet we rarely fixate on them as objects—
they are intermediaries that we rely upon unconsciously.  Tools in this sense extend far 
beyond what we might traditionally associate with the term: the floor we stand on 
constitutes a tool, as does the dirt beneath it, the air we breath, the grammar we use to 
speak, etc.  These are tools for Heidegger because they allow us to do other things 
without focusing on them: when I make a sandwich, I might concentrate on the 
6  Harman treats Heidegger’s theory of tool being in a number of places throughout his work; the most 
accessible and succinct of these occurs in The Quadruple Object, 35-40.
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mayonnaise I slather on the bread, but not so much on the knife I use to do so, or 
refrigerator that kept it cold beforehand, or the floor that keeps both myself and the 
refrigerator from plummeting to the ground.
Heidegger notes that such ready-to-hand objects really only become present 
objects of our perception when they break or fail to perform as we expect. My sandwich 
might be ready-to-hand if I only eat it to sustain myself for some other activity and so fail
to appreciate its savor; however, it may become present-to-hand if the meat has gone 
rancid or a seed from the bread sticks in my teeth.  Certainly other scenarios exist that 
would present an object to our perception: in fact, normally we compose eating into an 
event and attend to the flavor of an object in itself and not as a means to some other end. 
Aesthetic apprehension, in fact, brings an object into present perception without 
expecting it to function in a utilitarian way; unlike a broken tool, we expect to attend to 
such an object directly.  Presence is the generic aim of any art.  But for Heidegger, the 
basic paradigm of presence is malfunctioning, rather than such aesthetic concerns.  When 
an object breaks, we attend to a singular facet of its totality; the object, in itself, still 
possesses a multitude of features, but we ignore them to fixate on the one that has failed 
to conform to our semi-conscious expectations of it.  The breakage, for Heidegger, 
reveals the inherent partiality of perception—whenever we bring something into direct 
observation, we invariably fixate on some partial aspect of it rather than the entirety of its
being.  Phenomenology’s dream of producing a complete perception is illusory precisely 
because present, directed perception is inherently partial.
For Heidegger, we can only furtively access the reality of objects in the way we 
interact with tools; our approach to them must be tangential, never directly focused on 
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them, but integrated into their rhythms.  He calls this mode of vision “circumspection,” 
but as Harman notes, “this supposed sight does not make the tools visible in the least” 
(38).  Tools remain invisible, locked in a system of interrelated purposes with other tools. 
No observer’s gaze can fully exhaust the life of such a tool: however thoroughly we study
its interrelations, we fail to know every possible way in which it is situated within this 
subterranean backdrop of tool-being.  Each perspective from which it might be perceived
—every effect it has on some other object—is partial, and the aggregation of those 
perspectives is impossible for the mind to conceive.  The mind is itself only another 
perspective, and so cannot possibly conceptualize the ripples that every object casts out 
into the great sea of being.  Mind would cease to be mind if it could achieve such a 
totality of perspectives—it would have to become the logos itself, the system of relations 
which it sets out to perceive or conceptualize.  But the entire procedure of perception 
already signals the lack of this totality; its advent cannot occur through perceptual or 
conceptual means since these processes demonstrate that we are distinct from what we 
observe.  Perception creates a zone of separation from that totality into which we 
represent objects; perception is only ever memory, since the act of absorbing a present 
being into a mental representation already introduces a secondarity that a radical presence
must eschew. To perceive the full being of an object, we would have to merge into the 
entire network of relations that defines the contours of the object; but to do so, we would 
lose the vantage point from which we perceive—perception would have to bring about its
own death in its fulfillment.
Heidegger is correct to say that not even the most Herculean act of imagination—
which extends perception to its fullest limit—could fully exhaust the being Heidegger 
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finds in the tool.  The microcosm of the mind can never fully absorb the macrocosm or 
the two would become coextensive, not micro- or macrocosm at all but a continuous 
plane of presence constantly realizing itself.  Heidegger is also, in a sense, right to name 
presence as the failing of phenomenology, but in many ways he falls into the trap of his 
own critique. Presence, in Husserl, effectively was perception, or at least the 
perceptibility of an object conceived in its totality.  Presence was the moment of impact, 
where the valence of an object’s being made contact with another object; even if this 
object was not a human sensory organ, its contact signified a possible perception already 
taking place, as though we might situate an eye at each such point and, through the 
aggregation of data collected from all such eyes, attain a full understanding of the 
object’s being.  Heidegger critiques the methodology of presence advocated by 
phenomenologists, but his tool analysis does not really critique the underlying model of 
presence—it simply and rightly assigns it to a subterranean depth that is beyond the 
access of perception. Heidegger thus arrives at a methodology in which the willful 
attempt not to perceive, not to cognize an object, is preferable to science; but he does not,
by means of this methodological inflection, eliminate the model of presence assumed by 
phenomenology.  Being, for Heidegger, is still contact (albeit a rich and multifaceted 
contact) and that contact—while it lies beyond our representing perceptual faculties—still
constitutes a present moment.  Heideggerian philosophers are like the wheat threshers 
from Anna Karenina—they are tools using tools to thresh tools to feed tools, and so on; 
they suppress their conscious experience to the limbic system, intuiting there, rather than 
discovering, a participatory preconsciousness of the being that lies behind things.  But 
their participation still assumes that real being lies in contact, and that contact occurs in a 
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present moment which, could it somehow be recorded in its fullness, would offer us 
access to these objects. 
Neither Husserl nor Heidegger extend the trajectories of their philosophies to 
critique this ontological model of presence as contact; but in fact radical presence 
necessarily excludes contact, and with it, the object itself.  If Heidegger’s innovation was 
to discover the secondarity of perception, the truth he was unable to face is that all 
contact shares this secondarity—perception, is in fact, the tertiary record of a secondary 
contact that cannot occur in the radical present.  This counter-intuitive truth becomes 
evident through the analysis of another post-phenomenologist, Henri Bergson.  The 
essence of Bergson’s work is a thought experiment that, arguably, constitutes the most 
significant advance in the theory of time since Augustine’s Confessions.  While Bergson 
never announces his theory as a critique of presence per se, it constitutes the most 
significant challenge posed to any model of presence in modern philosophy; it, likewise, 
renders the phenomenological moment impossible.  Bergson’s essential innovation was to
analyze time in the age of film; Bergson saw how filmmakers fudged a representation of 
time by splicing together vast numbers of still images.  This, he realized, is how the 
human mind understands time: it is a series of immobile cuts severed from the pure 
temporal continuity that birthed them, and then spliced back into a sequence of jerkily 
moving instants.  Time, in its essence, could not be parsed into such frozen instants, 
however; as the space between any two decimal points is infinite, so too are the 
intermediary postures between any two images.  Time constantly flows between any 
images we can apprehend; it thus becomes pure movement for Bergson, a concept he 
calls “duration.”
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The concept of presence is a deeply misguided way of understanding beings in 
motion, but the perceiving intellect is fraught with its error.  When we perceive 
something in time, we experience the full progression of every infinitely divisible event 
we have witnessed; but the intellect invariably fragments the fluid totality of any such 
duration:
all the intelligence retains is a series of positions:  first one point reached, 
then another, then still another.  But should something happen between 
these points, immediately the understanding intercalates new positions, 
and so on indefinitely.  It refuses to consider transition; if we insist, it so 
manages that mobility, pushed back into more and more narrow intervals 
as the number of considered positions increases—recedes, withdraws and 
finally disappears into the infinitely small. (14)
As it attempts to recover the duration between retained images, the intellect only 
succeeds in fragmenting their duration further.  It further immobilizes the motion between
two images by generating more of the same; but each image remains distinct and frozen 
in the memory, which records not the continuity of time but the recomposed sequence of 
events generated by the intellect.7  Yet, in the conundrum posed by pure motion, the 
intellect demonstrates its own incapacity to itself—it simultaneously acknowledges the 
necessity of conceptualizing the infinite points of movement while demonstrating its 
inability to do so.
7  As we will have occasion to explore further in Chaucer, this model of memory strikingly resembles 
classical and medieval mnemonic techniques like the “architectural mnemonic,” in which one would 
identify important points in some text to be memorized and key it to some image in the mind somehow 
representative of that point.  The recollector then filled in the gaps between those points, since they 
necessarily implied all the intervening images needed to travel between the mnemonics.  For more on these 
artes memorandi, see Carruthers 89-98.
16
In the course of ordinary life, we rarely go to the lengths Bergson describes, 
trying to recover the full duration of some span of time.  Rather, we contract these spans 
into events—durations that are encapsulated by the paradigmatic moment we found 
important in them.  This procedure resembles a comic book or storyboard more closely 
than a film; a comic book records a narrative and so describes a length of time, but it 
discloses its time by selecting paradigmatic instants chosen from the infinite possible 
moments that populate the lacunae between any two images within it.  If the artist 
attempts to represent these intermediary images more thoroughly, we eventually arrive at 
the flip book and then film; in this sense, comics offer a profound analysis at the 
procedures of historical production: they most self-consciously represent the selection 
involved in perception and the violence that this selection does to duration.  
Just as no narrative could be represented without this event-making, neither could 
we live our daily lives without constructing time in this way.  If Husserl revealed that our 
historical consciousness only glimpses partial faces of an object so that we might go on 
living in the world, Bergson reveals that this same partiality necessarily occurs in 
temporal consciousness as well: we only select those frozen granules of time that our 
intellect deems relevant for whatever reason.  Bergson argues that this procedure occurs 
through a mechanism of habit, perhaps the most important point in Bergson’s analysis of 
time.  Intellectual habit stems from our most basic motor habit, which “once contracted, 
is a mechanism, a series of movements which determine one another:  it is that part of us 
which is inserted into nature and which coincides with nature; it is nature itself…  [O]ur 
inner experience shows us in habit an activity which has passed, by imperceptible 
degrees, from consciousness to unconsciousness and from will to automatism” (275).  As 
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infants—or rather, even before infancy, at the earliest prenatal stages and beyond—we 
have the most full experience of duration that human life can offer; we cannot say that no 
habit has formed since life itself is a habit, agreed to by all the cells and particles of one’s 
body, contracted into relation with one another.  Eggs and sperm are subject to habit 
before they combine to form a zygote: DNA is habit and pattern writ large in the 
structures of the body.  Every name describes a habit and only a habit.  However, these 
early habits are the most rudimentary in lived experience; boiled down, the maturation of 
any object—living or not—is the process of more complex habits accreting into a unified 
body.  Objects are more than the sum of their parts precisely because some new shell of 
habitual relation occurs once all the parts coalesce and tacitly agree to unify into a new 
habitual mode of existence.  A chair is not just a collection of wood pieces, just as those 
wood pieces are not collections of fibers, nor fibers collections of molecules and so on 
down to the most elementary particles.  These things are more than the sum of their parts 
because their parts contract into a new habit that relates to other habitually formed objects
in different ways, molded by one another’s contours and purposes.  In the case of human 
intellect, the basic motor habits of closing one’s hand on an object to grasp it or moving 
one’s legs to walk on the ground elaborate into all the more diverse and complex habits 
that constitute human life.
Bergson’s analysis of intellectual habit implies an even more startling realization: 
our habit of transforming duration into the immobile cuts of history responds to the 
rhythmic structure of the natural world.  The images that inhabit nature, at all the varying 
scales of their being, are habits—movements contracted into repeating, and so 
intelligible, patterns. Our analysis of Husserl and Heidegger already demonstrated that 
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the contours of the objects we encounter in the world are shaped by other objects, and 
that we only ever experience partial faces of any phenomenon.  Our own being is 
determined by our partial experience of objects, just as the shape of sand is determined by
its partial experience of water: sand only manifests the erosive force of water, but water is
more than its erosiveness.  Deleuze and Guattari use the example of a bee and flower to 
describe this sort of insight: bees and flowers are symbiotic organisms, many of whose 
features develop in response to the other.  Bees are fuzzy so that they can gather more 
pollen; flowers are shaped and colored so as to attract bees (10). The contours of both 
objects are shaped by the other, yet each has an independent life that is not exhausted or 
entirely experienced by the other: the entirety of bee-being is not understood by the 
flower, only the part of it relevant to the flower’s propagation.  The shape of each is 
partially determined by the partial view it has of the objects that surround it; this is as true
of inanimate objects as of animate ones, and is true on down the scale of being to the 
most basic cellular and atomic levels: perceptibility is a consequence of the habitual 
motions one object motivates another to perform in their mutual, partial perception of one
another.  The movement of one object conditions the movement of another object such 
that it becomes a unity—each contracts into the unity of object-hood in response to its 
partial experience of the other as it similarly contracts into a unity; subsequently, they 
contract into the organism, a whole of parts that operates through a habitual contract 
between its component objects.  Such object-organisms become capable of interacting 
with other object-organisms and organizing more complex organisms on up the scale of 
being.8 The unity of any such object simply describes the consistent patterns of motion 
8  In articulating this logic of object-organisms, I run the risk of what Graham Harman has termed 
“undermining” the object (8); that is, he considers the attempt to describe objects as aggregations of some 
prior, elementary particles erroneous since it does not explain the unique integrity of the object as object.  
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they engage in as a result of this conditioning, though as any cursory study of evolution 
can demonstrate, the unity of any object will deteriorate and change if the conditions that 
produced it are removed.  Any structurally cohesive unit of matter shares this habitual 
composition. Ultimately, the trajectory of Bergson’s analysis reveals that ontology is 
nothing more than the study of habit, and that being describes a hierarchy of increasingly 
complex motive particles contracted into characteristic modes of movement.  Perceptible 
images are amalgams of habitual motions, and our intellect—keyed, as it is, to the 
rhythms of nature—retains memories of these motions and so becomes capable of 
determining our own habituated being.
Habit is essentially opposed to duration, since it contracts duration into a 
paradigmatic span of time; this is not simply a human malady (though human 
consciousness may represent the most egregious case of habit), but one that frames 
existence itself.  But Bergson believes that, though habit is the means by which we are 
separated from duration, it can also be the means by which we reconstitute duration.  
Habit is constantly at the work of exposing its own inadequacies: habit and the history it 
structures are allegories of their inability to represent the presence that births them.  They 
imply presence at every turn; they are constantly at the work of exposing the infinite 
lacunae that stretch between any two habitual cuts from duration.  Like Husserl, Bergson 
However, my suggestion here is that a complex, integrated object-organism is more than the sum of its 
parts precisely because it engages in new habitual interactions with other object-organisms on its particular 
scale of being.  In its turn, this solution runs the risk of “overmining” (10) as Harman calls it—attributing 
the identity of an object solely to its relations with other objects.  However, though Harman is right that all 
objects have a radical being that is never disclosed by any single act of perception, I will maintain that it is 
accurate to say that they are disclosed by the hypothetical aggregation of all acts of perception actual and 
virtual, proximal and distant, literal and metaphorical.  In order to form progressively more complex 
totalities, the object-organism must deny its own radical being and enter into the limited habitual 
engagements that shape it; however, could all of its transversal associations with other objects across time 
be collected, we would reduplicate the object, or at least, create a simulacrum of it that was perfectly 
coincidental with its original such that we could no longer speak of an original and a duplicate.
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sweats blood and tears in attempting to retain the possibility of perception within 
duration.  This question of how perception can make contact with the fluidity of duration 
haunts his work:
how would [duration] appear to a consciousness which desired only to see 
it without measuring it, which would then grasp it without stopping it, 
which in short, would take itself as object, and which, spectator and actor 
alike, at once spontaneous and reflective, would bring ever closer together
—to the point where they would coincide,—the attention which is fixed 
and time which passes? (12)
As we have seen in Husserl and Heidegger, however, consciousness is the asymptote that,
however closely it approximates presence, never makes contact with it; as in earlier 
theories, Bergson’s insistence on retaining the subjective point of perception ultimately 
undermines the truly revolutionary character of what his thought experiment reveals.  He 
again tries to frame a methodology for approaching the pure mobility of time, the slur of 
the present moment as it sinuously unfurls; this is understandable, since Bergson believed
that duration undermined the idea of a presence as it had been conceived before.  The 
essence of time, for Bergson, was motion; the immobile cuts of past presences that we 
carve from this pure mobility were only illusions that defied the flow of time.  Perception
might then persist into duration so long as its scientific aspect—its tendency to measure 
passing time and catalogue the objects that populate it—is foreclosed in favor of a new 
form of awareness that flows along with time.  In describing this new awareness, Bergson
offers a temporal version of Heidegger’s circumspection—the goal of philosophical 
practice is to integrate oneself into the background of the phenomenological field as it 
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passes rather than to arrest some fragment of it.  The sinuous pageant of time would still 
pass before us, but we would deliberately cease to give priority to any particle of that 
passage; or perhaps better, we would work to give priority to all of them and so none of 
them, to persist in a continuous state of wonder at the emergence of time rather than any 
single thing that inhabits and moves through it.
But Bergson’s theory of duration never actually does away with the concept of 
presence—in fact, it thrusts us toward a presence more radical than Bergson himself is 
willing to conceive.  What his thought experiment does demonstrate is that presence 
cannot be populated by frozen images; images are movements contracted into habits, 
which habits are the fundamental base of phenomenal being.  But the presence that 
Bergsonian duration increasingly approximates cannot admit movement or the contact 
that occurs as a result of it.9  Movement requires both an object that manifests the 
movement, however infinitesimal that object is, and multiple spatiotemporal coordinates 
through which it progresses.  But objects, we have already seen, are contracted habits of 
movement and so, by their very nature, can never enter in upon perfect presence; 
subsequently, any object that manifests movement cannot experience presence because it 
cannot occupy two points in space simultaneously (in which case we would not have 
movement anyway), but only successively.  Further, whatever divisible particles comprise
the object cannot contract into the habit anyway, on down to the point where matter itself 
is revealed as a vestigial motion. Just as presence is prior to history, by its own internal 
structure, so too must it be prior to space—space describes the possibility of 
9  We approach Bergsonian duration through something resembling Zeno’s paradox of the arrow, wherein 
Zeno argues that, if an arrow is not moving in a single, durationless moment of time, it can never begin 
moving; but where Zeno’s conundrum led to a static moment, the model of presence Bergson’s analysis 
thrusts us toward is one in which the physical object of the arrow could never inhere in the first place.
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differentiation between objects and the possibility of their movement relative to one 
another.  Space describes the differentiation between coordinates that makes movement 
possible. But presence is prior to the object or any of its contracted habits of being; 
nothing can move in a perfected presence, because nothing can be in it, at least in this 
traditional, habitual sense. Presence must also, therefore, be prior to differentiation, even 
though it is the ground from which differentiation proceeds, both spatially and 
temporally. Presence is prior to the unity of the object, precisely prior to the relation of 
the congealed movements that progressively form matter.  Presence is a no-place where 
material being cannot actually inhere.  Matter itself is a historical vestige inexplicably 
spewed forth from a presence that excludes it. The attempts of both the 
phenomenological reduction and duration to construct a methodology for contacting the 
present moment is exposed as misguided in this realization; the idea of methodology 
assumes a perceiving intellect, but perception relies on differentiation, and the movement 
that enables contact to take place.  Neither of these can take place in the radical present, 
nor could there be a third, differentiated vantage point from which perception could view 
such contact.
The methodologies we have explored thus far are best understood as preliminary 
meditations on presence; they are useful, but only insofar as they expose to the perceiving
subject the necessity of abdicating methodology altogether as she approaches her 
unreachable goal.  Methodology always begins by defining a scientific object, then 
describing how an ignorant subject can come to make observations about that object;10 
10  As Michel de Certeau writes in describing the science of mysticism, every science has a methodology 
and an object of knowledge; in the case of the mystics, their object is infinite, just as is perfect presence and
so could never be known from a finite, historical perspective.  The methodology of the mystic, then, 
became the frustration of her attempt to define an object, to paradoxically make the attempt not to define an
object the object of mystical practice.  To this end they practiced disciplines of self-dissolution in all their 
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but presence is occupied by neither subject nor object.  To say presence is ever 
“occupied” by anything, as I have, of necessity, done throughout this discussion and must
continue to do, is erroneous first because it applies a spatial metaphor to presence when 
presence transcends space and second because it assumes a differentiation that presence, 
being prior to movement, will not admit.  There is no language—nor is there any possible
language—that can describe presence; language, like methodology, always targets some 
object and presence transcends the differentiation that defines objects as unities.  All such
methodological approaches can only ever succeed in demonstrating the necessity of 
relinquishing the perceiving subject and all of the methodological inquiries her 
perception constantly poses.  
We might, at this point, being to think that this anti-quest to somehow approach 
presence is doomed as a philosophical enterprise before its outset; but in a very real 
sense, presence is the only possible object for philosophy.  If philosophy is an inquiry 
into first principles, presence is precisely the principle of transcendence; if it is an inquiry
into how and what we know, philosophy must begin by recognizing the fundamentally 
historical character of any object, its noncoincidence with itself.  And this movement 
toward presence yields some unexpected but important practical fruits: against centuries 
of determinism, lodged in a mechanical cosmos populated by Bergson’s frozen images, it 
announces a new will.  Only in the context of the true relativism of a transcendent 
presence can any object free itself of the chains of causality that bind events and objects 
to one another.  Against idealism, it announces an authentic other that is truly outside the 
mind—that we must, in fact, relinquish mind in order to approach.  This other is not some
various forms, including those that dissolved the pretense that a negative self-dissolution offered any access
to God.  It is thus not simply negative, but positive, generative (77-78). An adequate theory of presence 
faces precisely the same challenges and must inevitably swerve toward the same conclusions.
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entity in the phenomenal world—the historicity of objects that appear to be differentiated 
is, in fact, a startling point of contiguity and sameness between them.  Objects and 
subjects that space appears to differentiate and offer an authentic identity are revealed, in 
their most fundamental temporal structures, as being quite similar to one another; they are
all contracted habits—albeit indefinably idiosyncratic ones—that form the object as a 
pole of unity, bringing together diverse parts to form something that exceeds them.  
Presence is, on the other hand, wholly other to our historical being.  And against the 
imperialism of self-satisfying philosophies whose model of the cosmos invariably 
consume its otherness into a cognizable same, presence announces a genuinely 
uncognizable object, an object unable to be conceptualized as such (though we always 
risk cognizing it by naming it uncognizable).  It replaces the imperialism of all 
intellectual endeavor with a humble and respectful passivity; but that passivity, far from 
leaving us inert, invigorates us with a newly discovered will and a mode of perception 
liberated from the strictures of history.
This last point—that presence counters the imperialism inherent in most 
philosophy—reveals an ethical dimension to presence best expressed by Emmanuel 
Levinas. Levinas finds, in traditional models of ontology, a deadening effect similar to 
Bergson’s immobile cuts; Levinas frames this failure of ontology in terms of language, a 
framework that will be particularly useful in the discussion of the mystical works and 
frame narratives that follows.  The basic dichotomy Levinas draws in his analysis is 
between the “saying” and the “said” of any instance of language.11  Normally, we only 
use language to recuperate the said of what it attempts to represent to us.  I engage in this 
sort of usage right now, struggling to make the target concepts of this exposition as clear 
11  See Otherwise than Being, 3-9.
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as I might.  When we use language in this way, Levinas believes that—even with the best 
of intentions—we attempt to colonize the other.  By apprehending some external object 
with a single term, we believe we have absorbed it into what Levinas calls “the same” of 
our minds; as subjects, we apply schema to the external world that ultimately 
accommodate it to the unified vision of the world that is, for all intents and purposes, our 
self.  In Bergsonian terms, we absorb the world into the habits that allow us to function as
organisms.  But by cognizing what is outside of ourselves, we inherently reduce its 
otherness, transforming it into another satellite lodged in the orbits of our understanding.  
Moreover, when something is said, it loses some measure of its agency—even if its said 
seems to confer subjectivity on its object, the mind attributing that subjectivity to the 
object occupies a privileged subject position, exercising subjectivity rather than having it 
exercised upon her.  The object is subordinated to the one who defines its parameters, and
also becomes a cog thrumming away in the machinery of the world as she envisions it. 
Drawing on the insights of Heidegger especially, Levinas realizes that we never fully 
understand any of the objects that populate our psychic lives; but where Heidegger 
simply found ignorance in the faith we place in our intellects, Levinas sees something 
much more insidious: the violent absorption of the external world into the internal world 
is the site of a profound ethical breakdown.  For an ethical obligation to emerge, an object
first has to have a defined identity, but for Levinas, the very mechanism by which we 
ascribe this identity to others is itself violent.
Levinas finds an answer to this dilemma in the same situation that causes it: 
speech, or more specifically, dialogue. While dialogue can always threaten to become the 
ethical morass described above, the possibility of discourse itself indicates that we have 
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already acknowledged an ethical situation that constantly precedes us.  For language to 
occur—over and above what is actually said in any given speech-act—both the speaking 
subject and the target of her speech must have an already integrated identity.  When we 
speak to someone, we tacitly acknowledge their equality with ourselves; before any of the
mental habits calcified in grammar can distribute a stream of phonemes into mental 
images, we acknowledge the presence of the other before us, and we acknowledge her as 
an authentic “other” who exceeds the mental categories we might apply to her.  In 
essence, we acknowledge our coexistence with the other in the presence from which both 
of our beings derive.  
The colonizing effect of the said is an aftereffect of our anxiety at the other’s 
approach; in fact, Levinas goes so far as to say that it is this approach of the other which 
causes us to become integrated subjects capable of response:
The approach of the other is an initiative I undergo. I am passive with 
regard to it—and even passive in a more pure sense than the sense in 
which a material substrate receives, with an equal and opposite reaction, 
the action impressed on it, and in the sense that the sensibility is passive as
a receptivity that synoptically, or syndotically, receives the medley of 
sensation given to it. Here no form, no capacity preexisted in me to 
espouse the imperative and make it my own. (xxiii)
Perception itself is conditioned upon a relationship of responsibility: before the 
perceiving subject becomes an integrated unity, the otherness of objects populating the 
world confronts her. The identity of objects in the phenomenal world summons 
perspectives from which they can be seen into being; Levinas’s concept of the other 
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refutes a philosophical idealism that prioritizes the subject above the world she perceives.
Being thus faced with the other, the perceiver’s identity contracts, by degrees, into a more
cohesive unity itself.  Without the integrity of the other, we would not have any reason to 
birth ourselves from the entropy of unconsciousness—it is the other’s transcendent 
unification that generates a likewise unified perspective from which it can be seen, albeit 
partially.
The concept of the other in Levinas can be rather elliptical and at times even 
obtuse in its refusal to outline an ontology; this may make some sense, given his mistrust 
of the ontologizing said, but he does not thereby escape the necessity of ontology.  His 
ontology ultimately resides outside the boundary of human speech, but for all our failure 
to speak them, objects still have being, perhaps even more so than in other philosophical 
systems.  In this, he draws upon the phenomenological tradition I have briefly outlined 
above: for Husserl and Heidegger, as for Levinas, objects have an integrity that exceeds 
any partial definition we might give of them.  When we make them present to ourselves, 
we inevitably ignore some of the features of their total perceptibility, since to fully 
understand them we would have to become the entire field of relations that constitutes the
world.  The integrity of the object is what makes it other, and it is precisely this otherness 
that forces new objects to coalesce into their integrated identities, and so on down the 
great chain of being.  Levinas locates this unspeakable identity in the saying precisely 
because it evokes the movement toward presence and identity described in the reduction
—wherein Husserl believed we would become uniquely capable of defining an object—
while methodologically frustrating whatever it is we attempt to say.  In so frustrating the 
said, Levinas acknowledges both the inexhaustible tool being of Heidegger, while 
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simultaneously shunting us toward the sinuous presence described by Bergson wherein 
objects inhere; saying, after all, reduces language to a pure procession of phonemes, 
deliberately lacking the content they profess to have.12  In this sense, saying is a perfect 
expression of Bergsonian duration: the grammatical habits by which we compose images
—represented images, but also the prior word-images through which we represent—are 
surrendered to reveal the deep unfolding of sounds passing directly before us.  As for the 
others, Levinas’s ontology, and so his ethics, resides in a presence which it is the task of 
the philosopher to recuperate, albeit by the same mental sleight of hand wherein we 
perceive presence by somehow refusing to perceive at all.
Yet as I have outlined above, the identity that these philosophers want to discover 
in presence seems to dissolve as we approach the limit point of its perfection.  The 
movement that makes contact possible and the tertiary perception that apprehends it are 
impossible in the present; it is only as presence slurs into history that it becomes capable 
of movement and so tangible. Levinas is right to say that the subject coalesces in 
response to alterity, but it is problematic to locate that alterity in the others that populate 
the near-presence of the saying.  This is not because objects in the world don’t have 
identity, but rather because they are all intrinsically historical—their being is a temporal 
shadow of the no-place of perfect presence.  This common historicity introduces a 
fundamental contiguity to all phenomenal beings that renders them alteregos of one 
another; all material beings, conscious or unconscious, must negotiate their relationships 
to a presence from which they have always already slid away.  True alterity does not 
reside in the other material existents that populate the phenomenal world, but in the 
12  Though one of the paradoxes that besets Levinas’s model of saying is that the reduction of language to 
its material signifiers is deliberate; insofar as it is deliberate, it regains some of the content of which it 
sought to divest itself.
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presence that refuses their approach even as it hurtles them into historical being.  While 
Levinas is right to say that material objects have a certain integrity, and that we form 
ourselves into objects in response to that alterity, the relationship of lived, historical time 
to presence forges a community that binds all material beings together without, of course,
collapsing them; but presence is other to history itself—presence is a continuous novelty 
whereby the past becomes legible.  
If we revise Levinas’s ethics to place presence in the position of the other, history 
itself occupies the subject’s position, coalescing into its slurred, perceptible moments of 
time as a response to the absolute alterity of the present. For presence is, structurally, 
other to history—as I have noted, if the present moment were not always different from 
the past (however short the interval), history itself would collapse; though philosophy, 
throughout the modern era, has indulged in a sort of relativistic determinism—prior 
discourses determining what can be said in the present—the radical present cannot be 
coincident with the past.13  History—like the Levinasian subject—struggles to colonize 
the present in its effort to define its own being and it is this effort at colonization that 
transforms history into a coherent progression; from the simple non-being of the past, 
history becomes an organism itself, slowly mutating in its attempt to define a presence 
that remains intrinsically other to it, whose otherness rendered it legible. Philosophical 
determinism thus describes the future quite accurately, but not the present.  The future 
describes, exactly, our projections of what the organism of history will mutate into as it 
continues to negotiate the presence that births it.  The idea of a future beyond the present 
13  Roland Barthes’s scriptor—elaborated in “The Death of the Author”—is a paradigm instance of this 
determinism: for Barthes, present authors are only capable of recombining past figures and tropes to create 
“new” literature.  Barthes robs the author of a genuinely creative novelty by recognizing that all literature 
must emerge within generic constraints that make it comprehensible; the wholly new is an incoherent 
concept, more incoherent even than gibberish (which also has its own genres).  
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is thus inherently deterministic, because to describe that future we already assume a 
continuous past.  But presence is not the infinitesimal point where future becomes past, 
since historical beings cannot inhere in the present; rather, presence is the transcendence 
that causes history to coalesce.  Physical being is a ghostly afterimage of presence that 
emerges in response to its absolute, constant alterity from history and space; its 
organization becomes increasingly more complex and cohesive to reflect and grapple 
with this perfectly unified other.
Conceiving of presence as the other offers an important inflection to the concept I 
have offered thus far: it asserts presence as a positive identity.  I have had recourse to 
terms like nothing, other, transcendence and “no-place” to describe presence thus far in 
this discussion; these terms, while they serve the important function of opposing presence
to vestigial, historical matter, inflect an erroneous sense of vacuity into the concept.  They
are a via negativa to something that cannot be described; but we cannot simplistically say
that presence cannot be described without reducing its meaning, and thereby colonizing it
in our attempt not to. Despite the non-coincidence of the lived, material world with 
presence, presence is still—as Augustine realized—the only “is;” we are never outside of 
the present moment, though neither are we ever inside it.  If presence were simply 
nothing, it would be paradoxically static: nothing would persist, unchanged, through 
time.  But the nature of presence is to be not coincident with the past, again, however 
brief the interval between past and present might be. A hidden spatial metaphor persists 
beneath the idea of absence that makes it constitutionally ill-suited to describe presence: 
when we initially imagine a no-place as the one I have attempted to deploy, we too often 
marshal our spatial consciousness to create an image of some black, dead space with 
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nothing in particular inhabiting it.  But its emptiness still categorizes it as space.  If we 
were to describe presence in such a way, we would still be imagining a duration, 
encapsulating the event of its eventlessness with such an imagined non-image.  Presence 
would, thus, be consistent with the past; it would not change and so, structurally, would 
not be presence.  Rather, we must somehow conceive (or resist conceiving altogether) of 
presence as dimensionless and durationless, but nevertheless infinitely new, never 
coincident with some moment in its past, never dead or dying.  This novelty is not 
defined or understood by the changing of material bodies—the changes to which matter 
is susceptible are a byproduct of the transcendent novelty of presence.  Novelty, in the 
sense presence demands, cannot be understood as change at all, since change requires 
that two moments of time be cut from a duration and compared; material change is 
possible, however only because the inexhaustible novelty of presence makes no material 
body entirely coincident with any point in its own past.  A material body’s habitual modes
of being might resist this insistent novelty, but the very struggle for continuity signals that
a radical reinvention of the world is always occurring. 
The philosopher who best understood this feature of presence was Derrida.  
Though he too, with an audacity to rival Nietzsche’s, announced his theory as a critique 
of the “metaphysics of presence,” he actually comes closest of all modern philosophers to
describing the novelty that inheres in presence.  Operating in the shadows of Bergson and
Levinas in particular, Derrida lamented the tendency of Western philosophy to locate 
identity within presence, and what he perceived as the exclusion of history from the 
present.  As Arthur Bradley summarizes, for Derrida “whatever we perceive or 
experience as fully ‘present’—the sound of my own voice, the wooden desk that I can 
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touch in front of me, the thoughts that are running through my head while I read or write, 
even the ‘here and now’ of space and time in which I exist—is actually shot through with 
an infinite, and almost imperceptible, number of differences, delays or spaces” (7). As we
explored in our discussion of Bergson, the slow slur of time does not really permit 
identity to coalesce in the way our minds want it to.  The mind tries to arrest the present 
moment as it passes and, within the frozen cut of time it extracts from duration, it assigns 
being and identity to discrete objects within that cut.  Derrida’s innovation is to introduce 
the concept of difference and otherness to duration; whatever moment we intellectually 
arrest only seems present by virtue of how it differs from every moment that we have 
arrested before it.
In its most essential form, Derrida’s critique of the metaphysics of presence 
applies Saussure’s synchronic model of the sign to a diachronic history.  For Saussure, 
any linguistic sign only means what it means by negating every other sign in the 
language.14  Any speech act evokes the entire system of language in the mind of a listener,
but its specific phonemic patterns distinguish the individual word from all other possible 
words: dog is not hog because its slight phonemic variation carves a different relief from 
the raw material of the whole linguistic system.  For Derrida, presence operates on a 
remarkably similar paradigm: we understand the present as present because it differs 
from the past.  Presence pushes the past into non-being, thereby legitimating its claims to 
14  See the Course in General Linguistics, 65-70.  Saussure’s brief mention of the inherent linear 
temporality of the sign is also relevant to my larger discussion: he argues that time is the essential 
dimension of language, because its elements unfold in a duration.  Other forms of sign present themselves 
instantaneously without this temporal unfolding according to Saussure; while I would argue that even 
visual images still unfold themselves in a temporal manner, Saussure is right that language draws our 
attention to its signification through time more so than other types of signs.
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a preeminent existence.15  But Derrida argues that, in our anxious effort to suppress the 
past, we actually expose the historicity of the present we have constructed.  Thus, “no 
historical moment, body of thought, epoch or tradition, is ever wholly at one with itself 
because it inevitably contains the traces of what precedes and follows it” (Bradley 37). 
For Derrida, any form of identity relies on everything outside itself to define what it is; 
presence is, he supposes, our most egregious offense, since our treatment of presence as 
the emergent locus of meaning ignores the ways in which it is always shot through with 
the past.
Derrida’s model of temporal difference accurately describes presence, but the 
conclusions he draws from it erroneously emphasize history’s impact on presence.  For 
Derrida, the present moment is a sort of illusion produced by every moment in the past; 
but though Derrida incisively describes the anxiety of influence that, in part, constructs 
our historical identities, he does not thereby authentically critique presence.  If presence 
were simply an idealist construct as he suggests—if it did not exist anywhere but within 
our minds as a play of difference—Derrida might be right to demonstrate its historical 
nature. But presence is not simply a projection of the mind, and in fact, it would be more 
accurate to say that the mind is a projection or aftereffect of presence.  Derridean 
difference, rather, gropes toward an understanding of a perfectly novel presence, one 
which is authentically transcendent and never coincident with itself.  Derrida argues that 
this difference reveals that presence is shot through with history, but the transcendent 
15  Derrida’s arguments, in this respect, are precursors to Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of the “field of cultural 
production,” wherein artists, vying for cultural capital, must position themselves in relation to the past.  
They co-opt elements from certain outdated modes while rejecting one’s immediate precursors; in doing so,
the artist seems novel.  Such snobs and quarrels between artistic eras are merely symptoms of a larger 
problem with the human tendency to seek the new in the present, for Derrida. On Bourdieu’s concept, see 
The Field of Cultural Production, 42.
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difference of the present—the difference that is not simply a projection wrought by 
puerile and self-involved minds—is what allows us to perceive history as continuous.  
The absolute otherness of the present is what causes time to unfold as a pure, 
uninterrupted duration; no atom of time, however minute, can persist or be coincident 
with itself, and so historical beings slur and mutate in the coherent progression that 
undergirds Derrida’s analysis of presence.  Derrida is right to criticize presence as it is 
constituted by historical beings, the presence where objects and ontology seem to inhere; 
but presence is a more radical concept than he is willing to admit.  It is not the locus of 
ontology, but the point where being dissolves, unable as it is to mobilize itself and so 
manifest its identity on some other being.  Presence ultimately precedes movement and 
influence, and so it precedes history which, in its most complete form, is the fossil record 
of every object’s influence on one another.  The otherness that Derrida discovers in 
presence does not make it an illusory play of historical difference, but rather 
demonstrates its transcendence of the linear progression of history.
It is this notion of the present’s transcendence of lived, historical being that most 
directly opens upon the mystical understanding of time I will briefly recount below; 
however before proceeding on, a more succinct summary of the features of presence that 
I have offered through this rapid exploration of contemporary philosophy is in order.  The
first tenet of presence is that it is the only time that ever “is.” History has always already 
passed into non-being, by its very definition.  Where we normally experience time as a 
progression, in reality there is only ever presence, from which history seems to slur away.
The second, more difficult tenet of presence, is that the concept of being itself is really 
inapplicable to presence.  When we theorize being, we are usually attempting to 
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substantiate the objects that populate the phenomenal world; however all such objects are
the products of motion manifesting motion, and motion requires a temporal duration in 
order to be comprehensible.  The most basic forms of matter—atoms, Higgs Boson 
particles and so on—are always vestigial, always comprised of the movements of some 
more elementary particle against another.  These motions contract into habits of relation 
that give way to increasingly more complex forms of habituated organization; these 
vestigial habits of motion are what define the identity of an object, or more aptly, an 
organism—it is more than the sum of its atoms insofar as it adds some new layer of 
habituated action relative to other habituated organisms on its own scale of existence. As 
products of movement, they are always historical or outside of presence. The third tenet 
is that historical beings coalesce in response to the alterity that is, structurally, a feature of
presence.  Presence is presence by never being coincident with the past; it is always 
novel, though we cannot conceive its novelty as a function of the change experienced by 
a material body.  Change and potentiality are how we experience the present’s alterity—
our bodies cohere in response to its constant onset, re-knitting the fibers of our identities 
to counter and mirror the simple, transcendent unity of presence—but since change 
requires movement and duration, it is not presence. A corollary to this tenet is that, 
despite the seemingly negative logic of presence’s alterity, it does not undermine being 
but serves as the ground from which being can begin to cohere.  Presence does not 
become absence simply because no object fully inheres within it; rather, its alterity is, by 
nature, infinitely productive.  This relationship to history is what I have been calling 
transcendence. 
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The fourth tenet is that the continuity we experience in history is a product of the 
creative alterity of the present.  Movement slurs into a vestigial being because the present
does not extend for any duration, it does not remain.  But the present’s alterity is not 
somehow erratic; rather its transcendence is simpler than the complex forms of historical 
relation that it spawns. It is this simplicity that is mirrored in matter’s tendency to 
organize itself into habituated patterns of organism, and organism is what makes history 
coherent as a progression.  While it seems that the present, as continuous novelty, should 
produce some new chaos in every after image of itself, the idea of chaos is itself 
incoherent: when we imagine chaos, we imagine an absolutely random series of 
movements.  But movement, if it is to be movement, assumes order—it assumes the 
coherence of an object moving through space and time.  Thus chaos, at its limit point, 
would be nothing, since no material could organize its movements into being, and we 
have already established that presence must be productive rather than negative.  History 
must, therefore, become a continuity capable of producing the vestigial objects that 
coalesce in response to the simple novelty of presence. Fifth, and finally, the 
methodology for approaching presence must, by its nature, be tangential; we cannot 
directly perceive presence or authentically theorize about it, since perception is an 
afterimage of a motion that could not take place in the perfect present.  Our minds are 
constitutionally unequipped to perceive the presence to which they respond: if there is 
one idea that all of these philosophers agree upon, it is that the normal intellectual habits 
through which we perceive the world around us obscure what time and being really are.  
Ultimately, approaching presence entails an impossible dissolution of the self who 
approaches; but that perceiving subject never fully disintegrates—she always reorganizes 
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into a deeper, more subterranean self that remains an afterimage of the presence she 
attempts to witness.  Our understanding of presence can, thus, only ever be tangential—
witnessed, not directly, but through the phenomenal world that is inherently exiled from 
presence—and incomplete.  A corollary to this point is that, on the human scale of being, 
the methodology for approaching presence must always entail some reconceptualization 
of the language we use to understand it.  Language is the means by which we arrest static 
images from the pure flow of time,16 and is itself an instance of this image making—in 
speaking, we parse an indivisible progression of sounds into the discrete events of 
individual words, phrases, sentences and so on.  To approach the pure flow of time 
proceeding from the inaccessible present, we must cease to arrest images and define their 
identities by the play of differences that makes them meaningful.  This does not entail 
that we should cease to speak, or that our speech should cease to mean (in which case it 
would no longer be speech), but rather that we must understand language simultaneously 
as what it attempts to mean and as the transcendent fact of its saying.  It is this particular 
methodological insight that medieval frame narratives develop most fully, as I will detail 
below.
Presence and Transcendence in the Middle Ages
Many of the concepts of presence described above have their unacknowledged 
genesis in medieval theology.  The touchstone of medieval temporal theory that all 
16  Language arrests time in two senses: in the most basic sense, it tries to re-present some past cut from a 
temporal sequence; but also, in its own internal structure, language requires a historical reconstitution to 
form its progressive units of meanings.  We understand language only from the position of its termination; 
even if we comprehend something as it is being said, we only do so by completing it in our minds before it 
is completed—the futurity of such linguistic anticipation is still a historical process.  In my chapter on the 
Canterbury frame, I will discuss this in more detail as the foundation of language’s mimesis: signifiers may 
be arbitrary, but the historical unification of a unit of meaning acts in precisely the same way as the habitual
organization of material organisms.
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subsequent theologians would have to grapple with is contained in Book XI of St. 
Augustine’s Confessions.  Augustine comes to meditate on presence by musing on the 
question of what God did before he made the world (9.2.9).  He concludes that this 
question, asked by many of his contemporaries, is actually incoherent in itself: if God 
was simply reposing before the creation, this would imply that He changed his mind, 
deciding to get to work at making a universe.  But God would then not be eternal—He 
would be time-bound and changeable, just like everything He created.  If God made time,
caused the original cause that set all the others in motion, then there is no historical 
moment in which He was not making the world (9.2.14).  The causal structure of creation
—wherein objects generate effects in other objects that generate still further effects—
necessitates this point outside the circle of history that first caused the entire chain of 
causality.  God cannot be some spatiotemporal creature, occupying the same space He is 
supposed to create, because this would imply that a space and a time existed before Him, 
in which case He would not be God.
Augustine thus proves that God is eternal, but eternity is not a matter of existing 
through an infinite span of time.  Augustine’s God is not the Deus absconditus of 
Enlightenment philosophy—He does not simply instigate a rational cosmos that then 
follows preordained rules; the eternity of God is not prior to history but a transcendence 
that runs through history at every microscopic instant of its passage.  God, at least in 
temporal terms, is the present that grounds all being, the only time in which objects 
actually have being. Augustine’s essential insight into time, that no theory before or after 
has been able to circumvent, is that the past and future—by their very nature—have no 
being in themselves.  We must alter the verb tenses we use to describe them in order to 
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indicate their absence: things in the past were and things in the future will be, but neither 
simply are.  They acquire some measure of being by being made proximal to the present: 
in the case of past events, they must be re-presented from memory or historical texts 
while future events must be predicted or prophesied.  In both cases we bring what is 
nonexistent into a more immediate memory so that it can be made to influence our 
current actions.  Past and future never have any being in themselves; they are structurally 
nonexistent, though we instinctively perceive of time as a progression from one to the 
other.  But in reality, we only ever subsist within the present; we are never outside the 
present moment even though it seems impossibly brief to us.  Presence is eternal only in 
this sense—it is all that is, not preexisting or outlasting history but hovering above it as 
the ground of its being.
But though presence persists through history, it does not therefore become part of 
history’s movements; the present is not merely the point that ushers the future into the 
past but rather it is a moment without extension, not really conceivable as a moment at all
in the traditional way we use the term.  Augustine comes to this conclusion through a 
thought experiment resembling Bergson’s: he begins by asking what measure of time can 
be considered present.  He concludes that a century cannot be present because within it 
years pass, but neither can years be present since months, days, hours, minutes, seconds, 
etc. pass within each interval of time.  This procedure of measuring and dividing time, as 
we saw in Bergson, cannot adequately describe what time is; time is infinitely divisible, 
and so the present must, at the unreachable apex of this infinite divisibility, be without 
interval.  Though in time one instant, however it is measured, succeeds another, “in 
eternity there is no such succession of things, the entirety is present, and that cannot be a 
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time.  In time, the past is shoved away by the arriving future, and the future trails behind 
the past, and both past and future are constituted by the present they flow through.  Who 
will catch and calm the heart, to see in stillness how it is the stillness of eternity that 
controls the past and future, without itself being either past or future?” (265)  In the 
perfect presence that this thought experiment uncovers, the succession that allows time-
bound objects to move cannot occur; fully integrated within itself, the novelty of the 
present has not spawned some prior moment within which the successive states of 
movement could occur.  Though time is purely mobile, the presence that generates time 
is, not static, but extensionless.  It does not describe an apprehended interval, but the 
infinite point prior to the movement that any interval summarizes.  
While the nature of this limit point is to be other to lived historical existence—
which otherness generates time—its lack of extension yet makes it transcendently unified
and simple.  Like the Neoplatonists, Augustine perceives temporal existence as inherently
fragmentary: as we saw above, he conceptualizes presence as a stillness that quells the 
“unquietness of time.” Both objects within time and the successive moments of history 
manifest a diversity that separates them from the presence they grope toward. Historical 
objects and subjects seem to acquire being only insofar as they persist; their unity as 
objects reflects the transcendent unity of presence, but that unity is spread throughout 
time and so ultimately subject to dissolution. This tendency toward dissolution is due 
precisely to the fact that their identities are historical—their organization depends on 
what is nonexistent. Objects are objects insofar as they have a sort of memory of 
remaining in a certain shape with certain physical properties that relate them to other 
objects on their scale of temporal organization.  But if the past is, by its nature, what does
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not exist, then the entire being of phenomenal objects is a re-presentation, an attempt to 
reassemble some prior experience of presence again.  Historical being resists the most 
salient fact of presence: that it does not persist, but always is and is different from the 
past that historical beings occupy.  Their near-present being is thus spread out 
inextricably across a host of past moments they experienced only partially. Yet their 
fragmentary existence does not, by this resistance of present difference, become absurd or
vain necessarily, though it is always in some measure tragic; rather, they progressively 
record the poignancy of the presence that is other to themselves.  As vestiges of some 
prior moment, they can never fully contact that present—their perception, in the broadest 
sense, always records some successive state of being that “occurs” because it is outside of
presence and has interval.  But the present’s lack of extension is the basis of their being; 
its eternal novelty is what generates the near-presence which they inhabit.  The truth of its
encounter with presence is what any object struggles to preserve, even as presence 
supplants the object’s identity by degrees. 
Augustine argues that all human beings—and we could extend this logic to all 
objects generally—struggle to return to the presence that constantly creates and recreates 
them.  He uses an exile metaphor to express this idea: “He is our origin, since we would 
have no place to return after wandering unless he were continuously there” (11.2.10).  
The eternal presence of God is the locus of being that does not admit the motion of time; 
the metaphor of wandering is both important and apt, evoking the exile of Exodus to 
describe the successive states of history.  We will see this metaphor of walking 
throughout the frame narratives discussed in this dissertation used to describe a similar 
exile from presence.  In this analogy, all action in the world is conceptualized as a sort of 
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pilgrimage back to the presence from which temporality is continually generated; but the 
actions that attempt to recuperate presence are, by virtue of being actions—by virtue of 
occurring in some interval and being performed by objects or subjects that have historical
identities—exiled from the presence they seek.  Insofar as they have a discernible 
spatiotemporal identity, objects cannot make contact with the presence that is all that is. 
They are doomed instead to the exile of history, attempting to get closer to their point of 
origin but remaining infinitely distant from it.
Augustine does envision various forms of contact with presence, but their ecstatic 
quality is tempered by a recognition that we always inhabit lived, historical time.  Human
beings cannot somehow escape time to fully encounter the present, since to do so would 
entail the dissolution of the subject so escaping; in a problem we will encounter again 
shortly, a person cannot, by an act of will, destroy her will since the attempt to do so 
would establish a new will destroying the prior will.  Will would reinscribe itself in the 
attempt to willfully destroy itself, and it would thus remain time-bound, in the world of 
actions and their intervals. The escape back to presence must, therefore, always be partial,
furtive, and accompanied by the history that seems incompatible with presence.  
Augustine’s preferred example of this seemingly paradoxical transcendent 
experience is language.  In describing presence, he contrasts human language to the Word
of God; whereas our language occurs through a succession of syllables, words, phrases 
and so on that emerge and pass away to be reconstituted in memory, God’s Word is 
durable, unchanging and without temporal extension.  God’s Word must be outside time 
and space, since it created both: “If, in order to make heaven and earth, you had said ‘Let 
there be heaven and earth’ in sounding and passing words, there would have been a 
43
physical medium before the creation of heaven and earth, a medium in which the words 
could make changes in time in order to run through their temporal sequence” (11.2.8).  
God’s Word must precede the spatiotemporal medium that it creates; its “speaking,” then 
is something different from our normal modes of linguistic expression, a transcendent 
form of language that does not re-present a prior object, but which is itself originary 
presentation, the first movement of temporal differentiation from the present.  Though 
human language only exists in sequential time, its capacity to make meaning offers a 
basic analogy by which we can begin to understand “the timeless word heard in silence.” 
Whereas God’s Word generates the silent medium through which human words persist—
and in some measure disrupt—the biblical metaphor offers two modes of access to God.  
The first is negative: by comparing God’s creative activity with human language, the 
biblical analogy forces us to consider the ways in which it is inadequate, thereby 
prompting a reflection on how God made the world.  However, the analogy also suggests 
an imperfect correspondence between the human mind from which language proceeds in 
time, and the divine mind from which time itself proceeds.  Pure mind—insofar as it is 
distinct from the material world in which it subsists—is a reflection of God’s presence 
that is capable of hearing the Word that produces history “in silence;” when its own 
activity ceases, the mind becomes passively capable of recording the microscopic 
succession of instants in which time is created from presence.  The mind is thus both 
deeply unlike and deeply like God’s Word; so Augustine concludes “I shudder off from it 
and burn toward it, shuddering off because I am so deeply unlike it, burning toward 
because I am so deeply like it” (11.2.11).  
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Augustine emphasizes the necessary mediocrity in any human attempt to contact 
God’s presence; he recognizes that contact with presence would dissolve the self, since 
differentiation cannot inhere in the present.  The mind that marshals its energies to make 
contact with the present, however, remains distinct for Augustine.  In fact, the 
distinctiveness of its identity exists in exact proportion to its efforts to know God.  
Augustine’s realism on this score distinguishes him somewhat from the mystical tradition
he will inspire.  While of course different mystics will conceptualize this contact with 
God in various ways, they are generally united by an optimism in the individual soul’s 
capacity to dissolve itself into God’s preeminent being.  By retreating from the lived 
world of historical time, the mystics escape the fragmentation and partial vision of their 
subjective selves to break upon presence.  The mystics know God by ceasing to “know” 
anything; they collapse the distinction between perceiver and perceived and so end even 
the most basic receptivity that divorces us from the pure present.
This optimism in Christian mystical texts stems from a common source: the works
of Pseudo-Dionysius, the wellspring of mystical theology in the Middle Ages.  While 
Pseudo-Dionysius tends to explicate his mystical theology in terms of the metaphysics of 
light, the methodology he describes has striking temporal implications as well.  In The 
Mystical Theology, Pseudo-Dionysius describes how “by an undivided and absolute 
abandonment of yourself and everything, shedding all and freed from all, you will be 
uplifted to the ray of the divine shadow which is above everything that is” (1.1000A).  
Pseudo-Dionysius is particularly emphatic that everything perceptible and 
comprehensible must be left behind at the furthest reaches of spiritual practice; since God
is the undivided point prior to spatial and temporal differentiation, the mystic’s 
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abandonment of the world must likewise be absolute and undivided.  Pseudo-Dionysius 
frequently uses the metaphor of darkness to describe this state: whereas earlier 
philosophical and religious traditions envisioned God as the light of reason that makes 
the world intelligible,17 Pseudo-Dionysius recognizes that God must precede even the 
rational categories He generates for the world, since they entail differentiation and 
temporality.
The problems Pseudo-Dionysius confronts in trying to describe this pre-rational 
God run parallel to the difficulty of adequately describing perfect presence; negation of 
the material most closely approximates His otherness to the lived world, but it ultimately 
transgresses its own principle by rendering God intelligible.  As we saw above, negative 
definitions of presence still leave an empty space and time in their conceptualization and 
so miss the mark they aim at.  Though Pseudo-Dionysius is often associated with 
negative theology, he actually says that negation is, in fact, only preliminary to a deeper 
mystical methodology: 
since it is the Cause of all beings, we should posit and ascribe to it all the 
affirmations we make in regard to beings, and, more appropriately, we 
should negate all these affirmations, since it surpasses all being.  Now we 
should not conclude that the negations are simply the opposites of the 
affirmations, but rather that the cause of all is considerably prior to this, 
beyond privations, beyond every denial, beyond every assertion. 
(1.1000B).
17  Plotinus is a key source for this metaphorical association between light and reason: he frequently has 
recourse to light as a metaphor for the ordering activity of the unitary soul on matter.  The divine light of 
reason shines on formless, receptive matter and so confers an intelligible shape to it; the hylemorphic body 
then refracts that light, always in a lesser degree, on other material forms.  See, for instance, Enneads, 4.17.
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As he does in his other works, Pseudo-Dionysius suggests that the attributes and 
likenesses positively attributed to God in Scripture are preliminary waypoints in any 
spiritual odyssey; such metaphors are useful, but must ultimately be negated as we begin 
to, in whatever measure possible, comprehend how fully God’s being transcends lived 
existence.  Presence, too, must transcend historical time and so seems governed by an 
emptying negation.  However his final move is to collapse the binary between affirmation
and negation—negation of the material is only another method of approximating God’s 
being and rendering it understandable to the human intellect.  God’s priority to both 
affirmation and negation becomes a deeper form of positive theology, renewed by its 
journey through negation: the affirmation of God’s priority to this binary becomes a 
negation of negation that leaves God not empty, but superabundantly full.  Metaphors of 
emptiness are equally transgressive—equally positive—unless they result in this final 
movement; likewise, the otherness of perfect presence to time cannot be comprehended 
through a negation that leaves it sterile.  Since it can never be coincident with itself, it is 
transcendently full; it has no interval—which durability is normally how we understand 
being—but it is not, for that fact, any less actual or new.  The hidden positivity of 
negation must be corrected by the hidden negativity of affirmation.
Pseudo-Dionysius’s most powerful description of this mystical experience comes 
when he describes Moses’s transcendence of Hebrew spiritual practice.  In his account, 
Moses engages in rituals of purification with the community; however, when they are 
complete, he hears trumpets and sees lights that the others do not, and so stands apart 
from them.  By means of these visions, God’s “unimaginable presence is shown, walking 
the heights of these holy places to which the mind at least can rise.  But then he [Moses] 
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breaks free of them, away from what sees and is seen, and he plunges into the truly 
mysterious darkness of unknowing.... Here, being neither oneself nor someone else, one 
is supremely united to the completely unknown by an inactivity of all knowledge, and 
knows beyond the mind by knowing nothing” (1.1001A).  Pseudo-Dionysius comes close
here to describing an unintelligible state of God prior to presence, but he stops short: the 
“unimaginable presence” is shown to Moses, and so still implies a subject point from 
which that presence is being perceived.  The final movement of the vision is to collapse 
this perception—wherein Moses can still walk as an integrated personality—and thus 
dissolve the self in the presence that precedes perception.  The means to accomplish this 
transcendence feel remarkably Levinasian: “the holiest and highest of the things 
perceived with the eye of the body or the mind are but the rationale which presupposes all
that lies below the Transcendent One” (1.1001A).  Just as the saying of language 
presupposes an other that underwrites ethics, so do mental and physical perception 
presuppose a presence that transcends the content of any given perception.  As the mystic 
moves up this ladder of presuppositions, she ultimately surpasses the most basic forms of 
historical ontology, beyond the divisions of space and time.  She lodges in an unknowing 
that, as Pseudo-Dionysius has shown us, is neither affirmative nor negative, but simply 
other to history.
To effect an authentic negation of negation, Pseudo-Dionysius will undercut the 
substantive negating metaphors he uses throughout his own work.  In his final lines he 
concludes “Darkness and light, error and truth—it is none of these.  It is beyond assertion
and denial.  We make assertions and denials of what is next to it, but never of it, for it is 
both beyond every assertion, being the perfect and unique cause of all things, and, by 
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virtue of its preeminently simple and absolute nature, free of every limitation, beyond 
every limitation; it is also beyond every denial” (5.1048B).  Not only does Pseudo-
Dionysius undermine the fundamental metaphor of darkness he has used to negate the 
positivity of prior philosophy and theology, but he creates statements that self-implode in 
the act of their speaking.  When he says “it is beyond assertion and denial,” he commits 
both of the transgressions he cautions against: the statement itself is an assertion, and its 
“beyond” gives it the form of a denial.  Likewise, in the following sentence he attempts to
describe the necessary proximity of any assertion or denial to God’s actual being; yet the 
form of this statement, again, purports to describe the “it” that the statement itself argues 
can only be described tangentially.  Freedom from limitation is itself a limitation, 
describing something God cannot be.18  Such assertions ultimately reflect the spiritual 
practice Pseudo-Dionysius advocates: they take the predicating form of human 
understanding and turn it upon itself, rendering its own activity nonsensical through its 
exercise.  The intellect—whose spatial and temporal divisions separate us from perfect 
presence—recognizes its inadequacies when faced with a non-object such as God’s 
presence; it thus relinquishes its self-cohesive force, leaving the mystic psychologically 
empty and outside history.
While Pseudo-Dionysius most often describes his mystical methodology and its 
object in spatial and epistemological terms, one of his most faithful expositors translates 
it into a specifically temporal register: the anonymous author of The Cloud of 
Unknowing.  The Cloud-author—whose work is roughly contemporary with Chaucer’s 
18  This insight corresponds to incarnational theology, which is, in essence, a disguised and specific form of 
the negatio negationis: if the statement “God cannot be limited” is self-contradictory, being a limitation 
placed on the divine, then the physical localization of God within a single body—rather than limiting the 
definition of God—actually manifests his transcendence of a limitation, the limitation of God’s ability to 
self-limit Himself.
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own—not only translates Dionysian spirituality into the English vernacular, but he offers 
more pragmatic approaches for the aspiring mystic.  The approach most pertinent here is 
his use of monosyllabic prayer.  As Eleanor Johnson describes, the Cloud-author 
recommends a unique type of prayer, wherein the aspirant—or perhaps in this case a 
“suspirant”—repeats a single, monosyllabic word like “God” or “love” repeatedly.  
Johnson argues that such prayers are designed to bring the person praying nearer to 
“atomic time”: the most minute, indivisible units of temporality that can be defined.  
Language normally situates the speaker more fully in the space and time she occupies; as 
we have seen, language activates all of the intellectual habits by which we mistakenly 
perceive time as a broken succession of frozen images.  Even prayer tends to be 
transgressive in this sense: in praying to the God who is fully outside of time, we often 
concern ourselves with events in our own time bound lives, using language that, as 
Augustine noted, makes its meaning in a fragmented succession of instants.  Both the 
form and the content of language implants us into passing historical time.  But as Johnson
notes, “prayer, for the Cloud-author, is neither narrative nor syntactic; rather, it is 
recursive and asyntactic” (346).19 As in Bergson’s procedure for reconstituting duration, 
this monosyllabic prayer deconstructs the entire syntactic machinery of language; instead 
of using words to reference ideas that are then coordinated in relation to one another, 
monosyllabic prayer makes the speaker aware of the surface sounds of the words being 
used to pray.  It thus pushes a speaker into a greater consciousness of the present 
19  As I have suggested above, this “asyntactic” quality is actually somewhat problematic in constructing a 
methodology for approaching presence, since it divests time of its rational, progressive sequence.  Insofar 
as this kind of practice tries to lodge us in a presence that precedes and excludes history, it transgresses the 
principle of novel generativity that is endemic to the idea of presence.  It moves toward the emptiness of 
true chaos in which moment doesn’t even follow moment. 
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circumstances in which she prays, where she would normally focus on the content of the 
prayer.
Johnson argues that the Cloud-author’s atoms of time actually have some 
indivisible duration that solves the quandary Augustine identified; as evidence of this, she
cites a passage where the Cloud-author defines the interval of atoms in terms of human 
will: the atom “is neiþer lenger ne schorter, bot euen acording to one only steryng þat is 
wiþ-inne þe principal worching miȝt of þe soule, þe whiche is þi wille” (18.3-5).  
Monosyllabic prayer, for Johnson, thus represents the smallest unit of language that still 
contains meaning; these units thus encapsulate the movement of the will that corresponds
to a single atom of presence, thereby pushing speakers to the indivisible duration of the 
present.  However, this passage does not really suggest that presence has an indivisible 
interval—the Cloud-author has learned his lessons from Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius
too well to simply believe that some unit of time is indivisible.  Rather, he does not 
describe the accomplishment of some act of will, but only its genesis; this birth of an 
intention in the soul is the closest that the human mind can come to understanding God’s 
perfect present.  Will always struggles to effect some change in the historical world.  It 
mobilizes the body to alter something from its past state; though it operates in the 
historical world, it thus contains a species of the difference inherent in the present.  The 
birth of a desire in the soul thus resembles that most infinitesimal slur of God’s present 
into a nonexistent history, when presence becomes non-coincident with itself and so 
generates time.  The presence from which time proceeds does not thereby acquire interval
even though it generates time; in its indivisible form it must remain prior to all temporal 
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extension.  The birth of a desire in the soul, prior to that desire’s mobilization of the body 
to effect itself, most closely resembles that present in which God inheres.
Monosyllabic prayer pushes us closer to that experience of time that would render
all language—as a movement in time—unintelligible.  For repeated words do not retain 
their potency, but rather lose it; any child revelling in words understands that a single 
word repeated indefinitely begins to lose its coherence as a word; the phonemes 
themselves begin to show the seams that stitch a word together.  The word itself becomes,
not an indivisible unit of meaning, but an arbitrary assemblage of sounds that cannot 
cohere into meaning.  Its incoherence does not, however, reduce the act of will 
motivating the speaker to speak; instead, it situates her awareness not in the 
accomplishment of the will to speak, but in its inception, in the first germ of difference 
that accomplishes itself within time but which begins outside of it in an undifferentiated 
presence that is purely other to history.  The repetition of a word like “God” does not 
locate a preeminent, indivisible significance in that word but, rather, fulfills the critique 
of traditional prayer that its procedure suggests: it renders the word we use for “God” 
incomprehensible to thrust us toward a Dionysian unknowing.  It does not simply negate 
this word: it does not, in an intellectual mode, try to impotently declare that God is not 
God.  Rather, it disrupts language to gesture toward a Dionysian “beyond” language that 
is neither affirmation or negation; it avoids the event-making procedure of language to 
demonstrate the infinitely divisible Augustinian particles of time that occur throughout 
any act of language.  And it adds to these two thinkers the realization that will itself is 
created in the image of God.  Insofar as that will remains the property of a distinct 
personality with its own partial view of the world—its own aim and intentions within the 
52
world—it remains exiled from God’s presence; but as it renders its own modes of 
worship incoherent—while continuing to will that incoherence—it paradoxically comes 
to approximate that presence more and more.
This necessarily brief glance at the two most important figures of the Christian 
mystical tradition and their synthesis in the English Cloud-author has added several 
dimensions to our earlier theoretical discussions of presence.  Perhaps most importantly, 
contra Derrida and Heidegger, Augustine’s analysis of time demonstrates that presence is 
the only time that “is.”  The past and the future are, by their definition nonexistent; 
however, this emphasis on presence does not necessarily tend toward the difficulties 
inherent in a Derridean “metaphysics of presence” largely because, in the absolute 
present, no material being could subsist.  Material life is structured by a distention of the 
present into the past, but this interval removes us from perfect presence.  However, contra
Bergson, this distention does not fundamentally describe what time is, but rather what our
minds are capable of perceiving.  Bergson’s infinitely divisible thought experiment does 
not prove that time is a fluid duration, but rather that a presence exists that precedes all 
temporal extension to which we fundamentally lack access.  Contra Husserl, Pseudo-
Dionysius recognizes that the perceiving subject must finally dissolve in the face of her 
ultimate object.  A fully present perception does, as Husserl suggests, require that the 
subject excise herself of the past experiences that color and skew her perception; 
however, even without her own private history, the subject still brings a temporal 
structure to any experience that is ultimately foreign to presence. Presence lacks 
experience because it lacks the division into subject and object of temporal existence and 
the movement through a duration by which such objects relate to one another.  
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Methodologically this creates a difficulty: the science of perception that Husserl sought to
create is ultimately an impossible venture.  Rather, the mystical methodology Pseudo-
Dionysius proposes is one which renders the subject unknowing. Along with Levinas and 
Bergson, the Cloud-author proposes a further facet to this methodology: whereas 
language is usually the means by which we generate the sequentiality of time, language 
perceived as a fluid duration can be the means by which we become more aware of our 
present circumstances.  Unlike Levinas, the Cloud-author suggests that perceiving 
language as a saying rather than a said brings us into contact, not with an external other, 
but with our own will as it bleeds from presence—the transcendent other—into time.  
Perceiving the musical slur of language in its fullness pushes us back to the will that 
generated the sound in the first place and it the human will that most closely resembles 
God’s infinitely novel, yet eternal, presence.
Language in the Medieval Frame
The above discussion is, of course, hardly exhaustive; it sets out only to recount 
the various permutations of the phenomenological theory of presence and to demonstrate 
how a few, paradigmatic medieval thinkers can complicate the ways in which modern 
philosophers in the phenomenological tradition have thought about presence.  The 
trajectories of this new theory of presence could intersect with a number of other theories
—especially the recent theoretical trends of object oriented ontology and postmodern 
theology—and could likewise admit to a variety of applications to different types of texts.
However, a theory’s value can ultimately only be determined by what it allows us to do in
a text; to that end, the medieval frame narrative proves a surprisingly fertile testing 
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ground.  Historically speaking, my claim is that the poets of the late Middle Ages took the
mystical and theological theories of Christian presence to their fullest fruition; after 
centuries of rarefied expository that tried to describe God through various means of 
positive and negative predication, the poets—most notably Dante—took up the discourse 
not through more expository prose, but through narrative.  This simple generic shift 
resounded through the theological world of the Middle Ages like a thunderclap; most 
simply, it relocated discourse on presence from the abstract and abstruse musings of the 
theologians back into the space and time that narrative invariably invents.  More 
specifically, though, the authors who prove themselves most sensitive to the temporal 
dimensions of their poetry deploy framed narration which—largely by virtue of its 
layering effect, its multiple, simultaneously imagined scenes—is uniquely capable of 
expressing their veiled theories of presence.
This methodological shift was already pregnant in theological discussions on 
presence: as we have seen, the transcendence of presence excludes our willed movement 
toward it and our perception of it;  perception can become like the asymptote, perpetually
closing gaps between its experience and presence, but presence itself remains out of reach
insofar as we perceive.  Insofar as we retain a will and some vestige of consciousness that
perceives the ascent to presence, we remain outside it.  Pseudo-Dionysius promised that 
this will could confound itself, and in its confustication, dissolve into the presence that 
precedes it; but the trouble remains that any methodology, however circuitous, still 
defines its object in relation to the self pursuing it.  However much they protest to the 
contrary, mystics can never achieve their limit goal of total self-dissolution because, as 
they labor at dissolving their selves, a new, subterranean self emerges to enact the 
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dissolution. Their humiliation at the failure to realize their goal brings them ever closer to
self-dissolution, but it nonetheless never quite accomplishes that goal. Only in death is a 
person truly relieved of the defined identity that exiles her from presence; but insofar as 
mysticism does not devolve into ritual self-sacrifice, it is a heroic endeavor.  The strength 
of the mystic will is shown by its accommodation to paradox that allows it to unmake 
itself.  But in unmaking itself, it has always already remade itself in a new image, and 
that image is potentially more perverse than the one it has shed if the mystic identifies 
through it, if she smugly believes she has made essential contact with the divine.  
Mystical praxis thus, in its most honest forms, becomes a matter of constant anxiety; 
insofar as the mystic retains her identity she knows she has not reached her object, but the
attempt to eliminate that identity results in a new identity that again locates her in lived, 
historical time.  The best we can do, as the Cloud-author suggests, is discover the 
moment where the birth of an impulse in our will first situates us within time.
Chaucer and his forebears respond to this situation with narrative.  The theology 
of presence locates true being outside of lived time but it offers only a self-defeating, 
recursive methodology to “access” that presence; but in their frames, these authors take 
as their starting point the inescapability of lived existence, and they work to locate 
transcendence within that existence rather than outside it.  To be clear, they do not render 
presence somehow historical, but they try to demonstrate how the present constantly 
operates through time and how its constant transcendence actually shapes the movements 
of history.  In a word, the medieval frame narrative entails a fully incarnational poetics 
that rediscovers transcendence in lived experience. The forms of transcendence these 
authors propose never fully extract us from time, nor should they—lived time is the 
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vantage point from which presence demonstrates its infinite fertility.  If the temporal 
creation could, by some means, come into contact with its source, it would be annihilated 
and presence would be sterile and non-differential; time is how presence expresses its 
being, even though no temporal interval ever persists in the present.  For medieval frame 
authors, then, temporal identity is a divine gift of the God occupying perfect presence; it 
accomplishes the work of love in the creation, which even as it suggests an affinity 
between two beings, allows to each an authentic individuality.20  Presence is thus other to 
historical time, but the beings that persist within time have authentic, purposeful 
identities insofar as they continually register the divine otherness of presence.  
As a medium, narrative allows these authors to meditate on this constant moment 
of creation; poetic creation, of course, offers a metaphor of the work of creation at large.  
The poet births intentions into words into a fully realized temporality wherein objects 
move relative to one another.  The author, however, must be careful not to simply fall into
the intellectual habits by which we normally live, fully captivated within the world’s 
procession of images and objects.  The transcendence of presence is still operative in such
a narrative—our intellectual habits do not, somehow impinge upon presence, but only our
capacity to recognize it—but it is masked in the same way it is usually masked 
throughout our lives.  Such narratives only further lodge us in the ontologies of history 
rather than working to discover the presence that generates history.  The author’s task, 
then, is to somehow produce lines of flight to the presence that transcends their narratives
and all temporal creation while still imagining a time; in doing so, narrative becomes 
20  Jean-Luc Nancy calls this maintenance of difference by an undifferentiated presence the “paradox of 
time, which is to be simultaneously pure succession and pure permanence, according to the pulsation of one
in the other.  Thus, even when nothing new happens, it still happens that the distinction is maintained and 
things do not collapse into one another.  The separation and distinction of all things is not a banal, de facto 
given.  It forms, on the contrary, the gift, the giving of things itself” (159).
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authentically mimetic, imitating the relationship between history and presence outside its 
bounds.  
Frame narratives do this by making language both an object imagined by the 
narrative and the agent that imagines other bodies.  They literally imagine the speech-act 
that produces their narrative.  When we read them, we always retain a preeminent 
awareness of their existence as language, an awareness that words are being used to 
conjure a scene (the frame) in which words are being used to conjure other scenes (the 
tales).  This graphic illustrates, as an example, how Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales uses a 
frame structure to represent language:
Figure 1: Imagined Linguistic Timelines in The Canterbury Tales
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While the words of any narrative level are, of course, sometimes used to simply imagine 
material objects and characters, they are used far more often to imagine the words that 
characters on a lower level are speaking.  As a reader constitutes the events of a tale, she 
must imagine not only the events themselves, but the several mouths from which the 
words representing that tale are spoken. This runs contrary to the logic of most fiction, 
which tends to hide the machinery by which it is produced, deploying our intellectual 
habits to tidily invent its forms, locales and characters in the minds of readers.  This 
structure forces readers to overlay the narrative image of a tale with a consciousness of 
the pre-representational speech act, in which a word is imagined as a sonic object within 
the frame at the same moment that it becomes a vehicle for imagining something else.  In 
this pre-representational dimension, words themselves become the objects that mark out 
the time inhabited by a speaker, not solely the means to imagine other such narrated 
objects.
Chaucer, Dante and Boccaccio use this structure of framed language to explore 
the pre-representational saying that always accompanies the narrative said.  In deploying 
this structure, they suggest a procedure analogous to those described by the Cloud-author,
Levinas and Bergson: they use the intellectual habits that entrap us within historical time 
to suggest a line of flight to the presence that transcends and always accompanies it.  The 
language by which we normally parse time into discrete events populated by distinct 
objects is, in part, surrendered to a consciousness of the language by which their being is 
enunciated; the internal grammar by which this language means its objects into the 
imagination is accompanied by an aesthetic music of language that manifests the full 
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duration of temporal existence.  That fluid duration is the fullest experience of presence 
available to beings in time: in it, no fraction of temporality is rendered insignificant, but 
rather has its own unique beauty that is the basis of its being.21  This music pushes us 
back still further to its initial conception in the will, prior to its realization in action, and 
so to the first movement of presence into time.  While the theorists and theologians 
oppose this experience of transcendence to lived time, framed narrative shows that the 
linguistic habits that compose our experience of lived time are an essential part of the 
continuum between history and presence.  These authors do not try to break the 
machinery of language as the Cloud-author does, but rather they allow these habits to 
play out to their fullest extension—the creation of an entire fictive temporality.  This 
narrative methodology does not vainly attempt to destroy time, but to fulfill its destiny by
demonstrating the transcendence that generates time.
In my first chapter, I will explore how Dante deploys such a narrative 
methodology to reconceptualize the ascent toward divine presence.  Dante’s most 
substantive and insightful revision to earlier theology was to spatialize Paradise.  In doing
so, he reintegrated time and presence; lived experience invariably provided the access to 
a divine presence just beyond its horizon.  Philosophers and theologians from at least the 
era of the Neoplatonists onward had insisted that perfect, divine presence could not be 
spatial or temporal; presence is the only thing that meaningfully is, but matter—as the 
phenomenological tradition has rediscovered in a somewhat more systematic way—is 
21  In his study of Plotinus, Pierre Hadot surveys the work of several authors who associate beauty with a 
pure experience of time, including Ravaisson and Bergson himself.  For Ravaisson, such an experience 
constitutes a “eurythmia,” which he defines as a “movement that does well” (qtd. in Hadot 50). For 
Plotinus, Ravaisson and Hadot, such gracious movements demonstrate the superfluous trace of the Good in 
the created world. I will return to this relationship between beauty and presence in my discussion of 
Beatrice in the Divine Comedy.
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always vestigial, a product of habituated contractions of movement whose successive 
states cannot be admitted to perfect presence.  Perfect presence was also perfect unity, 
and so could not admit the differentiation between objects in space, or the differentiation 
between moments in time.  To return to the divine ground of being, then, the philosopher 
had to practice ascetic disciplines of detachment;22 while theologians could not be so 
detached from their active duties to parishioners, their concern was fundamentally to 
spread that detachment from worldly concerns to others.23  
Dante’s Paradise, however, shows just how sterile this vision of divinity was; in 
their insistence on the perfection of deity, the theologians had stripped away its infinite 
generativity.  In place of a continuously novel presence they set up a stagnant no-place 
populated by paradoxes and contradictions.24  By resituating presence within emergent, 
unfolding time, Dante manages to reintegrate generativity into the concept without 
profanely rendering divine presence just another historical entity.  Presence is lodged 
within every significant experience, just beyond the horizon of the infinite parsing to 
which we can subject any temporal event; we only approach that horizon, however, when
22  One source proximal to each of the poets discussed here is Boethius; while the Consolation does not 
center itself on temporal issues per se, it demonstrates the necessity of detaching oneself from the 
machinery of politics and history to discover the rationality that transcends them.
23  In the monastic tradition, detachment was framed as the contemplative life which contrasted the active 
one—a development which mirrored the philosophical distinction between praxis and theoria; while most 
religious treatments of this topic advocate the need of a “mixed life,” authors like Augustine and Bernard of
Clairvaux tend to prefer the contemplative side of the equation. For an overview of the early Christian 
history of the vitae, see McGinn 58-74; for a broader overview, see Lobkowicz.
24  One of the more convoluted problems lurking in this Neoplatonic system was the ontological status of 
angels, which theologians made analogous to Platonic forms.  For Plotinus, the forms were beings that 
existed in closest proximity to the first hypostasis; they contemplated it perfectly and so lived a paradoxical
existence in which they both were and were not differentiated from one another.  As perfect reflections of 
deity, they had to reflect its unity; but in their secondary status as reflections they were differentiated from 
the One.  The Empyrean, in traditional theology, is beyond spatial and temporal differentiation, yet of 
course the angels and the most blessed were supposed to reside there.  Dante’s solution to this paradox is to 
simply sweep away one half of the contradiction: he renders this uppermost reach of Paradise spatial and 
temporal.
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we fall under the erotic spell presented to us by some object in the physical world—in 
Dante’s case, his beloved, Beatrice.  The beloved opens us to a different experience of 
time wherein we do not elide the Bergsonian gaps between moments, but rather try to 
fully instantiate the infinite passage of time.  The beloved effects this vision of duration 
by becoming radically intentional: the elision of temporal moments that defines the event
—however minute that event might be—is always accompanied by the containment of 
objects into partial identities that accompanies any act of perception.  As Heidegger 
described in his theory of tool-being, perception does not actually reveal an object to us; 
in fact, it closes off numerous facets of that object’s total being.  An object’s identity is 
determined by the innumerable relations it engages in with other objects surrounding it; 
however, when we perceive something, we curtail most of those relations to better see 
those aspects of it that hold some relevance to ourselves.  In a purely physical sense, this 
partiality is simply intrinsic to perception: our eyes cannot see the way an object reflects 
certain wavelengths of light, our ears cannot hear the minute vibrations of certain 
molecules and so forth.  When we perceive something, we intend toward it in a particular 
way, from a particular angle of vision, for particular purposes and on a particular scale of 
temporal organization; there is no unintentional, disinterested act of perception, but only 
perceptions that highlight some relevant datum of an object while obscuring others.  
For the great multitude of perceptual acts, such a system works exceptionally well
—we generally do not need to understand the radical identity of a chair, the multitude of 
interactions and possible interactions it has with other objects that surround it.  We only 
need to perceive those aspects of it that make it suitable for sitting on.  However, if our 
lives were populated by nothing more than these limited, functionalist perceptions, none 
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of them would have any real meaning; the world would be devoid of any ethical 
imperative, since we could reduce the being of objects to suit whatever self-centered 
reduction of ourselves we had effected.  In the presence of the beautiful, however, we 
intuit the dimensions of an object that exceed our perceptual capacities. We perceive them
in the full consciousness of the limitation of our perception, but with an enduring desire 
to recuperate the full being we know we deny them; contra Heidegger, that fullness of 
being does not lie in a renunciation of perception, but in an impossible radicalization of it
that would account for all the possible, partial, intentional perspectives available on it.  
As the beautiful object can be radically intentionalized within space, so too can it be 
across time wherein the object’s relations take place; without abandoning the specificity 
of each moment, the beloved object can make us witness time in the fullness of its 
passage, without compressing it into functionalist events.  For Dante, it is the poignancy 
of each moment of the beloved’s presence that opens us to the beatific vision: the 
fetishization of the beloved makes us greedy to witness each infinitely divisible atom of 
time as it passes, without any compression of it into successive moments. This perfect 
experience of time’s passage is what thrusts us toward God’s perfect presence, a presence
whose novelty and poignancy is realized within spatiotemporal experience, which avoids 
the stagnation of nonexistence by spewing history from itself.
In Dante’s vision, then, the only sin is to restrict this sort of fetishization onto a 
single, particular beloved; though Dante had tasted the divine through his immature love 
of Beatrice, he mistakenly believed her to be the only object in the cosmos worthy of this 
sort of vision.  Beatrice’s remonstrance in the Earthly Paradise redirects him to the 
philosophical point that was implicit in his love: the experience of presence cannot be 
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located in a particular object, but is a feature of existence that certain objects disclose to 
us.  While the beloved attains a special status in Dante’s phenomenology, his ultimate 
goal will remain allegorical: ultimately, his project is to generalize this temporal vision 
such that every object within the universe has the same fetishistic resonance as the 
beloved herself.  They all inhere within a sinuously unfolding time; their matters are 
mirrors of the divine presence that exceeds and produces the limited historical processes 
by which they are formed.  Matter is thus not opposed to the divine, but rather in its 
sinuous manifestation of duration, becomes the interpretive vehicle through which we 
approach the infinite generativity of presence. No object, in itself, is uniquely worthy to 
be experienced in its fullness; rather, every object—and every component object that 
comprises some larger object-organism on a greater scale of being—possesses its own 
strangeness that can prompt an experience of presence.  The beatific vision occurs when 
this fetishization—this radical intentionalization of the object—occurs through every 
object on every scale of being, when the entire creation becomes populated with an 
almost infinite pageant of unique existents whose strangeness pushes us to the horizon of 
the temporal experience they persist within.  Theology is not, then, a discipline that 
detaches us from lived experience, but one that radically attaches us to it.
Chaucer’s staggerment at this vision cannot be overstated; it reduced him to a sort
of timid, but impossibly excited, quivering.  Dante presented to Chaucer, not just a 
reconstituted justification of poetics, but a justification of the lived experience that poetry
reflects.  Suddenly, poetry—and all the spatiotemporal arts—became our primary means
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of access to the divine rather than distractive temptations;25 what is more, in Dante’s 
vision their very distractiveness became sacred.  Sin became salvation; the tendency of 
objects, in and for themselves, to absorb our attention became the means by which we 
transcended our limited perception of them to glimpse the horizon of the divine.  
Chaucer’s first attempt to deploy the resources offered to him by this new vision of 
temporality is the House of Fame—the subject of my second chapter—which presses on 
a single idea he derived from Dante: the application of ecstatic temporal vision to 
language.  Normally, language is the means by which we understand and express a 
partial, intentional perception; it begins to express the identity of an object, at the expense
of limiting our vision of it.  Additionally, language inherently requires temporal elision to 
function—not only must we freeze the object we describe into a single, always past 
moment, but we must also reduce the pure succession of linguistic sounds into the 
discrete events of words, sentences, paragraphs and so on.  In his Paradise, Dante began 
to experience language in its pre-linguistic aspect; when he first hears Cacciaguida speak,
for instance, he perceives not the discrete words, compressed and divided into distinct 
events, but rather their pure unfolding as sounds; unlike Nimrod’s babble in Hell, this 
paradisiacal speech does not lose its meaning, but rather suggests the sum intentionality 
of its referent before committing to a particular meaning about it.  Likewise, it focuses 
our attention back on Cacciaguida as a speaker, rather than solely on the referents of his 
language.  As in a frame, whenever he narrates something, we first see the joyous act of 
his narration before the specific objects and events he imagines.  Speech, first and 
25  The denigration of fiction extends back at least to Plato’s exclusion of fiction from his ideal civilization 
in book 2 of the Republic. From there, it is picked up by the monastic tradition and then into the academic 
tradition of the Middle Ages; while authors still, of course, wrote fictional works, they were never 
considered adequate vehicles for philosophy or theology by church institutions.
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foremost, signified the act of perception being actualized by its speaker, before that 
perception took on its specific, limited character.  
The sound bodies that populate the House of Fame push this conception of 
language to its furthest extent.  Where Dante’s shades remained historically intact people
—their present forms being a result of the accreted events of their past lives—Chaucer 
disintegrates the speaking subject into the full, infinite temporality she inhabits.  He 
effectively undoes the temporal elision that language requires by giving each, infinitely 
divisible moment its own discrete body; the poignancy of each unique moment that we 
must normally suppress to make speech mean is restored to the speaker.  Chaucer 
enframes speech, but he strands his reader at the signic waypoint most frames elide, never
allowing speakers’ tales to be realized as such. The House of Fame forecloses the 
possibility that language can mean what it says, instead making mean only the fact that it 
was said; the speaker is frozen in the moment of meaningful articulation, focusing her 
attention on the experience of making meaning rather than the limited meaning she was 
making.  In adopting this structure, the poem itself methodically pushes us out of its 
imagined space back into the lived time in which we intend toward it.  It thrusts us back 
to a moment immediately preceding—not so much temporally as structurally—linguistic 
reference, a pre-linguistic point where, as in Cacciaguida’s transcendent speech or 
Augustine’s birth of the word in the soul, we can glimpse the intentional pattern of 
language before it has committed to a single, limited idea about its referent, and before it 
has been codified into the discrete linguistic event of the word.
In disarticulating speech, Chaucer restores a temporal experience of language, but
at the ultimate expense of meaning; he freezes the speaker in her posture just prior to 
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making meaning, but he never allows language to fulfill its ultimate destiny.  He directs 
us to the proto-matter of language, the frozen moment prior to speech becoming 
articulated and so taking on some specific character; in a Saussurian sense, he directs us 
to the point immediately prior to the most rudimentary differentiation of speech: some 
meaning is about to be birthed, the entire apparatus of the linguistic system is evoked, but
the speaker has not yet begun to exclude any part of that system through phonemic 
differentiation.  Though language is, in a sense, present in its totality in Chaucer’s 
structure, that very structure threatens its being called language at all: this linguistic 
proto-matter has no actual meaning, only the potential for and structure of meaning 
implicit in every speech act.  By locating the temporal experience of language in the 
prelinguistic, Chaucer threatens to undermine the justification of poetics effected by 
Dante; if we can only access the hidden, radically intentional structure of experience 
before language has become its specific referent, poetics returns to askesis: we must 
renounce the pleasures of meaning-making to discover the temporal horizon which every 
object inhabits.  But Dante’s contribution to theological discourse was to realize how 
dangerous such renunciations were; his own solution to this problem as it pertains to 
language in Cacciaguida’s super-intelligible speech remains vague and precarious.  After 
Chaucer has pressed on it in the House of Fame, it begins to curve back into what it was 
supposed to oppose.  
In this sense, the House of Fame fell into Bergson’s temporal trap: if we do not 
offer any of the objects within time their specific character and identity—preferring, 
instead, to relinquish our eliding and constraining intellectual grasp on them—we 
threaten to hollow out time and presence entirely.  If time is pure movement, there is 
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nothing left within it to move; temporal mobility requires the calcified matters and 
organisms of history to manifest itself.  For Bergson, the goal of his new temporal 
awareness was to witness the pure, mobile passage of time without trying to grasp any 
particular moment, with which we might form a historical succession out of paradigmatic
event-images.  Chaucer implicitly asks us to do the same thing in his infinitely divisible 
sound bodies.  However, the procedure Bergson asks us to engage in is tantamount to 
asking us not to perceive; it is the limitations imposed by perception as it brings a 
moment “to presence,” as it arrests an indivisible succession into a paradigmatic image 
based on its own limited aims, that Bergson balks against.  But if time has to lose its 
intentionality in order to achieve the perfect mobility at whose horizon lies presence, time
ceases to be inhabited by anything; if an object is the sum of its possible intentional 
perceptions, eliminating perception paradoxically empties time, making it a static chaos 
rather than a mobile duration.  Presence again ceases to be generative and novel.  
Chaucer’s extension of Dante’s procedure threatens a very similar problem by locating 
the experience of pure temporality that gives us access to divine presence in the pre-
linguistic.
But Chaucer saw, in Boccaccio’s response to Dante, a poetic configuration that 
was flexible enough to avoid these difficulties: the framed narrative.  Granted, he 
obviously knew of framed narratives well before he encountered Dante or Boccaccio 
from the French tradition; however, it was not until this poetic structure had passed 
through the matrix of the spatiotemporal theology offered by Dante that its unique virtues
became apparent to Chaucer.  He had to read Boccaccio’s use of frame narrative as a 
solution to the conceptual problems he explored in the House of Fame in order to see the 
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potential of the frame for expressing a fully intentional vision of temporality.  Boccaccio, 
for his part, seemed to understand many of the dangers inherent in Dante’s particular 
configuration of temporal vision that Chaucer explored in the House of Fame.  In my 
third chapter I will examine how Boccaccio, in particular, balks at Dante’s allegorization 
of the beloved.  For Boccaccio, when Dante democratizes the temporal experience of the 
beloved onto every object within the cosmos, he essentially liquidates them of their 
particularity; all things become signs of God’s preeminent presence; theologians and 
poets alike must, in the final equation, turn away from particular spatiotemporal 
experiences in order to see God.  For Boccaccio, Dante abandons his most salient 
contribution to theology at the end of his work; the very spatiotemporal experience he 
sought to recuperate is supplanted by a vague vision of God.  The cardinal sin of Dante’s 
approach, to Boccaccio’s mind, is his abandonment of Beatrice in the final cantos of 
Paradise.  In his initial response to this aspect of Dante’s poetics—which response is 
contained in the Ameto—Boccaccio reinstitutes the female body in the uppermost reaches 
of deity; while the text is itself an allegory by genre, its insistence on the physical 
description of its feminine personifications works against its allegory, dramatizing the 
conflict submerged beneath Dante’s text.
While the Ameto constitutes his first response, Boccaccio’s most sensitive 
negotiation of this problem occurs in his Decameron.  Boccaccio addresses his text to 
love-lorn ladies in need of distraction; he says that their lack of enriching experiences 
leads them to spiral into deep bouts of romantic depression when they cannot actualize or
even really express their desires.  That depression is imagined as the plague of his frame 
in which the world has radically lost its desirability.  Organisms fail to cohere; cancerous 
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growths afflict physical and social bodies such that they degrade into the base, shifting 
matters of which they are composed.  Seen through the matrix of his love-lorn ladies, 
Boccaccio’s plague reimagines the situation of Dante upon the death of Beatrice—as he 
describes it in the Vita Nuova, every object in the world becomes a dark reflection of her 
absence.  The world radically lacks the grace that makes objects cohere into unities.  In 
essence, the plague thematic that Boccaccio uses to frame his tales summons us back to 
the selva oscura from which Dante embarks on his allegorization of love.  But where 
Dante consoles himself by refracting Beatrice’s beauty onto everything within the 
creation, Boccaccio opens a different road, a road that leads deeper into the selva rather 
than out of it.  For Boccaccio’s stated purpose of his text is to distract these young ladies 
from his text, offering them pleasure and useful counsel that will hopefully offer them 
some respite from the contagion of love that afflicts them.  Rather than allowing the 
stilnovistic allegory of love that their situation implies to take its course, Boccaccio 
pushes them toward other, limited perceptual experiences that will not reduce themselves 
to a single, totalizing allegory.  In doing so, Boccaccio validates the particular in 
experience, making the crass, fetishizing limitations of vision integral to the ongoing 
existence of the world.
To the Chaucer who wrote the House of Fame, the most poignant aspect of this 
response is its treatment of language. The plague describes a dissolution of the human 
scale of temporality; its festering bodies betray their own organization as integrated 
objects, reverting to more basic structures.  For Boccaccio, the plague begins to rescind 
God’s creative powers—if the Creation describes a certain distention of God’s perfect 
presence into the various scales of historical time, the plague begins to shorten the 
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interval that a body can record.  The habitual compact agreed to by the various 
component parts of the body to form an organism is dissolved; they begin to record 
time’s passage more immediately rather than on the human scale of historical transactions
between objects. Within the plague state, words are subject to the same dissolution as 
every other unified body; they devolve into their sibillant sound matters because nobody 
is left to hear them, or those who are left don’t care enough to engage in the social 
compacts wherein words become meaningful.  The storytelling of the brigata thus 
achieves a peculiar poignancy: words are always set in relief to the plague, and so their 
simple coherence as words, and subsequently as the progressively more complex units of 
narrative storytelling, becomes itself precious. Boccaccio’s frame makes the coherence of
the word itself as an imagined object an integral part of the drama of his narrative; those 
discrete word-objects do not remain in their material state, but are subjected to larger 
organisms of meaning, interpreted and intentionalized by the members of the brigata.  If 
their internal interpretations are sometimes limited and short-sighted, this is precisely 
Boccaccio’s point—to become enfleshed within the perceptible world, no such object can
fully expose its radical being.  Words, like everything else, should not be allegories, but 
pleasant distractions that disrupt their own allegorization and so enmesh us in the world.
The Canterbury Tales is Chaucer’s reconstitution of the project he set out upon in 
the House of Fame, refracted through his reading of Boccaccio’s reading of Dante; like 
Boccaccio, Chaucer’s wants to install a vivid sense of the particularity of the people and 
objects populating his world.  However, unlike Boccaccio, he wants to use that 
particularity as a vehicle for rediscovering a revised Dantean presence.  Boccaccio 
aligned the linguistic presence of the frame with his plague thematic; when language 
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becomes an object in itself with its own ontological resonance, the space it tries to create 
evaporates, organisms linguistic and otherwise break down into their sibilant matters.  He
thus introduces distraction as a poetic rationale to counteract Dante’s allegory of grace; 
the petty limitations of a perceiver not recuperating the divine in the perceived is what 
constitutes the physical world.  As we have seen, it is these habitual limitations that allow
objects to cohere as progressively larger organisms—when components of an organism 
contract into a pattern of relation, they do not perceive the radical being of one another, 
but only particular, relevant facets of one another’s being.  To the other facets, they turn a
blind, distracted eye. Without such self-interested perceptual limitations, no object-
organism could cohere, and in such a vacant world, the allegory of Dantean grace would 
be undone.  If every point in the world tried to recuperate the sort of radical vision of 
grace that Dante tries to effect, the physical-temporal structures of that world would 
begin to dissolve.
Boccaccio’s critique of Dante’s allegorical methodology is, in many ways, a 
damning one; however, as in the phenomenological tradition, Boccaccio ultimately 
doesn’t critique the target of Dante’s model of grace, only the means he uses to arrive at 
it.  Boccaccio suggests that only God can possess beatitude, and if we hubristically 
attempt to acquire it for ourselves, we threaten to unmake God’s world, the very world 
we have attempted to rejuvenate.  As Chaucer reads this veiled philosophical dialogue, he
realizes that Boccaccio’s methodology of distraction can be adapted into a means for 
approaching the very thing it sought to resist: Dantean presence. In narrative terms, it 
requires only a slight tweak of the interpretive equation of the frame narrative as 
Boccaccio had envisioned it: the transformation of Boccaccio’s malleable and plastic 
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brigata into the quarrelsome snobs and lovers of the Canterbury troupe.  Chaucer’s 
principle innovation on Boccaccio’s frame scheme is to use the stereotypes of estates 
literature to create his characters, as Jill Mann has demonstrated.  While the members of 
Boccaccio’s brigata were rhetorically pliant—immanently susceptible to the appeals they 
voiced to one another in their tales—Chaucer’s characters are essentially grotesque—they
each have a starkly restricted, virtually impregnable perspective on their world.  While 
the frame of the Canterbury Tales renders us aware of the pure, sonic passage of 
language that thrusts us toward an authentic presence, the limited perspective imagined 
by each pilgrim onto that language forces it to cohere into a fully imagined narrative, 
replete with ideological and philosophical resonances. As in the House of Fame, Chaucer 
uses his frame to imagine the speech act; before he allows us to imagine the tales 
themselves, he draws us to the waypoint in which the word is itself the signified rather 
than the signifier.  However, unlike the House of Fame, the poem’s internal audience 
doesn’t allow us to become stranded at this waypoint; they intend toward the linguistic 
objects passing between them too violently and with too limited an angle of vision for us 
to not signify along with them.  As readers, we can identify with the Canterbury pilgrims 
and see the world open up as they see it; one of the most salient pleasures of reading the 
Canterbury Tales is inhabiting their various perspectives, imagining the Wife of Bath’s 
response to the Miller’s Tale, or even better, to imagine the Wife of Bath’s response to the
Knight’s response to the Miller’s Tale. But just as Chaucer does not leave us stranded at 
the material word, neither does he leave us stranded in any single grotesque perspective 
imagined by the pilgrims; rather, all of the limited perspectives imagined by the poem are
available to us simultaneously; though we cannot inhabit them all simultaneously, we can
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shift fluidly between them at will, and we retain a prescient awareness that other 
perceptual and interpretive perspectives overlap whatever one we apply at a given time.  
The following graphic summarizes the point:  
Figure 2: Chaucer’s Linguistic Phenomenology
The grotesque perceptual angle of each pilgrim produces the pressure necessary for the 
signified word to cohere as a discrete unity, but at the moment it coheres into that 
linguistic object, it is refracted; the pressure that birthed it into a unity is not singular, but 
multiple.  Its codification into an object—brought about by a Boccaccian particularity—
simultaneously reveals it as polyvalent; its being is greater than the sum of any single 
perceptual relationship that brought it into being. The word possesses supplemental 
dimensions that inevitably go unperceived; narratologically, it is implicated in multiple 
imaginative structures; semiologically, it assumes multiple roles within those structures; 
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Chivalric Idiom 
of Knight
Materialism
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Polyvalent
Representational
Object
Material Word
Sentimentality
of Prioress
Penitential Orthodoxy
of Parson
Sexual Authority
of WoB
Skeptical Irony
of Pardoner
sociologically, it is refracted across the limited perspectives of the various estates; 
historically it is refracted among readers of different eras with concerns unimaginable to 
the poem’s internal audience or its author.  
When we read the Canterbury Tales, we thus have an overriding sense of the 
strangeness of the people, things, and words that populate Chaucer’s world; as they are 
disclosed to our imaginations, we retain a sense of the ways in which they exceed that 
disclosure, exceed whatever we perceive about them.  We become aware of their 
presence, the particular grace that animates each of them; we become aware of the 
relational pressures that have brought them into being, aware also of the failure of any 
one of those pressures to understand the full dynamism of the unity it has helped birth 
into history.  However our awareness of the particularity of an object increases in direct 
proportion to our awareness of its strange grace; unlike Dante’s allegory, Chaucerian 
grace does not transform everything into a sign of divine presence, but rather into a thing 
in the full sense of that term. Allegorization itself is folded into Chaucer’s scheme as only
a singular angle of vision that does not exhaust the being of the object it allegorizes; no 
allegory, in and of itself, can accommodate the full mystery of matter.  But as a variety of 
allegorizations begin to stutter and stammer atop one another, their additive attempts to 
colonize the object into their modes of meaning begins to disclose the transcendence of 
the object; it envisions the object as the nexus of a great web of relations and obligations 
that collectively generate the being of one another.  As we begin to perceive them—and 
to intuit what we fail to perceive about them—in this way, their full duration and constant
emanation becomes apparent; they ceaselessly move through the slur of time, 
unimaginably manifesting themselves on one another without pause, without freezing 
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into any single image.  We begin to see them as God would see them from the horizon 
point of presence, from which the history of their interactions slides.
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CHAPTER II
IMMEMORABILITY ON THE CUSP OF PARADISE
Dante’s description of Paradise depends on an overriding paradox:  Paradise is 
outside of time and space, yet Dante narrates his sensory experience of it and so 
reinscribes it within time and space.  Heaven—which should, in Dante’s theological 
milieu, be understood as a realm of intellection abstracted from the material world1—has 
all the exigencies of materiality and temporality imposed on it.  Even further, the visual 
faculty through which we primarily understand the spatiotemporal world is not so much 
frustrated or superseded by the ascent to Paradise, as it is perfected.  Though at first 
glance the bodies of the blessed in Paradise seem to become increasingly less material as 
Dante ascends toward the Empyrean, the Empyrean itself is starkly spatialized in the 
narrative, revealing the earlier rarefication of the blessed to be a condescension; whereas 
most commentators on the Comedy emphasize—along with Dante himself2—the 
condescension of the divine into narrative figures during the ascent to the Empyrean, at 
the point when those figures should reveal themselves as they are, Dante reinscribes them
1  In Aquinas’s psychological model, physical objects are abstracted into phantasms that encode their 
individualized forms into our memories; the active intellect further abstracts from these individuated forms 
into their intelligible species.  This sort of Neoplatonic formalism underpins the medieval understanding of 
Paradise and especially the Empyrean.  Dante’s innovation is to relocate the physical at the uttermost 
reaches of this procedure of abstraction.  For a summary of Aquinas’s model of perception, see Ginsberg, 
Dante’s Aesthetics of Being, 29-34.
2  The source of this confusion is Beatrice’s comment in Paradise 4.40-42; there, she informs Dante that the
division of the blessed into a hierarchy is only a condescension to his limited faculties of understanding.  
What he sees on his way up to the Empyrean is thus nothing more than a didactic figuration meant to 
prepare him for the beatific vision.  Most critics have taken these lines as a theologically informed 
commentary on Dante’s fiction—in order to defend his poetics, Dante couches them as an imperfect 
figuration of the actual state of the blessed.  Rachel Jacoff, for instance, likens Beatrice’s caution to the 
anthropomorphization of God in the Bible, arguing that we are not thereby meant to believe that God has 
these members, but only that the Bible is trying to relate some feature of God to imperfect humans (109).  
However, I think that such criticism takes Beatrice’s comment too far and so miss the truly revolutionary 
character of Dante’s Paradise; only the hierarchy of the blessed is a condescension, not the figuration of the 
blessed themselves.  When Dante reaches the Empyrean, he never disavows the narrativity of the figures 
there and he never suggests that their bodily appearance within a starkly delimited space is a condescension
to his faculties.
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within time and space.  The Empyrean does not simply transcend time and space, but 
perfects them by making vision perfect, capable of fully seeing all the discrete persons 
within the Rose at whatever remove and God at His infinite remove. If Dante’s narrative 
fails to represent his experience there entirely, it fails due to a superabundance of 
narrative detail rather than a dearth of it. By doggedly insisting that Paradise is a narrative
space—even if its full narrativity cannot be represented—Dante implicitly alters the 
model of divine truth we can hope to find there.  He reconceptualizes contact with the 
divine not as a unification or identification with God that effaces the physicality of the 
believer—a model authorized by the Neoplatonic and mystical currents within medieval 
Christianity—but rather as an experience that more fully situates us within time and 
space.
In his book on Dante’s metaphysics, Christian Moevs has explained the 
physicality of the Comedy’s metaphysics as a deliberate contradiction.  Moevs describes 
Dante’s vision of the Empyrean as deeply engaged with the Aristotelian and Scholastic 
models of the universe, which tend to dematierialize the highest reaches of spiritual 
ascent.  Closely reading Beatrice’s descriptions of the Empyrean, Moevs argues that, in 
line with these earlier traditions, Dante’s Empyrean exists outside of time and space; 
since all desires are fulfilled there, the Empyrean is static and immobile, the distinction 
between the subject and object of desire having been collapsed within it (23); being 
outside the creation, it is actually better understood as the perceiving subject who 
understands the created world as a play of appearances that it produces (169).  When 
Moevs confronts the narrativity of Dante’s Paradise, its purpose is therefore to prompt the
sort of cognitive dissonance that frees readers from the allure of the material world:
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The Comedy’s unprecedented realism, its irresistible continuity with 
spatiotemporal experience, is... intrinsic to its purpose: to understand how 
this fictive textual world becomes inescapably real is to awaken to the 
sense in which the spatiotemporal world is fictive (contingent or relatively
‘unreal’).  By Dante’s metaphysics, both worlds seem to be noncontingent 
realities because both force our suspension of disbelief, and by the same 
device:  by drawing us inside their frame of reference so deeply that all 
our questions presuppose that frame of reference. (10)
For Moevs, Dante creates a convincingly mimetic world in order to render us conscious 
of our captivity to our own notions of materiality.  Physical objects—beginning with our 
own bodies—create a system of reference that is self-contained and self-sustaining.  They
therefore become capable of engrossing the intellect such that it cannot contemplate the 
metaphysical planes of existence from which the contingent world takes its being.  The 
Empyrean represents a “space” in which those notions are transcended, or at least one 
whose inhabitants have transcended the categories of space; the particular poetic form 
Dante chooses for the Empyrean is thus secondary to the transcendence of spatial logic 
one must undergo to reach it:  “if we wish to picture it (for example, as a gigantic rose 
full of seats, children and sages), we must be aware that all that is appearance (parvenza),
and the reality is light, however understood” (24).  Ultimately, to align Dante with the 
metaphysical tradition he inherited, Moevs must reduce the rationale behind the 
Comedy’s narrativity to a reductively allegorical one: the material quality of his Paradise 
can only demonstrate the unrepresentable quality of its actual referent.
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In a lesser poet, such an explanation may suffice; however the entire machinery of
Dante’s poem seems to insist that transcendence itself must somehow be understood in 
spatial and temporal terms. Narrative in the Comedy is more than the condescension to 
human faculties that Beatrice admits to in Paradise 4. The highest reaches of the divine 
realm are imagined in narrative, and this imagination is more than a convenient metaphor.
This is not to say that Dante’s God is somehow materially sensible,3 but only that Dante 
meticulously structures his narrative to show that transcendence is immanent in our 
spatiotemporal experience; the Comedy does not abstract us away from that experience, 
but rather situates us more fully in it.4  The theological traditions that inform Dante too 
often—as Moevs does—cast contact with the divine in terms of its opposition to matter 
and its endless capacity for change.5  Space and time are the primary media in which this 
change can occur:  space allows en-formed beings to be distinguished from one another, 
and time offers a series of successive moments of being within which they can interact 
and affect one another.  In the Middle Ages, this potentiality and malleability of the 
physical world led theologians to contrast it with the immutable divine, where form and 
being were permanent and constantly present.  Dante struggles to preserve these qualities 
of God while simultaneously suggesting that the experience of God’s perfect presence is 
implicit within spatiotemporal existence; unexpectedly, he makes the temporal 
metamorphosis we experience in the physical world the basis of our understanding of 
3  See Summa Theologiae 1.12.3.
4  In this sense, Dante’s procedure is fundamentally opposed to negative theology—which posits a God who
is the inverse and ground of all the partial beings language is capable of naming—though neither is it 
simply kataphatic, naively trusting in language’s capacity to represent the divine.  Rather, Dante finds an 
essential analogy between what is indefinable in God and what is indefinable in our bodily experience: the 
perfect presence that we inhabit, and that we understand through our relationship with the physical, 
historical world.
5  On the concept of matter in Aristotle, see Gill, especially Ch. 1.
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God’s perfect presence, as I will explore in more detail below. Narrative can offer a 
mimetic reflection of this immanent possibility of transcendence; it takes us into a space 
and time, but always remains aware of its aesthetic, pre-linguistic presence.  For this 
reason, Dante does not, like Augustine, break from his figural autobiography into a more 
serious and rational expository prose to cope with the demands of describing divinity.  
Rather, narrative persists, even through the theological exposition of why it cannot exist; 
if anything, space and time become, in Dante’s poem, the essential conditions by which 
metaphysics can announce its transcendence, since theology always occurs as an act of 
language and language presupposes a dialogue between distinct individuals.6  When 
Beatrice describes the immateriality of the Empyrean, she does so from the perspective of
a space and time within which she speaks.
It is in this sense that we can speak of the Comedy as a framed narrative; while, 
unlike traditional framed narratives, its raison d’être is firmly located in the frame—the 
narrative of Dante the pilgrim’s progress through the afterlife—that afterlife is itself an 
amalgam of the myth, poetry and theology spoken by the people he encounters along his 
way.  Dante, for the most part, does not permit his sources to remain in the shadowy 
background of allusions or analogues, but situates them directly within the narrative 
alongside what they narrate.  Their tales are absorbed, coordinated and reimagined, back 
into Dante’s narrative world; nothing so richly expresses the contrappasso running 
throughout Dante’s afterlife as his insistence that his sources live within the milieu that 
they have individually and collectively narrated. As Giuseppe Mazzotta has argued in 
6  In Levinasian terms, its saying presupposes the existence of a self and an other situated within space and 
time; ethically speaking, the attempt to annihilate that spatiotemporality of the theological encounter is an 
imperalistic attempt of the self to colonize the other.  Though the theologian pretends to be destroying the 
individual self along with space and time, in reality he absorbs the difference inherent in space into the 
sprawling same of his intellectual model of the cosmos.
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Dante’s Vision and the Circle of Knowledge, the imagined space of the Comedy is an 
encyclopedia of knowledge condensed and reconceptualized from its many sources (18-
19); but whereas the encyclopedia frames its objects of knowledge in a static, synchronic 
and arbitrarily ordered way, Dante’s narrative sets those objects into relation to one 
another and so back into space and time.  Mazzotta argues that he does this primarily by 
situating Dante the pilgrim as a learning subject within the poem; I would add that the 
living, motive quality of the Comedy’s epistemology arises from the fact that it recounts, 
at every moment of that journey, the dialogic procedure by which knowledge has been 
produced.  As in any frame narrative, it uses language to imagine bodies using language 
to imagine other bodies; we are consistently aware that language is both an imagined 
object of the narrative and an imagining agent structuring other narratives within that 
frame.  Dante, however, refuses to fully sequester these narrative shells into a hierarchy 
of subordination; rather, he makes the framed stories impinge upon the way the frame 
that contains them is imagined.  By virtue of this frame structure, Dante is able to 
articulate the immanent transcendence his narrative aims at.  At once, we can become 
absorbed into the objects and events his narrative imagines and apprehend the aesthetic 
music of language—a language whose sounds manifest the presence of their speaker 
before they can constitute their meaning—that hovers above and through that act of 
imaginative absorption.  Dante firmly censures either extreme: the unintelligibility of a 
pure linguistic music is drastically curtailed in his silencing of Nimrod—though it 
reappears in a rehabilitated form in Cacciaguida’s unintelligible speech—while Dante’s 
own, fetishistic poetics is condemned through his restoration of the Siren.  Between these 
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two extremes, however, lies a different apprehension of language and temporality through
which Dante ultimately accesses the perfect presence of God.
While a full exploration of this theme throughout the Comedy certainly outstrips 
my reach here—as does any theme worth exploring in Dante’s prodigious poem—I will 
explore his construction of this alternative apprehension of time by means of what I am 
calling Dante’s “immemorability topos,” the purely rhetorical contention that an 
experience outstrips the ability of memory to record it.  Three such topoi exist in 
Paradiso 1, one of which is explicit, while the others occur through analogies to Ovid 
and become legible only in the context of Dante’s baptism in Lethe at the end of 
Purgatorio.  As a variant of the ineffability topos, immemorability would seem to imply 
precisely the kind of despatialization that Moevs and many critics see in Dante’s ascent to
the Empyrean, but in fact Dante insists on precisely the opposite.  Dante figures memory 
as incapable of recording his experience of the divine, but this failure of memory does not
render that experience any less spatial or temporal; immemorability, in fact, implies a 
superabundance of spatiotemporal detail that overwhelms memory’s ability to parse 
temporal flow into discrete images and events.  In this sense, memory runs parallel to the 
procedures of language on two counts: first, it requires that we divide an uninterrupted, 
temporal stream of sounds into units coordinated by grammar; second, it requires that we 
key those delimited sounds to memorial images.  Such experiences are fundamentally 
historical and so they lack presence; they surrender presence to the past and future by 
constructing it into temporal events, situated within the grammar of history.  
Beauty, however, offers an alternative apprehension of time as presence. That 
experience is grace in its aesthetic form, which for Dante describes the intervention of 
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God into human life more aptly and specifically than discussions of theological grace.  
Dante’s formative experience of Beatrice’s beauty, recounted in the Vita Nuova, offered 
him a window into the presence which God inhabits; the beautiful object made him aware
of the poignancy of presence as it passed.  While we still experience such objects in time, 
their ability to fascinate us offers a fluid, mobile vision of time that locates us in the 
present as it passes.  We cease to cut temporality into frozen and immobile images to be 
stored in our memories as artifacts.  Though Beatrice’s beauty presented such a window, 
Dante failed to typologize that beauty into a broader experience of grace; instead, he 
fetishized her as the sole object of grace, and so attempted to re-present her in his poetry, 
only to reinscribe her loss.  Beatrice converted him by drawing him back to his original 
experience of beauty, using it to critique all his subsequent attempts to recuperate that 
experience in the material world—both through his relations with other women and his 
poetry—and finally, by bringing on an amnesia that ultimately converts him.  Dante uses 
this temporal idea of conversion to rehabilitate Ovid’s nullifying irony that threatens to 
undo representation, and so entails a nihilistic immemorability.  The encounter with Ovid 
at the beginning of the Paradiso forces Dante to reconceptualize his poetics in terms of 
an aesthetics of experience that ultimately locates beauty and being at the ground of 
language as it attempts to signify, not solely in the objects of those attempts.  The 
shadows of Paradise that he is capable of representing are, in a sense, secondary to this 
prelinguistic music in which language first articulates the sinuous, ongoing present 
moment in which it is articulated—a move which recuperates the nihilism of Ovidian 
irony.
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Perception beyond Memory
As I have briefly outlined above, memory is the precondition of language in two 
senses: it is required first in the recombination of sounds, second in the referential keying 
of delimited sounds to images we have experienced or imagined in the past.  Paradise, in 
this sense, should be fully ineffable, since its denizens experience the pure presence of 
God.  The Middle Ages largely figured ineffability as a failure of reference:  no word 
could positively describe the referent of God, since God was, by definition, undelimited 
being.  Language could only define and describe some partial facet of the totality of 
God’s being; it cuts a particular feature from the sum background of being itself, always 
assuming a generalized existence whether predicating positively or negatively.7  It sets 
fragmented beings in relation to one another while never becoming capable of describing 
the fundamental commonality between them.  The peculiar problem of human language 
was thus that God was the ground beneath every utterance, yet no individual utterance 
could describe Him.  This ontological failure of language was accompanied by the 
temporal one: language assumes presence, attempts to describe it, and its sounds always 
occur in the temporal slur away from presence, yet it only succeeds in describing a 
partial, encapsulated historical moment that lacks duration.  Language embarrassedly 
constructs the event—a cut from an ongoing and infinitely divisible temporal sequence 
into a single, discernible point supposed to capture that sequence’s essential meaning.  
Memory thus makes the event singular in two senses: it condenses the duration of speech 
7  The ineffability topos of the Middle Ages is, in this sense, the unexpected alterego of the object as 
defined by Harman’s Object Oriented Ontology; for Harman as for Heidegger, the totality of any object’s 
being is ultimately unspeakable—speech, in fact, only brings one perceptual facet of an object to our 
present consciousness.  In a similar sense, God—whose being precedes the temporal groundwork that 
allows all object relations to occur—can only be partially apprehended; but where, in the case of the object,
it is the object’s substantiality that refuses full definition, in the case of God, it is His otherness to the 
historicity of substance that does not admit definition.
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into linguistic units, and it condenses the duration of the events described into historical 
units. Certainly, any such event is susceptible to a more minute delineation that defines 
events within the event—within the larger event of the Bolshevik revolution, for instance,
we could define the more minute event of the storming of the Winter Palace, and within 
that yet more minutely parsed events.  The event is hierarchical in structure.  With each 
movement toward specificity in this hierarchy, we approach something resembling the 
perception of temporal duration as it passed for those inhabiting that moment; however, 
like an asymptote, that duration is irrecuperable through the procedure of language that 
constructs the event.  The linguistic attempt to recuperate presence not only testifies to a 
loss of presence, but, as Bergson has demonstrated, it illustrates that language can never 
describe presence in the first place.  The entire procedure of language denies the sinuous 
unfolding of presence in an infinitely divisible succession of moments; time does not 
consist in a causal sequence of immobile events, but rather in the continual emergence of 
the present.
As Dante ascends through Paradise, it is the two temporal failures of language 
that preoccupy his professions of ineffability rather than the ontological one.  This is not 
to say that he excludes the latter, but rather that he expends more of his considerable 
semiotic imagination on the former.  In fact, he ultimately begins to rely on the variant of 
the ineffability topos I have described above—the immemorability topos, a profession 
that he cannot even remember what transpired in the divine realm, though the artifact of 
the poem itself resists that claim.  This topos differs considerably from simple 
ineffability:  whereas ineffability locates the failure of representation in the linguistic sign
and its ability to adequately represent something contained within the mind, 
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immemorability implies a failing in the mental faculty preceding any act of language.  
Dante suggests that, as he ascends to the pure presence of the Empyrean, the plenitude of 
temporality begins to overwhelm his historicizing mind.  Paradise is a realm of infinite 
fascination, where every person and object is capable of engrossing the fullness of 
Dante’s attention.  The fetishizing attention he once reserved for Beatrice alone—whose 
every gesture held the greatest significance, who alone exceeded the procedures of event-
making for the earthly Dante, thrusting him toward the experience of presence that 
justifies time-bound experience—can now be cast onto everything.  Dante protests that 
memory is unable to record his experience because the plenitude of Paradise overwhelms 
his capacity to code it into mnemonic representations.  He cannot cut the event from the 
sequence, since doing so would constitute a deep violence to the perfect presence he 
experienced in Paradise.
Of course, in Dante’s poem, such protestations of immemorability are fraught 
with the same paradox that besets the purported immateriality of Paradise:  Dante 
narrates past them, and with astonishing detail and imagination.  An experience that 
transcends memory should defy narrativization as much as a disembodied one; it would 
resist the historical causality that narrative and language encode.  But Dante continues 
despite the limitations of narrative and, more significantly, despite the immanent threat of
transgression he faces in narrativizing Paradise.  He insists, at his peril, that Paradise is 
visual, and so spatial and temporal, through and through, Moon to Empyrean. If we are 
not to read his immemorability topoi simply as disingenuous rhetoric, or as a nervous 
couching of his otherwise brazen narration, then, our task must be to elaborate how he 
reconciled the absorptive presence of Paradise to the historicity of narration.  
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Immemorability, for Dante, effects a reconciliation between history and its transcendence 
by forcing us to attend to the materiality of Dante’s signifiers; by framing his utterance in 
terms of what it cannot condense into mnemonic pictures, he tangentially gestures toward
the supplemental dimensions of experience always evident in Paradise.  The same 
presence he encounters there is available in any space when we hold the aesthetics of 
language in constant tension with its meaning.
Of all the instances of the immemorability topos littering the Paradise, none 
expresses this tension quite so well as the one at the poem’s outset.  Dante begins the 
Cantica by undermining his own poetic capacity to remember what he relates:  
Nel ciel che più de la sua luce prende
fu’ io, e vidi cose che ridire
né sa né può chi di là sù discende,
perché appressando sé al suo disire
nostro intelletto si profonda tanto
che dietro la memoria non può ire.
[I was in the heaven that takes in most of His light, and I saw things which
I neither know how to, nor could recount, since our intellect, bringing 
itself near to its desire, goes so deep that the memory cannot go behind.]8
Dante’s notation that he cannot “ridire,” or literally “re-speak” his experiences in 
Paradise already orients us to the both the memorial and linguistic nature of his 
incapacity; the things he sees become a form of original representation—anticipating 
Beatrice’s revelation in Canto 4 that all of Paradise except the Empyrean is a 
condescension, a performance put on for Dante’s benefit—that his re-representation 
8  All Italian translations are my own, unless otherwise noted.
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cannot fully figure.  He casts this failure twice as an epistemic failure rather than a simple
failure of poetic capacity.  His “né sa né può” seems almost redundant, except that where 
“può” suggests an incapacity of language, “sa” implicates the poet’s own mental faculties
in this failure.  We learn in the next stanza that the failure is one of memory rather than 
intellect.  Memory is pictured as a sort of laggard in the normal course of events, 
traipsing behind the intellect and recording its activity. It is a secondary activity, 
reconstituting some primary behavior of the intellect.  The memorial image is always an 
“ombra... segnata nel mio capo” [shadow... marked out in my head] (1.23-24);9 such 
memorial images are always already past representations of the temporal contact between
objects that intellect—which seems to be a faculty of original perception here—alone 
participates in.  The presence of Paradise thus repels the memory’s attempts at 
representation.
We might be tempted by this analogy to take a Neoplatonic approach to the 
immemorability of Paradise: in Plotinian philosophy, the purest form of intellect does not 
think in the way we traditionally conceive of the word.  Intellect, as applied to human 
creatures, takes place in time and language; it abstracts from sense impression to the 
immaterial form, or else it enumerates logical syllogisms that, however obliquely, refer to
our physical experience of the world.  However forms themselves—creatures of pure 
intellect—are devoid of both spatial and temporal dimension.  Memory cannot inhere 
within this primary intellectual consciousness, since the forms only gaze at the pure 
presence of the one that en-forms them.10  Dante’s refusal of memory at the most 
9  This subsequent image recollects the common metaphor in the Middle Ages of memory as wax, upon 
which perceptions were impressed to make images.  See Carruthers 16, 72.
10  Although, as I have noted, their differentiation itself poses an insurmountable problem in Neoplatonic 
thought, since it implicitly spatializes and temporalizes them, however much Plotinus might protest.
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profound depth of intellectual life seems to accord well with such a conception.  But the 
analogy, in fact, resists the Neoplatonic frustration of materiality that we expect; in a 
larger sense, though it distinguishes intellect from memory, the analogy Dante uses resists
the delineation of one faculty from another altogether.  The intellect is personified, 
becoming a metonym for the poet himself standing agape before God in the Empyrean; as
his appressando suggests, Dante is spatializing intellectual inquiry here, using the 
directional metaphors that always prove the hobgoblins of formalistic metaphysics.  This 
spatialization, ironically, foreshadows the spatialization of his journey in toto at precisely 
the moment it seems he should deny this spatiality.  The intellect itself is figured as a 
pilgrim approaching a destination whose descriptor—profonda—explicitly conflates 
conceptions of intellectual profundity and spatial depth.  
As a pilgrim itself, the intellect interestingly becomes a faculty of perception.  In 
this, Dante seems to be extending Aristotle’s analogy between sense perception and 
intellect from de Anima 3.4-5.  Aristotle’s analysis of both perception and intellect 
applied a logic of hylomorphism: a passive mental substance is actively imprinted by the 
form of its special object.  A special object is simply some dimension of form keyed to 
the perceptual faculty, as color is keyed to sight.11  In the case of sensation, he conceived 
of our perceptual faculty as a receptive potentiality capable of receiving the form of its 
special object. When we perceive a rock, for instance, we abstract its form from its 
matter; that form imprints itself upon our mental faculty, forming a new compound—a 
mnemonic image of the rock and of a more general rock-ness—within our minds.  
Memory subsequently encodes these perceptions even after their physical form has 
passed.  In an analogous sense, “the thinking part of the soul must... be, while impassible,
11  See 3.1.
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capable of receiving the form of an object; that is, must be potentially identical in 
character with its object without being the object. Mind must be related to what is 
thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible” (3.4).  The object that “is capable of being 
thought” by an individual thinker in potentiality—or passive intellect—is informed by the
active intellect, the thought moving from potentiality to actuality.  Dante’s allegorical 
personification bears some debt to this analogy—the intellect, returning to its true special 
object, embarks on an itinerarium mentis back to God.  As it increasingly patterns itself 
upon God’s perfected intellection of Himself and the creation, the human intellect must 
shed memory as something ancillary to the work of perfectly present thought.
Yet Dante’s metaphor is even more radical than Aristotle’s: he attributes not only 
perception to the intellect, but also “disire,” an activity more appropriately assigned to the
will.  He infuses the neutral Aristotelian special object with desirability and the volition it
implies.  In doing so, he further enfleshes his personification of the intellect: first, 
intellect took on the attribute of perception in its journey toward the profound depth of 
Paradise; now, it has also taken on the quality of will, whose provenance in Dante’s text 
is more properly Augustinian.  Dante associates memory with movement; it is memory in
his invocation that temporally and spatially “goes.”  Though a verb of motion, or perhaps 
of becoming, is implied in the line on the intellect, Dante omits the main verb, offering 
only the participle “appressando sé,” literally a sort of “en-nearing itself” and “being at.”  
This omission offers the pairing of ire and disire a special resonance—“disire,” breaking 
free of its etymological moorings, becomes literally a “dis-ire,” the object in which the 
motion of desire finds its rest.  In Augustine’s analysis of the will, desire indicates an 
imbalance or restlessness that inclines us to act until we possess the object of our desire.  
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Desire bespeaks an absence and incompleteness that we attempt to remedy by means of 
willed choices bringing its object under our control.  For Augustine, however, only God is
the proper object of our desire; in his justly famous equation from 1.1. of the Confessions,
Augustine says that “our hearts are unquiet until they rest in you.”  The intellect’s disire 
of God implies this cessation of desire that only God can offer; but where in Augustine's 
analysis, intellect is supposed to govern the desire of the will with its more perfect 
knowledge, Dante makes desire itself a property of intellect.  By dissocating memory 
from both desire and intellect, however, he implies that it differs from traditional human 
desire; it does not entail the loss of desire's object and the resulting imbalance, but rather 
a new order of desire in a perfected, calm equilibrium, an equilibrium that the final image
of the poem will formalize. 
Memory cannot participate in this intellectual form of desire; the desire generated 
by memory inevitably reinscribes the loss of the desired object that the will drives 
toward.  Memory recollects the brief and furtive moments of satiety whose cycle of loss 
and recovery organize our will; the will, in turn, can almost be said to organize the human
experience of time, since the objects and agents that move through time are always 
configured around our desires.  In Bergsonian terms, the frozen images—immobile cuts 
from the larger sequence—that our memories record are determined by our desires, by 
our will to retroactively rationalize a history that serves our desires even as those desires 
are determined by our past experiences.  This is the fundamental tenet of hermeneutics:  
whatever an objective history might look like, we lack access to it; our construction of 
history always reveals our desires.  Only when our attention is rapt in the presence of the 
beloved does our experience of time approaches a perfect presence.  Simple being 
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achieves a special resonance; the memory scrambles to encode as much of the image 
sequence as possible.  It struggles to approach that infinite succession between any two 
temporal sequents in its effort to record the perceptual experience of the subject.  
However its motive function ceases to have relevance in the presence of the beloved 
when the intellect and its will are at rest in simple perception.  Ironically, perceptual 
plenitude overflows memorial capacity and so transcends history while remaining in it.  
Now certainly, in the case of a delimited, material beloved, time and memory 
instantly recolonize that moment: the poignancy of the moment is inscribed with its 
always impending loss. Thus, for Augustine, the heart remained restless until it found rest
in God—all other rests were temporary, and so no rest at all, no real “dis-ire.”  The 
essential metaphor for this loss, especially for Augustine, was sexuality—the climax that 
rationalized the sinuous temporality of sex was fraught with its own brevity.  The 
expectancy that allows lovers to approach this experience of presence is always betrayed 
by the foreknowledge that the experience of presence offered by sexuality ends, abruptly. 
The loss that structures temporality thereby pollutes the experience of the material 
beloved, thwarting its promise.  In our contemporary context, this explains the 
pornography of the self:  pornography that features others has its rationale in curiosity 
and imagination, the projection of the viewer into various roles within the erotic mise en 
scéne.  This rationale fails to explain, however, the drive to record oneself in the sex act. 
While certainly there must be some social dimension to this—the representation serves as
an artifact of exhibitionism—its primary function is mnemonic.  It represents the moment
of satiety and so allows the lover to recuperate it, approximately, through imagination and
memory.  This drive extends well beyond the example of sexuality, which is only a 
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paradigm case; yet something of the loss that such acts—which admittedly are not 
ubiquitous—record is present in every attempt to transform experience into a mnemonic 
artifact.  For Dante, it was the drive to write poetry which, even before Beatrice’s death, 
overlaid her presence with the dark ladies suggesting her inevitable absence.  I will 
explore such episodes from the Vita Nuova in more detail below; however I will note now
that all such representations gesture toward the palimpsest of the present experience of 
desire, which promises to end the willed movement of temporality in an act of miraculous
perception, but which ultimately reinscribes the loss implicit within time and memory 
into that perception.  
The logic of such moments of satiety is one of habit: habits reorganize our desires 
after they have passed, motivating us to either reenact them or wistfully recollect them.  
The habitual experience is, however, subject to a further deprivation, precisely the 
deprivation of memory: it is always structured as a recapitulation of some prior 
experience in which we approached present being.  It assumes an originary experience of 
present being that, of course, is actually illusory, since it recedes backward indefinitely in
the memory, groping after an experience prior to the loss of presence; but it is the loss of 
presence that instigates memory, self, and so anything that remotely resembles human 
experience.  In other words, the originary experience of perfect presence that habitual 
desires attempt to represent precedes the structure of self inaugurated by its loss; one 
almost wants to say that this infantile experience is pre-conscious, though not prior to 
perception.  Lacan calls this stage of development the “Real” from which we are 
sundered by our induction into the—for our purposes aptly termed—“Imaginary.”  The 
infant mind does not realize its distinction from the world around it; lacking this capacity 
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for differentiation, it cannot understand time, since we comprehend time through the 
movement and action of bodies relative to one another.  Difference comes to be 
understood by means of withdrawal—of the breast, or to regress even further, the 
constant feeding of the umbilical cord—which forces a vestigial consciousness of 
difference and so institutes a desire, a will to recover that pre-conscious state of perfected
present perception.  That difference is subsequently codified through a Levinasian fear of 
the other: once the self has vestigially contracted into a self, the onset of the other 
becomes threatening; for Levinas, such an unrealized self implicitly enjoins the other not 
to kill her, and in that fear of its own destruction it becomes fully integrated as a 
historical being. But the habit instigated by loss and fear never succeeds in what it sets 
out to accomplish because the loss that motivated habit becomes part of the very thing it 
desires.  The object in which it seeks satiety becomes the agent of its deprivation.  While 
I do not have the space to pursue the argument here, I would suggest that this habitual 
logic structures the temporality of Hell.
For Augustine as for Dante, such desirables—though partial and temporary—bear
a typological affinity to God.  They prefigure the “rest,” the cessation of movement 
through time, that one can only experience when one desires God alone.  When Dante 
locates the disire of God within the intellect, he references this Augustinian allegorization
of particular instances of desire—the intellect, as an interpretive faculty, coordinates the 
meaning of such instances into the more generalized desire of human temporality for 
presence.  Time and history take their being from presence—they are predicated on 
events that once passed through the oculus of presence, or which will eventually do so—
and yet by their nature they lack presence.  For Augustine, then, when we allow our 
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desires to be organized by the past, we are participating in sin, the order of non-being; 
however, when we read such habituated desires as an attempt to seek presence, we can 
allegorize their meaning into a new, transcendent desire.  This desire, when 
consummated, does not so much escape history and lived temporality as it fulfills what 
they implied all along; so Augustine, in his Vision at Ostia, experiences a moment of 
contemplative contact with the divine from within his autobiographical narrative, an 
experience from which he necessarily returns sighing.  So, for Dante too, the vision of 
God is accompanied by a return to lived experience, and it is under the sign of this return 
that his entire narrative is written.12  
Yet though Augustine’s narrative suggests the necessity—perhaps dogged—of 
uniting temporal experience with its transcendence, Dante’s substantial revision of 
Augustine and the other philosophers and theologians that preceded him remains that he 
figures the transcendence itself in spatial terms.  The immemorability that characterizes 
all such experiences does not take him out of time, but situates him more fully in it.  The 
invocation we have been exploring is the first indication of this—it spatializes the 
intellect, the faculty closest to God and responsible for abstracting sensory experience.  It 
reintegrates another of the soul’s primary faulties—the will—to offer a foreshadowing of 
Dante himself standing before God in the Empyrean.  Yet both the invocation and what it 
foreshadows are starkly temporal in character.  To briefly treat Dante’s vision of God, 
whereas most medieval mystics and theologians expressed the vision of God as a sort of 
unification, a loss of the self in which the self becomes absorbed in the God’s presence, 
12  As John Freccero argues, the autobiographical conceit of Dante's text requires a sort of death to his 
former self.  Autobiography assumes that the author writing the record of his life is radically different from 
the self that he narrates; the author must reach a point of finality and completion for his prior life to be 
subject to narration.  See Rachel Jacoff's excellent analysis of this point in Freccero's thought in The 
Poetics of Conversion, xii-xiii.
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Dante very clearly remains a distinct figure, integrated both spatially and mentally.  The 
most startling feature of the Empyrean is how it treats vision—whereas one would expect
vision, the primary faculty through which we understand space and time, to become 
slowly superfluous during Dante’s ascent, in fact vision becomes perfect.  Dante is 
capable of seeing the objects populating the Empyrean at whatever remove; at the 
moment he perfects vision, Dante also perfects distance and space.  As he gazes upward 
toward God, then, he figures God as still impossibly distant, yet available to him through 
perception.  This is not to say that Dante spatializes God, which would be clearly 
heretical; but he avoids that heresy by positing an inverse relationship between insight 
and vision: the more one understands God, the further one is from him.  The vision of 
God does not absorb Dante, though it absorbs his attention; rather, his perfected vision 
penetrates ever deeper but never to the end of God’s being.  That distance actually 
situates him more fully in his own spatiotemporal experience by positing the annihilation 
in God inherent in many theological and philosophical accounts at an ever increasing 
remove.  In God’s incarnational depths, he even seems to see a reflection of the human 
person—Christ—residing in the perfect presence of the Trinity.  Thus, even after Dante’s 
alta fantasia is finally exhausted,13 his metaphor is one of a perfectly sustained orbit 
rather than one of absorption: “volgeva il mio disio e ‘l velle,/ sì come rota ch’igualmente
è mossa,/ l’Amor che move il sole e l’altre stelle” [the Love that moves the sun and the 
other stars turned my desire and will, as a wheel that is evenly moved].  The final image 
13  In the Aristotelian terms deployed above, “fantasia” occupies a contentious and somewhat inconsistent 
place in Aristotle’s psychology; however, it generally describes a faculty between perception and thought 
but distinct from the two.  Dante’s admission that his fantasia failed him—far from despatializing the final 
encounter—suggests that he attained an experience of pure, present perception unattended by conventional 
linguistic thought or even the most inchoate slurring of that perception into thought.  Gerard Watson calls 
phantasia “ a remainder, something left over from the actual sensation” (103), indicating that it is also 
implicated in the first descent of perception into memory.  The key section of de Anima on phantasia is 3.3.
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is one in which Dante participates in the temporality marked out in the Heavens; his 
spatial vision of the Empyrean does not render transcendence static or somehow outside 
of time, but rather sets the temporality that desire defines for will in a perfect, unending 
revolution.  The final vision thus resembles something like Gregory’s desire of desire: 
Dante continues to live in the world, yet the temporal experience his vision has enabled 
constantly transcends history to participate in God’s presence.
Still, some specter of Neoplatonic disembodiment may yet haunt this notion of 
disire as the cessation of temporality in the invocation.  But Dante clarifies, in the 
following stanza, the relationship between this transcendent experience and memory:
Veramente quant’ io del regno santo
ne la mia mente potei far tesoro,
sarà ora materia del mio canto.
[Truly, as much of the holy realm as I was able to make treasure in my 
mind will now be the matter of my song.]
Most translators feel the need to signal the apparent contradiction between this stanza and
the one preceding it by rendering the “veramente” as a qualifying conjunction like 
“however,” or “nevertheless.”  Yet, if my analysis of the prior lines is correct, there is no 
real contradiction in Dante’s suggestion that he possesses memories of the intellectual 
experience that transcended memory.  Indeed, it would be more remarkable if, given the 
spatial metaphor and its anticipation of an even more starkly spatial Empyrean, he did not
have some memory to record; the entirety of the Paradiso stretching out before us would 
stand as witness disavowing its own first claim.  The failure of memory in the above lines
becomes one solely of quantity:  the plenitude of presence abounding in Paradise 
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overwhelms his capacity to parse it into memorial images.  Where in the previous lines 
Dante seemed to criticize memory, here he appears indulgent—its capacity to reify 
temporality into discrete mnemonic artifacts is imagined as a treasuring.  Notably, 
mnemonic conversion is not primarily rendered as a verb, but rather as the noun “tesoro,”
into which the “regno santo” must be fashioned; it is these fragmented artifacts of the 
total experience that Dante represents into the even more material “materia” of his song.  
This last line admits to a second relevant interpretation: the “materia del mio canto” is 
simultaneously the represented images of his song and the linguistic matter comprising 
the “canto”—the poetic division that has structured all three realms—at the moment we 
read the phrase.  The suggestion is admittedly subtle, but already Dante is proposing a 
unification of these divergent, seemingly opposed modes of linguistic perception.  The 
transcendence of memory does not entail its renunciation; intellective perception simply 
becomes superabundant as it nears God’s presence.  Dante’s representation thus, from its 
outset, becomes a text that is at least as much about the unrepresentable lacunae in his 
text as it is the objects he is capable of representing.
To summarize, Dante’s personification of the intellect, while it suggests the sort of
delineation between faculties common to medieval theology, actually succeeds in 
blurring the margins between such categories.  Intellect both perceives and wills, 
traveling through a space that metonymically represents the poet’s own journey here at its
outset.  Though he distinguishes and disavows memory, this intellect seems to possess it 
also until reaching the innermost depths of deity.  Dante presents a reintegrative vision of 
an intellect whose experience of God relies on time and perception.  Rather than 
presenting a Neoplatonic vision, which would abstract, dematerialize and detemporalize 
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the subject, Dante’s understanding of presence arises from temporal experience as an 
alternative mode of perceiving bodily existence.  Mystical accounts of rapture from 
Augustine to Bernard and beyond were deeply informed by the former tradition, making 
the narrativity of Paradise one of his most important responses to theology and 
philosophy.  The immemorability topos he offers at the beginning of his text does not 
gesture toward this sort of detemporalized Paradise as we might expect, but rather to a 
plenitude of lived experience that overflows the images contained in the memory.  Those 
images are parsed and cut from an infinitely divisible—and so indivisible, constantly 
mobile—temporality; within Paradise, each successive, sinuous moment of that 
temporality achieves a special resonance that thrusts Dante toward an experience of 
perfect presence in the Empyrean, a journey foreshadowed in the invocation.
Dante’s Perverse Poetics of Resurrection
This immemorability of Paradise places Dante in an especially odd state of affairs 
when we consider it in the context of the events that concluded the Purgatorio.  Dante’s 
ultimate confession and conversion was consummated by his baptism in Lethe, the river 
of forgetfulness.  On its face, the mythological reference—coupled with the 
immemorability topos that begins the Paradiso—would leave Dante with no prior 
memory and no capacity to form new memories. Again, such an image seems to stand 
against the fact of the text, this time retrospectively: as readers, we have just read the 
product of Dante’s memory when we reach the Earthly Paradise, and so we know that 
Dante has modified the concepts of memory and forgetfulness. He not only recollects the 
past of the Comedy itself—the record of his salvation by the grace of Beatrice—but all of 
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the transversal associations and allusions that the text has invoked thus far, both to his 
private life and to literary history. In Canto 31, Beatrice suggests that Lethe washes away 
only memories of evil as she summons him to conversion, saying “le memorie triste/ in te
non sono ancor da l’acqua offense” [the unhappy memories in you have not yet been 
erased by the waters] (11-12).  Dante’s “memorie triste” refer both to a generalized, 
habitual memory of “evil” that caused him to sin and the specific sin of “unhappiness” or 
“sullenness” that beset Dante upon the death of Beatrice.  She makes this clear in her 
subsequent dialogue:
… Per entro i mie’ disiri,
che ti menavano ad amar lo Bene
di là dal qual non è a che s’aspiri,
quai fossi attraversati o quai catene
trovasti, per che del passare innanzi
dovessiti così spogliar la spene? (22-27)
[Within my charms, which were leading you to love the Good of that 
place beyond which there is nothing to which one aspires, what ditches 
obstructed or what chains did you find, that consequently you had to strip 
yourself of the hope of passing beyond?]
Dante thwarted this movement toward the good “tosto che ‘l vostro viso si nascose” [as 
soon as your face hid itself] (36). Though Beatrice will at least partially censure Dante’s 
desire of herself within the next few stanzas—insofar as it sought a transitory, material 
object—here she imagines it in the typological relationship described above.  Such desire
—since it allowed Dante to comprehend beauty—gestures toward the experience of 
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Paradise, the better object of human aspiration.  Dante again makes this typology of 
desire explicitly Augustinian:  the “catene” of line 25 recalls the metaphor of chains by 
which Augustine described habitual desires in the Confessions.  Chains, for Augustine, 
represent the historical procedures of memory, where each link is a particular event 
reinstantiating some desire (8.5.10).  These habits are both confining and inexplicable, 
their search for originary fulfillment dwindling into obscurity.  They bind us not only to 
our own past, but to an entire perception of time as a causal history, organized by desires 
seeking an elusive satiety. 
As she castigates Dante, Beatrice further defines these memorie triste, in part, by 
means of an allusion to the vision of the Siren in Canto 19.  Beatrice explicitly relates his 
sin to this scene when she says 
Tuttavia, perché mo vergogna porte
del tuo errore, e perché altra volta,
udendo le serene, sie più forte,
pon giù il seme del piangere, e ascolta. (31.43-46).
[However, so that you may now bear the shame of your error, and so that 
another time, hearing the sirens, you may be stronger, lay down the seed 
of weeping and listen.]
Beatrice ties Dante’s dream of the Siren to his material attachment to her body—the seed 
of his weeping and the shame he must bear—in these lines. This earlier episode occurred 
immediately after Dante had passed through the terrace of the slothful, a sin which holds 
special relevance for him.  In its less personal dimension, Dante imagines sloth as the 
typological inversion of contemplative detachment from the world, as Jeremy Tambling 
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has suggested.  As Vergil explains to him in Canto 17, the amore d’animo [love of the 
mind] “puote errar per male obietto/ o per troppo o per poco di vigore” [can err through 
an evil object or through too much or too little vigor] (95-96).  The measure of one’s love
for any object should proceed from its relation to God—all creatures must ultimately 
refer back to their creator, and they should be loved by virtue of the religious insight they 
offer.  No object of desire is intrinsically desirable without this relationship since, as 
Augustine argued, God is the only object of our love that is innately desirable.  This 
prioritization of the love of God over the love of any object effectively places the material
world at an intellectual remove from the contemplative; it detaches us from the interior 
hermeneutic of desire within the world by locating the final source of desirability outside 
of the world.  The majority of the sins Dante encounters on his road err on the side of too 
vigorously valuing some good that, loved in moderation, would be acceptable.  However, 
in the terrace of the slothful, he encounters the inverse—the sort of exhaustion with the 
world that Tambling relates to the monastic sin of acedia, a “lack of care, listlessness... 
[or] indolence of the heart” (56).  The sin of the slothful prefigures contemplative 
detachment, but it lacks both the insight that reinvigorates earthly objects with 
desirability and the desire that offers people their first glimpse of the divine.
In its more personal dimension, this sin suggests to Dante the extreme 
indifference to the world he experiences after, and even before Beatrice’s death.  The two 
primary types of sin Vergil defines are in fact intertwined for Dante, since that 
indifference resulted from the loss of the woman he desired out of measure.  The Vita 
Nuova records how Dante’s fixation on her death accompanied and coexisted with his 
celebrations of her beauty.  In Chapter 23, Dante is visited by a sickness that prompts him
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to consider his lady’s mortality, that “di necessitade convene che la gentilissima Beatrice 
alcuna volta si muoia” [of necessity it must be that the most gentle Beatrice, at some 
time, must die]; he says that the very thought of her death
mi giunse uno sì forte smarrimento, che chiusi li occhi e cominciai a 
travagliare sì come farnetica persona ed a imaginare in questo modo: che 
ne lo incominciamento de lo errare che fece la mia fantasia apparvero a 
me certi visi di donne scapigliate, che mi diceano:  ‘Tu pur morrai’; e poi, 
dopo queste donne m’apparvero certi visi diversi e orribili a vedere, li 
quali mi diceano: ‘Tu se’ morto.’
[wrought in me so strong a sense of loss that I closed my eyes, and my 
imagination began to torment me, like a delireous person, and to conjure 
up images in this way: so that at the beginning of this wandering that my 
fantasy made, certain faces of disheveled women began to appear to me, 
that said to me “you too will die;” and then, after these women, certain 
faces, various and horrible, appeared to me, the which said to me “you are 
dead.]
Oddly enough, Dante’s fixation on the death of Beatrice is transformed here into a 
relatively selfish reflection on his own death.  As he preemptively mourns her, Dante 
implies that he already understands the transgression that he will confront on the cusp of 
Paradise: his brand of fetishistic love reduces the experience of beauty to a historical 
event.  In essence, it fails to allegorize the beloved—to read her beauty as a trace of 
divine grace—then subsequently fails to typologically recast every other object in the 
world as a participant in that allegory. Beauty offers a glimpse of a more intuitive, fluid 
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experience of time that instigated the “new life” Dante imagines as a preliminary 
conversion, prefiguring his baptism in Lethe; however, in locating that experience solely 
in one object, he has resituated beauty within time and history.  Beatrice’s death thus 
seems to fracture and multiply through time into the ugly, dissheveled faces—whose 
description anticipates Dante’s transformation of the Siren—of women who are only 
capable of reminding Dante of his own, and everyone else’s, mortality.  These mementi 
mori prefigure how Dante will experience the world after Beatrice has died: feminine 
grace will be transformed into a grim specter of death to come, the world will be 
evacuated of significance.  All faces will become capable of representing only their 
tendency toward non-being rather than their present animation; they constitute only a 
habit performed over and over, recollecting an originary experience of presence.  This 
loss will be multiplied almost indefinitely by time, making every moment not torturous—
torture actually implies an experience of the fluidity of time at the other extreme of 
sensation—but senseless; this loss actually inverts the typological relationship Dante 
should adopt toward objects in the world: rather than understanding them as typological 
shadows of the grace he finds fully realized in Beatrice—who is herself an allegorized 
figure of the grace of God—Dante deprives them of any relationship to his beloved in 
order to make his experience of her more singular. Since Dante imagines this new mode 
of perception before her death, he even suggests that it infects even his experience of 
Beatrice herself; it coexists with the experience of presence she enables, which is 
transformed into an event and so lodged within history.  Beatrice prompts Dante to 
transcend memory but Dante converts transcendence back into a memorial event.  The 
consummate evil of this new mode of perception is that it makes all exterior signs refer to
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the desiring subject rather than to God.  Their present being, which they derive from God,
comes to only signify the historical destiny of the subject—his attempt to colonize and 
possess the beloved.  The world is configured around Dante’s fetishism of Beatrice—
objects within it become either means to the end of his acquiring her, or vacant symbols 
of her non-presence—and so everything, including Beatrice herself, loses its resonance in
the face of its impending dissolution.  Dante thereby perverts his own present being as 
well into a symbol of its future, dying before he is dead, as the proximity between the 
faces’ future and present statements indicate.
This evacuation is not only sinful, but disingenuous, since it pretends to evacuate 
desire when it really just locates desire in a different object: death.  Death, to the 
medieval world, required an allegorical logic to avert the ongoing tragedy of the world: 
the temporary quality of any given object of desire forced us not to locate a self-
sustaining meaning in it, but rather to look for meaning in God, the ground of a being that
exceeds the subjective duration of any given life span.  However Dante—along with most
people—found this allegorical procedure extremely difficult to actualize in practice.  As 
Beatrice tells him in the Earthly Paradise, earthly objects provide the first means by 
which everyone experiences God; but due to their obvious perceptibility, they more often 
prompt mourning rather than contemplation.  Mourning, contrary to common sense, is 
not authentically an evacuation of desire—so long as we live, human beings cannot cease
to desire since we cannot cease to will; our being is will, even if we will only to languish 
inertly.  Rather, mourning displaces desire onto death, the perverse parody of the end to 
desire Dante hopes to find in God.  In the Vita Nuova, Dante very deliberately projects his
idea of Beatrice onto the figure of Death—after seeing her dead body, wearing a look of 
106
infinite humility in his vision, he summons Death:  “Dolcissima Morte, vieni a me, e non 
m’esser villana, però che tu dei essere gentile, in tal parte se’ stata.  Or vieni a me, che 
molto ti disidero; e tu lo vedi, ché io porto già lo tuo colore” [Sweetest Death, come to 
me, and do not be boorish to me, since you must be gentle, to have been in such a place.  
Now come to me, for I desire you greatly, and you see that I already bear your colours] 
(23).  We need not belabor the eroticized portrayal of Death to perceive it here—not only 
has Death recently been inside the space of Beatrice’s body, but Dante coos to him in the 
idiom of Romance.  Love seems to possess the luf-daunger of the Romantic woman—
daunger in Romance indicates a sort of feigned rejection of the lover that indefinitely 
defers courtship.14  In doing so, it incites the desire of the lover.  Just so, the usually cruel 
Death has been gentled by his occupancy within Beatrice.  Yet the desire for Death, 
unlike the desire for Beatrice, requires an interminable courtship—Dante, in fact, ensures 
that he will not be left bereft of his new beloved.
This displaced love of death is the only way Dante can persist in his old paradigm 
of desire; it offers a perverted, sullen experience of presence in which the anticipation of 
Dante’s own death offers him a new sense of temporality.  This is, even still, a familiar 
trope—as in the cavalier “carpe diem” poems, the fragility of some desired object can 
offer a more intense experience of its presence.  The death in things—their historicity—
becomes the focus of their desirability.  Poetry becomes the instantiation of this shifted 
focus for Dante.  In his second canzone on the death of Beatrice, Dante demonstrates how
this displacement works:
Dannomi angoscia li sospiri forte,
quando ‘l pensero ne la mente grave
14  On this concept, see Barron 1-3.
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mi reca quella che m’ha ‘l cor diviso:
e spesse fiate pensando a la morte,
venemene un disio tanto soave,
che mi tramuta lo color nel viso.
E quando ‘l maginar mi ven ben fiso,
giugnemi tanta pena d’ogne parte
ch’io mi riscuoto per dolor ch’i’ sento. (31.43-51)
[Anguish gives me deep sighs/ when the thought in my heavy mind/ 
recalls her who has divided my heart from me:/ and often while thinking 
about death,/ there comes to me a desire so sweet/ that the color in my 
face is changed./ And when the image is well fixed in me/ such sweet pain
reaches me from every side/ that I shake myself through the pain I feel.]
The vivification Dante once felt while in the presence of Beatrice occurs, after her death, 
through his poetic reconstitutions of her memory; but his former desire for her has been 
overlaid with his consciousness that it is a recollection and a representation.  His sighs 
become a new form of animation—literally an “anima,” which term is etymologically 
related to breath—that suffuse him with color and unite his members with a common 
purpose.  He recognizes poetry as what it always was:  a representation, which 
fundamentally assumes the absence of whatever it represents.  But rather than becoming 
simply slothful, he uses his poetic imagines of loss to reinvigorate himself, even as they 
remain artifacts of his initial dissolution.
These reanimated artifacts come to so thoroughly define Dante’s desire that he 
personifies his canzone in its totality as Beatrice’s sullen surrogate:
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Pietosa mia canzone, or va piangendo;
e ritruova le donne e le donzelle
a cui le tue sorelle
erano usate di portar letizia;
e tu, che se’ figliuola di tristizia,
vatten disconsolata a star con elle. (31.71-76)
[My piteous poem, now go, weeping,/ and rediscover the ladies and the 
maidens/ to whom your sisters/ were used to convey joy;/ and you, who 
are the daughter of sadness,/  go hence, disconsolate, to be with them.]
Dante imagines all of his poems as daughters of his union with Beatrice here, an image 
which, read in the light of those poems, has definite incestuous connotations; his earlier 
poems record the experience of presence that Dante felt as he courted Beatrice.  Here, he 
refigures courtship itself as sexual consummation—the daunger which invigorated him 
was tantamount to the consummation it deferred. His earlier poems are imagined as 
secondary records of the primary experience of presence this sexual metaphor implies: a 
child always fundamentally represents some earlier moment of climax, and sex is a 
primary metaphor for the experience of presence.  However, the donna tristizia testifies 
more to the need for continuance inherent in the drive to propogate.  This child is a 
product of Dante’s union with the death that inhabits Beatrice, the death onto whom his 
desire has been displaced.  She records not the presence implied in sexual climax, but the 
fear of death and the need for continuance.  But as a representation of the need for 
continuance, she paradoxically becomes yet another memento mori, testifying to her 
mother’s death.  She is a poem, self-conscious of her status as poem; in creating her, 
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Dante attempted to represent her mother in language, but the language, at its surface, only
testified to its existence as language and not as the body of Beatrice.  Dante infects his 
entire corpus with that self-consciousness when he instructs his figliuola to go stand, 
disconsolate, among her sisters; beyond his own corpus, he even attempts to infect his 
audience—the donne and donzelle who read his earlier works—with this consciousness.15
The ghastly visi he saw prior to Beatrice’s death are reconfigured as his own poems here, 
which in their misguided effort to reference Beatrice now only reinstitute her loss.  Again,
he insinuates that the inevitability of death has suffused even his happiest, most 
celebratory memories of her; those moments of presence that organized his desire have 
been fully subsumed back into a consciousness of her as a historical being.  This morose 
recollection, however, rejoins the scattered members of her body into the disconsolate 
image of the poem; the sadness itself proves to be an animating force—perhaps, Dante 
muses in a peculiarly Ovidian moment, the only animating force available to him or 
anyone.  This reconfiguration of his poetics offers to Dante a new, incestuous drive to 
make his own poetic recollections of Beatrice the object of his desire.
This final move especially—in which loss that the poem records itself becomes 
the anima of the beloved—permits us to understand Dante’s Siren.  While Dante watches 
the slothful run about their terrace, he indolently falls from one thought into another, and 
ultimately into a dream state—a procedure of free-association that resembles the delirium
in which he saw the dissheveled visi above.  The product of Dante’s slothful vision is 
likewise similar to those faces:  “mi venne in sogno una femmina balba,/ ne li occhi 
guercia e sovra i piè distorta,/ con le man monche, e di colore scialba” [a stammering 
15  This image signals one of the principal shifts we will discover in Boccaccio’s response to Dante in the 
Decameron: Boccaccio’s poem also imagines sad, love-lorn ladies, but it purports to distract them rather 
than to reify itself into one of them, then infect them with an irrecuperable sadness.
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woman came to me in a dream, cross-eyed and distorted on her feet, with maimed hands 
and pale of color] (19.7-9).  Much of the criticism on Dante’s Siren has explored the 
analogues that generate her transformation from this corpse-like figure into an image of a 
beautiful women.  Yet in all the criticism, I have never seen suggested what seems to me 
unavoidable:  the Siren is the, quite literal, corpse of Beatrice.  Whatever other 
resonances she suggests (and of course these are present, if only in the mythological 
name), this significance is preeminent for Dante.  The misshapen image suggests a 
corpse, or rather one of the disheveled zombies of Dante’s vision, a figliuola tristizia 
shambling around and muttering about her death.  Dante offers in her a vicious critique of
his own poetics which, in the perverse act of incestuous necrophilia he imagines in the 
Vita Nuova, recreates those corpses as figures of desire.
This reading of her is born out by the effect of Dante’s gaze:
Io la mirava; e come ‘l sol conforta
le fredde membra che la notte aggrava,
così lo sguardo mio le facea scorta
la lingua, e poscia tutta la drizzava
in poco d’ora, e lo smarrito volto,
com’amor vuol, così le colorava. (19.10-15)
[I gazed at her; and as the sun comforts the cold members that the night 
weighs down, just so my gaze made her tongue sensible, and then 
straightened all of her in a short time, and colored her lost face, just as 
love desires.]
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Dante’s gaze, in a very literal sense, resurrects the femmina balba, transforming her 
deformed, maimed body into a shape “com’amor vuol.”  In a supreme instance of hubris, 
Dante likens his gaze to the sun, an image that in the Convivio and Paradiso he will use 
as the primary analogy for God.16  Dante’s gaze becomes a parodic rendering of God’s act
of creation, vivifying (expressed through the romantically pregnant conforta) the cold 
membra that night had rendered all but inert; it confers intelligibility to the siren’s 
stuttering lingua, and suffuses her smarrito volto with the same color that the desire of 
death had offered Dante himself.  The analogy between this episode and his earlier, poetic
resurrection of Beatrice should be evident17—Dante’s gaze rejoins the members of the 
siren’s body into a whole, overlaying its decay with a new anima. He attempts to restore 
the grace of Beatrice’s limbs to his figuration of her which, as Dante discovers in the 
Heaven of the Sun, is the fundamental point of the resurrection.  The blessed yearn to 
return to their bodies because their bodies will more perfectly manifest the grace of God. 
Soul and body are properly joined together; the embodied soul is more perfect than the 
disembodied one, just as poetry is ultimately, for Dante, is preferable to theology.  Poetry 
has the capacity to both reflect deity and to usurp its privilege.  Significantly, Dante 
imagines his poetic activity in this incident not as writing or speaking, but as an act of 
seeing, emphatically reinforced by both mirava and sguardo.  Dante’s transgression is to 
fetishistically focus on the referent of his poem, even though the poem itself testifies to 
its removal and difference from that referent.  Poetic words attempt to become something 
other than what they are, and in their attempt to reanimate the dead and reconsummate 
16  See Freccero 243-44.
17  Mazzotta, following Grandgent, notes that “the Siren’s 'sweet voice' constitutes a specifcally poetic 
temptation” (Poet of the Desert, 141).
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union with her, produce monstrous children capable only of representing their distance 
from what they try to represent—children onto whom the poet then displaces a perverse 
erotic desire; just so, Dante sabotages the image of the Siren for both us and himself by 
describing the deformed template upon which he erects his representation.
Dante’s poetic activity is figured as this referential gaze, but the Siren also uses 
language to reconstitute herself.  Once Dante’s gaze has performed the initial act of 
resurrection, she becomes complicit in its figuration:
“Io son,” cantava, “io son dolce serena,
che’ marinari in mezzo mar dismago,
tanto son di piacere a sentir piena.
Io volsi Ulisse del suo cammin, vago
al canto mio, e qual meco s’ausa
rado sen parte, sì tutto l’appago!” (19.19-24)
[“I am,” she sung, “I am a sweet siren, who enchanted the sailors in the 
middle of the sea, so full of pleasure I am to sense.  I turned Ulysses from 
his road, charmed by my song, and whoever becomes used to me rarely 
leaves me, so fully do I satisfy him!]
Like Dante’s figliuola tristizia, the Siren is only able to sing of herself; she acquires a 
semblance of agency and substantiality in her frantic attempts to reify the desirability 
with which Dante’s gaze has endowed her.  Poetry creates a vicious circle in which the 
poet’s gaze, once instantiated in the poem, reinforces the beauty of the object that 
motivated itself; it creates a circle of self-justification that legitimates the original desire 
and short circuits any attempt to allegorize it.  The representation satisfies so fully 
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because it is self-justifying; it lodges Ulysses—whom the Middle Ages often understood 
as an allegorical figure of philosophical desire—in the hermeneutic circle of the world.  
Yet, as we have seen, the representation can never succeed in becoming the object it 
attempts to represent, and so—by means of its resemblance—it becomes primarily a 
signifier of its difference from the beloved.  Like any habit, subsequent recollections of 
the original act are both fulfilling and exhausted; the threat of its dissolution, its 
becoming meaningless, is part of the motivation for reduplicating it.  The poet comes to 
value the fetishized memory more than the object of desire itself, and so, as Beatrice 
suggests in the Earthly Paradise, is averted from seeking the good by the very object 
which gives access to the good.
Beatrice singularly intervenes in Dante’s dream, signalling its importance to 
Dante’s project.  She appears to Vergil and fiercly asks “O Virgilio, Virgilio, chi è 
questa?” [O Vergil, Vergil, who is this?] (19.28).  Vergil, always stoic in such matters of 
desire—indeed, this scene may give us an inkling of why Beatrice chose him above all 
other figures as Dante’s guide18—tears off the Siren’s clothes, showing Dante her stinking
belly, presumably her material entrails, the womb from which he hoped to draw the 
figliuola tristizia.  This last image is redolent of the denuding of Marsyas which I will 
explore in some detail below; for now, I will simply note that Vergil reveals the Siren for 
what she always was—the smelly corpse of Beatrice’s physical body.  The tableau 
Beatrice creates in her appearance already suggests this; she appears to contrast the 
allegorized grace that Dante should have loved in her with the material body that Dante’s 
poetry had fetishized.  We do not fully understand this implication, however, until we 
reach the Earthly Paradise, where Beatrice’s first words bitterly echo the first words of 
18  On the relationship between Virgilian stoicism and Dante's choice of guide, see Wetherbee 10.
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the Siren: “Guardaci ben!  Ben son, ben son Beatrice” [Look well here! Well I am, well I 
am Beatrice] (30.73).  Beatrice ridicules Dante’s animating sguardo by enjoining him to 
“guardaci ben;” her repeated “ben son” ironically reflect the Siren’s repeated “io son” 
while also signalling Beatrice’s outrage at his desecration of her.  She thus begins his 
rehabilitation by criticizing the model of poetics he had articulated through the image of 
the Siren, setting her paradisiacal self in stark contrast to the fetishistic grace of his 
reanimation of her.
Unexpectedly, Dante finds himself bereft of tears when he sees Beatrice again; the
poet who had made a veritable homunculus of his tears and sighs finds those tears frozen 
around his heart.  It is not the grace of Beatrice that looses them, but rather the 
sympathetic song of her attendants liquefies them to “spirito e acqua” [spirit and water] 
(98).  His tears must achieve a different character than those he had wept earlier; only the 
tears of the penitent will satisfy the debt that must be paid to enter Lethe, not the tears of 
mourning.  The loss that generates mourning only instills memory further, entrenching 
the subject more deeply into history.  While Dante’s freed tears suggest an inchoate 
penitence, Beatrice remains initially unmoved.  Rather, as a lawyer accusing Dante, she 
turns to the ladies and informs them that, while she was on earth
il sostenni col mio volto:
mostrando li occhi giovanetti a lui,
meco il menava in dritta parte vòlto.
Sì tosto come in su la soglia fui
di mia seconda etade e mutai vita,
questi si tolse a me e diessi altrui. (121-25)
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[I sustained him with my face: showing my young eyes to him, I led him 
with me turned to the right place.  Yet as soon as I was on the threshold of 
my second age and changed life, he took himself from me and gave 
himself to another.]
The implication of infidelity is an odd one for Dante, who continued to worship Beatrice 
long after her death, as we have seen.  In fact, the Vita Nuova has shown us that Dante 
essentially lacked the capacity for infidelity—any other woman he loved was a dim 
shadow of Beatrice; he asked his own poems to infect all other women with her grim 
countenance.  Whatever real infidelity Beatrice may refer to here, Dante’s primary 
infidelity was, ironically, his devotion to her.  Beatrice never repudiates the sustenance 
her face gave him; if anything, she suggests that the beauty that initially drew Dante to 
her increased upon her death: “bellezza e virtù cresciuta m’era” [beauty and power had 
matured in me] (128).  She is not disavowing the experience of spatial beauty, nor can we
even say she is entirely allegorizing it, if allegorization entails removing that beauty from
time and space.  She is suggesting that the experience of presence he found in her 
remained available, even more so, after her death when he no longer needed to 
fetishistically attach it to her alone.  The young eyes grow up, but do not lose their grace
—as Paradise will show, her eyes in fact become incomparable loci of radiance.  Yet 
Dante was unable to understand what his experience of her indicated about existence 
itself; he localized the experience of grace and so initiated the cryptogram of memory and
desire we have been exploring.  He, instead, fixated on her corpse, transformed its 
crossed eyes into Beatrice’s clear ones and tried to maintain an unsustainable model of 
desire.
116
Beatrice elaborates on the transgression of that model and the allegorization of 
beauty in Canto 31, where she outlines why her death should have more fully turned him 
toward the good:
Mai non t’appresentò natura o arte
piacer quanto le belle membra in ch’io
rinchiusa fui, e sono in terra sparte;
e se ‘l sommo piacer sì ti fallio
per la mia morta, qual cosa mortale
dovea poi trarre te nel suo disio? (49-54)
[Never did nature or art present to you as much pleasure as the beautiful 
members in which I was enclosed, and which are scattered in the earth; 
and if the greatest pleasure so failed you upon my death, what mortal thing
should then draw you into its desire?]
Beatrice explicitly notes that Dante fetishized the pleasure he took in seeing her beautiful 
members, which were only an enclosure for the spirit that animated them.  Those 
members were the vehicle for a deeper grace that ran though Beatrice, but he located that 
grace only in her skin, as it were.  He failed to generalize the experience of her beauty, to 
realize that the presence and being he felt with her is a condition of existence, not the 
provenance of some partial and temporary cosa moratale.  Mortal things are rather signs 
of the presence of God; the mortality in them is their conceptualization as a historical 
body rather than a participant in presence.  This reduction of the beautiful object to its 
body renders it discrete and mortal, makes its desirability “suo disio” rather than a sign of
God’s preeminent presence, which is the ground of desirability.  As Beatrice goads Dante 
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toward penitence, she presents him with an interpretation of her beauty that transcends 
such partial manifestations without disavowing them.  This penitence prepares him for 
the baptism in Lethe that will wash away this historicized model of desire with the 
immemorability of the perfect presence beauty implies.
Lethe, however, does not wash away this memory of evil—or we might now say, 
the evil of memory—alone, nor the memory of Dante’s sadness at Beatrice’s death; it also
washes away the unhappiness of repentance, the immediate unhappiness that Dante 
suffers in Canto 31—a move which equates it with Augustinian grace.  Augustine’s 
conversion is unique in proceeding not from his own self-chastisement or philosophical 
inquiry.  The entire course of the Confessions actually demonstrates how ineffectual such 
measures are in inspiring constant good action; the chains of habit cannot be broken by 
an act of will since habit was instigated by will in Eden.  After his tearful scene in the 
garden at Milan, he embarks on a long excursus explaining the fundamental brokenness 
of the will. Will is essentially ascetic in the sense that, when we are conscious of willing, 
we have already failed to desire whatever we will. We desire something else, but desire 
that we did not desire it; or to approach it from the other direction, we do not desire what 
we will, but rather desire that we desired it.  It is ultimately the utter debasement 
Augustine feels after his repeated attempts to convert that allows him to finally succeed; 
he no longer conceives of the act as occurring through his own volition, but rather 
through the grace of God.  In Dante’s conversion, Lethe represents this final movement 
toward an unwilled, unmerited grace.  After he is rebuked by Beatrice for his desire of 
material things, he is commanded to gaze at her again.  Upon doing so, he begins to see 
her with different eyes:
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Sotto ‘l suo velo e oltre la rivera
vincer pariemi più sé stessa antica,
vincer che l’altre qui, quand’ella c’era.
Di penter sì mi punse ivi l’ortica
che di tutte altre cose qual mi torse
 più nel suo amor, più mi si fé nemica.
Tanta riconoscenza il cor mi morse
ch’io caddi vinto, e quale allora femmi
salsi colei che la cagion mi porse. (82-91)
[Beneath her veil and beyond the river she seemed to me to conquer her 
old self more than she conquered the others here, when she was there.  
The nettle of repentance so stung me then that whatever of all other things
had turned me most toward its love now made itself most hateful to me.  
So much recognition bit my heart that I fell, conquered, and what I then 
became she knows who gave me cause.]
Beatrice’s speech to Dante has introduced a reverse order of negative desire that makes 
his previous desires seem at best inadequate, and at worst outright hateful.  Her speech 
has prompted the “riconoscenza”—a term which literally entails the acknowledgement of
his sin, but which can also, in this context, be justifiably rendered as a term for memory, a
“re-knowing”—of sin that results in his swoon.  But a hidden danger lurks in Dante’s 
repentance, just as it did in Augustine’s.  Beatrice’s new spiritual beauty surpasses her old
physical beauty, but it is still enmeshed within the same matrix of desire, as indicated by 
the comparison drawn between the two. The emphatically repeated verb here is 
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“vincere,” which entails an ascetic logic: Beatrice’s spirituality competes with her 
physicality, and so upon announcing the full inversion of his desires, Dante falls 
conquered.  The shame prompted by Dante’s recollection of his sins—the exact 
recollection toward which Beatrice has been goading him—is fraught with an 
ambivalence about its own efficacy.
Dante’s debasement, like Augustine’s, is preliminary to the action of grace, but it 
is not directly responsible for his final conversion.  For that, more than an ascetic turning 
away is required—Dante must, in fact, forget both his sins and the even inverse order of 
repentance, once it has satisfied justice.  After Dante’s falls, Beatrice drags him into the 
river where she finally coos to him in the lover’s refrain:  “Tiemmi, tiemmi” [hold me, 
hold me] (93).  Ironically, only after Dante ceases to desire her transgressively does 
Beatrice fulfill the role of the lover, and only then to draw him into a river that will cause 
him to forget why he solicited such words from her in the first place.  This is not to say 
that Lethe will eliminate all erotic attraction per se, but only that he will cease to fetishize
her as the sole agent of grace in the universe.  When he appreciates her beauty after his 
baptism, it is no longer under the sign of memory, whose experience of presence entails 
its own loss; rather, he experiences the presence of God that animates her, and that makes
her an agent of grace in both senses of the word.  Divine grace is figured in the grace of 
her body; it is this grace that, as Beatrice has just suggested, paradoxically offered Dante 
his first avenue away from transitory desires.  Since he still appreciates her physical 
beauty—we cannot imagine her shade as anything but a reduplication of her body, a fact 
which is ironic given her repudiation of that body. This again does not somehow de-
spatialize her, but it recognizes the experience of presence he first understood, and still 
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understands, through the beauty of her body.  This beauty is now, in the afterlife, a 
consequence of her theological understanding, but to say that her beauty in Paradise is 
somehow intangible or immaterial surely resists the grain of Dante’s narrative.  Rather 
Beatrice allies the two meanings of grace, as she does at the end of Canto 31, when her 
handmaidens beg her “Per grazia, fa noi grazia che disvele/ a lui la bocca tua, sì che 
discerna/ la seconda bellezza che tu cele” [For grace, do for us the grace that unveils your
mouth to him, so that he might discern the second beauty that you conceal].  The 
handmaidens beg Beatrice first to turn her eyes to Dante, then to unveil her mouth, again 
a double symbol of erotic desire and her newly spiritual, discursive nature.  The repetition
of grace suggests three alternate meanings that Dante condenses into one:  first, grace is 
the grace of God of which Beatrice has been the avatar; second, and relatedly, grace is a 
favor, gesturing toward the Augustinian superfluity of unmerited grace; and third, grace 
also aligns with the “bellezza” to suggest the beauty of her physical features.  The three 
become one when read in the context of presence:  the grace of Beatrice’s figure first led 
Dante to understand the good, the perfect presence of God from which all being proceeds.
That grace is what rescued Dante from his crass, materialistic consciousness; he would 
have remained lodged within the trammels of a historicized vision of time had that 
superfluous grace not reflected the experience of presence in God.  
Pierre Hadot locates the provenance of such a conflation of grace, oddly enough, 
in Plotinus.  He notes that, for Plotinus, the experience of love first demonstrates the 
existence of a higher order of Being; we witness in the beloved what Ravaisson termed a 
“eurythmia,” a “movement which does well” (qtd. in Hadot 50).  For Hadot, this fluidity 
of movement gestures toward a supplemental dimension of reality:  “There is in love a 
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‘something more,’ something unjustified; and that which, in objects, corresponds to this 
‘something more’ is grace, or Life in its deepest mystery.  Forms and structures can be 
justified, but life and grace cannot” (50).  Material bodies, in themselves, never suffice to 
explain the experience of love; if they were simply the functionalist, historicized vision 
we often have of them, they could not motivate the experience of desire.  They could not 
captivate our attention if their being did not offer some deeper insight into ourselves and 
being generally; we would forever remain like the cowards banished from both Hell and 
Heaven, perpetually running through time but lacking a definite, consequential form 
through which to manifest God’s gracious present.  Dante recognizes the danger inherent 
in that love:  its premonition can cause us to fetishize a single outlet of grace rather than 
pressing us to realize that grace abounds everywhere, that it manifests a presence shared 
by every existent.  Dante does not repudiate Beatrice’s grace or beauty by forgetting his 
sinful vision of her in Lethe; rather, as in Paradise, the loss of memory moves him nearer 
to the perfect presence that beauty—the aesthetic dimension above form and matter—
always implied.
Dante’s Typology of Irony
In Canto 1 of Paradiso, Dante recollects this baptismal immemorability topos in 
the Ovidian figure of Glaucus.  By extending and reenacting this metaphor, Dante 
reimagines conversion not as a historical event in which the soul turns away from former 
sin toward the good, but rather as an ongoing process of transformation that renders the 
soul more sensitive to presence.  Just as they ascend to Paradise, Dante and Beatrice 
reenact the reflective glance of Canto 31:
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Beatrice tutta ne l’etterne rote
fissa con li occhi stava, e io in lei
le luci fissi, di là sù rimote.
Nel suo aspetto tal dentro mi fei
qual si fè Glauco nel gustar de l’erba
che ‘l fè consorto in mar de li altri dèi.
[Beatrice stood with her eyes entirely fixed on the eternal wheels, and I 
fixed upon the lights in her, removed from that place above.  Through her 
face, I made myself such inward as as Glaucus was made by eating the 
herb which made him consort of the other gods in the sea.]
Dante sees the lights of heaven through the mediation of Beatrice, who sees them more 
directly; while his journey through Paradise will prepare him to see grace as Paul did, 
face to face,19 at the outset of the poem he returns to the almost infantile state at which he 
had gone awry in his life—when, at Beatrice’s death, he had failed to seek God’s 
preeminent grace.  In Canto 31 of Purgatory, his repentance had been effected as he 
gazed at Beatrice, gazing at the gryphon; there he saw the material amalgam of two 
beastly natures become transmuted into a figure of Christ through Beatrice’s allegorizing 
vision.  The recollection of Glaucus similarly reenacts the baptismal scene in Lethe:  as 
Ovid narrates in his Metamorphoses, Glaucus was a fisherman who was transformed into 
a sea god.  After hauling in a catch of fish, he laid them out on a certain plot of grass, that
had never been touched by grazing animals; much to his surprise, the fish miraculously 
returned to life and flopped back into the sea.  Amazed, Glaucus ate some of the grass 
that seemed responsible for their resuscitation and immediately began to change into a 
19  On the relationship between Paradise 1 and Pauline rapture, see Mazzotta, Dante’s Vision, 198.
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sea creature.  After flinging himself into the ocean, other sea creatures conducted him to 
Oceanus and Tethys, requesting that they “mihi quaecumque feram mortalia demant” 
[remove from me whatever mortal things I might bear].20  They did so by means of a 
ritual incantation and a bath fed by a hundred rivers, after which he swooned and 
remembered no more until he awakened, a fully transformed sea God.  Glaucus’s myth 
combines elements of both Dante’s own, prior conversion and Pauline rapture—Dante 
subsequently draws on the mortal purgation of Glaucus to wonder whether both body and
soul or soul alone journeyed to the celestial realm (73-75).  More importantly, however, 
the analogy recapitulates his conversion narrative without figuring it as a simple 
reenactment: the effect of this ongoing conversion implies a progressive transformation.
Glaucus’s story is uncharacteristic in Ovid’s corpus for actually changing the 
mentality of the transformed along with his body.  While analyzing Daphne’s 
transformation into the laurel, Warren Ginsberg offers a more typical paradigm of 
Ovidian metamorphosis.  He notes that, though Daphne’s body is radically altered, her 
silent trembling indicates a continuity between old and new form that her metamorphosis 
has failed to alter.  The new becomes legible by the vestiges of the old it retains; thus “in 
Ovid, nothing is completely new.  Something of the creature that has undergone the 
change survives its metamorphosis to upset all efforts to designate anything univocally” 
(36).  Its new form is, in other words, an ironic alteration of the material surface that 
leaves the substrata of meaning and identity more or less untouched.  For Ginsberg, this 
continuity between old and new forms is what allows Dante to baptize Ovid; Dante 
adapts the concept of metamorphosis, purging it of its nullifying irony, to articulate 
Christian concepts, either in the contrappasso justly punishing sinners or in the 
20  All Latin translations are my own, unless otherwise indicated.
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conversions being slowly wrought upon the denizens of Purgatory. Knowledge of the past
is central to this adaptation:  the punishment that unites all Hell is the deprivation of 
hope, the knowledge that, whatever transformation their bodies might undergo in the face
of God’s torture, their minds and wills are fundamentally set.  
Though Ginsberg’s analysis certainly describes much of the Comedy aptly, it is 
noteworthy that the two Ovidian examples Dante uses to begin Paradiso—Marsyas, 
which I will treat shortly, and Glaucus—require some qualification.  In the case of 
Glaucus, Ovid explicitly states that his mind and will are changed along with his body.  
Certainly, he retains some memory of his prior history, as he recounts his story to Scylla 
in his attempt to woo her, but his transformation remains one of the most thoroughgoing 
in Ovid’s text.  His change of will occurs first, as soon as he eats the grass in fact: “vix 
bene conbiberant ignotos guttura sucos,/ cum subito trepidare intus praecordia sensi/ 
alteriusque rapi naturae pectus amore” [scarcely had my throat drunk the unknown 
liquids when I immediately feel my vitals tremble within and my chest was seized by 
love of another nature] (13.944-46).  Certainly, the violent connotations of Ovidian 
metamorphosis are still present in this description, but Ovid depicts the old love of life on
land being entirely destroyed and usurped by his new love of the water.  Similarly, after 
he has been cleansed in the waters, he relates that “alium me corpore toto ac fueram 
nuper neque eundem mente recepi” [I was wholly other in body than I had recently been, 
and I did not recover with the same mind] (13.958-59).  Glaucus’s transformation is a 
total one altering mind, will and body, only a vestigial memory of his transformation 
remains afterward.21
21  Or, in the medieval parlance used above, his intellect and will seem transformed while his memory 
remains.  Dante excludes the faculty that Glaucus retains just prior to introducing him as a figure for his 
conversion.
125
Dante’s use of the image becomes more complex in what it suggests about this 
remnant memory, however.  Glaucus’s story emerges in the context of his love for Scylla,
who tries to elude him.  Distraught, he turns to Circe for a love potion, only to succeed in 
making Circe love him, become jealous of Scylla, and turn her into a monster.  Ironically,
the erotic attachment that Glaucus conceives for Scylla after his transformation resembles
the erotic attachment Dante conceived for Beatrice before his transformation; she was, in 
the twisting terms of the analogy, almost the Scylla that, as in the case of Ulysses, 
wrecked the little boat of his intellect.  In Dante’s prior life, he was the agent of this 
transformation, however, as he transforms the clearly monstrous corpse into a deceptively
monstrous Siren. The inverse conversion of the analogy suggests one of two alternatives: 
first, it could cast doubt on the efficacy of Dante’s conversion, indicating a certain 
weakness of his vision that still relies on the mediation of Beatrice to see the divine; 
second, it could imply that the transformation was indeed as complete as both Dante’s 
and Ovid’s rhetoric suggests, so complete, in fact, that the dangerous beauty of Scylla has
been renovated along with it.  That Beatrice continues to serve as guide recommends this 
latter alternative. Unlike Scylla, she does not flee Dante’s pursuit—on the contrary, that 
pursuit is precisely what becomes the subject of the metamorphosis; and she is not the 
target of subsequent transformation, but rather its agent.
Dante explains this transformation in the subsequent stanza through an ineffability
topos that, in the context of Glaucus’s thoroughgoing transformation, more closely 
resembles the immemorability topos of the first few stanzas: “Trasumanar significar per 
verba/ non si poria; però l’essemplo basti/ a cui esperïenza grazia serba” [one cannot 
signify transhumanizing per verba; nevertheless let the example suffice for those to 
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whom grace reserves the experience] (70-72).  I have rendered here, perhaps, the easiest 
translation—which follows Durling and Martinez’s essential grammar—though the first 
and last lines admit four possible interpretations in total, all of which are pertinent.  The 
first half can also be rendered “one cannot transhumanize signifying per verba;” the latter
can take experience or grace as subject or object: “let the example suffice for those to 
whom experience preserves grace”.  Dante deliberately situates both grammatically 
similar terms next to one another to allow for each possibility.  In the first case, Glaucus’s
apotheosis recommends “significar” as the main verb to the auxiliary verb “poria,” 
though the alternative more properly describes the poetic difficulty he still struggles with 
despite his own metamorphosis.  Though his conversion altered his poetics from the 
earlier, fetishizing model he had applied to Beatrice, he cannot fundamentally alter the 
conditions of poetic utterance; foreshadowing his eventual resolution, he breaks out of 
the Italian into the Latin per verba to force a surface consciousness of his language.  
“Words” is ironically the referent, but he forces us to translate from a different linguistic 
system to make meaning. In the second half of the stanza, placing grace in the subject 
position indicates the divine provenance of Dante’s experience, but the alternative better 
describes the content of his Paradisiacal experience.  Dante suggests that any of his 
attempts at exceeding signification will only be successful if his reader has also 
experienced grace in the world; the fossilized referents of his words cannot conjure that 
experience unless it can, paradoxically, refer to a transhuman experience in the mind of 
the reader.  The deeply private experience of grace becomes a basis for communication.  
Dante has transformed his former, sinful experience of Beatrice into a vehicle for 
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transcendence, but he must ultimately moor the communicability of that transcendence in
his faith in an audience.
If Glaucus still retains some vestige of his prior self despite Ovid’s seeming 
insistence to the contrary, Dante’s other Ovidian example emphatically does not. In the 
fifth stanza of Canto 1, Dante begins an invocation to Apollo that will culminate in a 
comparison between himself and Marsyas:
O buono Appollo, a l’ultimo lavoro
fammi del tuo valor sì fatto vaso
come dimandi a dar l’amato alloro.
Infino a qui l’un giogo di Parnaso
assai mi fu, ma or con amendue
m’é uopo intrar ne l’aringo rimaso:
entra nel petto mio, e spira tue
sì come quando Marsïa traesti
de la vagina de le membra sue.
[O good Apollo, for the final labor make me a vessel of your worth made 
such as you ask from those to whom you give the beloved laurel.  Until 
this point one peak of Parnassus was enough for me, but it is necessary for
me to enter into the remaining arena with both: enter my breast and 
breathe, as when you drew Marsyas from the sheath of his members.]
Giuseppe Mazzotta has argued that Dante gives voice to the dangerous presumption 
inherent in his poetic enterprise in these lines.  Dante begins, relatively benignly, by 
conflating Apollo with the Christian God—his affinity with both poetry and the sun make
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Apollo an apt, mediatory figure to invoke at the beginning of Paradise.  Yet the 
subsequent stanza shades into a violent metaphor by characterizing the poem as an 
“aringo,” part of the Roman gladitorial arena (193).  This brief metaphor segues from the 
invocation to Apollo into the analogy between Dante and Marsyas, the flute-playing satyr
who challenged Apollo to a musical contest, lost, and was flayed alive for his 
presumption.  In his recounting of this myth, Ovid centers almost exclusively on 
describing the torture of Marsyas in gruesome detail; Ovid revels in relating how Apollo 
denudes Marsyas, how his “cruor undique manat,/ detectique patent nervi, trepidaeque 
sine ulla/ pelle micant venae; salientia viscera possis/ et perlucentes numerare in pectore 
fibras” [blood flows everywhere, uncovered sinew lies open, and trembling veins quiver 
without any skin; you could number the twitching viscera and the transparent fibers in the
chest] (6.388-91).  The brutality of the torture actually succeeds in making Marsyas 
renounce poetry altogether.  Dante thus seems to be questioning the value and 
advisability of his enterprise at the outset, wondering if it places him in a contentious, 
rather than reverential, relationship to God.
Most commentators have focused on how Dante transforms Ovid’s utter 
destruction of Marsyas into a metaphor of rapture.22  Unlike Marsyas, Dante first pays 
homage to Apollo, revering him as the poetic origin from whom he receives his own 
power; likewise, Dante tames the cruelty of Ovid, and typologically reimagines the story 
as a sort of conversion metaphor: he introduces a soul/body duality to the tale which 
transforms Apollo’s violence into a figure of bodily renunciation.  Yet though Dante 
surely typologizes the story as he has others, such readings always feel like an 
uncomfortable accommodation of Ovid’s text to Dante’s.  First, we should note that, 
22  For a reading and good critical summary of this episode, see Levenstein 411-12.
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unlike Glaucus—whose conversion leaves some memory, if not his mind or body, intact
—Marsyas is simply destroyed.  Only his name remains, metamorphosed into a river of 
tears wept by his fellow satyrs and nymphs.  Unlike Daphne—who is echoed here in 
Dante’s mention of the laurel—Marsyas retains nothing of his former self; he renounces 
poetry just before his body disintegrates, and his name is reapplied to a river that does not
emerge from the substance of his body.  Second, Ovid’s Marsyas seems deliberately to 
exclude the reference to spirit or soul that Dante’s commentators want to find in its 
revision.  The tale of Marsyas presents Ovid at his most ironically nihilistic: Apollo’s 
cruelty is to reveal that there was no spirit behind Marsyas’s poetry, only viscera, which 
in the Latin refers to the innermost parts of a living creature.  Apollo takes the normal 
bifurcation of interior and exterior—precisely the one that Ginsberg deploys in the 
Daphne episode—and denudes it, revealing that inside there is only more matter 
trembling at its exposure.  
Marsyas’s body stands in for the poetic utterance’s claim to reference, its claim to 
signify something other than its skin of sound. Ovid’s Apollo ironically exposes the fraud
inherent in poetic claims to truth—the poetic God unmakes what he should inspirit.  
Apollo should be the soul of the poet, but as a material body within Ovid’s poem, he 
ironically is susceptible to Marsyas’s challenge; Marsyas exposes his fraudulent claims to
divinity before Apollo returns the favor.  What remains of Marsyas is the skein of a name 
that floats across the surface of the text, becoming appended to the river that his tragedy 
inspires.  We can take this as a metaphor of the power of narrative to inspire cathartic pity
in an audience, whose collaborative witness of tragedy is the substantial remnant carried 
over from the wreck—indeed, I want to argue that Dante alters Ovid’s procedure in 
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exactly this way.  A memory remains, even if it is not Marsyas’s memory.  However, 
Ovid’s own poetic fascination with the cruelty done to Marsyas seems to mock such a 
transformation-in-reception in the same moment it yearns for catharsis.  Ovid reveals 
here an ironic attitude toward his own text that threatens to undo its capacity for 
reference, leaving the meaningless sonic metamorphoses of language the real subject of 
his poem.
 Dante’s description of Apollo’s spiration into Marsyas recollects the overarching 
dictum of the Metamorphoses which, whenever Dante transforms such Ovidian scenes, is
never far from his mind:
In nova fert animus mutatas dicere formas
corpora; di coeptis (nam vos mutastis et illas)
adspirate meis primaque ab origine mundi
ad mea perpetuum deducite tempora carmen. (1.1-4)
[The mind compels to speak of forms changed into new bodies; Gods 
(since you changed them), breathe into my beginnings and guide this 
perpetual song from the origins of the world to my own time.]
Ovid’s first line seems to simply announce the subject of his work—the mutability of 
bodies—but it also cleverly manages to implicate the linguistic vehicle of the 
Metamorphoses in that subject.  Formas seems as though it should act as the indirect 
object of dicere, yet its case suggests that it is, in fact, its direct object.  In addition to 
speaking about forms changed into new bodies, Ovid evokes the technical, grammatical 
sense of the term as well: he speaks forms changed into new bodies—a new corpus, 
which term also bears textual associations—freshly minted by their grammatical 
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coordination with one another.  In classical grammatical manuals, forma is a term often 
used to describe the grammatical features of a word, particularly of nouns, as it is in 
English; relatedly, in the rhetorical tradition, it can describe the style of an oration, its 
level of elevation and frequency of ornate figurae.23  The late antique manuals often use it
in this sense, and we can see it used thusly with increasing frequency in the Middle Ages
—Diomedis in his Ars grammatica speaks several times of the “forma declinationum 
nominum” [forms of declined nouns] such as the “nominatiui et uocatiui” [nominative 
and vocative] in his section on nouns.  The usage of forma from late example stretches 
back to the more sparsely documented tradition extant in Ovid’s own time; within the 
first century AD, Aemilius Asper’s Ars maior and Probus’s De nomine both use the term 
in a similar sense.  Probus, interestingly, also often uses the verb “mutare” to describe the
changing of a noun to its appropriate declension.  Given these grammatical resonances, 
Ovid’s first line already gestures toward the irony that will underlie all of his narrative:  
not only are the beings he narrates caught in an always unstable process of becoming, 
where identity only exists to register the changes wrought upon it, but the perpetuum 
carmen through which that narrative is articulated is equally unstable.  Ovid begins his 
narrative by making us attend to the way its grammar attempts to restrain an ongoing 
chaos of sound that, ironically, mimetically reflects the chaos of Ovidian history where 
every being tends toward its own inevitable dissolution.  He thus ensures that, like the 
meandering stories that populate the Metamorphoses, the order that his text imposes on 
the chaos of sound or visual characters will always be temporary and partial, always 
23  See especially Quintillian 10.1.10 and 11.1.2; Rhetorica ad Herennium IV.VII.10.  In the Ad Herennium, 
the term is also frequently used to describe the form mnemonics take, and it is the root of “conformatio,” 
the technique of personification.
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attended by an uneasy sense of our own animus’s attempt to make reference from its 
tenuously formed speech.
Beyond the grammatical significance of the line, Ovid’s invocation of the 
“animus” as the motivating agent of his narrative subtly deploys an Epicurean 
materialism to criticize the almost Platonic form/body distinction later in the line.24  
Drawing on Epicurus’s own distinction between the “rational” and “irrational,” Lucretius 
famously used the terms animus and anima to describe the separate functions of the soul. 
Animus operated roughly as the understanding, and was primary in relation to anima, the 
means by which the rest of the body moved.  Lucretius argued that both animus and 
anima had to be identifiable material forces, since they were capable of moving the body 
(De rerum natura, 3.161.67); mind and soul would be incapable of influencing matter if 
they were not themselves material.  The animus resided in the chest while the anima was 
diffused throughout the remainder of the body. The two had to be separable, since, 
Lucretius argued, mind and body do not always share the same state: at times when the 
body is injured, the mind can be well as, in his analogy, the foot can feel pain while the 
head does not.  Emotions like fear thus originated in the interior animus and subsequently
extended through the anima, ultimately manifesting as a shiver in the body.  The animus 
was conceived as deeply material in Lucretius’s philosophy and that basic materialistic 
impulse undergirds much of Ovid’s poetry.  The instigating idea that infuses the diverse 
and often uncoordinated members of his poem is this nullifying materialism that his irony
represents on a linguistic level.  Whereas in Plato or even Aristotle—who, as we saw 
above, suggested that form never exists apart from matter, though he still strictly 
delineates between the two—form or anima was the essential, but immaterial thinking 
24  On Lucretius’s influence in Book 1, see Wheeler 200-3.
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part of a subject that informed his or her mutable matter, the curiously unaffiliated poetic 
soul25 that motivates Ovid’s work is material through and through.  Formas is clearly 
meant to designate the remainder that persists despite the transformations Ovid’s 
characters will undergo—a meaning that is deeply ironic, given the grammatical 
overtones discussed above—which most classical philosophy figured as the consistent 
soul that withstood the mutable changes of bodily matter; however for Ovid, it is the 
Lucretian animus that contemplates these metamorphoses from its seat within the 
material heart.  The informing reason of the animus is already contaminated with 
materiality and so the capacity for corporeal change; Ovid mocks the capacity of form to 
lend continuity and consistency through such changes by using animus as the third term 
outside of this duality. For Dante—who read all such lines typologically, through the lens 
of scholastic thought on the soul—Ovid’s implication would have felt even more 
dangerous, collapsing the dichotomy that undergirds Christian spiritual life.
When Ovid reaches his invocation to the gods, it already feels somewhat 
disingenuous, a feeling that reaches its fever pitch in the Marsyas episode.  The action of 
the Gods—whom Ovid goes out of his way to describe as the agents of change—becomes
little more than a series of declensions in an unstable grammar of being.  The order that 
governs the perpetuum carmen of the material world is as unstable, arbitrary and 
temporary as that which governs language.  Ovid again conflates text and world by 
asking the gods to inspirit his text; the gods are the cause of change, which makes them 
properly the referents of the work, yet Ovid also beseeches them to “adspirare” the 
25  Ovid seems to stage this almost as a philosophical inquiry by leaving out a personal possessive adjective 
“meus” and the direct object “me” surrounding animus, though they are implied.  He suggests that the 
mutability of the world should prompt the same materialistic reflection in everyone that it has in himself; he
does not specify the animus behind the text as his private one, but rather a generalizable or almost universal
one.
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beginnings of his text.  The overtones of breath in this term—redeployed to great effect 
by Dante in his own invocation—again locate us in a Lucretian cosmos:  the gods are 
imagined as the animus who are supposed to breathe anima into the corpora of his text.  
But Ovid only asks them to breathe into the beginnings of his text, foreshadowing its 
loose, free-associational narrative structure: the Metamorphoses is a series of re-
beginnings that fail to begin anything in particular.26  Narrative is always structured on 
beginnings and endings that construct the definable corpora of events in time; meaning 
can only inhere in the bodies that inhabit this space and time when such events delimit 
the scope of signification, as words only fully acquire meaning in the context of a period. 
But those events are essentially arbitrary since time exceeds them on both sides.  The 
vastness of the historical project articulated here ensures its unintelligibility.  Ironically, 
Ovid promises to produce a perfectly mimetic text that exactly reproduces the history of 
the world, but in doing so he exposes the world as fundamentally ahistorical, eventless.  
The metamorphoses that promise to stabilize his historical record inevitably resolve into 
free-associational occasions to begin anew in a chain of beginnings that never ultimately 
understands what it has begun.  On the macroscopic, historical level, time gives the lie to 
events within time; on the microscopic level of passing moments, life, like language, 
loses the points of reference that anchor our experience, making time’s passage 
intelligible.  Ovid’s gods ironically inspirit the body of his text in their failure to inspirit 
26  In The Book of the Incipit, Vance Smith has made a similar argument about Piers Plowman, arguing that 
the work ruminates on the nature of the event by asking how the sequence of occurrences that lead up to it 
can be begun.  If time is continuous, the beginnings and endings we assign to history are arbitrary; I would 
add that, just as history cannot be reliably segmented into significant events, neither can the event itself be 
internally parsed.  Ovid’s Introduction evokes both problems with beginnings and carries this problem into 
the fabric of his text.
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it; they offer a history of time’s failure to coalesce into a history as they repeatedly fail to 
offer an orienting, rationalizing force.
The gods’ inevitable failure to offer a stable anima to the poem mirror their failure
to create order in the world with whose beginnings Ovid begins.  Before the world was 
made, Ovid describes the uniform, fluid chaos of original nature:  
Ante mare et terras et quod tegit omnia caelum 
unus erat toto naturae vultus in orbe, 
quem dixere chaos: rudis indigestaque moles 
nec quicquam nisi pondus iners congestaque eodem 
non bene iunctarum discordia semina rerum. (1.5-9)
[Before the sea and earth and the sky that covers all/ there was one face of 
nature throughout the whole world,/ which they called chaos: a rough, 
confused mass,/ nothing if not an inert weight piled in the same place,/ the
discordant seeds of things not well joined.]
Chaos is the essential condition behind the world that precedes anything; notably, the 
chaos is figured as both visual and sonic.  “Quem dixere chaos” refers to a plural subject 
that the text does not present, making it seem as though the discordant seeds themselves 
speak their own collective name.  Most translators supply a historical subject for dixere
—“our ancestors called chaos”—and while this makes some sense, it makes the perfect 
tense of dixere sit in an uncomfortable relationship to the imperfect erat of the line 
before.  The progression of tenses seems to actually locate the naming of chaos at a point 
in time prior to the chaos itself, as though the visual manifestation was birthed from a 
cacophony spoken by invisible voices; the etymological connection of rudis to the verb 
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rudo [to roar] in the next line heightens this suggestion.  The single, almost uniform face 
of chaos—which coalesces into an identifiable unity by virtue of the discordance of its 
parts—mirrors the apprehension of the sort of white noise preceding the world into the 
unified, significant term chaos.  But the scene Ovid poses defies precisely that possibility 
of transforming sound into referent, mass into face—the discordant seeds of things are 
unjoined, lacking an ontological grammar to set them in relation to one another.  The real 
chaos that precedes Ovid’s sensible, historical chaos is unimaginable; insofar as its 
discordant bits move in a coherent temporal progression, they possess a historical 
organization and so are not primal chaos. Ovid dramatizes our failure to reconstitute that 
originary sense of chaos, or rather the impossibility of its reconstitution by means of 
representation; simultaneously, he suggests that the state of chaos offered a more unified 
state of being than the subsequent order imposed on it.  In that state alone, everything was
what it seemed to be, because it was nothing in particular—it is the only state of being 
when form and body are actually unified for Ovid. The pure, atemporality of chaos is a 
more honest state of being because it lacks being; matter is just the scarcely coherent 
vehicle for manifesting the constant change that is the precondition of being.
An ironically unnamed god appears to organize the chaos, put form to the 
changing materiality of the world, but in the attempt to order it he only participates in the 
chaos, since he must alter and change its form.  The god appears arbitrarily from the 
confused mass, without any explanation of his provenance:  “Hanc deus et melior litem 
natura diremit” [A god better divided this dispute within nature] (1.21).  Again, Ovid uses
a verbal metaphor to describe the litem in nature, making the god appear almost legalistic 
in his separation.  However, though this unnamed demiurge imposes order on the world, 
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his random appearance seems more to participate in the disorder; the order he imposes is 
not a prior state of being that chaos degrades, but is rather a transformation of the chaos.  
The god is the Lucretian animus that struggles to inspirit the world, but is subject to the 
same exigencies of materiality, spatiality and temporality as anything else that exists 
within it. The only difference in the state of the world after his coming is that, whereas in 
the original state of chaos, there was only a minimal, inchoate form of matter to register 
the change being wrought upon it by time, the order imposed by the god constructs more 
complex and nominally stable beings for time to degrade.  The God comprises organisms 
out of the primal matter, restricts relationships between material elements and so creates 
different scales of temporal being; however each of those scales is only capable of 
reproducing the chaotic unmeaning of the scales preceding it. The relation established by 
this grammatical differentiation only succeeds in making its discrete beings 
representations of chaos; where order should offer them identity, identity itself only 
records a past that is always threatening to unravel.  Identity is a vestigial memory that 
nostalgically records a prior state in the flux that will never return again; after the god 
imposes order, makes this memory possible, things no longer are what they seem because
they seem capable of resisting the constant metamorphosis of time.  Their being no longer
seems located in the pure presence prior to the elemental matters that first manifest a 
basic temporal destiny, but rather in their dogged continuance of the past.  The long-lived
—but not immortal, as their emergence from chaos clearly shows—gods are the worst 
offenders in this regard, for the initial order imposed by the god did not remain, 
immutable—the bulk of Ovid’s text demonstrates instances in which that order is 
subverted, most often at the instigation of the gods themselves. Ovid subversively 
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transforms the very attempt to impose order into a participation in chaos, which is why 
his gods always seem so contaminated by pettiness.  Glaucus’s tale contaminates 
godhood by suggesting that it is attainable by arbitrarily ingesting grass, and that the 
transformation destroys identity even as it constitutes it.  Marsyas’s tale contaminates it 
more intensely by showing—as Ovid has shown from the beginning of his text—that the 
gods operate within the same ontological stratum as every other being, and are subject to 
the same denial of chaos that must ultimately overwhelm them.  They are the animus 
through which the chaos of the world achieves a semblance of reference, but that animus
—as Lucretius saw—was itself fundamentally material as well, and so could not offer a 
stable, transcendent order to other matter.
Seen through this matrix of the divine, Apollo’s flaying of Marsyas stands in as a 
metaphor for the entire idea behind the Metamorphoses.  It shows the god whom Ovid, in
his invocation, ironically beseeched to inspirit his poem with purpose and even basic 
reference denuding the very animus the poet sought; it shows the god who should impose
order and being on the world reducing it to the essential flesh of Marsyas’s quivering, 
disordered entrails. Apollo brutally demonstrates that within the poet there is only 
viscera, and that we can only understand the anima moving through poetry as the body’s 
quivering when the god reveals its progressively material strata, when the god dissociates
the organs comprising its temporal organism and so sends them quivering into prior 
temporal scales.  Paradoxically, this strange animus is the impulse behind Ovid’s poem:  
the contamination of Apollo and his sadistically forensic desecration of Marsyas both 
reveal a devastating materialism that undermines Ovid’s poetic activity even as it 
animates it.  The corpora of Ovid’s poem quivers just as Marsyas’s exposed entrails, but 
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it quivers most not at the instability of existence it must relate, but the instability of the 
poem as a vehicle of that truism.  Ovid’s perpetuum carmen is not just a song about 
endless change, but is itself endless change; the thoroughgoing ironic materialism that 
inspirits the poem, giving its interpretive gestalt a tenuous meaning and purpose, doubles 
back upon itself at the deepest level of the text.  It begins to unweave the most basic, 
grammatical presuppositions of narrative and poetry, leaving words that, in their 
aggregate, try to signify an inert materialism inert themselves. They threaten to become 
only their near-present state of being, random sounds devoid of the linguistic memory 
that would allow them to signify.  Like the hubristic Marsyas, who challenges the fount 
of poetry, Ovid challenges his medium and his own identity as a poet, suggesting that 
poetry—like everything else—can only finally succeed in representing its own denial of 
the fluid temporality from which it emerges.
In this Ovidian context, Marsyas seems an odd emblem of Dante’s own poetic 
transformation; he seems, rather, to entail the sort of irony that, in Ginsberg’s reading, 
Dante’s text silences.  The rehabilitation many argue toward cannot fully silence that 
irony—as Mazzotta suggests, the analogy gestures toward Dante’s ongoing, sometimes 
ambivalent negotiation of poetry and theology.  More specifically, the analogy expresses 
his very Ovidian fear that poetry about the divine can only succeed in contaminating it 
with an Epicurean materialism.  The purpose behind the entire Comedy has always been 
to spatialize and temporalize deity within narrative, not to rely on any of the simplistic 
bifurcations of matter and spirit that Ovid disintegrates and yet not to desecrate the 
divine. The analogy seems also an odd figure for divine justice since, leaving aside 
Apollo’s cruelty, the potentially forensic metaphor of flaying results in a complete 
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dissolution of its object; Dante seems to be asking for a more radical conversion than 
either of the others we have investigated from in Purgatorio and book 1 of Paradiso, a 
conversion in which God’s action upon him would leave nothing, neither soul nor body.  
However, he averts this conclusion in two ways.  First, as I suggested above, he 
rehabilitates Ovidian irony by recuperating Ovid’s caustic dismissal of audience 
reception.  In Ovid, the nymphs and satyrs watching Marsyas’s destruction can only 
record his utter dissolution in their tears; the assignation of his name itself to those tears 
gestures toward Marsyas’s identity in the narrative as loss unmoored from a physical 
form.  Yet this subterranean river imagery, situated as it it in Dante’s text between two 
rivers of forgetfulness—Lethe, and the streams that bathe Glaucus not 50 lines afterward
—takes on a wholly different resonance.  It is, in fact, a deftly concealed immemorability 
topos.  Marsyas’s loss of his own identity is figured as Dante’s conversion, which entails 
a very particular loss of memory and identity.  His hubristic attempt to narrate and 
spatialize the divine denudes him of the fetishistic materialism through which he had 
perceived his experience before; from this perspective, he can truly experience Beatrice’s 
grace which, like Ovid’s irony, forces him into the present moment of time’s passage 
where perception can scarcely cohere into memory, language into its referent.  But 
whereas, for Ovid, such an experience could only inspire a nihilistic perception of 
tragedy in those who witnessed it—a river of tears after whose narration we simply move
to the next story in Ovid’s free-associational text—in Dante, the reader experiences that 
loss as a preparation for grace, the tears of Beatrice’s attendants that loosed Dante’s first 
penitential tears and so prepare him for Lethe.  The amnesia inspired by Lethe actually 
serves to reintegrate the poet’s identity in the present that transcends memory.  It does 
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this, as I have remarked above, by supplanting Ovid’s ironic mode of perception with an 
aesthetic one that finds the ultimate referent of this potentially nihilistic play of signs in 
the experience of beauty and love.  The act of writing his text for a Christian audience 
becomes not an act of historical autobiography, but a way for Dante to reconstitute his 
life under the rubric of aesthetics.  He can only do this within the liberating confines of 
literature; when he makes public his disintegrative repentance in the act of confession, his
audience, in a sense, produces the river in which he can reconstitute himself. Their 
witness of the destruction of his past enables the alternate mode of perception through 
which Dante understands God and Paradise.
Second, Dante averts Ovidian irony by suggesting that, in fact, there was an 
unrecognized remainder left over from Marsyas’s destruction:  in fact, the very surface 
consciousness toward which Ovid’s violence orients us.  Throughout his invocation, 
Dante makes use of a container metaphor.  It appears first when he asks Apollo to 
transform him into a vessel for the God’s power, the type to which he awards the laurel. 
He does it again in the lines following the Marsyas reference:
O divina virtù, se mi ti presti
tanto che l’ombra del beato regno
segnata nel mio capo io manifesti,
vedra’mi al piè del tuo diletto legno
venire e coronarmi de le foglie
che la materia e tu mi farai degno. (1.22-26)
[O divine power, if you would lend me so much of yourself that I might 
manifest the shade of the blissful realm marked out in my head, you will 
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see me come to the foot of your beloved tree and crown myself with the 
leaves of which the matter and you will make me worthy.]
In this latter metaphor, Dante makes his own memory a vessel filled with the images of 
Paradise; again, he notes that God must lend him divine power if those memories are to 
find adequate expression.  Both of these container metaphors find their rationale in the 
Marsyas myth; as he did in Hell, Dante’s virtuoso imagination outdoes even the cruelty of
Ovid, and in doing so, paradoxically recuperates Ovid’s nullifying irony.  He indicates 
that Marsyas did not, in fact, fully disintegrate; rather, the sheath of his skin remained, the
container that Apollo had stripped away to denude his quivering innards.  Apollo, he 
suggests, uses this skin as an instrument, like some perverse bagpipe: “entra nel petto 
mio, e spira tue.”  In Ovid, this would have been Apollo’s consummate act of desecration
—he would have been punishing, finally, Marsyas’s presumption by transforming him 
into an instrument of the God’s own music, viciously parodying Marsyas’s revelation of 
the God’s physicality.  As I noted above, Marsyas’s challenge underscored the physicality
of Apollo and the fact that, as a delimited body himself, he could not truly inform anyone;
poetry belonged to the poet, he suggested, and Apollo was simply another poet.  The 
search for the abstract, informing inspiration of poets dwindled into obscurity.  Apollo, 
recognizing the implication, would have been reasserting his status as the preeminent 
poet—albeit not the informing principle of poetics—by violently performing the 
implication of Marsyas’s challenge on his own body.
Dante carries Ovid’s image to its furthest possible extent by reimagining the 
earlier formulation of his poetic activity he had offered to Bonagiunta in Purgatory:  “I mi
son un che, quando/ amor mi spira, noto, e a quel modo/ ch’e ditta dentro vo 
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significando” [I am one who, when love breathes in me, takes note, and in that mode 
which is spoken within, I go signifying] (24.52-54).  In his Dante’s Aesthetics of Being, 
Ginsberg has described Dante’s poetic self-definition as incarnational.  Whereas, in the 
Vita Nova, Dante wears the brutal signs of his love for Beatrice on his flesh, here “Dante 
is not a sign, but an incarnation of love” (90).  He does not simply record love’s action on
the medium of his body, but rather both records and perpetuates it.  Though he acts as a 
mediator, stopping short of dissolving the “I” in the “amor” and rather maintaining a 
separate identity for himself, his being is wholly defined by the fidelity of its 
transliteration of Love’s breath.  His own intellect is subordinated to the informing action 
of love, inverting the traditional medieval dynamic between the two concepts.  Drawing 
on Mazzotta’s analysis of these lines, he notes the Trinitarian resonance of “spira,” a term
that “takes for its model the procession of love in the godhead, which is called spiration 
and which has as its analogue in corporeal beings the ‘movement and urging of the will 
of the lover towards the beloved’” (89).  Amor thus supplies Dante with the most 
essential function of the soul—basic mobility, a reason to will—which his poetry 
attempts to reflect, notably, in its act of signifying rather than the simple artifacts of his 
representations.  Amor’s breath in these lines is, of course, doubly metaphorical—Dante 
constructs an analogy between his own poetic production and the already analogical 
figure of the Trinity’s members breathing.  Its metaphorical quality shields the divine 
from the contamination of materiality that its association with Dante might engender even
as it allegorically infuses him.
This contamination was precisely the point of Marsyas’s challenge and Apollo’s 
response; and whereas, in his earlier formulation of his poetic activity, Dante located 
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inspiration in a safely abstract, allegorical figure of God, in the analogy between himself 
and Marsyas, he threatens a similar contamination.  Yet he answers that threat—and with 
it the threat of Ovidian irony more generally—by means of the Christian concept of 
incarnation.  His transformation here is even more complete than that of Purgatorio 24:  
whereas in his earlier self-definition, he imagined himself signifying “a quel modo” in 
which Love spoke, here he asks Apollo to physically enter his chest and signify through 
him.  Dante’s skin becomes the spatial continuum within which the divine takes its form; 
in a sense, he ceases to be a poet at all, since the slight space of his ingenuity—the “a 
quel modo”—has been hollowed out from his chest along with all the other viscera to 
make room for the god within and to allow the instrument of his skin to play that god’s 
music with more fidelity.  In Ovid’s rendition, Apollo viciously punished the presumption
of Marsyas and its implication that the two existed in the same ontological stratum; 
however in Dante, God deliberately seeks to instantiate Himself in a material body, and 
Dante’s last trace of individual will is to ask to be possessed by Him.  The hubris of the 
god and that of the poet are resolved in this mutual will to become one another that 
reflects, as nearly as possible, Christ’s incarnation.  Apollo’s punishment is ultimately 
transfigured into the just punishment of Dante’s sins on the cusp of Paradise that made 
him regret his earlier poetic fetishization of Beatrice; however that dissolution prepares 
him for the saving action of grace, the spiration of God that overtakes Dante’s broken will
and in doing so, repairs it.  Thus when Dante crowns himself with Apollo’s laurel, 
Marsyas’s presumption is contained by the God’s residence within him; God honors his 
own incarnation (and perhaps Dante’s brilliant structure of poetic self-renunciation) 
through the instrument of Dante’s skin.  
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The grace that Dante finds, first in Beatrice’s beauty, but subsequently abounding
—as grace does—everywhere is the typological recuperation of Ovid’s irony.  Ovid’s 
nullifying materialism is transformed into Dante’s aesthetics of experience; the loss of 
identity through Apollo’s denuding of Marsyas’s corporeality is refigured as Dante’s 
immemorability topos that actually locates meaning at the surface of experience.  Ovidian
irony threatened to undo linguistic reference by making the material world nothing more 
than a series of signs, as shiftless and changing as the sonic stream of signifiers that 
articulated them.  Dante’s God allows for such an apprehension of language, but he forces
us to recognize the beauty within it that signals a deeper ontology than that which Ovid 
would undercut. When Dante equates his poetic activity to that of a musical instrument, 
he already indicates that we should apprehend it, in some measure, under the rubric of 
aesthetics.  But that aesthetic perception, at the surface, actually offers a deeper sense of 
being than the reference Ovid forecloses by situating us within the sinuous duration in 
which those sounds are articulated; such aesthetic perception is proximal to God’s divine 
presence and redeems the crass, historiographical procedures with which we normally 
perceive the world.  That duration is a condition even of irony; Dante reveals the meaning
behind Ovidian irony in its attempt not to mean anything, and he instead locates his 
experience of God where a triumphant Ovid thought—almost two thousand years before 
Nietzsche—to announce His death.  This linguistic presence of immemorability does 
indeed denude us of the sinful accretions of our history where we thought to locate 
meaning, but it does so only to offer us a deeper and more secure sense of being and 
presence.  Spatiotemporal experience, far from defying deity, is the inescapable ground 
through which we constantly experience Him.
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CHAPTER III
CHAUCER’S HOUSE OF FAME AND THE POETICS OF TEMPORALITY 
Dante’s afterlife imagines an eschatological space in which historical time is 
collected without being destroyed; one of the oddest implications of his narration of the 
afterlife is this disjunction of its own time with lived, historical temporality.  In historical 
time, we understand time’s passage through the death of things: organisms on a certain 
scale of temporal being coalesce, act for a while, then dissolve.  Within their dissolution, 
we are made privy to time’s full movement.  Georges Bataille aligns this moment with a 
sacred experience of temporal continuity; describing the collective witness of ritual 
killings, he argues that
The victim dies and the spectators share in what his death reveals.  This is 
what religious historians call the element of sacredness.  This sacredness 
is the revelation of continuity through the death of a discontinuous being 
to those who watch it as a continuity; what remains, what the tense 
onlookers experience in the succeeding silence, is the continuity of all 
existence with which the victim is now one. (84)
As a temporal organism becomes extinct, the continuity of time reveals itself with a 
poignancy that mundane experience denies us; the organism dissolves into its 
fundamental parts, ceases to express the integration that manifested its being on its own 
and the spectators’ scale of historical being.  The threat of analogy—the revelation of 
mortality and mutability—renders every spectator simultaneously aware of the unique 
character of every moment of their continued being and of the durability of time itself, 
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which seems to roll on whether or not any of the subject positions within it continue to 
exist.
Dante’s afterlife—though its narrativity makes it indestructibly temporal—lacks 
death; the bodies that populate it, in fact, are the consequences of deaths in the historical 
world.1  Death precedes the appearance of every human figure within the afterlife, but no 
figure is subject to death any longer.  The diverse forms of torture that afflict the denizens
of Hell underscores this fact: in most cases, the physical acts to which they are subjected 
would kill a person, but the shades of Hell simply persist in a mangled state, always 
destined to be subject to the same sort of torture over and over.  Dante’s afterlife is the 
end of time, despite the fact that historical time proceeds outside it and narrative time 
proceeds within it: it collects the totality of history—everything whose dissolution 
revealed the continuity of historical time—and places them within a single space and 
time; all beings persist at once in the clear vision of God’s judgment. The network of 
transversal associations through which objects and subjects bring one another into being 
is imagined, not just in a single moment, but across the entire swath of history; in the 
afterlife, they inhabit the same essential space: even though they may not see one another,
Dante’s passage from Hell to Paradise underscores their simultaneity.
Theologically, Dante’s project demands this eschatological orientation: a God 
who does not reign over the entirety of the creation, past and present, isn’t much of a God
for Dante.  But it presents structural problems in Dante’s temporal mechanics that he 
1  Dante does make one exception to this rule on Circle 9 of Hell: those who betray their guests are sent to 
Hell before they physically die, while a demon is sent back to Earth to occupy their bodies.  The same sort 
of idea as I am advocating here applies, however; Dante figures such a monstrous betrayal as a form of 
death, an unforgiveable sin that determines, finally, the moral content of one’s life.  It is for this reason that 
the medieval world called such sins “mortal” sins—in committing them, one had already died, since 
forgiveness from such a sin was impossible.
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never fully resolves: how can beings manifest a narrative temporality if they are not, in 
some sense, becoming, even dying?  If they are becoming—if they change states of being
relative to one another—how can the judgement of God be final? If they are not 
becoming within a time, how can divine presence remain novel, non-coincident with 
itself? If eschatology collects all the detritus of history into the single, present moment of 
God, how can Dante install time—and so history—within that presence?  The conceit of 
any eschatology is that temporal moments that seem to pass away do not really pass 
away: though the passage of history obscures the fact, all such moments for all objects 
within the world are being collected by God, who will pass judgment on them all in the 
fullness of time. That fullness of time should, in theory, be the utter end of historical time
—just as time did not precede the Creation, time cannot succeed the Judgement; the 
Judgement is the moment in which all things are once again made present—for a flash—
judged, and categorized.  Though Christian theology didn’t always recognize the 
implications of the Judgement, temporal becoming should not be able to occur following 
such a moment: the blessed would not dance about for all eternity, nor would the damned 
wail and moan.  If they all simultaneously inhabit a presence that collects all history, that 
presence could not admit movement—to do so would be to reinstigate historical time.  In 
reality, as we have seen elsewhere, such a perfectly present moment could not really 
admit identity either, since identity is a historical institution; likewise, the time marked 
out by the relative movement of discrete, identifiable bodies relative to one another in 
time would be impossible.  The mystery of the Judgement is that it would render the 
moral bases of human judgement unintelligible.
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In a sense, this summarizes Dante’s critique of temporal theology: a present 
moment like that assumed by eschatology would render God sterile; without historical 
continuity, presence is absence; without death, it is stagnant.  Yet in maintaining the 
judgement motif, Dante’s project runs up against many of the temporal and imaginative 
problems that theologians had resolved by simply dispensing with time at the final 
moment. Dante’s solution to these quandaries is to make his afterlife a series of repeating 
loops—in Hell as in Paradise, people have been judged and their state has been fixed, but 
that judgement is manifested as an inescapable narrative repetition of reward or 
condemnation that they are doomed to replay over and over without end.  Only in 
Purgatory does an authentic temporality still inhere: those who populate Purgatory are 
still capable of authentic change (though in another sense, they are doomed to that 
change, it is a foregone conclusion); they are capable of conversion, the death to the old 
man and the birth of the new one.  But Purgatory itself is doomed to end in the fullness of
the fullness of time: at the Judgement, some people will be assigned to Purgatory, but 
after however many thousands of years they take to wander up its terraces, Purgatory will
be a vacant space and all will be caught in the repeating cycles of Paradise or Hell.  But 
history still inheres in these spaces: though Dante tries to ignore it, these repetitions are 
still numerable and the 107th narrative round is, in some vaguely definable way, different
from the 107,000,000th. The differences between the historical world and the afterlife 
thus begin to break down and trouble the conceptualization of Dante’s afterlife as a 
present receptacle for all of history. The eschatological orientation of his space is, in 
many ways, inimical to his goal of describing the transcendence that persists throughout 
history.
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In the House of Fame, Chaucer lodges a further complaint about Dante’s 
eschatology, even more damning than those I have presented above: it does not really 
gather all of history into the present moment.  It takes only a particular scale of temporal 
organization—the scale of human perception—and reimages the ways it collects a fluid 
duration into discrete events.  In particular, Dante’s shades reimage the period of an entire
life within a single body; it becomes complicit with history’s procedures of event making 
by so encapsulating its shades.  Dante’s afterlife purports to record all time in its 
reproduction of singular bodies that are morally culpable for the entire period of time in 
which they were unified as organisms; but in many ways, this fundamental gesture belies 
the sort of sacred presence that all historical beings are supposed to find within the 
passage of time.  It belies the radical allegorization of grace that Dante struggles toward 
throughout the poem by prioritizing historical organization above presence, and by 
prioritizing human beings above all other objects.  Grace is a transcendence implicit in 
every moment of historical passage, yet the shades in Paradise arrive there as a result of 
some more or less arbitrary period of time in which they made more or less arbitrary 
choices.  Dante’s text seems almost pulled in two: in one sense, it retains a conventional 
medieval morality that placed a burdensome significance on certain behaviors willed by 
human beings on their scale of temporal organization; in another sense, it introduces a 
morality of grace that would absolutely upend such conventional moralities.  If grace can 
be recuperated out of any desire, no particular behavior is sinful—virtue consists only in 
becoming aware of the sinuous temporality proximal to presence that an object manifests,
and in remaining detached from a fetishism of the object that would render it significant 
in itself.  The transmutation of Beatrice’s sexuality is the cardinal instance of Dante’s new
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virtue.  But the very logic of grace that Dante champions seems ill-suited to the sort of 
historical summations entailed by his shades: if grace renders every moment poignant and
every particle within the creation moving through time likewise poignant, then 
encapsulating spans of time within shade bodies and condemning them to a repetitious, 
historical judgement would seem to forestall the revolutionary consequences of what 
Dante envisions.
While the House of Fame obviously does not attain the level of genius and 
intricacy of Dante’s Comedy, I would argue that it does create a more convincing and 
fully figured eschatological space; in fact, the ways that it extends the eschatological 
logic implied by Dante’s afterlife and the theological tradition are what ultimately render 
it an inferior poem.  It squares Dante’s circle: it reconciles the temporal vision Dante 
advocates to his eschatological structures by modifying the very idea of eschatology.  
Granted, it does so sometimes at the expense of coherence; however, the House of Fame 
is absolutely uncompromising—in a way that Chaucer never reduplicates in his career—
in its commitment to a single idea: recreating a perfectly present space wherein all of 
history is collected.  By imagining the afterlife, not as the afterlife of bodies, but as the 
afterlife of sound, Chaucer revises Dante’s conception in two primary ways: first, the 
images that appear in his afterlife do not encapsulate the event of an entire life, but only 
the event of a particular utterance.  Over the course of the poem, the interval of that event
becomes progressively smaller until Chaucer imagines every moment of every act that 
ever produced a sound as a discrete body within the House; in this way, it becomes truly 
eschatological, reimagining every instant of history as an indestructible, integrated body.  
Second, Chaucer extends this replication into the afterlife of sounds not only to human-
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produced sounds, but to all sounds produced by all bodies.  The already infinite number 
of bodies generated by his omission of interval from the poem is subjected to a further 
infinity in this move: not only organisms are replicated in the afterlife, but presumable 
every component of every organism that ever made a sound is also replicated.  Every 
gurgle ever made within an organic cell is replicated separately from the body it inhabits, 
which must coexist separately with the component parts that comprise it.  Bodies are 
desubordianted from themselves both vertically and horizontally, within their essential 
structure that exists at any given moment of time and across the infinite succession of 
temporal moments they all, collectively, inhabit.
Within this space Chaucer composes, history is an illusion perpetrated by the 
fickle Lady Fame.  The mechanics of his afterlife ensures that no moment that has ever 
existed will pass away; it presents an entire after-image of the creation, but one in which 
the past does not pass away or change.  But Chaucer parodically places Fame in the 
judgement seat Dante had built for God.  Fame defines what will be remembered and re-
presented in a space that ensures her superfluity—the eschatological domain that 
surrounds her nullifies her function even as it is articulated.  Repetition of an utterance in 
the historical world is unnecessary if it is already preserved in the afterlife of language; 
what is more, its repetition in the historical world belies what it really is in all its 
phenomenal particularity—whoever repeats it ultimately fails to fully understand the 
phenomenon she has attempted to replicate.  Only Chaucer’s afterlife which reimages 
each moment of the articulation of the sound, its full presence, can authentically re-
present the linguistic moment.  Other authors, in paying homage to the famous utterance, 
actually lose their own moment, surrendering it to a time that has already past and so 
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chaining the present to the non-being of historical absence; they defer to arbitrarily 
selected moments in the history of speech, and so surrender their own capacity to 
generate something authentically new. Fame rules over this charnel-house of history, 
precariously—we can even say, impossibly—erected within Chaucer’s perfectly present 
afterlife.  Yet, by the terms of that domain, neither she nor her House cannot exist within 
it since she is not a historical speaker but an allegorical invention.  History—that depends
on events arbitrarily cut from the totality of temporal duration—is a seemingly 
monolithic institution that is utterly inexplicable.
It is only through the hubris of human speech that present duration is surrendered 
to history. While Chaucer extends his afterlife to incorporate all sounds made by all 
objects, the disintegration of speech into duration possesses a special urgency in his 
project.  For Chaucer, speech divorces us from an experience of duration in two ways: 
first, it surrenders the presence of sound to historical meaning—it symbolically refers to 
something other than what it is.  The arbitrariness of signification is the precursor to Lady
Fame’s arbitrary judgement.  Second, in its attempt to mean, speech possesses an inherent
egotism—it always asserts the memorability of itself and its listener.  Essentially, all 
speech is rhetorical, and in pronouncing an argument, whatever it is, it proclaims that it 
should be remembered and reduplicated in others.  All speech yearns for the replicative 
processes of fame, even speech that is explicitly self-effacing or satiric.  Chaucer parodies
this egotism by making every speech act an image of its speaker rather than its referent; 
he violently relocates symbolic speech back onto the body, shearing it of its symbolic 
dimension.  Speech, in Chaucer’s afterlife, is what it is: a series of sounds produced by a 
human mouth.  These speech bodies sue at the ephemeral and unstable feet for 
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remembrance, but they are pulled in another direction as well, toward the House of 
Tidings that Chaucer announces at the end of the poem.  Tidings, for Chaucer, are speech 
acts perceived in their temporal dimension: Chaucer subjects language to a double 
deprivation, first excising its capacity to refer to anything else, then subsequently 
disarticulating its sounds across time as he has done to all other sounds. 
In doing so, he stages a strange and unique encounter in his text where he meets 
himself and we meet ourselves.  Chaucer’s egotistical, authorial privilege—which is 
consummately egotistical, here, because he has hitherto exempted only his own poem 
from the conditions of his afterlife—is finally absorbed into the machinery of the poem.  
The reader, too, is absorbed into it: all of the sounds she made while reading the poem—
whether she overtly read the poem aloud or subvocalized it—are replicated in the final 
heap.  Ultimately, this is the way that Chaucer seeks to position readers in relation to his 
poem. Critics of the House of Fame frequently turn to reader response theories—whether 
in their modern or medieval variants—to explain Chaucer’s seeming incoherence and his 
suspension of reference.  Chaucer, so the theory goes, fragments language and narrative 
to restore interpretive responsibility to the reader of the narrative.2  He gives us all the 
tools of interpretation—analogues, commentaries, etc.—but so configures his narrative 
matters that any interpretative framework will sit uncomfortably atop them, never 
finalizing itself.  He performs the way in which present texts coalesce out of literary 
traditions by making his text somewhat defunct, or unable to coordinate the variety of 
2  For examples of this trend, see especially Laurel Amtower, “Authorizing the Reader in Chaucer’s House 
of Fame”; Katherine H. Terrell, “Reallocation of Hermeneutic Authority in Chaucer’s ‘House of Fame’”; 
Lara Ruffolo, “Literary Authority and the Lists of Chaucer’s ‘House of Fame’: Destruction and Definition 
through Proliferation”; Lisa Kiser, “Eschatological Poetics in Chaucer’s House of Fame”. Such studies 
often cite Sheila Delany’s seminal study, Chaucer’s House of Fame: The Poetics of Skeptical Fideism. In 
Delany’s account of the poem’s philosophical skepticism, we can see a medieval version of response theory
in the injunction to suspend belief.
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traditions it invokes; in doing so, he allows us to see our own susceptibility to those 
traditions and so mobilize our own interpretive wills, which are no longer solely reliant 
on the will of the author.3  I maintain that these response theories, while often helpful in 
Chaucer, sit uncomfortably within the House of Fame.  He certainly comments on 
tradition in the way these authors describe, but this critique is far from being the bottom 
of the rabbit hole he has dug for us.  They entail a difficulty that cuts across all such 
response theories:  the author’s attempt to free us from from authority constitutes another 
authoritative meaning she attempts to inflict upon us.  Insofar as we can contract such an 
idea into an argument, it has failed in its ultimate, radical aim.  We become bound to the 
ideology of resisting ideology; representation necessarily entails this aggressive posture 
toward our listeners. But in the final heap he imagines, Chaucer largely escapes this 
condition of narrative: the narrative itself breaks down  as it furiously attempts to re-
image the fullness of our own experience while reading it and we—along with Chaucer—
are left at the cusp of a present perception of our experience as we imagine the infinitely 
divisible sounds we make while imagining within the perfectly present space he has 
constructed.
Representing the Pre-representational
It has often been remarked upon that Chaucer begins the House of Fame by 
undermining the possibility of its interpretation.  As Sheila Delaney argues in her seminal
study of the poem, the Proem of Book 1 contains wealth of “contradictory information 
about dreams” which renders that information largely inapplicable (41).  It presents 
numerous dream categories familiar to the Middle Ages, each of which necessitate a 
3  On the poem’s relation to its antecedent traditions, see Kean 3.
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different attitude toward the text of the dream.  Chaucer’s dream might be a prophetic 
“revelacion,” a literary or allegorical “avision,” or a meaningless “fantome” (7-11).4  
Each of these categories entails a radically different interpretive procedure, but one never 
knows which to apply to any given dream.  These various dream categories stammer on 
top of one another, in the sense of the term described by Roland Barthes.  Barthes notes 
that, while we very often attempt to revoke an utterance, to erase it from the mind of a 
listener, we can never actually reverse the fact that we have spoken it.  These attempts at 
erasure are, ironically enough, only additive:   “What has been said cannot be unsaid, 
except by adding to it:  to correct, here, is, oddly enough, to continue” (76).  We trust the 
minds of listeners to reconstitute our final meaning from this irrevocable string of words 
by subordinating and discarding those which we indicate they should.  In doing so, we 
elide the full duration recorded in our memories by surrendering the temporality of its 
sounds to a single, instantaneous meaning that encapsulates a particular strand of 
utterances. 
Chaucer, however, refuses to give us the cues that would allow us to tame his 
discourse, allowing it to stammer over itself unchecked by a clear aim.  His poem is a 
thought experiment, wondering what language and narrative would do if its intent were to
recuperate the fullness of temporal duration.  Spatiotemporal narrative and duration 
ordinarily resist one another—an intent, or in Chaucerian terms, a sentence, is always a 
summary that compresses and elides a succession of sounds into a single meaning; and 
similarly, duration ordinarily resists representational narrative in its attempt to present an 
authentic, and so unintelligible, temporality.  The task of the First Book of the House is to
leave us at the abyss between the two.  In his Temple of Glass, Chaucer provides an 
4  All citations from Chaucer are from The Riverside Chaucer.
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image of the procedure of representation, considered in its totality.  He attempts to 
illustrate the manifold elisions that narrative representation effects upon time by drawing 
attention to the proliferating detail he must leave unsaid in his exhaustive descriptions.   
By demonstrating the various inadequacies of his text, he gestures toward the deficiency 
of narrative itself: it always fails to fully reconstitute precisely what it sets out to 
describe.  Though it models itself upon time, it is fundamentally incapable of reproducing
it; and, worse, in that incapacity it inflicts upon us a more general incapacity to 
conceptualize duration.  By forcing his text to stammer, and then imagining that 
stammering in narrative form, Chaucer is anticipating the design of Fame’s larger 
domain, where every speech act is preserved indestructibly.  Fame, he suggests is the 
faculty of judging the quality of one utterance over another—it allows us to subordinate 
and organize the ongoing, stammering duration of language—but that faculty resists the 
grain of his poem, even at its inception.  
Chaucer certainly does not prefer any one interpretive avenue offered by the 
Proem over the others; he is only willing to say that “oure flessh ne hath no myght/ To 
understonde hyt aright,/ For hyt is warned to darkly—/ but what the cause is, noght wot 
I” (49-52).  Chaucer admits here what no poem should—that it is actually 
uninterpretable, that the author-dreamer himself does not know what it means, why he 
should record it, or why we should read about it. But again, read in terms of the poem’s 
larger design, his admission takes on a different character than we might expect. 
Significantly, it is our flesh that lacks the capacity to understand the dream—mind never 
seems to enter into the interpretive equation.  The interpretive possibilities he has 
established will be mediated only by flesh.  In the House of Fame, mind is always body, 
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and body is a product of discourse; we cannot reduce the text into any single interpretive 
system, since to do so requires more speech.  Every act of language, however, is 
transformed into a fleshly body that cannot understand itself, since understanding is 
effected only through further acts of language, which become bodies, which produce 
language, and so on.  In attempting to fill in the lacunae they always leave unsaid, the  
bodies in Fame’s House fragment themselves further.  Meaning is “warned to darkly,” but
its warning entails a contradiction—as in Modern English, “warne” suggests both an 
intimation and a refusal.5  Chaucer implicates, in his poem, every speech act about the 
poem, every attempt to discern its “cause,” which in Middle English is both the cause of 
an effect and the anticipated object of an action, a motivating aim or end, simultaneously 
preceding and succeeding action.  
Chaucer’s dream categories do not frustrate interpretive discourse, but prolong it 
indefinitely, ensuring that it will continue without really accomplishing anything.  All that
Chaucer is willing to hope is that “God turne us every drem to goode!”  The line occurs 
twice in the poem, first in the opening line of the poem, and second at line 58, with the 
substitution of the “holy roode” for God, after he has enumerated the various dream 
categories.  The line thus frames the irreducible interpretive polarities he establishes in 
describing dreams.  It is especially remarkable for its grammatical indeterminacy.   At 
first glance it seems the dream is the object of “turne,” in which case Chaucer asks God 
to turn every dream to good purposes, or into “goodness” itself.  The trouble is what we 
5  In its reference to Corinthians 13:12, the line also anticipates the eschatological figuration of Fame’s 
realm.  But whereas Paul’s line promises that, in the afterlife, we will see God face to face, Chaucer’s 
visionary journey to the afterlife of language only leaves its meaning more opaque than ever.  Unlike 
Dante, his retrospective, autobiographical self does not return from the other world with a renewed capacity
to understand and judge aright; whatever conversion is effected on Chaucer by his journey does not permit 
him to interpret the world any better.  In fact, it seems to have the opposite effect: as the bodies in Fame’s 
realm coalesce from a refusal to imagine their referent, so does the retrospective Chaucer attempting to 
understand his own fiction refuse to offer them any totalizing meaning.
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do with the “us.”  It seems almost to blur into a possessive modifying the dream, but it is 
incapable of functioning so.  Chaucer could have made it a possessive without disturbing 
his meter, with the simple substitution of an “oure” whose ending “e” would have elided 
with “every.”  But he did not do so.  Two likely possibilities remain for it:  it functions 
either as an indirect object or the direct object itself, in which case “every drem” is an 
apposition modifying it.  In the first case, the line would read “God, turn in us every 
dream to good;” in the second, it would read “God, turn us, every dream, to good.  In this 
poem, the two amount to the same thing—we are Chaucer’s dream-bodies, reconstituting 
his narrative in our minds and so becoming captured in its design.  As we read the dream, 
absorbing it in into “us,” we are simultaneously enveloped by it, as Chaucer must have 
been himself while composing such a monstrosity.  Like Dante, Chaucer has absorbed 
our discourse into his poem by making us speak it again and forever; it will persist, 
indestructible, in the space that the poem imagines.  Reading has more the character of 
faith for Chaucer—in the sense of conversion that God’s “turning” implies, we can only 
hope that He will turn these self-engendering linguistic dream bodies to some good end, 
or that he can transform them into an unforeseen goodness.
Following his Proem, Chaucer makes an Invocation to Morpheus, whom Chaucer 
associates with memory.  Morpheus, in Chaucer’s poems, is always a cave dweller.  In the
Book of the Duchess he lives, as do all the gods, in a valley filled with dark caves; in that 
poem, also, Juno summons him to reanimate the body of the dead lover Ceyx, which he 
does in a perversely corporeal representation of memory, by creeping inside his dead 
body to parade it before his beloved Alcione.  In the House of Fame also he dwells in a 
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“cave of stoon” (70) near Lethe, the river of forgetfulness.  Chaucer summons Morpheus 
out of concern for his own memory, and he prays that Morpheus 
… wol me spede
 My sweven for to telle aright,
Yf every drem stond in his myght.
And he that mover ys of al,
That is and was and ever shal,
So yive hem joye that hyt here
Of alle that they dreme to-yere,
And for to stonden alle in grace
Of her loves, or in what place
That he were levest for to stond. (78-87)
Morpheus is to help Chaucer tell his dream “aright,” whatever constitutes rightness in his 
interpretive dream space.  But he goes further:  he actually conflates Morpheus with the 
Christian God, the mover of all.  Chaucer leaves the “he” of line 81 indeterminate—he 
may be again referring to the God he hopes will turn the dream to good, and so 
interrupting the invocation addressed to Morpheus.  Or Morpheus himself might be that 
God, and so the same God that turns every dream to good, or joy, or grace, or more 
simply, place.  The latter seems more plausible, given the context—dreams stand in 
Morpheus’ might, as we are clearly told in line 80, and so he is the “mover of al” to 
whom we would turn in asking that our dreams give us joy.  Cumulatively, these images 
suggest that Morpheus is a God of memory and of dream, but also that the memory of a 
dream is a kind of forgetfulness, suggested by the appearance of Lethe, which Morpheus 
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dwells “upon” (71).  The grace and movement implicit in love and, indeed, the entire 
Creation are in his power, and are fully deployed in the dream, but in the dream space 
they cannot produce a viable interpretation.  Chaucer can only hope that they produce 
“joy” in the reader, whatever semblance they adopt, as  they incarnate what “is and was 
and ever shal,” temporality, in the full and unpredictable duration that memory 
encapsulates.  To tell a dream “aright” is simply to tell it as it appeared to the dreamer, in 
its full duration, which is precisely what language is incapable of doing.
The relationship Chaucer draws between Morpheus and Lethe also suggest that 
his poem will attempt to stage a sort of abortive Dantean conversion, but one so twisted 
as to almost be unrecognizable.  While Lethe is, of course, a popular mythological locale 
used in many poems of the Middle Ages, the direct citation of Dante in the latter parts of 
the poem indicates that Dante’s Lethe was closest to Chaucer’s mind as he conceptualized
Morpheus.  As I have remarked, Dante’s use of forgetfulness as a metaphor for 
conversion alters both concepts considerably: Dante, of course, doesn’t really forget 
much about his life before or after his conversion, and conversion—insofar as it entails a 
change—requires memory to become legible.  Dante’s conversion reoriented him to a 
presence whose plenitude outstripped the capacity of memory to record; time is too full, 
existence too vibrant at each infinitesimal moment of its persistence, for any faculty to 
really apprehend it adequately.  Even as Dante continues to narrate his vision, he thus 
tacitly protests that he is only recording a spare fragment of the grace that animates every 
particle of Paradise.  Chaucer likewise struggles to outline a poetic structure that will 
moor a recollective time and space within an immemorability topos.  In Chaucer’s 
parodic version, God himself is eternally forgetful; he is subject to the waters of Lethe 
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not temporarily, but as a permanent state of being.  Where Dante’s journey through Lethe 
briefly rendered him without memory, and so capable of the apprehension of the passing 
present unadulterated by intellective recombination, Morpheus resides in that state, only 
emerging furtively—if at all—to bestow dreams that deliver their dreamer to a similarly 
insensate state of being.  Significantly, Chaucer himself never approaches the river that 
heralded Dante’s final conversion—he remains in incomprehension for not having passed
through the symbolic locus of Lethe; but in essence, incomprehension is what Morpheus 
is supposed to inspire in dreamers.  Chaucer’s ironic distance from the symbolic Lethe 
actually indicates that he understands its lesson more thoroughly than Dante did: insofar 
as Dante emerges from Lethe with a new hermeneutic, he has not authentically imbibed 
its waters, leaving behind the gestalts that organized his perception and so left him 
separate from God.  Chaucer suggests that, in fact, only God can inhabit that presence, 
and that humans can only wistfully wish it will descend on them as well—that for a 
moment they will be able to stand in grace. The uninterpretable dream is the revelatory 
gift of Morpheus that approximates immemorability, but real immemorability is the 
provenance of God alone: Chaucer carefully distances himself from the site of Dante’s 
conversion to suggest that he may have overreached in his attempt to participate in divine
presence.
As a revised version of the Creator, Chaucer’s Morpheus becomes both an 
incredibly powerful and impotent force in the narrative.  The poem’s free-associational 
structure itself suggests that Morpheus is operating within it—islands of intelligible, 
recollective narrative emerge only to be seemingly submerged by tectonic shifts in the 
narrative.  Like God, Morpheus’s creative power lies in his refusal to govern the dream-
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world he creates: his seeming withdrawal opens the space and time in which beings can 
possess authentic identities.  If Morpheus possessed memory—if he operated within the 
historical confines of the narrative—his will would be absolute; everything would simply 
be an extension of his will, mindless parts in the system of his organism.  Just as Chaucer,
as author, purports to refuse the governance of his uninterpretable narrative, so too is the 
god he invokes utterly incapable of governing the meaning of the dream-space.  Of 
course, neither Chaucer nor his god succeed in this effort—the effort to remain 
meaningless instantly, insofar as it is an effort, reinstitutes an overriding meaning and 
rationale to the text.  But when representation does begin to coalesce into the narrative, it 
invariably attempts to push us back outside itself, demonstrating the inadequacy or 
unreality of the procedures we have applied to make the text mean; under the sign of 
Morpheus, the text asks us to forget itself for a moment, and along with it the entire 
recollective machinery through which we divorce ourselves from the presence Morpheus 
alone occupies.  This conception of Morpheus hovers at the tattered edges of the entire 
poem—he is the real deus absconditus of the text, not the petty goddess whose name the 
poem itself bears.  It is ironic that, in writing a poem called the House of Fame, Chaucer 
does not invoke Fame but rather her diametric opposite, a god who rules over utterly 
subjective experiences and who utterly lacks memory.  Fame, in essence, is only memory;
she is the arbitrary selective procedure of memory writ across history.  But ultimately it is
Morpheus who envelops her with her own unreality.
After Morpheus has been invoked as the patron god of the poem, the poem itself 
unceremoniously stammers to the next manifestation of its matters.  The narrator falls 
asleep, already exhausted by his poetic labors (115-16).  We now see his first imagination
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of the dream space:  the Temple of Glass, Venus’ Temple.  It is in the Temple of Glass that
he most fully undermines the possibility of narrative, though, being Chaucer, he does so 
in narrative.  When he enters, he sees a wealth of memorial images, further reinforcing 
the association between dream and memory he hints at in Morpheus.  Within the temple
ther wer moo ymages
Of gold, stondynge in sondry stages,
And moo ryche tabernacles,
And with perre moo pynacles,
And moo curiouse portreytures
And queynte maner of figures
Of olde werk, then I saugh ever. (121-27)
Chaucer suggests that the whole of literary history is contained within the images of the 
temple of glass, existing side by side with one another.  Mary Carruthers and Beryl 
Rowland have explored the memorial resonance of these images.  In Classical and 
Medieval mnemonic practice it was common to imagine aspects of a text as memorable 
imagines, which one placed in their loci (Rowland 167).  That these images are 
mnemonic devices need not detain us here—this interpretation is a critical commonplace;
what is interesting for our purposes is what this mnemonic technique does to both the text
and time.  Mnemonic practice, by its very nature, is designed to elide duration, focusing 
on momentous events in a narrative for ease of retention.  The images it creates must be 
visually impactful, so as to make a deeper imprint on the memorial wax (Carruthers 132).
Such mnemonics thus extend the elision effected by narrative upon time—they further 
truncate and immobilize the lacunae in which time persists.  Chaucer encounters these 
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immobile images in his dream space because, being the consummate reader and author of
love poetry but never himself a lover, he has populated his memory with enshrined 
images that he experienced in their frozen, literary state. 
These narratives occur in sequences of images whose figures are “stondynge in 
sondry stages” as in the Bergsonian flip-book of the intellect.  They suggest the temporal 
lacunae between themselves while attempting to render the motion contained therein 
trivial—it is always guided by a telos, a “cause” in both senses.  Chaucer roams up and 
down, unable to adequately represent the plenitude of imagery—and in many cases not 
even trying to do so, letting the mnemonics stand unremembered—until he lights upon a 
“table of bras,” upon which are inscribed the opening lines of the Aeneid, translated into 
Middle English.  He seems to gravitate toward the text because it is text and not image, 
but after the initial presentation it becomes unclear whether he is reading or viewing 
images.  The opening lines of the poem ensure that we understand it as text—they, in fact,
refer us to our own activity as readers, reminding us that we are constituting visual 
images from text; but the activity comes to seem starkly visual in character, reading being
expressed almost without exception here by the verb “sawgh.” This conflation of text and
image expresses representation in its perfected form, the word becoming so intermixed 
with its image that one can not discern between actual sight and its verbal equivalent.
Chaucer proceeds to offer a highly compressed paraphrase of the events of the 
Aeneid.  He sees each of these events “graven,” a word that reappears throughout the 
passage, suggesting both their status as statuesque carvings and dead, immobile narrative 
images.  The inclusion of this particular narrative is patently inappropriate to the poem.  
Many critical readings hinge around the attempt to reintegrate this episode into the larger 
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sweep of the poem, as it seems to bear little on Fame’s House.  In a sense, I would argue 
that Chaucer includes it only to create a fiction of faithfulness to the memory of his 
dream.6  By making the dream appear random, he actually legitimates its status as an 
actual occurrence rather than as a literary production.  If time is to be indestructible in the
dream as it is in life, it must always threaten to become illegible.  But this interpretive 
trajectory doesn’t really go far, and it doesn’t bring much joy.  Instead, let us imagine that
Morpheus has a plan for us; let us say that the two houses imagine narrative in a radically
different way.  In the Temple of Glass, Chaucer imagines narrative as representation—the
image of glass is appropriate, since we are made to imagine the images that his language 
conjures, as through a transparent medium. Fame’s House imagines narrative as 
signification—narrative and discourse produces only an image of the body speaking it, 
rendering its language opaque.  In its purely representational aspect, figured in Venus’ 
Temple, language is only capable of conjuring immobile sequences of images.  The 
subjectivity of Chaucer, imaged into the dream, attempts to suppress the dream’s duration
as he has struggled to suppress the duration of his experience outside the dream:  he 
reads, he imagines narration and so immobilizes the time that swirls around him.
I will not attempt to further paraphrase Chaucer’s paraphrase of the Aeneid; it 
really is profoundly—and I would argue intentionally—boring, even when one is familiar
with the Aeneid and can fill in the gaps, to whatever measure possible.  Two aspect of 
Chaucer’s retelling are, however, worthy of note.  The first is more easily dealt with:  
Chaucer’s Aeneid is frequently peppered with references to the time required to read it.  
6  Payne intractably argues that “Book I (excluding the Proem and Invocation) has a completely separate 
existence; it does not suggest anything which follows, and critics have been able to correlate its “sentence” 
with the rest of the poem only by abstracting to so great a degree as to vitiate comparison” (203).  Its 
irrelation to the other books might lend credence to this sort of fiction of faithfulness.
167
This will prove to be one of Chaucer’s most recurrent device throughout the entire poem: 
it deliberately refers to its own discourse in temporal terms.  A few examples will suffice 
to indicate the trend here:  “And, shortly of this thing to pace” (239); “Hyt were a long 
proces to telle,/ And over-long for yow to dwelle” (251-52); “And nere hyt to long to 
endyte,/ Be God, I wolde hyt here write” (380-81).  One wonders which Chaucer is 
interrupting with these truncations—Geffrey the narrator of the dream, or the Chaucer 
who narrates that narrator.  If the later, he has violated his own desire to represent the 
dream as his memory recorded it, or perhaps more justly, he has begun to acknowledge 
the impossibility of the task he has set himself.  We begin to wonder how populated the 
temple of glass is with these images, in what level of detail these “sondry stages” record 
their narratives.  Regardless of who truncates the narrative, Chaucer is unable to 
reproduce it in even its already truncated temporality.  Beyond this, Chaucer commits the 
cardinal sin of any narrative—he actually calls attention to how boring it is, a tactic he 
will use, in modified form, in his Tale of Sir Thopas.  In boredom, we experience 
something approaching the pure passage of time; being bored with a narrative, we cease 
to read it as a representation.  Its mnemonic fails to generate images of significant depth.  
By writing a boring paraphrase of another narrative, Chaucer already forces us to 
experience narration as a passage, not by filling up its lacunae, but by making us fill our 
own, so long as we keep reading.  He places us back within our present situation, book in 
hand, eyes roving across his lines, unable to will them into representation.  The text 
seems not to care whether we continue or not—as Geffrey will later profess, he does not 
desire Fame and so does not concern himself with the impact of his text.
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The other interesting feature of this narration is somewhat more complex.  
Though Chaucer indicates that he is trying to abbreviate his telling of this already too-
long tale, he seems incapable of actually doing so.  It is not only the truncated narration 
itself that he seems preoccupied with, but also the interpretive lacunae, the accreted 
commentary tradition working to digest the narrative, the allusive webs and analogies to 
other narrations that might be established, etc.  This type of inter-linear narration erupts 
primarily around the portion of the tale treating Dido.  Notably, from lines 300-63 he 
actually allows Dido to speak—one again wonders whether Chaucer imagines a separate 
graven image for each moment of the speech, or whether it is all text, or some hybrid of 
the two almost like a graphic novel.  In any case, he afterward breaks into one of his 
excuses for the length of the narration, referring us to the works of Virgil and Ovid if we 
want a full recounting, as though any narration of the events could suffice.  Though he 
breaks away from narration, he feels compelled to comment further upon the event, 
which was one of the moral cruces of the Aeneid during the Middle Ages.7  Like the 
material Chaucer has introduced on dreams, the commentary tradition on the Dido 
episode was interminable and frequently contradictory.  To recollect this truncated 
tradition, Chaucer first compares the treachery of Aeneas to that of Demophon, Paris, 
Jason and Hercules, whose stories must also be lurking about somewhere in the House of 
Glass.  All of these he invokes to censure Aeneas’ treatment of Dido; however he 
undercuts his own censure in the brief stanza following these extended comparisons:  
“But to excusen Eneas/ Fullyche of al his grete trespass,/ The book seyth Mercurie, sauns 
fayle,/ Bad hym goo into Itayle” (427-30).  This comment on Aeneas’ betrayal undercuts 
everything Chaucer’s literary comparison has just accomplished, and it does so only by 
7  See Desmond 226-27.
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means of a reference to the narrative it indicted.  It recasts the commentary tradition on 
the poem into a parody of itself, which the text it attempts to read always undermines.  
Indicting Aeneas requires that we change the narrative, it requires that we read the 
mandate of Mercurie as somehow resistable by Aeneas, or that we transfer blame onto 
Mercurie himself; but doing so also entails a judgement on the remainder of the narrative,
requiring us to ignore what Aeneas accomplishes in Italy, and so on.  The narrative 
requires an endless succession of interpretive judgements, whose resulting system can 
never account for the whole, as we can never completely reconcile the pieces of 
Chaucer’s poem (and we cannot believe that they are reconciled in our bland statement 
that they are irreconcilable—they are too relevant to one another to be so easily 
systematized). 
When he has “seen al this syghte” (468), though not represented it all, he leaves 
the temple, hoping to find the sculptor who carved all the engravings, or even just 
someone “that may me telle where I am” (479).  The Temple of Venus has imagined the 
representational system in its fullness. Though it parses time into the narrative images 
retained by the memory, it threatens to overflow its own mechanisms of containment.  
Overwhelmed by the vision, Chaucer seeks to disengage with it, emerge into the actual, 
non-represented world; he seeks a point of reference outside this textual temple that can 
provide a foothold for interpreting what he has just witnessed.  But, of course, in the 
dream space, even the narrator’s interlocutors are internal; as often occurs in allegory, the
characters encountered in a dream vision represent some aspect of the narrator 
fragmented and externalized.  However, unlike allegory, Chaucer’s dream never allows us
to know precisely what faculty is being represented in any given figure.  He offers us no 
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unmediated access to a lived reality outside the text; even in Fame’s House, where 
language no longer imagines its referent but its historical speaker, we still occupy the 
space of the dreamer’s perception.  The closest Chaucer can come to offering us an 
external point of reference is to push toward the mediating agent that we transform into 
interior representation:  sound.
Sound, in a modified, visual form, is precisely what Geffrey discovers in his 
search for an external point of reference, though he seems not to understand its 
significance. When he emerges from Venus’ Temple, he finds himself standing in
a large feld,
As fer as that I myghte see,
Withouten toun, or hous, or tree,
Or bush, or grass, or eryd lond:
For al the feld nas but of sond
As small as man may se. (482-84)
While many critics have read the field of sand as an image of desolation, inertia and 
unproductivity—as Chaucer’s final word on the possibility of interpretive authority 
suggested by the commentary within the temple—David K. Coley sees a continuity 
between the temple’s glass and the sand.  The temple itself is comprised of reconfigured 
sand—sand that, through a procedure that seemed vaguely arcane to the Middle Ages, has
been rendered clear.8  While Coley reads the sand as an image of tradition, ground down 
until it becomes virtually illegible, I would argue that Chaucer articulates in the image a 
rather clever and opportune pun that anticipates the composition of Fame’s House.  The 
“sond” outside is the “soun” from which the representational apparatus of Venus’ glass 
8  See Coley 63.
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temple is composed.  This reading recommends itself on several counts:  as noted, “sond”
homonymically gestures toward the Middle English “soun,” and also “sonde,” a 
revelatory message from God.  We will see this pun again in Book 2. Gefrey is mystified 
by the procedures of representation he has just witnessed. Formally, a pun pushes us 
toward the surface enunciation of language, disturbing the metonym in which it is spoken
and which determines its meaning.  The Temple of Venus has pushed Chaucer into an 
essential awareness of the lacunae that narrative always leaves unimagined.  As Geffrey 
escapes from his representation of the mechanisms of representation, he is left at the 
bleak point at which the material vessel of sound is transmuted into what it attempts to 
imagine.  His vision has thrust him back toward, if not into, the lived experience of 
narration; the sand becomes the opaque granules that he can no longer render clear.  
These granules tend toward the duration of speaking, rather than the duration of the 
spoken—they are as finely particulate as it is possible for the mind to conceive.  Chaucer 
is going about his vision backward, starting in the midst of representations and regressing
backward toward the material word that always accompanies and precedes 
representation.  The puns especially force our own experience of the narrative to stammer
at such a moment; Chaucer implicates us in his text by directing us to the pre-intellective 
sound of a term obliquely referencing the idea of pre-intellective sound.
Though Coley is right to understand the sand as material and spatial, correcting 
prior critics’ oversimplified reading of its negation, Chaucer does cast it in largely 
negative terms.  He goes to great pains to contrast it to the traditional, lush elements of a 
dream vision’s landscape.9  The emptiness announces itself in the mode of a stammered 
9  In “The Logic of the Dream Vision in Chaucer’s House of Fame” Kathryn L. Lynch reads the field of 
sand as such an inversion.  The traditional lushness of the dream landscape may suggest the 
representational plenitude of the dream from which Chaucer attempts to turn away here.
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retraction; each image in the list is concrete and we imagine the things that it names as it 
articulates them.  Only by virtue of the “withouten” are they cancelled while still being 
substantively articulated.  They populate the space in their absence, opening its capacities
even as the text forecloses them.  If Chaucer had wanted to accentuate the emptiness, we 
would have expected him to simplify it, using a single, perhaps abstract term to describe 
it:  “nothing” or a similar term would have effaced its substantiality.  Likewise, to 
emphasize its substantiality he could have described the sand, rather than offer a negated 
set of images for it.  Chaucer’s sand is a substantive absence, the stammer made flesh.  
The sand, like the sound that precedes representation, is pregnant with the images that, in 
a Saussurian sense, it negates in order to mean.  But Chaucer cannot turn back to the eros 
of representation, cannot force himself to make the sand cohere into a clear glass.  
Instead, he offers to let us follow him into the erotic play of a new representation, the 
narration of a space preceding narration.
The Fullness of Emptiness
Chaucer is plucked from the shifting sonic sands of the first book by an eagle 
whose appearance recalls Dante’s dream of the golden eagle in Purgatory 9.  As in 
Chaucer’s poem, Dante’s eagle emerges in an important liminal space—it is, in fact, a 
figure of the divine lady Lucy who transports Dante to Purgatory proper.  Prior to the 
dream, Dante has been exposed to a unique music in the Valley of Rulers that bears on 
Chaucer’s redeployment of the image.  In the Valley of Rulers, Dante joins a company led
by Sordello, a Mantuan poet.  At the beginning of Canto 8, one of the members of this 
group rises at dawn and begins to sing a hymn.  Unlike the hymn sung in Canto 7, the 
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specific content of this hymn seems unimportant to Dante—he names it the “Te lucis 
ante,” but he is unconcerned with its words; rather, Dante records the aesthetic, sonorous 
quality of the music.  He begins “render vano/ l’udire” [to render empty his hearing] (7-8)
in preparation and after hearing it, Dante says that it “fece me a me uscir di mente” [drew
me out of myself in mind] (14-15). The music here prefigures the sort of immemorability 
topoi he will exercise in Paradise and, indeed, an angelic vision immediately follows his 
empty perception of the song: two allegorical angels descend to reenact the expulsion of 
the serpent from the Garden.  When Dante sees these figures, “ne la faccia l’occhio si 
smarria,/ come virtù ch’a troppo si confonda” [the eye is bewildered by their 
countenance, as a faculty is confounded by excess] (35-36).  The three images share a 
common, temporal focus—in each, perception is overwhelmed by the sheer plenitude of 
sensible detail, which results in the stupefied state of the perceiver.  Not only do they 
leave Dante unable to represent the experience of perceiving them to his own readers, but
he suggests that they verge on becoming unperceivable, since they unsettle the self who is
supposed to be perceiving them, emptying and bewildering him.  These sensory 
experiences manifest to Dante a preliminary experience of divine presence through 
aesthetic perception; he hears only the physical sounds of the hymn rather than their 
referent.
Dante signals the importance of this moment with one of his few direct addresses 
to the reader.  Instructs us to “aguzza qui, lettor, ben li occhi al vero,/ ché l’ velo é ora ben
tanto sottile,/ certo, che ‘l trapassar dentro é leggero” [sharpen here, reader, well your 
eyes to the truth, because the veil is now so subtle, certainly, that to pass within is simple]
(19-21).  Dante signals here that something important has occurred in the song, 
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something which seems, at first, to necessarily preclude our access to it—after all, the 
only description Dante can offer of song and angel is to tell us that they literally made 
him insensate—but which Dante insists makes the allegory of his poem more clear here 
than at any other point preceding it.  In reality, our exclusion from the scene Dante 
imagines is the allegory it has to impart; in our necessary failure to realize the scene 
Dante purportedly imagines, we are delivered to the same surface apprehension of his 
language that Dante himself enjoyed.  The “veil,” between fiction and truth is so 
attenuated because Dante has repelled his readers, at least in part, from his narrative, left 
them stranded in a paradoxical attempt to imagine mindlessness.  To identify with 
Dante’s character, the reader must similarly empty out her own consciousness; but in 
doing so, the reader who attempted to effect such a self-negation no longer exists and can 
no longer mobilize the will to identify with Dante.  The presence that Dante nears in 
apprehending the unrelatable song and seeing the unrelatable faces of the angels installs 
itself in the reader at the moment she is pushed out of the text itself; to pass within the 
allegory is to, along with Dante himself, pass out of the scene it imagines, pass out of 
one’s own mind altogether.
Book 1 of the House of Fame has left Geffrey in a similar state: Chaucer has 
deeply problematized the very representational machinery through which his poem 
imagines itself, and his proxy is left stupefied in an empty field of meaningless sand-
sounds.  Chaucer parodically literalizes the emptiness that Dante’s experiences have 
inspired in him; in fact, the parody offers a subtle critique of Dantean emptiness by 
suggesting, first, that Dante took a perverse and paradoxical pride in that seeming 
emptiness and, second, that he cannot actually succeed in pushing his reader out of his 
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narrative.  Dante’s rendition of cognitive emptiness deployed a sacred rhetoric to 
authorize itself; the parodic atmosphere of Chaucer’s poem, however, empties Dante’s 
emptiness of its ineffable pretensions.  Chaucerian emptiness is an authentic 
bewilderment that does not really seek to enforce its imitation on a reader.  While readers 
aren’t supposed to exactly imitate Geffrey, Chaucer does cleverly implicate them in the 
design of the poem.  The sounds they make while reading—the subvocalization of the 
text, the rustle of the pages, even unrelated noises like sneezes that occur while reading—
are all collected into the imaginative space Chaucer constructs.  But even as he gathers 
readers into the space of Fame’s House, he fragments the continuity of those sounds, 
making each infinitely divisible sound ever made into a separate body. Even more so than
in Dante’s text, the more fully we imagine the scene, the more are we repelled from it 
back into our own bodies, into the passing duration we inhabit while we read.  Chaucer 
places us before ourselves, shows how we—along with Geffrey, the great reader of love 
poetry—surrender the literal phenomena surrounding us to the seductive fiction of the 
world a text imagines.  As we watch ourselves unfold, spread like everything else into an 
infinite number of separable bodies, the text increasingly approximates the presence from
which each of those bodies, in its historical moment, persisted.
 He begins by foreclosing the possibility of representation—every sound ever 
made will be imagined, in Fame’s domain, as an image of its maker; in terms of 
language, speech appears as the person who spoke it rather than as the thing it tried to 
represent. Dante’s afterlife did something similar—his shades are sorts of echoes that 
manifest a life; like Chaucer, he is insistent about democratizing the afterlife, including 
figures from his private life alongside important historical ones.  Chaucer goes even a 
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step further, in two regards: first, he includes not only every human being but even 
objects incapable of linguistic speech;10 second, he makes every individual sound made 
by all such objects a distinct object within his afterlife.  In Fame’s realm, it is not people 
who are judged, but distinct sounds made at distinct moments in time—the fickleness of 
Fama is both a strength and a shortcoming in this regard.  This further democratization of
the afterlife of sound offers us one of the key ways in which Chaucer read Dante’s poem
—as Dante’s own task was to extend the grace he found in Beatrice to the whole of the 
creation, so Chaucer has extended Dante’s framing technique to everything that produces 
sound. He effectively undoes historical identity: where Dante’s afterlife recorded a total 
organism, Chaucer’s breaks every such organism into its component part, giving each a 
strange substantiality that does not depend on its persistence through time. Each sound-
body is susceptible to its own judgement, but the basis for that judgement erodes as each 
sound is broken into its sibillant parts; at the point when they cannot represent a 
continuous thought, they can no longer be judged by Fama, God or any other authority.  
They are incoherent, empty but for the substance Chaucer has offered them within his 
narrative space; Dante’s emptiness on the cusp of Purgatory and throughout the Comedy 
never willingly approaches such an emptiness, as its emptiness is always composed 
across a history, soliciting an understanding. 
Only Chaucer’s own language—and by extension, the reader’s reconstitution of it
—continues to represent; yet Chaucer is constantly seeking, in his design, for a way to 
unravel even that most basic precondition of narrative.  He tries to project himself and his
reader into the poem as simply another of its imagined sound bodies, to refer us to our 
10  This move, in particular, anticipates something like Harman’s Object-Oriented Ontology, which does not
distinguish human objects from other types of objects, or even the living from the inanimate—all alike 
share a tendency toward integration and identity that defies such delineations.
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own duration which we spend attempting to reconstitute his strange and shifting 
narrative.  He will accomplish this aim in Book 3, which we will consider in more detail 
below, by describing a model of Fame that opposes the scheme articulated by the Eagle in
Book 2.  Here, rather, he tries to describe a configuration of narrative space capable of 
expressing what narrative itself has failed to do—to recuperate time in all its fullness. He 
struggles to find a narrative scheme capable of expressing more than just historicized 
elisions of time.  Narrative, in Venus’s Temple, could only serve as a memorium to lost 
loves, since the grace that animates the beloved can never be adequately represented in 
whatever its language imagines.  Chaucer tries to recuperate that loss by means of a very 
clever omission of his own—the Eagle’s exhaustive description of Fame’s realm fails to 
articulate the period of sound imagined in each of its sound-bodies.  Each body might 
represent an entire work, a paragraph, sentence, word or fragment of a word.  By 
removing its periodicity from language, Chaucer renders language unintelligible, since, to
take the sentence level as an example, each word in a sentence would be present 
simultaneously, making the temporal subordination necessary for meaning impossible.  
The structures of relation that turns individual words spoken across a period of time into 
a linguistic organism breaks down in the House so that each strange element in it wakes 
to itself and performs a danse macabre with every other sound surrounding it, linguistic 
or not. Within this unintelligibility, Chaucer parodically expresses the temporality of each
moment of meaning that language surrenders to time.  He tries, oddly enough, to make 
this pre-representational unintelligibility the site of meaning, and tries also to surrender 
his own text to it.
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However, as Chaucer well knew, it is more difficult to desire to abandon authorial 
privilege than it is to actually do it.  Such attempts to abandon privilege—as the reader 
response critics have shown—always codify into a new, subterranean form of privilege: 
the privilege of an author not privileging himself.  Chaucer wants to harrow his text more
deeply than that, and so it will require several attempts.  In his first attempt, Chaucer 
signals his abdication of his authorial position as he describes his abduction by the Eagle. 
While standing within the field of sand, the eagle swoops upon Geffrey  and begins to 
conduct him to the House of Fame.  The narrative highlights the violence of this act, and 
Gefrey’s lack of volition:  
And with hys grymme pawes stronge
Withyn hys sharpe nayles longe,
Me, fleynge, in a swap he hente, 
And with hys sours ayen up went...
How high, I can not telle yow
For I cam up y nyste how
For so astonyed and asweved
Was every vertu in my heved,
What with his sours and with my drede,
That al my felynge gan to dede
For-whi hit was to gret affray. (541-53)
Following on the punning logic he introduced in the previous Book, Chaucer imagines a 
character within his poem forcibly capturing its own “sours,” its creator.  The “sours” 
literally acts in an instrumental sense—he conveys Chaucer upward through his “soars,” 
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the thrust of his wings; but Chaucer so constructs his line that “sours” also refers to a 
material “source” within a prepositional phrase.  Both senses were available in Middle 
English.  The Eagle—who will serve as Chaucer’s means for outlining the mechanism by 
which sound arrives at the House of Fame—enters the narrative as a terrorizing presence,
characterized primarily by his vicious claws.  The effect of the terror is to impede the 
narrative—Chaucer imagines his own creation disorienting himself to the point that it 
frustrates the project he has articulated in the Proem.  Chaucer’s reified Thought only had
the capacity to tell the dream aright, “Yf any vertu in the be” (526), yet in less than 25 
lines, he has imagined his narrative proxy losing every “vertu” because of the violence 
done to him by a character within the narrative.  As a result, Geffrey’s initial ascent to the
House of Fame is obscured; he almost suggests that Geffrey is transmuted into one of the 
House’s odd embodied sounds by describing his death to feeling, but his own fear renders
the procedure opaque.  We only understand this procedure when Chaucer narrates the 
eagle’s rendition of it.
Chaucer further indicates that he is being absorbed into the House’s machinery in 
the next stanza.  After he swoons, the Eagle tells him “in mannes vois” to “Awak!/ And 
be not agast so, for shame!” (556-57).  Following this direct speech, the narrator informs 
us that the Eagle also
called me... by my name,
And for I shulde the bet abreyde,
Me mette “Awak,” to me he seyde
Ryght in the same vois and stevene
That useth oon I koude nevene;
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And with that vois, soth for to seyn,
My mynde cam to me ageyn. (558-64)
Several puzzling features present themselves in these lines.  Foremost among them is that
Chaucer neglects to tell us whom he “koude nevene” in line 562; the description suggests
an intimate familiarity, which has led several critics to suppose that Chaucer is referring 
to his shrewish wife, Philippa.11  However, the reference to the “mannes vois” of the 
Eagle makes this at least somewhat problematic; this may be part of the joke, but the 
subsequent discourse with the Eagle hardly suggests any kind of domestic banter.  
Conversely, B. G. Koonce reads the line as a scriptural reference to Christ and the 
apostles who summoned people to awaken from the slumber of sin (143).  Such scriptural
and theological readings, however, too often feel as though they miss the humor of 
Chaucer’s text.  Its invocations of the Christian tradition are never straightforward or 
exclusively pious, but rather parodic.  If we take the line in the terms the poem offers us, 
Chaucer seems to be referring to himself in the line.  “I koude nevene,” occurs in such 
close proximity to “by my name” that Chaucer’s name—which is oddly excluded from 
the Eagle’s direct speech—is on the reader’s mind.  He jokingly reminds us that his voice 
has been usurped by the Eagle who, after flying off with its “sours,” now uses it to 
summon Geffrey back to the task of narration.  The terms in which he does this are 
starkly spatial: anticipating the embodied sounds of Fame’s house, Chaucer tells us that 
Geffrey “mette ‘Awak.’” Literally, the line indicates that Geffrey has reinitiated the act of
dreaming, “I dreamed that he said to me ‘Awake’”—he dreams what has just been 
narrated to us, catching up to the Eagle’s dialogue out of his swoon; however, in this 
poem, the line also suggests that Geffrey “met” the word awake.  This is accompanied by 
11  See Klitgård 163.
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the local personification of his “mynde” which, using another spatial metaphor, comes 
back to him again.  Chaucer’s narrative begins to fold in on itself from the moment the 
Eagle appears: the design of the poem begins to overtake the act of authoring it.
The violence of the Eagle’s onset also signals that Chaucer is borrowing from 
Dante.  Dante’s dream explicitly alludes to a violent mythological episode: the abduction 
of Ganymede, whom Jupiter, in the form of an eagle, bore away to heaven. As he does so 
often through the Comedy, Dante Christianizes the sin in this episode, making it a 
metaphor for contemplation: the soul, chosen by God’s grace, is forcibly conducted back 
to its source:12  
terribil come fólgor discendesse
e me rapisse suso infino al foco.
Ivi parea che ella e io ardesse,
e sí lo ‘ncendio imaginato cosse
che convenne che ‘l sonno si rompesse. (29-33)13
[terrible as lightning it was descending/ and it bore me upward to the fire./
There it seemed that it and I was burning/ and the imagined fire so 
cooked/ that my sleep was necessarily broken.]
Dante’s Eagle anticipates the process of rarefication that will occur as he proceeds up the 
mountain to the terrestrial paradise and beyond; its terror is preliminary to the union that 
is effected between pilgrim and the company of the blessed in Paradise.  As Dino 
Cervigni notes in Dante’s Poetry of Dreams, the language of this description is insistently
Pauline and Augustinian (106). Particularly in Augustine, the Latin verb “rapere,” 
12  On this image, see Brownlee 137.
13  All subsequent citations will be from Durling and Martinez’s edition of the text. 
182
cognate to the Italian “rapire,” is frequently used to describe conversion in the passive 
and often violent sense seen here.14  The repeated fire imagery is likewise commonly 
associated with contemplation and conversion motifs:  the uncontrolled, sinful fire of the 
passions is transformed into a purgative fire that prepares the soul for the beatific vision.  
The fire here grammatically fuses Dante to the eagle so that in line 31 “ardesse” occurs in
the third person singular, rather than the first person plural that we would expect.  This 
compounded eagle-pilgrim is subtly subjected to a further violent uniting, suggested by 
the verb “cuocere;” Dante literally says that the purifying fire bakes them together.
Chaucer’s rendition of this event devastatingly undercuts its gravity and sanctity.  
After he reawakens to his dream, Geffrey nervously recognizes that “I neyther am Ennok,
ne Elye,/ Ne Romulus, ne Ganymede” (588-89).  He imagines himself caught in a 
contemplative vision resembling that of Dante, or one of the Classical and biblical 
sources that informed his presentation of vision.  Geffrey imagines that the Eagle, 
descending from Jove’s palace in circles reminiscent of allegorical falcon imagery and 
Dante’s cerchi, will bear him back to its source, again in the divine sense and as a 
reference to the author himself.  However, the Eagle quickly disabuses Chaucer of his 
self-aggrandizing notion:  “Thow demest of thyself amys,/ For Joves ys not theraboute—/
I dar wel putte the out of doute—/ To make of the as yet a sterre” (596-99).  Chaucer 
deliberately distinguishes his vision from Dante’s, who journeyed to the fixed stars and 
beyond, joining the blessed there.  Paradise, for Dante, constituted a perfectly represented
space; the difficulty in narrating that vision was not the ineffability of a theological 
paradise that defied the spatial and temporal categories that are the province of language, 
but rather the super-effability of a space that constantly manifested the motive grace 
14  See O’Connell 42.
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inhering in its every member. In Paradise, narration—Dante’s grace in language—
accompanied and inhabited what it represented. If Dante expresses anxiety over the 
adequacy of his own, particular representation, this is only to heighten our sense of it as a
fully realized space.  However, Chaucer’s vision drives toward a thoroughly different, far 
more insipid, end.  Rather than Ganymede’s and Dante’s lofty visions of Jove, Chaucer 
seeks an authentic, self-emptying befuddlement that will reduce him to the 
phenomenological experience of wonder: he will watch himself watching himself, seeing 
every particle of time in his experience until watcher and watch touch briefly and 
furtively.
Despite the Eagle’s ironic undercutting of the Dantean parallel that produces him, 
the poem does not simply parody this evocation of contemplation. His Eagle is still an 
agent of Jove—albeit a pedantic and pompous one—even if it will not bear Chaucer back
to him, and Chaucer still deploys many of the metaphors of ascent familiar to 
contemplative discipline.  Yet his attention is turned toward the speech acts that precede 
representation, and that occur in the historical world, rather than the metaphysical 
language that attempts—either by positive or negative means—to represent God.  Of 
course, like Dante, Chaucer must still narrate a new metaphysical space into being in 
order to articulate his critique of metaphysical language; but, unlike Dante, his world 
always seems to be at the work of unraveling itself, demonstrating the mechanisms by 
which it is constituted.  Chaucer most consistently refers to the aim of his ascent with the 
term “tydynges,” which the Eagle tells Geffrey are to be the reward for his all too literary 
service to Cupid:  
Wherefore, as I seyde, ywys,
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Jupiter considereth this,
And also, beau sir, other thynges:
That is, that thou hast no tydynges
Of Loves folk yf they be glade,
Ne of noght elles that God made. (641-46)
Much critical ink has been spilled describing the implications of Geffrey’s lack of 
tydynges on the poem’s concept of authorship; the Eagle here carries on the trajectory of 
the first book, in which Chaucer understands the world solely through literature. He lacks
an experiential basis for interpretation, and so must rely on divergent and contradictory 
texts and traditions.15 I want to highlight the explicitly temporal dimension of this key 
term: the term “tide” primarily designates a span of time in Middle English. According to 
the Eagle, the narratives Geffrey has encountered are fundamentally incapable of 
representing the gladness experienced by lovers.  He lacks his own Beatrice, capable of 
reorganizing his perception of the material world under a renewed rubric of grace.
Geffrey’s reliance on literature for his experience of the world elides his 
experience of temporal duration and presence; as the Eagle continues, “of thy verray 
neyghebores,/ That duellen almost at thy dores,/ Thou herist neyther that ne this” (649-
51).  Language is supposed to facilitate contact between people.  It is, in this sense, the 
primary way in which we express our being in duration.  Language is always referencing 
something that words themselves—the matter of their sounds—is not; yet in facilitating 
exchanges between people persisting in time, it simultaneously offers a direct experience 
of “newe thynges” (654), a Bergsonian procession of the new in the present as it 
constantly remakes itself.    Novelty is the primary characteristic of the present—it is why
15  See, for example, Payne 204; Ruffolo 326.
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presence can never remain static, even though we always inhabit it.  Language, as it is 
spoken, or spoken in the mind, can facilitate this contact with the present; however, 
Geffrey only uses it in its representational function to reimagine, without recognizing the 
deep temporality of reading, hearing and speaking, what the words he reads are trying to 
represent.  Chaucer casts this as a distinction between oral and written language here:  the
written language he reads in his study removes him from  the moment he inhabits, while 
verbal contact with neighbors would situate him more fully in that moment.  However the
poem affirms that this is really more an issue of the representational functioning of any 
text, written or spoken.  To render language transparently into the figures and narratives it
imagines removes the reader or listener from her own temporality until she sits, dazed, 
like Geffrey: “domb as any stoon,/ thou sittest at another book/ Tyl fully daswed ys thy 
look” (656-58).  Chaucer implicitly extends this threat to the reader of his text as well by 
imagining himself in a circumstance resembling her own as she reads the poem—after 
all, the House of Fame has frequently left its readers feeling rather dazed. Chaucer uses 
this metaphor of the “dumb stoon” again in the General Prologue to the Canterbury Tales,
where it also describes a sort of graceless state outside duration.  As in Dante’s image of 
the Medusa, stone is incapable of dynamically manifesting its existence in time.  It is 
“dumb,” susceptible, perhaps, to the inscriptions of others, but incapable of speaking 
itself.  Otherwise, the only time it can manifest is its gradual effacement, its wearing 
away into, as we might expect, sand.
Chaucer explicitly recollects the sand metaphor from the previous book shortly 
after using the stone metaphor.  While describing the impending journey to the House of 
Fame, he tells Geffrey to
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truste wel that thou shalt here,
When we be come there I seye,
Mo wonder thynges, dar I leye,
And of Loves folk moo tydynges,
Both sothe sawes and lesinges,
And moo loves new begonne,
And longe yserved loves wonne,
And moo loves casuelly
That ben betyd, no man wot why, ...
And moo berdys in two houres
Withoute rasour or sisoures
Ymad then greynes be of sondes. (672-91)
This breathless list of “mores” continues on until line 698.  As Katherine Terrell has 
argued, the profusion of details that are offered in the poem’s lists “demonstrate at the 
level of individual words, at the level of nouns uninterrupted by grammatical 
subordination, his tendency to juxtapose potentially inharmonious objects together” 
(334).  The elements in his lists stammer over one another, irreducible to a logical order 
that could harmonize them.  They are thematized only by the parataxis of the line that 
spills them out—by the temporality of their narration, not the space they inhabit; their 
description in this list actually frustrates our capacity to imagine them distinctly in the 
narrative.  But despite this difficulty, as in the first book, this growth results in material 
metaphors of particulation:  the repeated “sondes” pun here, and “cornes in graunges” in 
line 698.  As the Eagle will soon describe, Geffrey will witness not the referents of all 
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these tydynges, but the material moments of their signification. Nor will those moments 
be composed into tidy events, compressing a span of time—Chaucer suggests that 
Geffrey will see, spread out within a single space, the particulate sonic matter of which 
such articulate, literate events are composed.
Following this list, the Eagle begins, at last, to describe where the House of Fame 
is located.  He begins by telling Geffrey that “first shalt thou here where she duelleth,/ 
And so thyn oune bok hyt tellith” (711).  As he begins to organize his explanation, the 
Eagle again casts Chaucer as a reader of his own narrative, implicated in its design.  Most
simply, the line indicates that Geffrey will recount the Eagle’s description in his own 
narrative, after the dream; however, the line also seems to indicate that the Eagle’s 
description derives its authority from the very poem it is unfolding.  “Tellith” is not 
placed in the future tense, but rather the present.  Immediately following, the poem does 
describe the House of Fame’s metaphysical locale:  
Hir paleys stant, as I shal seye,
Right even in myddes of the weye
Betwixen hevene and erthe and see,
That what so ever in al these three
Is spoken, either privy or apert,
The way therto ys so overt,
And stant eke in so juste a place
That every soun mot to hyt pace. (713-20)
The Eagle intensifies this description in the next few lines, adding that any sound 
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whatsoever “Certeyn,... moste thider nede” (724).16  Chaucer locates the House in the 
precise center of the cosmos. He seems to aim, here as elsewhere, at a critique of Dante’s 
metaphysics in so situating the House: his goal is not so high as the Comedy’s Paradise. 
In fact, as the mountain on which Fame’s House is situated will suggest, he seems to 
think that a space of purgation is the best he can expect from his narrative, and perhaps 
earthly life more generally.  However, he simultaneously suggests that the House of Fame
transcends Dante’s project: even the speech of Heaven echoes toward this center, which 
narrative gesture playfully topples the hierarchical, spatial ordering of the Medieval 
cosmos.  Divine speech is subject to the same conditions as human speech, and even 
animal or vegetable “speech.” Dante’s afterlife, which he demands we interpret on the 
pattern of historical exegesis,17 is subsumed by Chaucer’s design, reimaged in its sonic 
totality within the House of Fame.  The Word itself would be subsumed into this 
construction; the Eagle’s description suggests that the House of Fame actually becomes 
the seat of judgement, since its location is so “juste” and clear that sounds necessarily 
tend toward it.  
This description of the House’s location also subtly invokes the two figures to 
whom Chaucer will explicitly compare his upward journey:  Phaeton and Icarus.  
Chaucer, through his Eagle, will use both of these stories as analogies for his flight, at the
moment when his ascent begins to obscure the ground from which it took flight.  Both 
16  The verb in this line is particularly interesting, as it uses an active verb in a passive sense—“nede” is 
best translated as “be forced,” though it also invokes the modern sense of “need.”  Chaucer suggests that 
the movement of speech to the House is part of its nature and so involuntary, but also an active seeking to 
remedy some deficiency in itself. This describes, with remarkable economy, the ontological point about 
representation Chaucer is making here: language arises from a need to make present the object it names, 
when it always arises from the object speaking, defining her continually renewing being through time.
17  On Dante’s distinction between the allegory of the poets and the allegory of the theologians, see 
Singleton 78-86.
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stories are deployed by Dante in his reworking of Ovidian mythology, and both 
prominently feature a “middle way” between ruinous extremes.  Dante uses these stories 
as a way of foregrounding his need of a guide.  In Inferno 17, he references them both in 
describing his flight on the back of Geryon, the monstrous icon of fraud whom Vergil 
must trick into aiding their descent.  As Teodolina Barolini has argued, Geryon acts as a 
metaphor for Dante’s project since “the encounter with Geryon dramatizes the text’s 
confrontation with its own representational fraud, when the text gambles all on being 
accepted as a ‘ver c’ha faccia di menzogna’” [truth which has the face of a lie] (66).18  
Dante invokes Phaeton and Icarus to express his misgivings about the heights to which he
expects his Comedy to ascend.  Rather than ascending to God, it may become lodged in 
Hell; the image of contemplative flight is inverted in Geryon so that Dante descends to 
the harrowing depths prompted by this question.  However, his project does not falter 
here largely through the efforts of Virgil, who knowingly summons Geryon with Dante’s 
belt at the brink of an otherwise unbridgeable gulf, who enjoins the monster to descend 
slowly and in wide circles, and who protects Dante, bodily, from the scorpion’s tale that 
is first obscured by his “faccia d’uom giusto” [face of a just man] (17.10).  As Robert M. 
Durling notes, Virgil’s directions “draw on the advice that Phoebus and Daedalus give 
their sons” (561); we are made to understand that Dante’s success is possible because he 
has a paternal model, on which he can pattern the initial descent that will ultimately prove
an ascent.  
One of the effects of this conceit is to soften the truth claims of his own 
represented space—as readers, we always imagine what he names in a material way, but 
Dante simultaneously demands that we remain conscious of the discursive history that 
18  On Geryon as a figure for Dante’s fiction, see also Ferrucci 66-102.
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produced those figures.  We are aware of them as constructed literary repetitions, 
reimagined from the earlier texts they inhabited.  His afterlife vibrates with its own 
analogic modes of production, when he situates—as in Geryon’s case—the historical 
authors who most vividly imaged a narrative figure with the figure itself. Dante’s 
narrative structure ensures that, the more vividly we imagine his narrative, the more will 
we become conscious of its existence as discourse, with a generic history that produced 
it.  Geryon’s just face expresses the danger of all narrative—if we simply imagine its 
figures, the text will become complicit with our escapism and we will defraud ourselves 
of our own moment; so, while Geryon traditionally had a human face, it is Dante’s 
exclusive innovation to describe that face as “giusto,” “just” or simply “correct.” He is a 
liar, almost an allegorical personification of lies, and yet through the conceit of the 
fiction, his face appears just—it seems what it is not through our imagination of its 
physicality. The denizens of hell, in their various ways, have fallen prey to this danger of 
fetishism, failing to self-consciously imagine the objects of their desire as products of the 
historical discourse that makes them seem desirable.  Dante’s text threatens to damn 
himself and readers if it indulges in this vain curiosity as it describes Hell, Purgatory, and 
even Paradise.  Narrative is capable of surrendering us to a model of time that divorces us
from the experience of our own, present duration that language expresses before being 
transformed into a figure.  However, Dante turns this idea inside out, making our act of 
imagination the mechanism through which we recognize a figure’s textuality; as the 
reader’s eye, following Dante’s, roves across Geryon’s triple body, pregnant with 
shadowy allegorical significance, we become aware of his implicit textuality. The tableau
of Vergil and Geryon, narrator and narrated,  demands that we attend to the procedures by
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which Dante fabricates his world.  As Dante descends on this creature, he too is overlaid 
by his own analogues, which render his role in his own narrative comprehensible.   Dante
is a rehabilitated Phaeton or Icarus not only because he is humble enough to be governed 
by Vergil’s good advice, but also because they submit Dante himself to the analogical 
structure that pervades his world.  His middle way is constituted, in part, by his deliberate
lack of invention, his always tenuous submission of his own genius to his literary 
precursors.
However, as Chaucer suggests, Dante’s desire is no less lofty than that of Icarus 
or Phaeton, despite the careful moderation he exercises in his pursuit of it.  The object of 
the Comedy is not the modest middle way that these myths enjoin their protagonists to 
seek, but rather the same unreachable contemplation that, in the allegorical reading, 
ultimately results in their ruin.  Chaucer reconstrues the middle way—the means of these 
other journeys—as the end of his own; this gesture is reinforced by his conflation, in the 
eagle, of the means of transportation with the guide figure.  Dante made author and 
representation coexist beside one another, but Chaucer brackets the possibility of 
representation altogether; he makes language capable of representing only its irreducible 
historicity.  He references the duration of his reader by implicating our act of reading into
what the poem imagines; once we are imagined within his poem, he proceeds to fragment
his representation of the instants of our reading into successively smaller interval-images 
until he pushes us out of the narrative entirely back into our own moment, where words 
have been coalescing into the forms that Chaucer seems so intent on rupturing.  In order 
to do this, he first renders language inertly material.  In one of the most often cited 
passages of the poem, the Eagle informs Geffrey that 
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Soun ys noght but eyr ybroken,
And every speche that ys spoken
Lowd or pryvee, foul or fair,
In his substaunce ys but air; 
For as flaumbe ys but lyghted smoke,
Right soo soun ys air ybroke. (765-70)
Chaucer’s reestablishes the same relationship between language and representation here 
that he did in Book 1—he violently curtails language’s almost mystical transmutation into
its referent, leaving its effects only material.  His use of air as its medium is significant, 
as air—like the glass of Venus’s temple—is more fundamentally the medium of visual 
things, the clear space through which we perceive whatever is distant from us.  In Ovid’s 
description of Fame’s House, both visual and auditory events are transmitted to sue at 
Fame’s seat for remembrance and imitation; however, Chaucer almost makes the two 
oppose one another.  In his poem, sound quite literally “breaks” the air as he reiterates 
explicitly four times in this twenty-one line passage; his description reaches its fever 
pitch when he says that, when a musical instrument is played, “The air ys twyst with 
violence/ And rent—loo, thys ys my sentence” (775-76).  Ironically—and likely 
uncomprehendingly—the Eagle’s “sentence” is undercut by what it attempts to mean.  
His “sentence” concerns the impossibility of “sentence” and spatial imagination.  
Chaucer suggests that sound, in its most fundamental form, ruptures the visual in order to
manifest itself.  His poem, in fact, conflates the two:  it forecloses the possibility of 
speech referring to anything it attempts to (visually) apprehend, shunting it back to the 
speaker.  Yet in the House of Fame, this very closing off of visual representation is 
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repeatedly imaged within the narrative.  His various attempts to resituate speech outside 
of his own narrative fail due to the rather obvious fact that it continues to be a narrative.
Chaucer elaborates on this relationship between air and representation as he is 
conveyed upward by the Eagle.  Later in the poem, at line 905, Geffrey says that the 
Eagle 
Was flowen fro the ground so hye
That al the world, as to myn yë,
No more semed than a prikke;
or elles was the air so thikke
That y ne myghte not discerne. (904-908)
The Eagle’s reference to Icarus follows soon after, when he tells Chaucer that neither 
Alexander of Macedon, Scipio, Dedalus nor Icarus had flown half as high as this, 
ironically confusing our sense of his middle way with the lofty height that destroyed 
Icarus (920).  As he rises, the air—again like the glass in Venus’s temple—becomes 
opaque; oddly enough, as he reaches toward the domain where history is preserved, 
indestructibly, Geffrey becomes unable to see it.  Or rather, Chaucer makes the opacity of
language the object of his representation:  as he turns upward, away from the world and 
toward Fame’s House, he beholds a new space populated with “eyryssh bestes,” air 
rendered visible and given form.  Whether we are to equate these figures with the 
denizens of the House of Fame is left unclear; Chaucer does call them citizens at one 
point, but they seem to precede the House itself.  Regardless, these beasts announce a 
new facet to Chaucer’s commentary on language: the disruption of vision becomes the 
medium through which Chaucer effects representation; his narrative makes visible this 
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rupture in the visual mechanics of signification.  In doing so, he circles closer to the 
narrative mechanism that will ultimately push himself and his reader out of narrative and 
into a pure linguistic duration.
Reconfiguring his earlier description of sound as broken air, Chaucer 
subsequently attempts to frustrate his representation by plenitude rather than a reductive 
violence.  The Eagle announces this immediately after his initial description: 
Now hennesforth y wol the teche
How every speche, or noyse, or soun,
Thurgh hys multiplicacioun,
Thogh hyt were piped of a mous,
Mot nede come to Fames Hous. (782-86)
Chaucer finally presents here, the eschatological space in which all of history extends 
simultaneously in an ongoing present that accumulates all the sonic detritus of the past.  
But, as Chaucer now introduces, we must understand its extent in two ways.  The first is 
finite, though impossibly vast:  every event from the past and every material body that 
was involved in it is recreated in its entirety in the House.  Sound is apprehended in 
metonymic intervals—the span in which a story is told, for instance, would be 
reimagined as the storyteller replaying an entire sequence of sound.    Dante’s 
eschatology follows this pattern, encapsulating all the various moments of a person’s life 
within the rubric of a single body.  It is a fundamentally moral and intellective vision of 
time, since moral interpretation requires the compression of duration.  However, 
everything about Chaucer’s narrative up to this point asks us to resist this simplistic 
conceptualization of the House.  It asks us also to conceive of language and history in 
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terms of its duration; only in this sense does it press towards the infinite.  Chaucer 
unchains the event into the multitude of temporal points it compresses, and ultimately, its 
ineffable present duration.
Chaucer elaborates on this dual model of time and language in his image of the 
widening circle.    The Eagle likens the clear process by which sound comes to Fame’s 
domain to the circles produced by a rock being thrown in water:
That whel wol cause another whel,
And that the thridde, and so forth, brother,
Every sercle causynge other
Wydder than hymselve was; 
And thus fro roundel to compas,
Ech aboute other goynge
Causeth of othres sterynge
And multiplyinge ever moo. (794-801)
At first glance, the Eagle’s analogy seems to describe the process by which famous 
utterances gain their authority.  They are spoken or written at a single, local point, from 
which they spread outward in a series of repetitions and citations.  Our own familiar 
analogy of “circles of influence” derives from a similar metaphor.  However, as the Eagle
has already said, a sound does not need to be famous to be conveyed to Fame’s house; 
even the piping of a mouse is reconstituted there. Rather, it seems to describe the 
persistence of the individual articulations that we compress into a linguistic event when 
we make meaning from sound.  While, in making meaning, we must cease to hear earlier 
sounds in order to apprehend later ones, and to recoordinate them in memory, Chaucer 
196
indicates that the sounds do not actually pass away.  Their loss is a trick of our 
perception, too weak to hear them persist, toppling over one another in the simultaneity 
of the present that they all inhabit.  Past sounds motivate and determine future ones, but 
they do not really pass away in Chaucer’s world; they had being once, and so they always
have being regardless of whether or not we have discarded them.
Chaucer’s favorite analogy for this ongoing presence of language is the sea.  As 
we saw earlier, Chaucer locates the House in the middle of heaven, earth and the sea, a 
detail which he draws from Ovid’s account;19 yet, outside of the Classical context, we 
expect the commonplace tripartite model of the cosmos deployed by Dante.  The sea 
emphasizes the materiality of the House of Fame and its tie to the historical world rather 
than the world of moral metaphysics.  He reiterates this situation at line 846, adding that 
this locale is “most conservatyf the soun.”  Chaucer forces us to place the noise of the sea
alongside the articulated sounds of speech produced on Earth in so locating Fame’s 
domain.  The image of the sea intensifies the conundrums of the House that Chaucer has 
left unsaid:  first, the sea cannot be divided into discernible entities that could be 
reimaged in the House of Fame; second, its sounds cannot be divided into distinct 
moments of articulation.  What interval of the sea song would be conveyed to the House
—each crashing of a wave, each slosh of water against water?  And what body would be 
imagined, when sea sounds are produced by the endless recombinations of water?  The 
infiltration of the sea into Fame’s House forces us to imagine language and sound in 
19  We should note that Chaucer’s treatment of Ovid is one point of correspondence between Books 2 and 3 
and Book 1.  In Ovid, the episode of describing Fame’s House is not only quite brief, but is only a 
rhetorical adornment anticipating news of Troy’s invasion.  As Chaucer accentuated the lacunae left by 
Virgil’s narrative and the subsequent commentary tradition, the bulk of his poem drastically and comically 
expands on an otherwise insignificant lacuna in the Metamorphoses.
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terms of a temporal duration that defies the intellective parsing of time into discrete 
moments marked out by discrete entities.  
As Geffrey and the Eagle near the House itself, Chaucer intensifies this sea 
thematic.  The Eagle asks Geffrey
“Maistow not heren that I do?”
“What?” quod I. “The grete soun,”
Quod he, “that rumbleth up and doun 
In Fames Hous, full of tydynges,
Bothe of feir speche and chidynges,
And of fals and soth compouned.
Herke wel; hyt is not rouned.
Herestow not the grete swogh?”
“Yis, parde,” quod y, “wel ynogh.”
“And what soun is it lyk?” quod hee.
“Peter, lyk betynge of the see.” (1024-34)
Oddly, Geffrey seems initially incapable of hearing the noise of the place because it is so 
ubiquitous.  Despite the volume of the sound—he says that it “is not rouned,” or 
whispered—the Eagle has to expound on it before it becomes discernible.  He calls this 
ubiquitous noise a “swogh,” which the MED defines as a  general “rushing sound, as of 
water or wind,” or a “murmuring.”20  Chaucer deliberately characterizes this noise as 
inarticulate when heard in its totality; the chaos of this white noise is also visual when it 
seems almost to defy gravity, rumbling up and down.  As such, when Chaucer is asked to 
20  The term seems almost to recall Elijah’s vision of God on Mount Horeb when he sees a powerful wind, 
an earthquake and a fire, but then only hears God in the “whistling of a gentle air” (1 Kings 19:12).
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liken the noise to something, he chooses the sea whose noise is already represented 
within this “swogh.”  Most importantly, Chaucer overlays his pervasive mention of 
“tydynges” with the idea of the ocean in these lines.  He reveals the term to be another 
pun:  in addition to its temporal associations, he evokes its association with the “tides” in 
the modern usage of the word.  By compressing these two inflections into the governing 
term of the poem, Chaucer implies that its aim is the apprehension of sound in its present 
duration, sound not subject to the recombinative functions of memory that produces 
language.  When every sound ever articulated has its own individual presence, language 
becomes impossible; the ontological space that it seeks to describe—which we conceive 
of as the space of existence and presence—is supplanted by a richer idea of present 
duration, the space in which language is articulated.
In parallel with this likeness between “swogh” and sea, Chaucer reiterates his 
conception of language as broken air.  After articulating the initial comparison, he says
Or elles [it is] lyk the last humblynge
After the clappe of a thundringe,
Whan Joves hath the air ybete.
But yt doth me for fere swete. (1039-42)
Interestingly, in this iteration of the image—again drawn from Ovid—the sounds in the 
House of Fame are likened to the aftermath of air’s breakage rather than the breakage 
itself.  Chaucer maintains the notion that his poem breaks the representational capacity of
language, yet he also acknowledges that the poem depends on representational narrative 
to effect this breakage.  This feature of the poem reintroduces it to the realm of the 
secondary—the poem can only be an echo of what it attempts to name.  Further, it should 
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be noted that the idea of likening this sound to anything, which task is pursued further in 
these lines, is  inappropriate—as we have seen, the sound itself defies the descriptive, 
referential power of language.  Any likeness can only prove a partial metonym for the 
sound considered in itself, since both the sea and thunder from the heavens would be 
represented in it.  It is essentially ineffable.  However, the sound itself is only a likeness, 
albeit a perfect one.  Chaucer’s narrative trails after the idea that is its generative 
principle, the clap of thunder—deriving from the Jove to whom the Eagle would not bear 
Geffrey—that disturbed the clear air of representational language.  No act of language 
can recuperate that idea, though every act of language manifests it.  Chaucer emphasizes 
the secondary relationship between what his narrative imagines and what it wants to 
instill in the reader; his text operates on two levels: that of its imagined narrative, and that
of the temporality passing as we read the poem.  Each moment of the latter is a clap of 
thunder that renders the former unintelligible and unnecessary, so fulfilling the narrative’s
aim and delivering the reader into a persisting presence that linguistic recombination 
obscures.  Chaucer’s innovation is to place narrative at the service of the clap so that its 
echoes direct us toward their object.  The House’s represented space is a simulacrum of 
the entire creation, conceived as God would witness it from the judgement seat: perfectly 
present, and so disarticulated from the historical temporality that gave birth to it.
This simulacral relationship is manifested not solely in this thunderous 
description, but in every sound that populates the House of Fame.  Though I have 
deployed the idea throughout my discussion of the second Book, only at its end do we 
actually discover that sounds are reimaged as their speakers in the House.  The Eagle’s 
discussion of the machinery by which sounds are conveyed to the House thus far has 
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been meticulous in its absurd logic.  However, when he describes this most important 
facet of the poem, he offers little rationalization of it, simply calling it a “wonder thyng”  
and then departing (1083).  In his account, 
Whan any speche ycomen ys
Up to the paleys, anon-ryght
Hyt wexeth lyk the same wight
Which that the word in erthe spak,
Be hyt clothed red or blak;
And hath so verray hys lyknesse
That spak the word, that thou wilt gesse
That it the same body be. (1074-81)
As he did above, Chaucer accentuates the “likeness” of these simulacra to the moment in 
which they were spoken, recollecting their secondary relationship to the sounds that 
produced them.21  In the final two lines, the Eagle distinguishes between the historical 
speaker and her image in Fame’s domain while emphasizing how perfect the image is.  
Ironically, the House of Fame, which forecloses the possibility of speech meaning what it
says, simultaneously seems to perfect representation—the representation of Chaucer’s 
bracketing of representation.  However, Chaucer also renders his perfected 
representations incapable of articulating anything themselves.  The dissonance between 
the praxis of the poem and its idea is most intense here, since Chaucer deliberately 
21  In Chaucer Reads “The Divine Comedy,” Karla Taylor  reads the clothing of the embodied sounds as 
deriving from “black-letter manuscripts with red capitals and rubrics” (34).  In so clothing his sounds, 
Chaucer seems to be describing the relationship between oral and written texts—written texts are 
reproduced by a host of different voices and so are overlaid with the physical image of the text; in this 
sense, the image can even describe the reader of the poem who is allowing her voice to be determined by 
the text. 
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disarticulates language at the level of sentences, unchaining words from the interval that 
produced the sentence.  Each word is imagined as the body that spoke it, so that, if a 
sentence, paragraph, etc. was gathered into a single room in the House, they would all 
simultaneously bleat their part, unsubordinated by the passage of time.  Yet there is 
nothing to stop him from applying this same procedure to the temporality that produces 
the word itself; we will see him increasingly disarticulate time over the course of Book 3 
as his own poem produces a heap of linguistic bodies reiterating their moment in their 
unintelligible sea-song of tydynges.
As William Quinn argues, the deliberately secondary nature of Chaucer’s sonic 
bodies strikingly resemble Dante’s shades (184).  The embodiment of sound is Chaucer’s 
most striking innovation in the poem—it does not appear in Ovid, whose Fame sits atop a
high tower and seems to perceive the world as it is happening.  Both Chaucer and Dante 
invoke the idea of resurrection in such shades, but they both insist on the lack of 
identification between the shade and the  historical person that produced it, which 
identification resurrection would imply.  For Dante, this secondary relationship implies 
that a shade summarizes and encapsulates the interval of a life.  Caroline Walker Bynum 
has noted that Dante’s shades seem to retain the individuality they had in life (295-304); 
at times, they even seem to have physicality, though at others they distinctly lack it. 
However, as Dante comes to understand in Paradise 14, shades are fundamentally 
incomplete beings.  Even the blessed in Paradise anticipate the time when they will be 
able to leave behind their radiant shades to return to their historical bodies.  They suggest 
that the light of God which illumines the shade—and by which they see back to their 
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source—will actually be increased when they regain their substantial bodies.22  Much of 
Dante’s project works to reintroduce narrative space and time to metaphysics, which his 
shades imperson.  But though they are capable of expressing their continued temporality 
as a result, they are nonetheless fixed in the moral universe Dante has composed.  A 
shade compresses an interval, which is judged by God and assigned a state.  This is 
clearest in Hell and Paradise where orders are fixed; but even in the mobility of Purgatory
an inevitable trajectory is firmly marked out.  The bodily effects that manifest time in the 
afterlife are more a performance of those effects, since they lack the capacity to produce 
the new, the capacity to authentically hope.  Only the historical body possesses that 
capacity since it is more fully capable of feeling the effects of other bodies.  Presence is 
relational, and though the shades of Paradise worship God’s perfect presence without 
obstruction, they still lack the capacity to fully represent it in their secondary afterimages.
The resurrection will effect a perfect marriage between the body that moves and changes, 
and the static revelation available in the afterlife.
Chaucer parodies Dante’s shades by fracturing the interval that they encapsulate.  
The coherence of the individual life was central to the Comedy; without it, there could be 
no reconciliation of time and intellect to God’s persisting presence.  The historical, 
temporally integrated self was divorced from God, insofar as her present was determined 
by the past and the future; however, she was also capable of contacting the present in the 
experience of grace, in the love and beauty that are the very engines of history, whose 
advent history is always at the work of mourning or anticipating.  Chaucer radicalizes 
Dante’s project by fragmenting the subject perceiving and the subject manifesting that 
22  “per che s’accrescerà ciò che ne dona/ di gratüito lume il sommo bene,/ lume ch’a lui veder ne 
condiziona” [therefore that gift of free light from the highest good will be increased there, the light that 
conditions us to see to him] (14.46-48).
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grace; he leaves no purchase from which the historically integrated self might read his 
text.  He suggests that any notion of interval projected into the eschatological space is 
misplaced and dangerous, especially as it might be applied to God.  Any God who judges 
interval must prove as fickle as Lady Fame, and any self constantly reintegrating itself 
through history must become one of her sycophants.  Language is their medium, as the 
sounds that manifest ongoing duration are surrendered to those that precede and follow 
them.  However, Chaucer suggests that we can inhabit our own fragmentation, place 
memory at the work of disintegrating itself.  We can experience time, not solely in terms 
of intervals apprehended by the intellect, but as an ongoing duration constantly at the 
work of remaking itself.  His shades remain shades because they are not ourselves:  they 
represent our capacity to inhabit our moment while also instantiating the point at which 
we have surrendered that capacity.  
Fame and the Transgression of History
Ironically, the Eagle’s description of the sonic bodies in Fame’s House seems to 
actually invert the normal mechanism of fame—in the concept of fame, a group’s 
representation of a person determines their being and meaning.  Yet in the House of 
Fame, gossip would simply appear as the person who spoke the gossip rather than the 
person being gossiped about.  That speech act itself would be placed before Fame’s seat 
and judged; its resulting fame or infamy would be spread abroad by Eolus’s trumpets, 
which we presume would result in an alteration of the way a person is perceived and 
talked about in the historical world (though the poem leaves this mechanism surprisingly 
undefined).  This apprehension may be spread abroad, yet as the gossip produced by 
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Lady Fame returned to her house, it would again be imagined as the person who spoke it, 
simply as she spoke it in the world.  Ironically, none of Fame’s inflations or deflations 
can have any purchase in her own domain. Fame is powerless to alter the image of the 
person to whom it refers in the House.  The representations which constitute the famous, 
infamous and un-famous alike demonstrate their inability to describe the world; the only 
being they ultimately uncover is that of their speech-act impotently directed outside itself,
and presuming a power to ontologize others which it fundamentally lacks.  
Fame, in the poem, describes a very human misapprehension of the temporal 
space she inhabits.  She demonstrates, everywhere, the impossibility of her production.  
We understand this first by the fact that she is an allegorical figure inhabiting a starkly 
historical space.  In the terms the poem has given us, it is impossible for her to appear—
there is no Lady Fame existing in the world who says the things that she does, nor is there
a house like hers to make noises capable of being converted into an after-image.  
Allegory derives from a moral syllogism, extrapolated from a multitude of similar 
historical experiences; that syllogism is subsequently articulated by narrative means, 
making bodies or the interactions of bodies elaborate some facet of the concepts that 
inform them.  But this type of extrapolation is precisely what the House of Fame refuses 
to do—its informing idea is to resituate all speech within history, essentially to undo the 
compression that allegory, conceived both in the narrower sense of the genre and in the 
broader sense of interpretation, effects.  Second, and relatedly, she is impossible because 
she is conscious.  By the Eagle’s account, no act of discourse inhabiting the House should
be aware of its existence as a sonic shade:  properly, they should be afterimages incapable
of expressing new agency or generating new speech.  Nor do we see the image of any 
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non-human inhabiting the House, suing at her seat for recollection.  Yet Fame styles 
herself a judge, and seems to actually confer her awareness onto the other speech bodies 
that surround her.23  They become capable of posturing in relation to Fame; snobs and 
lovers all, they incessantly reflect on their reputations, attempting to reimpose the interval
of meaning back onto their shattered bodies.  Though Chaucer has been at pains to level 
language with all other sounds, he suggests that it differs in one crucial respect:  the 
egotism by which it compresses the ongoing duration of sound into an interval capable of
being judged by Fame.  These sounds sell the moment in which they are spoken—the 
moment faithfully reimaged in the House—to history; their consciousness is a product of 
language’s failure to simply exist, so that the non-being of past and future, of interval, 
inhabit the sound more than the sound itself.  Ironically, the fact that Chaucer’s sounds 
self-consciously clamor for fame does cuttingly imagine what they said, but again in an 
impossibly allegorical sense.  Chaucer reduces all human speech to a vain vying for, or 
avoidance of, fame that effaces its individual character.  The bodies that speak retain their
historical particularity, but the speech that produced them is tragically allegorized into 
this one meaning of all human speech: that it occurs in a present moment that it remains 
intrinsically unaware of.
Chaucer announces this concern for the temporality of language at the beginning 
of Book three.  He reconfigures the sea metaphors of the previous book into the mountain
of ice, atop which Fame’s House sits.  When he first approaches it, Geffrey cannot 
understand what material it is made from:  he discerns some “congeled matere” 
characterized principally by its clarity.  The term “congeled” is particularly interesting, 
23As Delany, “Chaucer’s House of Fame and the Ovide Moralise,” 212-13, argues, few of Chaucer’s 
sources ever cast Fame as a judge figure.  This role is usually reserved for her sister Fortune  whom 
Chaucer conflates with Fame as Boccaccio does in the De Casibus.  See also Boitani 152.
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since it denotes a process by which liquid is rendered solid.  It is noteworthy, first, that 
Chaucer does not seem to intend that we understand the mountain as a physical form 
being reimaged in the House.  It is again an allegory in a space where allegory is 
impossible:  the liquidity of the sea of tidings that Geffrey encountered during his ascent 
is here rendered static.  As it is converted into a more permanent form, it becomes 
incapable of manifesting the constantly growing, motive chaos of embodied noise that 
seems to swell up around it.  Ironically, sounds seem to become incapable of speaking 
when they are congealed into the mountain; they are transformed from the historical 
bodies demanded by the text into something else entirely.  The substance’s clarity recalls 
Geffrey’s first excursion in Venus’ temple, and the visible disruption of representation 
offered by the Eagle. Geffrey sees the names of famous people, engraved on the surface 
of this calcified sound.  Though the ice’s clarity suggests that the mechanisms of 
representation could function through it, that a referent could be seen through the ice, 
Geffrey stops short at its surface and the egotistical inscription carved on it.  Language is,
in its representational aspect, hollow for him—ultimately, he could only see more ice 
through the ice, see its ongoing attempt at reference—but instead he sees the names of 
speakers, who attempt to codify a self through linguistic recombination.  One almost gets 
the sense that the ice congeals in order to serve as a medium for their names, as though 
the act of inscription in the poem can precede its medium by necessitating it.  
The means by which the mountain of ice is maintained suggests this twisting of 
temporal and causal logic. Like Fame herself, the mountain of ice presents a physical 
object in Fame’s domain that is unable to be produced in the terms the poem has given us.
Geffrey tells us that the names etched in the ice are always threatened by the sun, which 
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melts them back into their liquid form.  The names on one side of the hill are effaced in 
this manner, while those on the other are sheltered by the shadow of the Fame’s house.  
The House of Fame and its “feble fundament” (1132) thus present a conundrum:  the 
mountain cannot congeal without the shade of the House, but the House cannot be built 
until the mountain exists beneath it.  For its foundation to exist, the House must first exist
in thin air, or at least it must be adrift on the sea of tidings that it freezes.  Chaucer makes 
this impossibility intensely personal:  “Hyt was conserved with the shade/ Of a castel that
stood on high—/ Al this writynge that I sigh” (1162).  The last term feels as though it 
wants to slur into a term for sight, indicating the visual mountain that Chaucer has just 
narrated into being.  But it stops short in a sigh, referring us back to Chaucer’s own 
narrative production.  The writing that he sighs refers to the names inscribed in the 
mountain, but it also suggests an affinity between those names and his poem itself, the 
words passing across the page each of which should be imagined as a distinct Geffrey, or 
as an innumerable succession of readers.  
As many critics have noted, the mountain also recollects Dante’s Purgatory; 
however I would argue that it more strongly evokes another important mountain from 
Dante’s poem:  Mount Parnassus, the poetic mountain said to be home to the Muses, 
Apollo, and Bacchus.  In fact, Dante’s poem itself overlays the ideas of the two 
mountains—Dante’s purgation is always a poetic one, an attempt to find a narrative mode
capable of representing the divine.  His first mention of the mountain occurs at the 
summit of Purgatory, where he says that the great poets residing on Parnassus may have 
been able to imagine the prelapsarian garden he finds there (28.139-41).  Chaucer has 
already mentioned Parnassus once in the Proem to Book 2.  There, he invokes the Muses 
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who reside on Parnassus, asking them to help him “to endite and ryme” (519).  Chaucer 
situates the Muses on Parnassus rather than Helicon, a different mountain which was also 
said to be their home; he metonymically transforms the latter, rather, into a well near 
Parnassus.  
The geography that Chaucer establishes in this earlier mention corresponds well 
to Fame’s domain.  While, for reasons I will speculate on below, Chaucer does not picture
the twin peaks of Parnassus, his way up Fame’s mountain it is littered with the image of 
famous poets, the first of whom is Orpheus, who was raised on Parnassus.  The poetic 
wellspring that Chaucer describes here is also metaphorically recalled in his description 
of the House of Tidings, which lies in a valley beneath the castle.24  As he describes the 
absurd size and construction of the House—it is sixty miles long and made all of twigs—
he implicitly contrasts its strong foundations to the House of Fame’s weak ones.  Though 
its timber is “of no strengthe,” Chaucer says that the House of Tidings 
is founded to endure
While that hit lyst to Aventure,
That is the moder of tydynges,
As the see of welles and of sprynges;
And hyt was shapen lyk a cage. (1980-84)
In an odd instance of local personification, Chaucer seems to set up Aventure—who 
suggests the figure of Fortune that we expect to see in Fame’s seat, but who seems also a 
personification of simple historical occurrence—in contrast to Lady Fame.  However, he 
undermines the tendency toward allegory in his subsequent analogy; he allies her, rather 
24  Chaucer may also be referencing Delphi in this description, situated on the lower slopes of Parnassus, 
though this association is less clear in the poem.  Such a correspondence would, however, fit well with 
Chaucer’s explicit invocation of Apollo, and his inversion of the idea of prophecy.
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to his amorphous sea imagery, but also to the wells and springs that were a ubiquitous 
analogy for poetic creation in the Middle Ages, being associated with the Muses in 
Classical tradition.  Chaucer suggests that this shapeless “Aventure,” which the form of 
his poem has forced him to name, is the foundation of the House of Tidings, whereas the 
impossible ice is the foundation of Fame.  In this well beside Chaucer’s poetic mountain, 
the House of Tidings is submerged beneath the sea of sound that is its foundation, the sea 
that is perilously calcified to raise up Fame’s House.  Here, the proliferation of tidings, of
temporality reflected in its infinite purity, constantly swell beyond the confines of walls, 
whose rickety character and monstrous size seem designed to demonstrate the 
impossibility of effectively caging its contents.  Chaucer subverts the idea that poetic 
fame is capable of conferring more or less existence on the matters it represents; all such 
events bubble up in the “grete swogh,” the sea of tidings that confers being not on the 
objects that poets describe, but that manifests the being of the poets themselves.
Chaucer’s description of the sun melting the mountain also refers us back to his 
Invocation, which contains a further allusion to Parnassus.  The Invocation to Book 3 is 
the most explicit and sustained borrowing from Dante in the poem.  In it, Chaucer prays 
to Apollo, who dwelt atop Parnassus, “This lytel last bok thou gye” (1093).  The 
invocation draws from the first canto of  Paradiso, in which Dante expresses misgivings 
about his capacity to represent the divine realm.  Though he begins the final leg of his 
journey with an ineffability topos, he nevertheless persists in his description, asking first 
for Apollo’s aid:  
O buono Appollo, a l’ultimo lavoro
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fammi del tuo valor sì fatto vaso,
come dimandi a dar la amato alloro.
Infino a qui l’un giogo di Parnaso
assai mi fu, ma o con amendue
m’è uopo intrar ne l’aringo rimaso. (1.13-18)
[O good Apollo, for the final work make me, of your valor, a vessel made 
such as you ask from those to whom you give the beloved laurel.  Until 
this point one peak of Parnassus was enough for me, but it is necessary for
me to enter into the remaining arena with both]
As he does in the Convivio, Dante makes the sun god a figure for the Christian God, 
asking him for poetic grace in both senses of the term.  In the Convivio, Dante says that 
the sun is a particularly appropriate metaphor for God because of the basic analogy 
between vision and intellect.25  As light allows our vision to perceive sense objects, so the
light of God confers being itself, and not just visibility, in its emanation.  Dante uses this 
same metaphor on the threshold dividing Purgatory from Paradise, in the divine palace 
atop the penitential Parnassus that has refined his poetics.  It has refined his poetry, in 
part, by making it passive:  carrying on his guide motif, Dante now asks Apollo to 
directly remake him into a new sort of linguistic vessel.  This passivity is accentuated by 
the allusion to Ovid’s Daphne throughout the invocation; but whereas Daphne resisted 
Apollo’s advances and so was transformed into the laurel, Dante pictures himself 
deliberately submitting to the transformative effects of the poetic god.  Similarly, Dante 
likens himself in the next stanza to Marsyas, the satyr whom Apollo flayed alive for 
25  On Chaucer’s use of the Convivio, see Minnis.
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presuming to compete with him in a singing contest.  As we have seen, Dante again 
transmutes Apollo’s violence toward poets as a metaphor for contemplative ascent; he 
acknowledges his hubris in attempting to narrate Paradise, but suggests that the 
punishment resulting from that hubris can serve as the vehicle of his transformation.
Scholars have argued over the significance of the two peaks of Parnassus since 
the first generation of Dante’s commentators.  In Classical tradition, the palace of 
Bacchus was on the top of one peak while that of Apollo was on the other.  In his 
commentary on the Comedy, Dante’s son, Pietro di Dante, reads the peaks as signifying 
scientia and sapientia, earthly and spiritual knowledge.26  I would suggest that, to 
Chaucer’s mind, the peaks similarly represent his common division between poetic 
pleasure and sentence, its moral significance.  The debauched Bacchus rules over the one 
peak, the contemplative sun god over the other. For Chaucer, the challenge in Dante’s 
representation of Paradise is the difficulty of manifesting grace in the visible narrative 
body without allowing that body to be denigrated into a fetish.  The stakes are impossibly
high:  if Dante imagines narrative pleasure without its theological significance, Paradise 
itself will revert into Hell via a habituating materialism; if he shunts spatial and temporal 
pleasures to the margin, as centuries of theologians had done, his Paradise will lack the 
feature of the material world that motivated him to seek it.  Dante must ally the intrinsic 
and potentially dangerous fascination of narrative space and time to theological insight if 
he is to adequately represent the continually renewing, poignant presence in which God 
and the blessed reside; thus he must be inspired by both peaks of the poetic mountain.  
Chaucer’s mountain remains singular, in part to recollect Purgatory—which Dante has 
overlaid with the image of Parnassus—more forcibly, but also because his poetic ascent 
26  See Durling’s note on these lines.
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has worked to compress and neutralize the function of both peaks.  As we saw while 
exploring the Eagle, the poem’s contemplative sentence is its unrelenting reference to the 
material world, but, in its tiresome references to the time of its own retelling, it renders 
that world insufferably boring.
As noted, Dante must cast himself as a passive vessel of this union, lest he again 
practice the perverse resurrective poetics of his Vita Nuova.  However, in a line that 
would have been particularly significant for Chaucer, he recognizes that this passivity is 
itself an authorial act.  After finishing his first invocation to Apollo, he seems almost to 
rebegin:
O divina virtù, se mi ti presti
tanto che l’ombra del beato regno
segnata nel mio capo io manifesti,
vedra’mi a pié del tuo diletto legno
venire e coronarmi de le foglie
che la materia e tu mi farai degno. (22-27)
[O divine power, if you would lend me so much of yourself that I might 
manifest the shade of the blissful realm marked out in my head, you will 
see me come to the foot of your beloved tree and crown myself with the 
leaves of which the matter and you will make me worthy]
Dante still couches his self-crowning in a series of subjunctives that surrender his poetic 
agency to God and the materia—the subject and the bodily matter—of Paradise, that his 
poetry will reflect; and, further establishing the link between his shades and his poetics, 
he moderates the claims of his Paradise by asking only to represent the ombra cast by the
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place itself.  But despite these cautions, he acknowledges the authorial arrogance that will
be apparent in his attempt to describe the ineffable realm.  Beyond the danger of its 
subject matter noted above, Dante recognizes a second danger: any attempt by an author 
to surrender poetic agency expresses a new, subterranean poetic agency.  Poets are always
crowning themselves, even when they profess to be doing otherwise.  Dante attempts to 
defer the responsibility for this inherent poetic egotism onto the loftiness of what he must
address and the god who gracefully enables it; his conceit remains that he is a conduit 
conveying divine power to language and narrative.  He allies his will to God’s in doing 
so, but he cannot eradicate that will as his own violent metaphors of submission enjoined 
him to do.  Poetic pride remains capable of breaking the circuit between his divine 
subject matter and the source that allows him to speak of it; even his earlier masochism 
cannot obviate this feature of his poetics.  However, in the next two stanzas, Dante 
suggests that failure to ennoble the poet is, in fact, a greater sin, the product of the “colpa 
e vergogna de l’umane voglie” [sin and shame of the human will] (30).  The poet 
participates in the mobile grace of Paradise—he is his own, autobiographical “materia”—
and so he must celebrate his poetic act along with all its objects, with as little ego as he 
can muster.  
Chaucer’s key revision of Dante’s Apollo, as I have noted, is that he sets the God 
in opposition to the poetic mountain that should enshrine him.  Chaucer turns poetry 
against itself; he asks Dante’s contemplative god of poetry to render sounds that have 
been codified into poetic representation back into their purely temporal, liquid form.  The
Invocation to Book 3 suggests this alteration:
O God of science and of lyght,
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Appollo, thurgh thy grete myght,
This lytel laste bok thou gye!
Nat that I wilne, for maistrye,
Here art poetical be shewed,
But for the rym is lyght and lewed,
Yit make hyt sumwhat agreable,
Though som vers fayle in a sillable,
And that I do no diligence
To shewe craft, but o sentence. (1091-1100)
Chaucer’s description of Apollo as the god of science and light suggests his conflation of 
the Convivio and the Invocation of the Paradiso.  Apollo is the god of the spatial world, 
whose light, in conferring visibility, resembles God’s emanation of intelligibility.  
However, Chaucer pits the literal-mythological level of the analogy against its spiritual 
one—Apollo’s light is precisely what melts the House of Fame’s foundations, the space 
of knowable “science” in the poem.  The visuality of Chaucer’s world, again, attempts to 
render the visible world unintelligible.
Chaucer asks this Apollo to guide the narrative of his little last book, a 
characterization that belies Book 3’s ungentle length; however, drawing on Dante’s 
submissive posture, he asks not to show his mastery of poetic art, but actually to 
demonstrate his ineptitude.  The repeated “for” suggests an uncomfortable parallel 
construction.  The first “for” clearly indicates motive:  he does not wish that poetic art be 
showed in his poem for the sake of an egotistical mastery of his craft. Alternatively, but to
the same effect, it can simply be the object of “wilne,” with the subsequent line working 
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as an apposition modifying “maistrye.”  The second operates in a different grammatical 
sense, introducing a clause of opposition—which “though” will do much more clearly 
and redundantly two lines later; however, it retains an echo of the earlier usage.  This is 
compounded by the seemingly wayward “that” of line 1094, whose antecedent can only 
be “gye.”  He asks Apollo to guide his book, so that Chaucer will do no diligence to show
his craft, again introducing a purpose clause that defines the motive of his text. In place 
of Dante’s prayers for a submissive transformation, Chaucer consistently refers his reader
to the metrical and grammatical level of his poem, drawing attention to the deficiencies 
of its prosody.  Yet the idea of that transformation echoes from the Comedy:  Dante’s aim 
was essentially to be converted into the form of the inhabitants of Paradise.  He wanted to
read everything in the world as a manifestation of grace, which is always spatial and 
temporal.  Similarly, the attention that Chaucer draws here to each slip of his meter asks 
us to conceptualize him in terms of the stuttering sonic bodies of Fame’s House.  Dante’s 
concern for the loftiness of his materia is here converted into the fear of Thopas’s “drasty 
rhyming;” he is concerned that we will only be able to hear the sounds of the poem’s 
language due to deficiencies in its craft.  But whereas Harry Bailly devastatingly halts 
Thopas, Chaucer here names this purely temporal experience of the poem as his aim.  
Dante’s desire to represent divine grace runs parodically parallel to Chaucer’s attempt to 
represent historical people in their acts of representation.   He applies the dangers of 
representing the divine identified by Dante uniformly to all poetic description.  Poetry 
inherently fails to represent the full duration of its objects, which is why both Dante and 
Chaucer cast their poems as secondary shadows.  Yet it also, equally inherently, manifests
duration by submitting narrative representation to the constraints of meter and rhyme.  Its
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internal form refers us back to its vehicle.  Ironically, Chaucer attempts to elaborate on 
this feature of poetry by breaking its rules, then drawing our attention to that breakage.  
Chaucer’s lack of diligence in showing craft is, in fact, the unifying sentence of the text, 
punctuated by its light hexameter and its occasional metric failure. Otherwise, his text has
worked to foreclose the possibility of a coherent sentence; Chaucer deploys the term as 
another pun, referencing both an essential meaning, and a simple act of utterance.
In the second half of the Invocation, Chaucer elaborates on his ineptitude, 
subverting Dante’s pretense to poetic elevation.  As he continues:
And yif, devyne virtu, thow
Wilt helpe me to shewe now
That in myn hed ymarked ys—
Loo, that is for to menen this,
The Hous of Fame for to descryve—
Thou shalt se me go as blyve
Unto the nexte laure y see,
And kysse yt, for hyt is thy tree. (1101-1108)
We might first note that Chaucer deliberately ruins the rhetoric of Dante’s invocation here
by needlessly elaborating on what is marked in his head.  The power of Dante’s line is in 
the economy of his expression, but Chaucer’s “lyght and lewed” rhyme draws attention to
the fact that he has failed to articulate his idea clearly in his translation of Dante.  The line
itself is a simulacrum that draws attention to its inexactness.  Also, whereas Dante names 
the shadow of Paradise as the direct object he hopes to visually manifest, Chaucer’s 
apposition makes the tableau of himself describing the House the object of his showing.  
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Dante’s representational attempt to manifest Paradise is transformed into a self-
consciously linguistic description.  To punctuate his failed translation, Chaucer bungles 
the self-crowning episode; even if Apollo were to bless him, Chaucer indicates that he 
would not know what to do in the presence of the poetic tree.  His kiss is one of 
incompetent veneration.  Part of Dante’s justification for elevating himself as a poet was 
that he shared in the beatitude of his subject, but Chaucer dodges that elevation by 
sharing in the general confusion of the House of Fame.
He avoids poetic honor, also, by debasing poetry itself, along with poets.  The 
mountain of ice provides us with his first image of what poetry and narrative do to its 
purveyors; as he begins to climb it, he seems almost to begin again, reconfiguring his 
critique of poetry to center on its status as an imitation.  On the slopes of the mountain, he
finds Orpheus singing and harping along with several other famous poets, and with a 
multitude of imitators behind them.  His strategy is again that of Dante, using a few 
famous figures, described distinctly, to metonymically describe a larger group whose 
members are largely anonymous.  However, Chaucer reverses the formula, centering on 
the “many thousand tymes twelve” (1216) imitators rather than their exemplars.  As the 
lesser poets sit beneath their betters, they “gunne on hem upward to gape,/ And 
countrefete hem as an ape,/ Or as craft countrefeteth kynde” (1211-13).  Chaucer’s image 
of poetic production is of a brutish, unreasoning imitation of ultimately mythological 
figures; the eponymous poets he names—Orpheus, Orion, Chiron and Glascurion—are so
overlaid with the detritus of mythological tradition that they, like Lady Fame, can 
scarcely be produced here.  They only vaguely reflect historical poets capable of being 
imagined on the mountain, but are as much the objects of song as singers themselves. In 
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essence, they are produced by the legions of followers that ape them.  Poetry, for 
Chaucer, generates an ephemeral ontology for its famous forebears that legitimates its 
entire edifice; those forebears partially stabilize aesthetics, such that poets are not forced 
to commit themselves to the shifting flux of language perceived as pure temporality.  But,
even more devastating than this characterization of poetic production is its implications 
for representation itself.  Craft counterfeiting kind is as pithy a summary of Chaucer’s 
own poem as one could ask for; moreover, it condenses an entire theory of mimesis that 
was supposed to provide the raison d’être of medieval poetics.  Yet Chaucer makes it the 
second, ancillary analogy describing poets’ mindless imitation of their peers.  Poetry’s 
mimetic veneration invents the natural world it tries to reflect by parsing it into discrete 
moments and populating it with discrete objects.  In doing so, it actually serves to exile us
from the apprehension of time and space that Chaucer implies in the House, the perfectly 
present vantage point from which God—the Word in its perfect form, before it is 
committed to a referent—perceives the creation.
After this disastrous critique of poetry, Chaucer can only continue to forge his 
way up the mountain through a tactic that now feels familiar:  he describes profusely the 
multitude of sounds and figures he sees, then ends by twice referring us to the surface of 
his text.  In this instance, however, when Chaucer draws attention to the simultaneous 
boredom and impossibility of his description, he more insistently applies his interruption 
to the reader.  He sees on the mountain a great quantity of poets,
Whiche that I kan not nevene,
Moo than sterres ben in hevene,
Of whiche I nyl as now not ryme,
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For ese of yow and los of tyme.
For tyme ylost, this knowen ye,
Be no way may recovered be. (1253-58)
Indeed, at this point we understand the irrecoverability of time from Chaucer’s own text
—he almost indicates a slight amazement that his reader has persisted so far into his 
poem here.  Chaucer reverses his usual association of poetry with pleasure such that our 
“ese” depends on the merciful elision of his experience.  His narrative does not excite the 
vain curiosity of its readers, nor is it meant to.  He codes the poem as an almost 
penitential act that must be eased here, not through narrative indulgence, but through 
omission.  The poem seeks to render his reader aware of the time they invest into his 
narrative, the “lost” time that, ironically, would be preserved indestructibly in the 
narrative space he has created. 
After Chaucer has finished saying that he must leave some of his experience 
unsaid, he proceeds to continue in much the same way he did before the interruption; 
however, he shifts focus away from great poets and singers and onto famous magicians.  
He draws our attention to the fact that we lose time through his narrative, then he 
proceeds to inflict that loss on us again.  The shift to magicians intensifies his 
conceptualization of poets:  magicians attempt to impose language directly on the world.  
The medium of imagination, where language is composed into the representative body,  is
excised.  Chaucer’s own poetic magic violently curtails the possibility of this “magik 
naturel” quite as much as it curtails the possibility of poetry, ironically curving the 
linguistic act away from the world and back to its speaker.  As in his profusion of poets, 
Chaucer can only forestall this line of inquiry with the same diversionary tactic:  “What 
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shuld I make lenger tale/ Of alle the pepil y ther say,/ Fro hennes into domes day?” 
(1282-84).  As he did with “sigh,” Chaucer slurs a verb of speaking into a verb of seeing 
here in a parodic reference to the magicians he has just contained.  In doing so, he subtly 
undermines the referential basis of his poem.  He no longer describes a prior dream, 
within which he saw these figures, but his own act of fictional creation.  He referentially 
“says” these bodies into existence, violating the central tenet of his narrative space: 
namely, that words are reimagined as their speakers.  Yet, alternatively, he also 
acknowledges one of the central features of the poem—he must cease describing the 
multitude because, in speaking about them, he “says” more bodies into existence.  The 
House of Fame, reduced into the system articulated by the Eagle, is an elaborate 
tautology where language attempts to describe its own act of description.  Yet the 
overwhelming remainder is the rule here—description can, in fact, only produce more 
bodies.  The attempt to reference anything—even oneself, as Chaucer labors toward here
—only wastes the duration one manifests, but fails to comprehend, in the attempt.  
Chaucer jokingly conceives this waste in eschatological terms, because the temporal 
position God occupies to judge the world is precisely what is lost; the poets who ply their
trade on the slippery slopes of Fame’s mountain lose the continually renewing flux 
swelling around them to the historical narrative composed by fickle Fame.  They inhabit 
an eternal space and time, yet they perversely submit themselves to the exigencies of 
earthly time, clamoring to be remembered in a space where they cannot be forgotten.
With this second conceptualization of fame untidily wrapped up, Chaucer 
progresses into the beryl walls of Fame’s House itself.  Within, he finds Lady Fame 
within a house that seems, at first glance, quite tidily ordered.  Chaucer’s third depiction 
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of fame deliberately tries to exclude the disordered profusion he has found everywhere 
else; the sense of magnitude persists, but it is restrained by the courtly etiquette that fickle
Fame necessitates.  People are ordered into companies defined by distinctive “vesture” 
and codified by heralds (1320-25).  Oddly enough, individuals never appear alone before 
Fame, either to be judged or in the ornamental capacity of the companies:  they are 
always portrayed in groups. The mechanism of the House renders language irremediably 
personal; speech, which is supposed to foster contact with others, proves unable to reach 
them.  Fame is speech constituting the moral ontology of another person.  It determines 
their being.  But this speech would be unable to reach its target in the House of Fame. 
The sound bodies are generated by the desire for contact with others, but their speech 
curves back to themselves.  We expect individuals to appear before Fame, desiring to 
spread their names into the mouths of others; however, Chaucer reiterates the imitative 
orientation to fame he introduced on the mountain’s slopes.  Famous individuals organize
communities, even as communities generate the famous individual.  But their mutual 
imitation elides the distinctiveness of their moment; it inevitably lodges them in a past 
that is irrecoverable.  Chaucer seems on the brink of admitting that community itself is 
invariably fraught with the problems of fame worship here.  Yet his text itself presents a 
different form of community in its contact with readers.  Chaucer recognizes that his 
resistance to fame, history and representation are a form of contact as well.  
The architecture of Fame’s House similarly exudes the order that the rest of her 
world makes impossible.  Only in the architectural features of the place do we see named,
individual poets, yet they are rendered static within the house, tasked with the enormous 
labor of upholding an impossible edifice.  Ovid serves as a typical case of these figures:
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...on a piler was,
Of coper, Venus clerk Ovide,
That hath ysowen wonder wide
The grete god of Loves name.
And ther he bar up wel hys fame
Upon this piler, also hye
As I myghte see hyt with myn yë. (1486-92)
Only in the famous poets are we able to actually see narrative representation functioning. 
All of these poets stand atop metal pillars, and are pictured as bearing up their subject 
matter as a burden.  “Beren,” is emphatically the verb Chaucer uses to describe their 
poetic activity.  The burden they bear is the same impossibility running throughout Book 
3—the impossibility of referential language in the narrative space Chaucer has composed.
The pillars are not merely ornamental, but load-bearing; they structure the inhabitable 
space within, which is dependent on language cohering into a comprehensible, 
representative form.  Chaucer mixes historians, such as Josephus, with authors of more 
fantastic, mythological tales like Ovid, indicating that distinctions between types of 
representation are irrelevant in the present space of the House.  Representation is, for 
both equally, a burden that language cannot bear up.  Oddly enough, he omits Dante from
these pillars, despite the significant engagement between his own poem and the Comedy.  
The omission seems both encomium and condemnation:  he suggests that Dante may 
escape the fate of prior poets, as Dante had himself hoped in his own narrative; yet 
Chaucer may also suggest that Dante’s subject would have unequivocally crushed him 
beneath its weight.  
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Fame herself participates in this portrayal of referential language:  she “on her 
shuldres gan sustene/ Bothe th’armes and the name/ Of thoo that hadde large fame” 
(1410-12) such as Alexander and Hercules.  Ironically, the line itself has Fame aping the 
enormously famous lines from the Aeneid, though with a shift in focus from the “man” 
Aeneas to the “name” of the famous, which should amount to the same thing in her 
House. The stasis of famous poets seems to emanate from Fame’s throne:
Ful moche prees of folk ther nas
Ne crowdyng for to mochil prees.
But al on hye, above a dees,
Sitte in a see imperiall,
That mad was of a rubee all,
Which that a carbuncle ys ycalled,
Y saugh, perpetually ystalled,
A femynyne creature,
That never formed by Nature
Nas such another thing yseye. (1358-67)
First, we should note that Chaucer reinforces his critique of the impossibility of fame, 
introduced first in the mountain of ice.  Fame is an allegorical figure and so cannot be 
produced in her own realm; this is emphasized by Chaucer’s final two lines:  Fame’s 
body only exists here in this space.27  Geffrey’s own experience in the world cannot 
prepare him for the vision of her, since no other “femynyne creature” can resemble her.  
27  The description of the gate of Fame’s House is similar in this regard:  “The castel-yate on my ryght 
hond,/ Which that so wel corven was/ That never such another nas” (1294-96).  Chaucer emphasizes that 
the castle, like its foremost inhabitant, is emphatically not a reflection of some historical castle whose 
sounds might be represented here.
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Yet all bodies in the House of Fame are supposed to be secondary shades defined by their
absolute resemblance to a historical counterpart.  
Second, and equally noteworthy, Chaucer ironically uses the same pun to describe
Fame’s seat as he did to describe the chaotic noise she restrains.  The Latin-derived “see,”
in Middle English, acquires connotations of sight; this fact is ironic, as Chaucer has 
deliberately excluded the visual from Fame’s domain.  As noted above, in Ovid, Fame 
can hear and see everything from her tower, but Chaucer’s Fame can only see sound-
bodies from her judgement seat.  The pun also takes on a different tenor here—whereas 
earlier, as “sea,” it was a metaphor of the ever proliferating “prees of folk” in Fame’s 
domain, here it is transformed into a term of episcopal and political authority. Before, the 
metaphor indicated temporal duration, fully extended and embodied in its infinite parts, 
but here the metaphor is perversely transformed into one of stasis:  Fame is “perpetually 
ystalled” on her throne, perpetually “dwelling,” but also “stopped,” “stalled,” “frozen.”  
In place of Beatrice—who, atop Dante’s mountain, most fully manifested the 
rehabilitated grace he sought—Chaucer finds someone vaguely resembling Dante’s 
Satan.28  The likeness to Satan stretches credulity less, when one considers Chaucer’s 
transformation of the mountain itself:  as in the final circle of Hell, Chaucer has seen 
names that should be bodies lodged in the ice.  Dante’s ice is primarily an image of the 
28  Chaucer’s use of a ruby throne may also support this interpretation.  In many of the English and Anglo 
Norman lapidaries, rubies were considered the most virtuous of gems.  As Margaret Jennings notes, “the 
gem conferred grace, favour and joy,” even conferring “love between men and God and between man and 
woman” (533).  Similarly, it is associated with vassalage.  Fame’s sitting atop the ruby is thus an 
ambivalent image:  it first indicates the lord-vassal relationship she enjoys with those around her.  Yet it 
also seems an image of usurpation and presumption.  Rubies enjoy a prominent position in the Paradiso—
when Dante’s vision is further refined in Canto 30, he sees a river of souls glinting like gold and rubies; 
similarly, in Canto 19, Dante likens the angels to rubies on which sunbeams fall, which are then refracted 
and magnified into Dante’s eyes.  The image is one of divine wisdom made visible; however, in Chaucer, it 
is also again an image of stasis, perhaps even of the confinement of divine grace in the eschatological 
space.  Fame’s presumption in sitting upon such a throne resembles Satan’s attempt to usurp God’s 
authority.
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stasis of hell—the bodies held in thrall by it become incapable of motion; they still persist
through time but they cannot manifest time or change.  At the crescendo of the Inferno, 
Dante most forcibly demonstrates the relationship between Hell and history:  the 
infamous denizens of Hell are lodged inextricably in a moment that has passed.  Their 
being solely, habitually references a moment that has ceased to be and so to become.  
Dante attempts to recuperate the famous among the blessed by suggesting that their fame 
is based on their capacity to experience time as grace; their fame within the confines of 
history echoes a transhistorical experience of time.  This is the attitude that allows him to 
crown himself with the laurel.  Chaucer, on the contrary, extends the damnation of stasis 
to anyone complicit with Fame’s project.
However, as becomes apparent, it is much harder to avoid this complicity than 
one might expect.  Chaucer deliberately tells both the Eagle and his unknown Friend 
toward the end of the poem that he does not seek fame, but rather “tydynges” of love.  
But as bands of people present themselves before Fame’s seat, it becomes unclear how 
exactly one can avoid seeking fame.  First, the groups that come to be judged by fame 
contain people of “alleskynnes condiciouns/ That dwelle in erthe under the mone” (1530-
31).  We would expect these communities to consist of like-minded people saying much 
the same thing, as we saw in the imitative poets on the mountain’s slopes.  However, the 
groups that appear before Fame seem to lack a single, distinct goal in their speech.  All 
that seems to unify them is their attitude toward fame:  they either desire it, or desire to 
avoid it.  Chaucer again reduces the meaning of speech, this time not to its simple 
materiality, but to its common egotism.  The referent of  speech acts seem to be 
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irrelevant, even for their speakers; reference does not provide a means for thematizing the
speech bodies into groups for Fame to judge.  
This reduction of speech is compounded by Fame’s characteristic fickleness:  not 
only does she show utter disregard for the referent of language when it was historically 
spoken, she disregards also the speech bodies’ wishes with regard to fame.  The first three
groups who approach her are instructive in this regard.  The first asks her, “In ful 
recompensacioun/ Of good werkes, yive us good renoun” (1557-58).  Fame, however, 
refuses to grant their request, explaining only “For me lyst hyt noght” (1564).  Instead, 
she says that none will speak of them hereafter.  The second and third groups use 
precisely the same argument drawn from the biblical Book of James:  good works merit 
fame.  However, the second group is subjected to Eolus’s slanderous trumpet, while the 
third is granted a fame more emphatic than they originally asked for.  These episodes 
overturn the expectation that fame can operate as a sort of allegorization of the 
individual.   The tradition of fame parallels the tradition of allegorical reading; as Justin 
Steinburg recently described, fame acted as a commentary on the internal characteristics 
of a person, contrasted to a simplistic literalism based solely on external appearances 
(1124).  Good fame, in particular, was thought to accurately reflect one’s intrinsic nature. 
As Steinburg notes, Dante had already debunked much of this theory in his Convivio, 
where he argues that the inherent subjectivity of our perceptions colors fame too much 
for it to reflect any objective truth about others.  Chaucer extends this argument in the 
first three groups of petitioners.  Ironically, the author who seems so intent on 
empowering readers to make their own judgements and interpretations supplies them 
absolutely no information by which to make a judgement.  All of the petitioners construe 
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their former behavior in the same way, but whether their self-representation is accurate or
not becomes irrelevant in the face of Fame’s juristic style.  We only sense that Fame is 
fickle because she refuses to give reasons for her assessments.  Thus, Chaucer subverts an
allegorical model of fame not by offering good appearances to bad beings, but by denying
them any interiority that might serve as a basis for objective judgement.  Ironically, we 
cannot see their actions as we should be able to in a space where all sound is recorded as 
the body that produced it; within Fame’s House proper, we only see egotistical self-
judgements.  Chaucer thereby indicates that we surrender the distinctness and 
individuality of moments in which we speak to the banal meaning of our own self-
images.
This critique extends, however, not only to those seeking fame, but even to those 
who deliberately try to avoid it.  Her sentence having been passed on the third group, two
small bands of ascetics approach her seat.  The sentiment they express, like the earlier 
groups, is similar, but their fate dissimilar: 
We han don wel with al our myght,
But we ne kepen have no fame.
Hyde our werkes and our name,
For Goddys love; for certes we
Han certeyn doon hyt for bounte,
And for no maner other thing. (1694-99)
This ascetic band—whose desire to avoid fame mirrors Geffrey’s ambivalence about it—
asks explicitly not to be remembered so that others will not impute the self-interest of the 
prior three groups as the cause of their good works.  However, Chaucer still makes them 
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ironically appear in the House; he suggests that their desire not to have fame actually 
expresses a new, subterranean desire for a different type of fame:  the fame of being 
forgotten.  Fame grants this forgetfulness to the fourth, but not the fifth group—despite 
their petition to the contrary, she orders Eolus to trumpet their praise to all the world.  
Chaucer extends the concept of fame to cover something more akin to pride or self-
interest in this gesture, and he reduces all human activity to that one perverse aim.  All 
sounds made by humans have this common self-reference that confines them to Fame’s 
House rather than the shifting duration that persists outside of it.  In perhaps the poem’s 
most twisted logic, Chaucer parodically perverts the procedure described by the Eagle in 
exploring this inherent egotism of speech.  Not only is language permanently sequestered 
from its referent in the House, Chaucer makes all speech attempt to refer to the person 
who spoke it.  Chaucer implies that all speech—even self-effacing speech—arises out of 
a concern for reputation, for how it will make others perceive us, rather than out of a 
simple desire to mean what it says.  The contact that it facilitates with others always has, 
as its point of reference, the self that produced it; like the Levinasian “said,” speech, 
when it tries to referentially mean something to another, invariably attempts to subdue 
them into complicity with the speaker’s self-aggrandizement. Chaucer extends Dante’s 
critique of the subjectivity of perception to the self-serving subjectivity that produces 
speech, and more broadly, to all human action.
The sixth group further cements this broadening of the concept of Fame, 
reconfiguring the contemplative desire to be forgotten.  In the contemplatives, Chaucer 
construed a passive desire to be forgotten as virtuous action; their ascetic disregard of 
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fame promised to, in itself, purify their deeds.  The members of next group, however, 
confess their idleness:
To tellen certeyn as hyt is,
We han don neither that ne this,
But ydel al oure lyf ybe.
But natheles yet prey we
That we mowe han as good a fame,
And gret renoun and knowen name,
As they that han doon noble gestes. (1731-37)
The otium of the contemplatives has here been converted into simple idleness. These 
loafers, however, face what the contemplatives could not: namely, that inertia entails the 
same self-interested drive for reputation as any other human activity.  Their idleness lacks
the religious principle that sought to legitimate the contemplatives’ leisure, and so their 
desire for fame appears denuded of self-effacing rhetoric.  The desire of the idle is the 
same as the active, with the sole difference that they were unwilling to physically 
actualize their desires while still on Earth.  However, in the House of Fame, where 
reference has been foreclosed, actual performance matters little.  Fame grants their 
request at once, presumably voicing a similar ideal of principled leisure as she did earlier.
However, again, the subsequent group that mirrors the sixth is diversely served.  
This time with remarkable economy of expression Chaucer dispenses with the self-
description, having the seventh group say only “Lady, graunte us sone/ The same thing, 
the same bone,/ That [ye] this nexte folk han doon” (1773-75).  The call for justice in 
fame is expressed most clearly in this entreaty.  If the loafers—who seemed, almost, to 
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lack any interior principle for their behavior—were granted the fame they asked for, fame
should be extended to everybody.  Though it structures all human action, it seems to 
utterly disregard the content and motive of that action.  This anonymous group stands in 
for every other; yet, ironically, Lady Fame gives them the ear lashing that she should 
have given the loafers.  She calls them “Ye masty swyn, ye ydel wrechches,/ Ful of roten 
slowe teches!” (1777-78).  She responds to the call for justice with this belated 
castigation at precisely the moment when Chaucer has most thoroughly disempowered us
as readers.  We lack even the self-representation that at least situated on the prior groups 
on a moral grid—while they have asked for the same outcome as the prior group, they 
have not indicated that they were similar in character. Without intending to do so, Fame 
has demonstrated the failure of referential language that pervades her domain.  In the 
eschatological space Chaucer has constructed, the only real sin is the misapprehension of 
time and one’s persistent being through it.  This sin is an inherent feature of language, 
which subjects shifting moments of sound to a past and future not native to them.  In 
attempting to describe being, it removes us from the present in which being inheres; and, 
worse, all its attempts to describe being mask a frantic, underlying concern to assert and 
define one’s own being.  The being that language posits always resists the permutations 
of time that makes the present present, that makes it ceaselessly new and poignant.  It 
seeks justice across history—a justice which would legitimate the mode of being that it 
expresses, and which, in the process, would render time static, comprehending the 
significance of every moment under a single rubric.  History presents a mode of being 
against time, a mode that labors to domesticate temporal difference and effect a justice on
top of that domestication, amongst its congealed fragments of time.  But in the seat of 
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history, Chaucer shows us that we only ever find Fame, language making fickle, inept 
pronouncements about language, spoken by a figure who can have no actual being.  
Chaucer asks us to look for justice, instead, in a different place altogether, outside her 
palace in the clamoring, eschatological sea.  He suggests that justice can only occur in the
present, where none of the identities that human language organizes and human justice 
attempts to coordinate can have any purchase.
Toward Tidings
Chaucer’s upending of historical ethics concludes with a final twist:  another 
company, admitting their perfidy, asks to become infamous, which request Fame grants.  
Geffrey, seeming more dazed than disgusted, turns away from Fame’s House, sensing 
someone behind him.  This unknown friend remains unnamed; however, Chaucer 
intimates that here at last, he is staging the first of his long awaited encounters with 
himself that the mechanics of the House has necessitated.  We understand this first in the 
verbal echoes that occur between the two characters.  When the unknown friend first 
speaks to Geffrey, he asks 
“Frend, what is thy name?
Artow come hider to han fame?”
“Nay, for sothe, frend,” quod y;
“I cam noght hyder, graunt mercy,
For no such cause, by my hed!
Sufficeth me, as I wer ded,
That no wight have my name in honde.
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I wot myself best how y stonde;
For what I drye, or what I thynke,
I wil myselven al hyt drynke,
Certeyn, for the more part,
As fer forth as I kan myn art. (1871-82)
We seem to be offered a very different Geffrey in these lines.  Having learned the lesson 
that Fame had to offer, he becomes cagey about voicing his name, which the unknown 
friend assumes is the cause of his visit.  Instead, he echoes the anonymous title offered to 
him, reflecting it back on the questioner.  Another such echo occurs in lines 1895-96, 
where the two mirror an emphatic “noo.”  Their mutual anonymity is especially important
in the context of the poem, as Geffrey now takes naming as a theme encapsulating 
everything that is wrong with fame.  He refuses to participate in the ontologizing 
procedure of naming, and, oddly enough, the unknown friend seems to follow suit.  This 
is particularly odd in Fame’s House, where everyone is concerned solely with spreading 
their own names across the bodies of others.  Yet the Unknown Friend’s first question 
resists the whole tendency of fame-mongering that Chaucer has just cast as inescapable—
he asks for the name of another, and asks his purpose.  Chaucer’s entire poem is such a 
question, a question, first, about how language could possibly congeal its variegated 
sounds into meaning, and second, about how we might again thaw it, thereby escaping its
ubiquitous attempt to codify the self.  The inevitable self-reference of speech becomes a 
question, refracted through the prism of the poem that has preceded it; the encounter with
Fame provoked for Geffrey the question of his intent in visiting the House, and through 
the mechanism of the House, that question takes on its own sonic flesh here.  The 
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question retains its integrity—its existence as a question—through Geffrey’s response, 
which attempts, with all of Chaucer’s considerable art, to resist the pitfall he pictured in 
the contemplatives.  It is perhaps the most honest statement of Chaucer’s poetics that he 
ever offers, this attempt to resist the self-aggrandizement he sees as all but inherent in 
poetics.29  He succeeds in his task, here, only by becoming other to himself; he transforms
the potentially self-reflexive question prompted by his poem into a separate entity, whose 
independent existence he maintains in his refusal to answer.
We should note, also, that Geffrey is different in his seeming self-assurance.  
Gone is the hapless dreamer plucked up by the Eagle in Book 2; in his place, we seem to 
have a fully fledged poet, capable of articulating “The cause why y stonde here” (1885).  
Finally comprehending the meaning of his own term, he says simply that he came
Somme newe tydynges for to lere,
Somme newe thinges, y not what,
Tydynges, other this or that,
Of love or suche thynges glade. (1886-89)
As he says in the next few lines, “newe thinges” are precisely what he was unable to find 
in the House of Fame itself.  Fame ensures that present utterances will be construed 
wholly in terms of the past—the aesthetic past that structures the space of the House, but 
also the simple compression of sound into language that allows the bodies to advocate for
themselves.  Having seen the procedures of history, Geffrey yearns for the new, for some 
meaning that Fame could not anticipate or encompass.  As he insisted on refusing the 
29  On the House of Fame as Chaucer’s ars poetica, see Payne 198; Shook 341-54; Clemen ch. 2.  While I 
would agree that Chaucer announces a theory of his art here, it can only act as such a statement by effacing 
the very vehicle poetry usually uses; for a poet of Chaucer’s calibre, this must have been the most bitter-
sweet rationale behind poetry.
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question of his name, he refuses again to define the thing he expects, since to define it 
would be to relegate it and himself to Fame’s judgement.30  This new thing on the horizon
of Geffrey’s expectation is “tydynges,” still language, but rehabilitated language that he 
deliberately construes as lacking a specific content.31  These “tydynges” are language 
perceived in its purely temporal aspect, as the endlessly new, shifting duration of sound; 
the love they express does not concern some banal affair, which presumably he could 
have heard about in the House, but the love of the all-embracing present that Fame has 
shut out, the love of God conceived, not as historical judge, but as the pure continuity of 
this infinitely renewing presence.
Geffrey’s earlier posture of constant questioning takes on a new and altogether 
strange light as he becomes capable of answering those questions.  In fact, one of the 
chief ways we know he has staged an encounter with himself is the Unknown Friend’s 
adoption of Geffrey’s earlier, flatfooted persona.  Throughout the poem—though most 
notably in Book 2, in his encounter with the Eagle—Geffrey has been imagined as a 
witless wanderer, engaged in a futile attempt to understand his surroundings.  The 
questions asked by the Unknown Friend have a character similar to those asked earlier by
Geffrey; they provide occasions for long, explanatory excursus that do not seem to offer 
30  In terms of Derridean messianism, the new is not something that can be anticipated as a future event; 
insofar as it can be anticipated, it is simply an extension and reconfiguration of something in the past.  
Chaucer also yearns not just for some futurity implied by what has already occurred, but an authentically 
new tiding that will upset Fame’s machinery.
31  In this sense, David Wallace accurately senses the real potency of the poem when he says, describing 
Chaucer’s reception of Dante, “Chaucer is evidently struggling with something new; something so new, in 
fact, that the narrator himself can barely grasp or articulate what that something might be” (“Italian 
Inheritance,” 39).  It is but a slight conceptual leap from this position to say that Chaucer desires to suspend
himself on this horizon of expectation, that the object of his anticipation is the anticipation itself, its nothing
in particular.  The poem is the expression of his desire not to confine this new something he has discovered 
in Dante, which Dante likewise sought to leave only partially defined in order to leave his poem open to 
hope.  This ongoing expectancy, not governed by an object, but by the simple experience of time, is central 
to duration.
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much explanation.  Geffrey, on the other hand, takes on the mantle of his authority—he 
begins to become the Chaucer capable of writing such a baffling poem.  Thus, at the end 
of their interview, the Unknown Friend asks Geffrey a most surprising question:
“Whych than be, loo, these tydynges,
That thou now [thus] hider brynges,
That thou hast herd?” quod he to me;
“But now no fors, for wel y se
What thou desirest for to here.
Com forth and stond no lenger here,
And y wil thee, withouten drede,
In such another place lede
Ther thou shalt here many oon.” (1907-15)
Astonishingly, Geffrey is now pictured as the bringer of tydynges, the only inhabitant of 
the poem capable of rendering its twisted logic comprehensible.  He becomes the guide 
figure, while the Unknown Friend behaves as the student who has too long stood gaping 
at Fame’s House.  Ironically, Geffrey has just informed the Friend that these tydynges are 
deliberately vague and could be about anything, but the Friend persists in asking after 
them.  This question prompts the journey to the House of Tidings where Chaucer will 
envision the structure of his own representational act in composing the poem.  
Geffrey leaves the House of Fame with the Unknown Friend, though after line 
1916 he is never mentioned again, the two seeming to have again coalesced into a single 
figure.  Outside he sees a new house in a valley, presumably beneath the “sea level” of 
sound.  However, Chaucer’s attempt to localize this house seems to undo itself: “ever mo/
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as swyft as thought,/ This queynte hous aboute wente,/ That never mo hyt stille stente” 
(1924-26).  Chaucer geographically situates the House of Tidings, only to render 
geographical location impossible.  Not only do this House’s denizens ceaselessly move, 
the House itself is characterized by its mobility.  Whereas the House of Fame was 
primarily thematized by stasis, language in the House of Tidings has again been made 
liquid, such that it is incapable of stillness; it expresses motion, purely, and little else 
besides it.  The geography of the House of Tidings resembles the procedure of the poem 
as a whole:  swift as Chaucer’s own thought—the same thought he invoked at the 
beginning of Book 2 to help him tell his tale aright, and the same thought that he has just 
promised to drink down himself—it constantly shifts its underpinnings out from 
underneath us.  Geffrey is capable of leading the Unknown Friend to this House because 
the House, now self-consciously, resides within Chaucer’s literary dream space.  But the 
landscape of that space, as we now know all to well, is never allowed to fully cohere.  
Were a stable geography to present itself here we might forge an interpretation, allegorize
its rickety, component parts in terms of their more stable surroundings.  But for Chaucer’s
House as for his poem, pure mutability is the only geography locale offered to stabilize 
what the poem imagines.
Chaucer seems to realize that this thematics of mutability and mobility cannot 
help him escape the problems he witnessed in Fame’s House.  It is still a representation, 
and so cannot actually persist in the world he has composed.  He thus uses a similar 
technique to describe the House of Rumor as he did to describe the House of Fame, and 
Lady Fame herself:  he casts it in terms of superlatives, and compares it to literary 
structures.  First, we see him compare it to “that Domus Dedaly,/ That Laboryntus cleped 
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ys,” which “nas mad so wonderlych, ywis,/ Ne half so quentelych ywrought” (1920-23) 
as the House of Tidings.  Later, he exclaims that “Certys... in al myn age,/ Ne saugh y 
such an hous as this” (1985-87).  Both descriptions emphasize the ongoing artificiality of 
Chaucer’s inventions.  First, Chaucer suggests that even a comparison to an imagined, 
literary House cannot account for the wonder—and the sheer intricacy of confusion—on 
display in this new house.  Geffrey’s subsequent exclamations runs parallel to the 
description of Fame and her House, the impossibility of both herself and her mountain.  
Though the House of Fame labors to present us with a purely historical space, it violates 
its own tenets, situating imagined representations alongside historical speech-acts.  Of 
course, the difference between the two is that, whereas the massiveness of House of Fame
implied resistance to the scheme of the poem, the House of Tidings seems deliberately 
constructed to display that scheme.  Though the House of Tidings may still be “shapen 
lyk a cage” (1985), it is a cage that makes its inability to contain its contents apparent.32  
As noted earlier, its ricketiness and its absurd length suggest that it is receptive to the 
endless swells of sound that beset it; it is a House built, paradoxically, only to be blown 
apart and recombined.
Geffrey rightly fears to be lost amidst the general motive clamor of the place 
should he enter; however, he notices that the Eagle—now almost authorially called “myn 
egle”—is perched on a nearby stone.  He informs Geffrey that, as it turns out, he is the 
only mode of conveyance that might grant one entrance to this House:
32  In a very interesting paper given at the 2014 New Chaucer Society Conference, Rebecca Davis drew 
attention to a peculiar metaphor Chaucer uses for the House of Rumor: he likens it to an eel cage.  In the 
Middle Ages, loosely woven baskets with lids were placed in rivers to catch eels that would enter.  Davis 
argues that, in many similar images, the House of Fame seems to capture natural forces—the light in 
Venus’s temple being another example; in this case, the rickety quality of the House of Rumor both arrests 
and does not arrest natural flow.  Even as it begins to close in on the wily eel of its temporal vision, it must 
construct a trap for it that allows the fluid temporality of the poem to seep through its cracks.
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but I bringe the therinne,
Ne shalt thou never kunne gynne
To come into hyt, out of doute,
So faste hit whirleth, lo, aboute. (2003-6)
The Eagle’s reappearance recollects his earlier description of the mechanism of Fame’s 
domain, which has been papered over by Fame’s House itself.  That description provides 
the point of access to the poem:  only in relief to it can we understand the real violence 
which language and sound suffer at the hands of Fame.  As an agent of Jove, the Eagle 
figures forth the authentically eschatological character of the place, whose precepts both 
of the houses violate.  The motive duration that he imagined throughout Book 2 is what 
sets the house of Chaucer’s poem whirling through its diverse matters; it is the only 
conceptual window that Chaucer leaves open to himself or to us so that we might, 
without simply doubting the poem’s intelligibility, discern the tidings he has to offer us in
it.
The Eagle does indeed fly Geffrey up to such a window, where he is able to peer 
within the House of Tidings.  What he discovers there are the endlessly novel 
recombinations of language that were lacking in Fame’s House.  The place is filled with 
an endless whispering and murmuring which reimagines rumors being passed from one 
person to another, constantly being enlarged and elaborated.  As in the House of Fame, 
the sound-bodies here seem to resist—to a lesser extent—being spread out into the 
infinite duration of time expressed by their speech.  Chaucer imagines them as saying, 
cohesively, “‘Thus hath he sayd,’ and ‘Thus he doth,’/ ‘Thus shal hit be,’ ‘Thus herde y 
seye,’/ ‘That shal be founde,’ ‘That dar I leye’” (2052-54).  However, we might note three
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features of what Chaucer is able to hear.  First, these rumours lack the insistent self-
reference that characterized all sound-bodies in Fame’s House.  They seem to actually 
imagine the historical event that reimagined them here, and so they largely follow the 
scheme offered by the Eagle.  Second, in place of that insistent self reference, they each 
reference a prior act of discourse that they leave unspoken.  Chaucer is thus able to retain 
the studied ambivalence with which he answered the Unknown Friend’s question.  They 
lack specific content, even as they gesture toward that content.  Third, and relatedly, the 
fragments that surface are as brief as they are unintelligible without the remainder of the 
speech that produced them.  Chaucer accentuates the growing unintelligibility of 
language in his poem by making all the speech that coalesces in the House of Tidings too 
fragmentary to relate the event that spawned the body which articulates it.  The 
unintelligible murmur of the tide of tidings is the rule in this house; now when language 
briefly and furtively coheres, it only serves to spawn further tidings that increase the 
general clamor, making it ever more difficult to discern what any given body is saying.
Chaucer goes to great lengths to accentuate the proliferation that occurs as a result
of rumor.  He also seems preoccupied with the seeming disregard for truth demonstrated 
by these gossipers.  As in Fame’s House, truth content seems largely irrelevant here:
Were the tydynge soth or fals,
Yit wolde he telle hyt natheles,
And evermo with more encres
Than yt was erst. …
And whan that was ful yspronge,
And woxen more on every tonge
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Than ever hit was [hit] wente anoon
Up to a wyndowe out to goon. (2072-84)
The truth content of a statement becomes irrelevant, but not as it was irrelevant in Fame’s
House.  There, Fame was set to judge the significance of earthly utterances, and to spread
them more broadly throughout the world; yet her judgements were unjust, resulting in the
general confusion that besets the fallen world, and which is subsequently reimagined in 
the House of Tidings, which fly to Fame’s House to be judged and so on ad infinitum.  
Here, the general disregard of the content of language feels less pernicious because no 
judge is appointed to sort the sound bodies, or to set examplars for other speakers.  
Lacking a judge, their relativity playfully demonstrates a different, overriding sort of 
truth figured forth in language: the fact of its utterance, its occurrence it in time, and its 
capacity to engender more language conceived in the same aspect.
The “fals and soth compouned” in the place also acts as a metaphor for poetry, 
anticipating the fruit and chaff of The Nun’s Priest’s Tale.  The flight of the enlarged 
tidings inverts Geffrey’s own course through the poem:  enlarged, they escape the cage of
the House of Tidings not to range freely in the open sea of sound, but to fly to Fame’s 
judgement. Geffrey, on the other hand, was borne away from the Temple of Venus to 
Fame’s House largely against his will, and in the face of his insistence that he did not 
desire fame.  He ultimately turned away from it without having been judged, and was 
taken to a window by the Eagle in order to witness the House of Tidings.  Chaucer cannot
understand why poets, attempting to distinguish themselves from the mass of sound 
present in the world, try to escape the conditions of language that the Eagle has 
elaborated, and that the House of Tidings embodies.  In their attempt to form a coherent 
241
sentence out of fictions, they submit themselves to Fame, attempting to become one of 
the massive, distinct figures upholding her edifice, only to be judged as arbitrarily as any 
other utterance.  Chaucer’s own trajectory has been to regress this poetic pride, to make 
poetry serve the conditions of utterance and to gesture back toward them, since it cannot 
name them.  Chaucer stages the trajectory of most poems in the subsequent lines, where 
two tidings—one true, one false—crowd to escape from the same window.  Unable to 
simply take turns, they first jostle angrily, then settle upon a different idea:
We wil medle us ech with other, 
That no man, be they never so wrothe,
Shal han on [of us] two, but bothe
At ones, al besyde his leve,
Come we a-morwe or on eve,
Be we cried or stille yrouned. (2102-7)
The two then merge forms and fly together to Fame’s House.  These two tidings, and 
those who similarly seek escape from the House of Tidings, are notably the only people 
here who exhibit the same self-reference of Fame’s retinue.  They fetishize their sound 
bodies, treating them as literal; of course, we understand from their dialogue that they 
refer to some combination of ideas on earth, forged into a single utterance.  But within 
the conceit, they treat their sonic flesh as actual flesh, perversely merging two disparate 
natures.  Alone, either would have prevented the other from escaping to seek Fame, but 
together they join Orpheus and his band in their journey up the mountain.  This union 
seems to imagine the union effected by poetry, in which philosophical and theological 
truths can be expressed through a fiction; Chaucer emphatically believes that the two 
242
cannot be separated from one another, and may indeed be destined to merge.  The 
perversity here is not in the alloying of truth and falsehood, but in the resultant tiding 
escaping from its proper house to submit itself to Fame.  There, Chaucer imagines them 
being offered a temporary, historical “duracioun,/ somme to wexe and wane sone” (2114-
15), their wings caught in the wind of Eolus’ trumpets; but in the House of Tidings, their 
existence would be retained indestructible, if indiscernible.  Such is Chaucer’s poetic 
fountainhead.
Chaucer turns away from such folly one last time, preferring the company of the 
crude pardoners and messengers with their “boystes crammed ful of lyes/ As ever vessel 
was with lyes” (2129-20).  Even his analogies begin to fail Chaucer—we can interpret the
second “lyes” as the “lees” or dregs of a wine bottle, but it seems more to simply refer 
back to the initial image of the analogy.  As Geffrey moves amongst the throngs, 
gathering various tidings he does not bother to record for us, he suddenly hears a “gret 
noyse withalle/ In a corner of the halle,/ Ther men of love-tydynges tolde” (2141-43).  All
the denizens of the House of Tidings begin to clamor and rush toward the new noise, 
asking “what thing is that?” and replying “I not never what” (2147-48), again, reflecting 
the Unknown Friend’s questions to Geffrey and Geffrey’s ambiguous answers.  They 
collide into “an hepe” (2149) of writhing bodies, reimagining the stagnant stasis of 
Fame’s frozen mountain as what it always should have been: a motive chaos of sound 
bodies constantly proliferating, climbing and treading on one another.  The House of 
Tidings has recapitulated the entire poem, but in such a way that the confusion of the 
earlier sections renders the purpose of the poem clear here: the windows, now lacking 
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glass and structure, refer us back to Venus’s temple; the flights of poetry and poets to 
Geffrey’s upward flight; the heap of bodies to the mountain of ice.  
Atop this freshly conceived mountain, Geffrey discerns a figure who, at long last, 
promises to put a point to all these tidings:
Atte laste y saugh a man,
Which that y [nevene] nat ne kan;
But he semed for to be
A man of gret auctorite. (2155-58)
It is a favorite game of the poem’s scholars to guess at the identity of the “man of gret 
auctorite” at the end of the poem, and at why he proves unable to speak.  I will offer three
such guesses, all of which amount to the same thing, namely, that the man embodies the 
present moment of utterance.  Finally, at the end of the poem, Chaucer peers through the 
veil between his fictional world and the historical world, encoding a moment of pure 
linguistic passage.  Thus, first, the man stages another of Chaucer’s encounter’s with 
himself.  The concern with naming remains from his previous encounter with the 
Unknown Friend—he first suggest that he is unwilling to name the figure, then that he is 
unable to do so.  The man of gret auctoritee encapsulates the studied ambiguity with 
which Chaucer has presented the tidings he has to offer readers; at precisely the moment 
he appears, the poem ceases to be capable of continuing its conceit.  As Geffrey peers 
into the House of Tidings that promises an alternative poetics to that practiced by the 
Lady Fame’s sycophants, he finds himself already within the House, as he had to be.  The
poem has, at last, caught up to itself and begun to impersonate the moments of its writing 
as so many Chaucers, mingled, as they desired to be, in the larger heap of the House of 
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Tidings. Each crests atop the heap in the fleeting moment it takes for Chaucer’s utterance 
of the poem to be reimagined within it, demonstrating the authorial position from which 
the poem was penned.  It ends in an unfinished silence because it has finally perfected its 
procedure: each representational word Chaucer attempts to utter elaborating the poem 
becomes caught in its net, imagined as a body impotently trying to mean.  The man of 
gret auctorite’s silence finally becomes capable of finishing the proliferating poem 
because in it, Geffrey finally coincides with Chaucer, the interior narrative of the poem 
brushes against its historical utterance.  Chaucer has finally landed upon a construction of
language that does not lodge him in another referential landscape, but which pushes 
himself back to the present duration too often submerged by poetry.
But Chaucer does not reserve this privilege to himself alone; the second likely 
possibility of the man’s identity is the reader who has reproduced Chaucer’s poem in her 
imagination and so shared in its realization.  Chaucer has cast himself all along as a 
reader of his dream, more subject to what it has imagined than in control of it.  His 
readers, too, if they persist so far into the poem are forcibly reimagined into the heap of 
Tidings, insofar as they have reproduced the language, or even simply the sounds of 
reading.  And, certainly, critics of the poem have converged into the disordered heap 
imagined at the end of the poem; the man is constructed to be an insoluble crux that 
spawns an endless procession of interpretations about what he might have said to knit the 
poem together.  In this aspect, Chaucer’s man of gret auctorite attempts to offer a form of 
community different from those presented in Fame’s House.  Fame attempts to subsume 
the historical specificity of the individual self in a group consciousness; ironically, the 
drive of each individual to spread her name across the bodies of others results in a general
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lack of identity and distinction.  Each person mirrors the posturing of the others before 
Fame; they must first take on the aesthetics of another before they can inflict that 
aesthetics, now nominally under their own names, on others.  The seeming distinctness of
famous figures belies this homogeneity, which is why the truly famous figures who 
structure the imitation of others are figured as either mythological amalgams of poets, or 
static figures atop pillars, crushed beneath the burden of what they represent.  Oddly 
enough, historical specificity is only to be found in the last place anyone would think to 
look for it:  the House of Tidings.  Chaucer overlays his own authorial image with that of 
the reader here, not to inflict some allegorical sentence upon them, but to push them back 
to their own situation while recreating the poem.  There, having passed through the 
latticework of the poem, they become capable of experiencing their own time as a present
duration, before language organizes imagines that time into passing particles to be 
reconstituted.  We could, of course, call this yet another sentence that Chaucer has simply
dissembled, but it is a sentence that unwinds every other along with itself; and Chaucer 
maintains its authenticity by refusing to name it, by actually entertaining the possibility 
that we are the man just as much as he is himself.
Nothing describes both of these possibilities as well as Augustine’s discussion of 
the birth of the word in the soul, which, transgressing Chaucer’s ambivalent refusals, I 
will name my third guess.  Granted, having recourse to such a grave theological concept 
at this moment of the poem might appear to miss Chaucer’s joke entirely; however, Book 
XV, Chapter 10 of de Trinitate does offer some striking resemblances to the procedure 
offered by Chaucer here.  Augustine there muses on the relationship between the moral 
self and the language she produces; he struggles to define a “mouth of the heart” 
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(15.10.18), a center of knowledge whence arise the various terms we employ to 
communicate that knowledge.  He says that understanding this mechanism is a road to 
partially understanding God:  “Whoever, then, is able to understand a word, not only 
before it is uttered in sound, but also before the images of its sounds are considered in 
thought... is able now to see through this glass and in this enigma some likeness of that 
Word” (15.10.19).  Augustine describes a form of language that precedes its resignation 
to a specific meaning; certainly, such an instance of language still proceeds from 
knowledge, stored in the memory—all language does—but Augustine asks us to 
retrospectively consider the point of contact between an idea and its signifier rather than 
the idea itself.  He asks us to consider the possibility of language.  His Pauline enigmatic 
glass is opaque—or, perhaps like Chaucer’s, colored to represent images on the glass’ 
surface rather than what is beyond the glass, what illuminates its translucence—when we 
understand language solely in its representational aspect.  However, when we attend to 
the instant of contact between mind and the sonic matter of words, we become capable of
seeing some shadow of God.  Such a conception of language pushes us toward the 
irreducibly significant present, not the present as a simple subtraction of meaning, but as 
a duration where meaning has an ongoing poignance analogous to the spontaneous 
production of God by God within the eternal presence of the Trinity.
In his groping depiction of the Word, Chaucer offers a last, smirking nod to 
Dante’s Paradise, parodying the final image of the rose within the Empyrean.  At the end 
of the Comedy, all the hierarchical tiers of Paradise were revealed as a single unified body
gazing at God and singing about Him.  God was still infinitely far off from these figures, 
but their vision was equally infinite, having been refined by their experience of grace in 
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the world.  It allowed them to progressively penetrate toward a constantly renewing 
vision of God, who seemed infinitely mobile, unchanging in the consistent novelty of the 
present moment He inhabited.  God transformed into a human figure as Dante gazed at it 
to indicate that renewal of Dante’s experience in the world, the grace in matter that the 
incarnation made perceptible.  This progressive vision paralleled Dante’s own effort to 
represent God, which deployed ineffability topoi even as it persisted in its description; in 
doing so, it drew our attention to the internal form of the words being transmuted into the 
vision, which became, if Augustine is correct, a more essential metaphor for God than the
images they articulated.  Chaucer’s man of gret auctorite figures forth a similar vision, 
albeit one less loftily conceived.  Unlike Dante, Chaucer’s stated aim is not to 
reconstitute a vision of God—in fact, much of his poem has worked to render that lofty 
goal impossible.  However, it has attempted to deliver Chaucer an image of his own, 
radically present, experience, which, in Augustine, is the first term and only knowable 
term in the analogy between ourselves and God.  Chaucer struggles to see the initial echo 
of presence into his own historical body; he wants to reduce his perception back to the 
point at which it births words so that he can see them in their prerepresentational aspect. 
His poem has set about accomplishing this by constructing an eschatological space, in 
which the absence of God is deafening.  Chaucer’s heap of bodies inverts the image of 
Dante’s perfectly ordered rose, absorbing Dante along with all the other authors he had so
carefully ordered throughout his afterlife into a single, common condition.  This heap of 
bodies, and not the strictly delimited halls of Fame’s House, is the essential state of 
discourse.  It all clamors, as in Medieval theology the whole creation did, to represent 
God, the transcendental signified whose authority makes sense of the rest of discourse; 
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however, it only partially succeeds in doing so in its internal form, before it can exercise 
its representational will.  Chaucer leaves us, and himself, exactly at the point when we 
have changed the word into the man, presenting the central paradox of his poem that runs
parallel to Dante’s vision of the incarnation, the square he cannot seem to circle.  His 
representation finally conforms to the design of the poem; the man’s lack of identity 
forces us to consider him as the poem has asked us to, as his own word at the moment in 
which we transmute it into an imagined, represented being.
Every body in the House of Fame imagines that moment; if they fail to 
understand it, the transgression is their own, the consequence their subjection to Fame 
and history. Chaucer has bracketed reference not to shunt us into silence, but to show us 
our speaking selves.  He offers to us a different form of significance in language, not 
constrained into something spoken—as, perhaps, Augustine has done, less deftly but 
more clearly—but as a word at the moment of its birth.  Of course, to do so, he has had to
transgress his own laws, representing others in their acts of representation; and he has 
made us complicit in this transgression of the poem’s terms simply by the fact that we 
have read it.  But the entire poem works toward the surrender of that narrative conceit to 
its own birth, a surrender which it finally effects in the man of gret auctorite.  If we can 
recuperate the joke through the theology, Chaucer’s man of gret auctorite seems to poke 
fun at his own success:  though threatening to become, probably unfavorably, subject to 
Fame’s judgement, as all narratives must, Chaucer does find a configuration of narrative 
capable of expressing something that fully transcends linguistic imagining, and which 
does not have to pass through the historicizing mechanics of Fame’s House to do so. The 
man has his authority from another source, and it is of a different character than fame: his
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authority is not to dumbly reduplicate the specific utterance he represents in the world, 
but to be the scarcely seen shadow of every utterance.  Though his poem threatens to 
come apart at every convolution, it ultimately fails to fail.  Like Dante, Chaucer is 
ultimately forced to crown himself with the laurel, to take on his authority; but whereas 
Dante achieved his laurel by making the representations of authors coexist with their 
saying of them, Chaucer has made that saying itself into the object of the narrative.  As he
hoped, he is fully absorbed into the poem’s mechanics of presence by its final image, and 
we are absorbed along with him.  
250
CHAPTER IV
BOCCACCIO’S DISTRACTIVE EROTICS
Chaucer’s initial response to Dante’s aesthetics of experience, as we have just 
seen, was to essentially strip it of its erotic quality.  Despite his self-presentation as a poet
concerned with love, the world of fame that Chaucer produces is one that has been 
radically shorn of the poet’s erotic attachment to the object he narrates.  For Dante, divine
presence could only be approached through erotic attachment to a physical object; the 
grace of the beloved prefigured a renovated experience of time wherein the lover 
attempted to perceive the full duration of time in which the beloved was persisting and 
the entire network of relations that brought her into being.  Her most indifferent gesture 
became the object of intense, fetishistic fascination, as did the intermediary movements 
that comprised that gesture.  On the one hand, Dante suggests that we must invariably 
return to the spatiotemporal world to experience the presence toward which erotic 
attachment thrusts us—experience isn’t experience without time, but rather a nullifying 
stagnation; on the other hand, he requires us to still conceptualize such erotic experience 
as transcending traditional spatial and temporal categories, gesturing toward a presence 
that does not admit the inherent vestigiality of temporal life.  Chaucer—unable or 
unwilling to reconcile the two movements of Dante’s Christian phenomenology—prefers 
the latter over the former in the House of Fame. In the place of Dante’s stilnovistic 
eroticism, he weaves a poetics of befuddlement and boredom wherein the poet is 
propelled toward an experience of pure presence by being violently relocated within his 
own, temporally fractured body and out of the world of his representation; in order to 
accomplish this effect, the poet must be irremediably divorced from the object of his 
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narration which, in Dante’s vision, was supposed to prompt a renovation of temporal 
experience.
If Chaucer’s initial response was to prefer transcendence in Dante’s equation, 
Boccaccio’s was to prefer erotic attachment.  More than Dante, Boccaccio will insist that 
the sensuous physicality of the beloved which sparks the movement of desire in the lover 
is of central importance to whatever spiritual insight she might offer; further, her 
specificity as beloved is not something to be surpassed at the highest reaches of our 
awareness as Dante, in whatever measure, diffused his attachment to Beatrice onto the 
entire cosmos.  Without that specificity and physicality, the spiritualization of love 
threatens to resolve back into a sterile, metaphysical theology.  Boccaccio does not fully 
repudiate the stilnovist project to ally romantic love with spiritual insight, but he does 
suggest that the particular beloved cannot simply be supplanted at the end of the journey. 
This is not to suggest that love, for Boccaccio, must be exclusive—indeed, he seems 
much more a libertine than Dante in that regard—but that every beloved must have her 
own unique quality that demands the attention of the lover and that does not make her a 
mere typological duplicate of a prior beloved or, worse, an allegorized mirror of God’s 
divine presence.  The insight to be gained by love relationships does not occur through 
the sort of progressive allegorization of love that Dante offers, but rather through a 
progressive surrendering to the materialism of sexuality. As pure presence, God may exist
outside of spatiotemporal categories, but God too succumbed to a sort of sexual 
materiality in creating the world; the very existence of objects as objects, to the mind of 
Boccaccio, testifies to the absorptive attention with which God invested them.  Our erotic
attachments thus mirror and mimic the act of creation; our eroticized perception of 
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objects in the world knits them into the ontological weave that defines their being.  For 
Boccaccio, surrendering to the temptation of materialism does not necessarily distract us 
from the divine, but rather allows us to remake ourselves into the image of God the 
creator, whose consciousness emerged through an excess of love from His perfect 
presence to construct the world of time.  The experience of the beloved still fosters a 
temporal awareness resembling that which Dante found in Beatrice, but whereas Dante 
turned at the last moment toward God in that temporal movement, Boccaccio stares down
with God at the graciousness of the particular, voluptuous being who prompted the 
transcendent movement.
Among his early works, the Ameto most clearly represents his attempt to grapple 
with the implications of Dante’s vision of divine presence in these directions—while 
virtually all of his poems draw upon the resources of Dantean imagery and ideas, the 
Ameto is his most sustained, early reaction to Dante’s Comedy.  Now, to characterize the 
Ameto as a movement away from the Dantean allegorization of love and grace should, at 
first blush, seem odd, since the work is itself an allegory; at the end of the text, Ameto 
does seem to transcend the particularity of his sexual attraction for the nymph Lia and 
ascend to a sort of divine bliss.  In this sense, Boccaccio actually seems to flatten Dante’s 
vastly more nuanced allegorization of love; the Ameto’s imagery of the divine, for 
instance, draws on a relatively tired visual and sensory repertoire, with a few notable 
exceptions.  However, what strikes most readers of the text is not the putative spiritual 
program set out by the brief ascension episode at the end of the poem but rather the initial
evocation of Ameto’s insatiable desire for the nymph and the exhaustively detailed 
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descriptions Boccaccio allows his character to indulge in.1  Ameto’s eyes rove feverishly 
over the bodies of the nymphs, always attempting—and ultimately failing—to 
forensically digest their feminine grace by defining and assessing each minute constituent
component that comprises it.  The nymphs, in their turn, gaze back at Ameto—
Boccaccio’s relentless focus on their eyes is one of the most obvious references to the 
Comedy in the text; in their early meetings, they seem almost as lusty as Ameto himself 
becomes, a detail that the allegory attempts to tame without fully succeeding.  Ultimately 
the poem’s genre seems to put it at odds with itself: the eroticized description in the 
beginning exceeds the abrupt allegory’s explanatory force.  
As a sensitive reader of Dante, Boccaccio makes the ways in which the 
description exceed the allegory seem the point—Dante, too, insisted on the continued 
relevance of the spatiotemporal world to spiritual awareness.  Dante allegorized grace, 
not in the sense that he subjected it to an overly rigid intellectual system, but in the sense 
that he universalized it, used the temporal experience he found in Beatrice’s grace to 
understand every other object in his world; ultimately, Dante’s eyes turn toward that 
universality—he strives to look through physical objects, not at them.  The world of the 
Ameto, by contrast, is unremittingly absorptive; the nymphs—who at the end of the poem
1  Even earlier generations of critics who were more apt to accept relatively straightforward allegorical 
correspondences, express a distinct discomfort with the allegory Boccaccio finally voices in the Ameto. 
Comparing Dante’s use of allegory to Boccaccio’s in the Ameto, F. MacManus concluded that, while Dante 
managed to understand visible objects as both simultaneously signs and things, Boccaccio “was beguiled 
by the appearance and forgot the deeper reality, until the last moment” (198); taking a more evaluative 
stance, Aldo D. Scaglione concludes that “even while Boccaccio was still under the direct spell of his great 
master,” as he certainly is in the Ameto, “his imitations of Dante’s sublime allegories was somehow 
contradictory and out of focus” (109); remarking on the specifically sensuous quality of the Ameto’s 
allegorical women, L. G. Clubb argues that Ameto “is ennobled by the teachings of these voluptuous 
abstractions… but he nevertheless desires to get his hands on them” (191), and more generally that 
“Boccaccio parts company with his reverend Dante at the point where love is dehumanized” (190).  
Somewhat more recently, Luisa Del Giudice has framed this problem as a disjunction between the poem’s 
allegorical and realistic elements. The work is pulled in two directions; toward the real, dictated by the 
senses, and toward the allegorical, dictated by reason. The spiritual aspirations embodied in this Christian 
allegory seem to be at odds with the narrative realism” (15).
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confess themselves to be mere signs—surpass the interpretive constraints they impose on 
themselves.  Ameto intuits and demonstrates this before the allegory is realized, thereby 
preempting and undercutting it.  Even if Ameto departs at the end of the poem in some 
celestial reverie, the reader—along with the narrator2—is left with a residue of erotic 
energy that the allegory failed to satisfy.  Ameto’s own ascension suggests this fact: in his
divine vision, the biblical God is figured as the divine Venus, the most radiant example of
beauty the text has yet afforded.  Her appearance heralds the culmination of the tension 
roiling beneath the surface of the poem: God Himself is replaced by God Herself; Dante’s
third heaven—the sphere of Venus—is made into the Empyrean.  The vision that is 
supposed to supplant the physical female body is itself supplanted when the female body 
is reinscribed within it.  In essence, Boccaccio parodies Dante’s beatific vision by 
replacing the vague, incarnational figure of Christ with a spurned Beatrice.
The very tension that makes the poem interesting also, it must be said, makes it 
relatively bad poetry—as in the case of the House of Fame, the swirl of ideas prompted 
by Dante’s masterwork seems to have left his descendants’ early responses to it somewhat
uneven in their execution.  Both poems ultimately work better as ideas than they do as 
poetry. But the Ameto is particularly important to our purposes here for three reasons: 
first and foremost, Boccaccio builds this early response to Dante’s temporal vision as a 
frame narrative.  Dante’s text itself makes extensive use of framing techniques, but 
Boccaccio amplifies the frame into a further, more fully realized commentary on the 
relationship between temporal vision and narrative production.  The same erotic tension 
that inheres in the allegory applies to the frame’s imagination of language: Ameto 
experiences the nymphs’ tales in two opposing ways.  In one sense, he experiences the 
2  See Del Giudice 23-34.
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narratives as he should—as realized spaces and times that apply, in various ways, to his 
own experience.  While Ameto doesn’t understand their allegorical resonance until the 
Divine Venus reinterprets the stories for him, he does apply the narratives to himself in a 
rudimentary, self-centered way as he hears them. But in another sense, he hears the 
nymphs’ language in a way analogous to Chaucer’s sound-bodies: he perceives language 
as a strange sort of music, an aesthetic act that unfolds the temporality of the beautiful 
bodies before him.  Ameto thus frustrates the representational and reformative work of 
the stories—language manifests the present moment of its speaking rather than the 
spatiotemporal world it intends to represent, a world through which the speakers intend to
instruct their listener. It instead draws attention to the nymphs’ mouths, to the tangible 
sonority of the sounds they have produced, the gracefulness of gesture that accompanies 
their telling, etc.  In doing so, Boccaccio places Ameto, the listener and judge of the 
stories, in a position that opposes that of the reader—where the narrator’s telling of the 
frame story relied on eros to enact its representation, that same eros resists the realization 
of the frame narratives themselves. Dante’s framed stories had a similar structure—
Cacciaguida’s incomprehensible language, for instance, entails such a double experience 
of language—but Boccaccio intensifies the disjunction between the aesthetic 
apprehension of language and the allegorical one.  The Ameto appears to prefer the 
sterility of allegory on its surface, but the text parodically undercuts its own preference.
The second reason the Ameto is important to our present purposes is more 
pragmatic:  it prefigures Boccaccio’s use of the frame in the Decameron, so much so that,
in the Cinquecento, Francesco Sansovino called the Ameto “un picolo Decamerone.”3 As 
I will demonstrate in the two sections that structure this chapter, the Decameron 
3  See Sansovino’s introduction to his edition of the Ameto, folio ii verso.
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represents the culmination of Boccaccio’s response to Dante that he initially attempted in 
the Ameto.  The most striking revision Boccaccio makes to his earlier frame is his use of 
the plague thematic; whereas the world of the Ameto is organized by playful, but 
generally well-ordered erotic energies, the world of the Decameron is bounded by the 
almost Ovidian relativity of the plague.  Spatiotemporal markers unfold, in the Ameto, 
with an effortless grace; the pastoral landscape of the poem delimits a place wherein 
objects can contract into habitual patterns of relation without friction.  The characters and
objects that populate the Ameto’s world are endlessly fascinating to one another, and 
through that fascination, they structure the ontological web in which all inhere.  Even 
death, in the Ameto, feels erotic—the scenes of hunting prefigure the perceptual darts of 
love that will pass between Ameto and the nymphs.  By stark contrast, the Decameron 
presents a world in which spatiotemporal organization is literally unravelling; the plague 
has broken the compact between humours that knits together the human body, allowing 
parts of it to rupture out of the habituated roles that define them.  This occurs on all levels
of the human temporal scale: the individual body’s dissolution is metaphorically reflected
in the social body as family relationships dissolve, in the religious “body of Christ” as 
church officials abandon their charges, in the body politic which lacks the means and 
resources to enforce even the most basic laws of property, and so on.  The effect of the 
plague is to literally uncreate Florentine society; just as God effected the creation by 
imposing spatiotemporal markers of varying scale and complexity into a spatial cosmos 
and setting them into relation with one another in time—allowing them to congeal away 
from His perfect, generative presenence—so do those progressive layers of organization 
begin to rescind their complexity, breaking down into simpler forms of temporal 
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organization.  The plague still represents a narrative world, but it is one in which organic 
particles teem at one another, rebelling against the habitual agreements that transform 
them into organism-objects defining an ordered temporality until they become 
rudimentary matter—which, in the Aristotelian sense, is nothing, being pure change.4  In 
phenomenological terms, matter begins to insist upon its radical intentionality; each 
constituent part of a systematized object begins to assert the dimensions of its being that 
are necessarily ignored by its fellow constituent parts in the constitution of their 
collective organism. As a result, these constituent parts cease to become parts altogether, 
as do the parts that formed them; their refusal cascades into increasingly minute layers of 
temporal organization until they threaten to become nothing, a pure, unmoving flux 
unable to manifest any discernible ontology.
The plague thus constitutes a parody of Dante’s democratization of temporal 
vision.  In suggesting that we must cast the phenomenological vision of the beloved onto 
the entirety of the cosmos, Boccaccio believes that Dante threatens to unravel that very 
cosmos.  The limitations of vision and sensation generally are what allow the objects that 
inhere in the world to appear, and so to organize a history from whose vantage point we 
can prosecute Dante’s new temporal vision.  If we try to recuperate the universal 
poignancy of everything persisting in the universe, restoring its radical being at every 
level of its organization, we threaten to lose the specific character of the very objects we 
are trying to recuperate in their full temporality. The eroticism that Dante allegorized to 
arrive at that vision ceases to be erotic, since erotic attachment depends on its own 
pettiness and limitations—the very qualities that Dante still renounced as sinful even as 
he tried to reclaim their spatiality.  In the Ameto, Boccaccio critiqued Dante’s loss of the 
4  See Moevs 4-5.
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particular by locating the disavowed female body onto deity itself; this critique, however, 
doesn’t go very far in explaining the danger he intuited in Dantean beatitude.  The plague,
however, offers a very sophisticated response to the idea of Dantean vision itself: if 
objects are as Dante suggests they are—radically intentional and durational—then they 
would simply fall apart.  If the goal of human philosophy, intended by the creator, was to 
allegorize from the particular experience of grace to a universal one, all philosophers 
would be mad—they would lose the very world they tried to recuperate.
Boccaccio’s own world, of course, doesn’t fall apart in this way, but those who 
bear history out of the plague space are not philosophers, but a band of young aristocrats 
beset by their own limitations.  The members of the brigata possess no special 
insight:what spiritual, philosophical or moral insight they offer in their stories tends to be 
reducible to conventional medieval ideas; even Dioneo’s subversive irony derives from 
traditions of subversive irony embedded deeply in the medieval world.  The members of 
the brigata are not privy to any special vision or revelation from above; they cannot, in 
any real sense, confront or counteract the principle of uninterpretability that the plague 
poses in the world.  By framing his frame in terms of the plague, Boccaccio heightens our
sense of the absurdity of his choice of subject—the plague seems to demand a different 
sort of narration, some tragic or wisdom literature; the stakes of the situation lead us to 
expect more from the brigata than they are able to offer. But it is precisely the 
conventionality of their thought, their youthful ignorance and indolence, their inability to 
provide a sufficient allegorization of the plague,  the stupid persistence of their erotic 
preoccupations with one another in the face of universal dissolution—it is these features 
that, for Boccaccio, makes them suited to indirectly answer the philosophical 
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ramifications of the plague.  They counter the plague by consciously pretending to forget 
it, by even allowing the reader of the Decameron to forget it; they retreat into the easy—
albeit now embattled and fragile—pastoral landscape of the Ameto and distract 
themselves into the spaces and times of their stories.  They limit the thematics of those 
stories such that—though they often far outstrip their aims—they can digest and interpret 
the stories with relative ease, debating the points and lessons they offer perhaps, but 
doing so within the defined interpretive perspectives the plague seems to dissolve. From 
the perspective of their relative simplicity, they can recreate the perceptible, historical 
world which the plague’s radical temporality threatens to destroy.  None of this is to 
suggest that the Decameron is itself a simple text—Boccaccio is far too clever an author 
to allow the brigata’s limited perspectives on their own stories to be the only permissible 
ones.  The linkages between tales alone create an enormously complex texture that far 
outstrips any design the brigata could invent themselves and this is, in part, Boccaccio’s 
point: while the perceptible world emerges from our limited perception of one another, 
the weave that results from those perspectives is far more intricate than any person could 
ever really understand.  But the limitations that create that weave are not something to be 
transcended; they are, rather, the ineradicable ground of existence; transcendence can 
only result in the radicality of the plague.  Boccaccio instead celebrates the petty 
limitations of the world’s inhabitants while simultaneously pointing toward an ecology of
ideas and objects that, while it depends on those limitations, outstrips them.
The polarity between the plague vision and this ecology of limited perception runs
parallel to the textual and linguistic ecologies Boccaccio institutes through his frame.  As 
I have noted, frames structurally embed two different modes of perceiving language 
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within themselves: words are both sonic objects and signifying subjects.  As sonic 
objects, words are threatened by the sort of dissolution to which the plague subjects 
bodies, a fact that Chaucer discovered in his House of Fame.  If every speech act, every 
moment of phonemic enunciation, is given its own integrity, language dissolves first into 
a cloud of sounds, then into silence; if the contours of a sound cannot be tamed by the 
sounds adjacent to it, there is not a reason for its articulation.  Moreover, the sound itself, 
its moment, gets lost in the infinite divisibility of moments such that it can never appear.  
For Dante, this threat was impersoned by Nimrod and was recuperated by Cacciaguida; 
Boccaccio, however, makes this threat of linguistic dissolution part of an essential 
condition of the universe, one which cannot be so easily typologized away.  This 
possibility of linguistic dissolution is one of his most significant conceptual innovations 
from the Ameto; in that poem, the universal condition is eros, and even when Ameto 
perceives language as an indolent stream of sounds, he does so under the eroticized spell 
of the nymphs.  The plague, by contrast, is the vacuum that opposes eros; the basic erotic 
energy that magnetizes sounds so that they adhere to one another evaporates and word-
organisms dissolve into nothing.
The brigata’s tale-telling, however, staves off the plague condition, allowing 
language to reassemble into words and from that foundational coherence, into spaces and 
times that bear the structure of history out of the plague space.  The words of the brigata 
attain a different sort of poignancy than Dante’s: where language became temporally 
poignant in Paradise immediately prior to acquiring a specific signification, Boccaccio’s 
language becomes poignant as it signifies, when it is delimited from the cacophony of 
plague-meaning into some limited, partially conceived and perceived body.  The plague 
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imagines a pre-linguistic space that words—insofar as frame narratives force us to 
imagine their sonic matters—must inevitably occupy, but which they persist past in order 
to construct meaning in the mind of a listener or reader.  In his reconfiguration of the 
frame, Boccaccio found a narrative tool pliable enough to reflect his broader 
phenomenology; the semiology of the text functioning itself testifies to the inadequacy of
Dante’s universalizing beatitude.  As Boccaccio read Dante, he grew increasingly aware 
of the ways in which the praxis of Dante’s text cut against its theory: to make sense of the
Comedy, one cannot have the sort of breathless vision he describes as its apex.  His 
exchanges with the denizens of the afterworld were more local and specific than that 
vision would allow, even in Paradise.  Boccaccio’s extension of the frame narrative 
allows him to recover the centrality of the local and particular in the context of the 
universalizing phenomenology he found in Dante.
Boccaccio’s response, in its turn, deeply informs Chaucer’s own attempts to 
respond to Dante, at least, after the House of Fame.  Before I proceed into my analysis of 
the Ameto and the Decameron, a few words on this narrative reception are in order—this 
dissertation is, after all, principally about Chaucer, and unlike his reception of Dante, we 
are less sure of the specific Boccaccian texts that were available to Chaucer.  Chaucer 
likely knew the Ameto; it is more likely that he knew the Ameto than the Decameron.  The
most compelling argument for his knowledge of the Ameto is his deployment of one of 
the Ameto’s tales—that of Agapes recounting her marriage to an aged husband—in the 
Merchant’s Tale.  Certainly, Chaucer drew upon many sources for this tale: the pear tree 
story was a commonplace in Medieval literature, and in general Chaucer seems to have 
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preferred the narrative structure of other versions to Boccaccio’s in the Ameto.5  However,
several narrative details indicate that Boccaccio’s version here was part of the chorus of 
sources Chaucer had in mind when he penned the tale.  In particular, Chaucer seems to 
have been tantalized by Boccaccio’s rather gruesome depiction of the sex scene. E. Talbot
Donaldson argues that, though Chaucer’s tale is told in the third person, the text “quietly 
shift[s] the point of view of the narrative so that we see the wedding night through May’s 
eyes rather than January’s” (43); Boccaccio’s tale is, of course, told entirely from a 
woman’s perspective, and is possibly the first version of this oft told tale that does so in 
the Middle Ages. The details recorded from that perspective also mirror Boccaccio’s 
account—specifically, the slack neck skin and the beard imagery seem to borrow directly 
from Agapes’s story.6  I would add that the husband’s self-recollection of his former 
virility and his argument to Agapes that she should feel lucky to be married to an old man
also prefigure January’s elaborate rationalization of his choice of a young wife and the 
ensuing debate that occupies so much of Chaucer’s version of the tale, though other 
sources like Deschamps’s Le Miroir de Mariage are also sources for this section.  
5  Interestingly, Helen Cooper accepts Decameron VII, 9 as an analogue to the Merchant’s Tale on account 
of its combination of “a high-romance style opening with bawdy content” (12). In his chapter from Sources
and Analogues dedicated to the Merchant’s Tale, N. S. Thompson accepts both the Decameron and the 
Ameto as sources of Chaucer’s description.  However, the lack of distinct verbal parallels from the 
Decameron makes it suspect as a source, here as elsewhere.
6  This is precisely the sort of detail that would have stuck in the mind of someone trained in medieval 
mnemonic techniques.  As Mary Carruthers has described in The Book of Memory, people in the Middle 
Ages used grotesque and shocking imagery to help themselves store and recall data; they imprinted such 
images in their memorial “wax,” and from these paradigmatic events, recalled the totality of a story or 
composition.  Chaucer demonstrates his interaction with such techniques in the House of Fame; while 
many of the images and ideas in the Ameto may not have made much of an impression—lacking, as they 
do, a sort of shocking, formalist quality that would differentiate them from the tired imagery of other genres
—the image of the slack neck skin would been such a mnemonically distinct moment.  Certainly, it is 
possible that Chaucer developed the same image on a parallel trajectory without knowledge of Boccaccio’s 
text; but given the other evidence that he knew the text and the fact that Chaucer derives many of his most 
memorable images from other sources rather than from his own creative energies, Occam’s razor would 
suggest that he probably recollects Boccaccio’s image rather than inventing one so strikingly similar.
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There is evidence, too that the Ameto was lurking in the corners of Chaucer’s 
mind as he began to conceptualize the framework of the Canterbury Tales, though its 
influence on the framework is less certain and widely accepted than its influence on the 
Merchant’s Tale in the source criticism.7  As far back as 1913, John S. P. Tatlock 
catalogued a number of similarities between the two frames: the springtime setting that 
occurs in conjunction with religious observances, which causes a company to assemble 
and tell tales to pass time; the use of a “head” of the tale-telling group who appoints 
tellers (a fact also true of the Filocolo and the Decameron); the personal point of view of 
the tales told by the tellers; the use of headlinks to connect the tales; the structure of the 
characterization wherein each teller is described, in detail, prior to her tale; and finally, 
the mutual thematization of marriage in the two frame stories (86-91).  Any one of these 
borrowings, on its own, feels insecure; however, as Tatlock notes, they do have a 
cumulative effect that—especially when viewed in conjunction with the evidence from 
the Merchant’s Tale—suggests that Chaucer knew the text.8
7  It should be noted that, in her chapter on the frame in Sources and Analogues, Cooper more or less 
dismisses the Ameto as an analogue for the frame, saying only that “the evidence is very weak, and the 
latest scholarship on the subject does not claim indebtedness on Chaucer’s part” (6), though her own 
citations on this “latest scholarship” is rather anemic itself.  In reality, few contemporary critics comment 
either positively or negatively on the Ameto’s influence on the Canterbury framework—it seems to simply 
be a text that has not caught the modern ear, and for good reason.  However though she dismisses the 
Ameto as a source, her own catalogue of resemblances between the Canterbury frame and the Decameron is
scarcely more convincing than Tatlock: her first point, for instance, is that the Decameron is the only source
in which a “series of narrators” tell their stories specifically as pasttimes (which is, in fact, not true, since 
the Ameto’s storytellers are passing a hot afternoon with their storytelling); her second point is that five 
Canterbury Tales have analogues—without any direct verbal borrowing—in the Decameron, but the Ameto
has an analogue with direct verbal borrowing. Tatlock’s list of parallels are at least as convincing—and at 
times as problematic—as these; both works serve to underscore the problem in charting Boccaccio’s 
influence on Chaucer: Chaucer’s works seem too similar in their deep conceptual underpinnings to discount
a relationship, but too different in their realization of those concepts to treat them as distinct analogues.
8  While other sources have also commented on this possible relationship, they generally all emphasize one 
or two points of resemblance in Tatlock’s longer catalogue.  One notable essay linking the two works is W. 
H. Clawson’s essay “The Framework of the Canterbury Tales.”  In particular, Clawson is struck by the 
Ameto’s use of a “special religious occasion” (6) as the mechanism that brings the company together and as
Ameto’s role as a “presiding officer.”  While the first point does have some merit as a source for Chaucer’s 
pilgrimage motif, it must be said that Harry Bailly bears little resemblance to Ameto, nor do the texts seem 
to conceptualize the role of this figure similarly—Ameto is an indolent, love-besotted character undergoing
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While he likely knew the Ameto, I would suggest that he wasn’t particularly 
struck by it—at least not on his first reading.  If I might indulge in a brief interlude of 
historical imagination, the narrative of reception that seems most convincing to my mind 
runs as follows: Chaucer probably encountered the Ameto when he first encountered 
Boccaccio’s other early works, perhaps on his first trip to Italy in 1372 or immediately 
preceding it.  Indeed, there were only a few of Boccaccio’s earlier works that Chaucer 
didn’t seem to know—the Ameto was written immediately after Boccaccio’s Neapolitan 
period when he had returned to Florence, and Chaucer likely knew all but one of the 
works Boccaccio wrote in Naples in the vernacular—Boccaccio’s first poem, the Caccia 
di Diana—as well as the early texts written after his return. It would be odd if, 
sandwiched as it is in Boccaccio’s chronology between the Filocolo,9 the Teseida, the 
Filostrato and the Amorosa Visione,10 Chaucer somehow missed the Ameto.11 While 
Boccaccio’s other texts evidenced a vibrancy of imagination that captivated Chaucer, thus
prompting him to more overt acts of imitation, the Ameto probably seemed a rather static 
and conventional affair.  Its final allegory likely felt as abrupt and out of place to Chaucer
as it does to most contemporary readers, yet Boccaccio didn’t immediately demonstrate 
an allegorical transformation at the center of the tale; Harry Bailly is a much more liminal figure in 
comparison, motivating the pilgrimage and interjecting at key moments in the headlinks, but lacking the 
sort of organizing force of Boccaccio’s character.  If Chaucer does borrow this structure from the Ameto, he
alters it into an almost unrecognizable form.
9  The Filocolo is a likely source of the Franklin’s Tale.  On its influence, see Sources and Analogues, 213-
214; Wallace, Chaucer and the Early Writings of Boccaccio, 39-60; Rajna. Cf. Helen Cooper, “The 
Canterbury Tales,” 233-34.
10  Chaucer’s knowledge of this text is uncertain—less certain than the Filocolo—but various critics have 
seen its influence on The House of Fame, The Parlement of Fowles, and The Legend of Good Women.  For 
its influence on the House of Fame, see Child 190-192 and  Boitani 93-95; on The Parlement, see Koeppel 
237-38; on the Legend of Good Women, see Collette 46-51.  Cf. Cummings 14-32 and Fyler’s comment in 
the Riverside Chaucer’s edition of the House of Fame.
11  On Chaucer’s reception of Boccaccio’s early works generally, see Wallace, “Chaucer and Boccaccio’s 
Early Writings,” and Chaucer and the Early Writings of Boccaccio. While Wallace comments on the Ameto
as representing a developmental stage in Boccaccio’s poetics, he does not comment on the likelihood that 
Chaucer knew or did not know it.
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the kind of self-consciousness of this artistic effect that would have appealed to Chaucer; 
the settings and descriptions, in their turn, likely would have felt rather tired, a bit like the
highly conventional Romance setting and characters he would later lampoon in Sir 
Thopas.  Chaucer had read more artistically poignant pastoral poems, romance narratives 
and allegories than he found in the Ameto.  He would have seen the references to Dante’s 
Comedy throughout and perhaps understood the text as a response to that poem, but at 
first glance the response did not strike him as particularly insightful; his own House of 
Fame demonstrates a radically different, practically diametric trajectory in his own first 
response to Dante, and the artistic gap between the two texts goes some way toward 
explaining why Chaucer wouldn’t have drawn on its resources for his own poetry. It takes
a preliminary and limited encounter with the Decameron to prompt Chaucer to reevaluate
the Ameto as a potential source for imagery and narrative structure.12
A similar explanation does not suffice to explain the dearth of direct verbal 
borrowing from the Decameron: Boccaccio’s later narrative was precisely the type of text
that would have captivated Chaucer’s imagination.  While a good deal of recent work has
begun to more confidently treat the Decameron as a source for the Canterbury Tales,13 the
lack of any sustained borrowing still makes such efforts deeply problematic.  Moreover, 
12  Reading the Ameto as an analogue that Chaucer didn’t really like solves a number of puzzles posed by 
source criticism on the Canterbury Tales: it explains, first, why there is only one direct verbal borrowing 
from that work; it explains why Chaucer’s frame seems to strikingly lack a firm antecedent—Chaucer 
draws upon some of the imaginative resources of the Ameto, but scrambles them and entirely reimagines 
the uses to which he will put them; and it explains why the Canterbury Tales seems to run parallel to the 
Decameron’s project without directly citing it—Chaucer had to turn to a text he didn’t particularly like to 
help him imagine how Boccaccio had innovated on his earlier use of the frame.  After this, Chaucer could 
plot his own point on that same trajectory, innovating on his own imagined version of the Decameron with 
the Ameto as a sort of grudging reference point.
13  As I have mentioned above, the Sources and Analogues of the Canterbury Tales has begun to more or 
less confidently assert the Decameron as an analogue; other interesting work in this area includes that done 
by Harkins, Finlayson, Beidler, Biggs, Heffernan, and Finlayson, among many other critical works.  Cf. 
Severs whose curmudgeonly attitude toward the relationship still seems to me the most reliable starting 
point.
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the frame of the Canterbury Tales seems to lack much specific reference to Boccaccio’s 
frame—if Chaucer had thoroughly read it, we can probably assume there would be more 
overt echoes of the plague motif, some borrowing, perhaps from the narrator’s 
introduction, etc.  Chaucer was always deeply struck by the ingenuity of other authors’ 
solutions to philosophical problems, so much so that he sometimes falls prey to a 
paradigm of imitation and evolution rather than innovation. In reality, his lack of a fuller 
knowledge of the Decameron probably left Chaucer more free to develop an original 
deployment of the frame, which might have been stifled had he seen more of Boccaccio’s
text—his lack of specific knowledge leaves him free to fill in the blanks of Boccaccio’s 
framework. In terms of structure and motifs, the similarities to the Ameto that Tatlock 
notes are more convincing than any that could be mounted for the Decameron, or really 
for any other single frame narrative.14  However, though it is difficult to claim that 
Chaucer had a thorough knowledge of the Decameron, Helen Cooper’s suggestion that he
might have encountered the idea of it in some rudimentary, summarized form seems 
entirely plausible and even likely (8-9).  In his capacity as Controller of the wool customs
or one of his other official posts, Chaucer could easily have come into contact with 
someone familiar with the Decameron; such a reader could have acquainted him with the 
broad strokes of the work—its characterization of the brigata members (whose depth 
exceeded virtually all of Boccaccio’s precedents), the plague thematic, the pastoral 
gardens they journey amongst, the thematic linkages between tales, etc. When Chaucer 
learned of Boccaccio’s use of the frame narrative for his greatest work, he might well 
14  Cooper—after claiming the Decameron as the most comprehensive analogue for the Canterbury Tales—
suggests the A-text of Piers Plowman as the nearest analogue for the pilgrimage motif, which is entirely 
plausible (21-22); however, the parallels she adduces between the two texts are again not much more 
definitive than those Tatlock notices in the Ameto.
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have revisited an earlier work he had largely discounted—the Ameto—for insight into the 
opportunities that framed narrative afforded Boccaccio in his magnum opus.
In the shift from the eroticism of the Ameto to the plague thematic of the 
Decameron, Chaucer seems to have found a poetic mode that would help him to resolve 
some of the conceptual traps that had impeded him from fully realizing the House of 
Fame’s temporal poetics.  I will treat the Canterbury Tales’ adaptation of the frame in the 
next chapter; of course, the narrative of reception I have offered above necessarily 
possesses a great degree of uncertainty—in the lack of more direct borrowing, it is 
difficult to know exactly how much of either text Chaucer really knew, and even more 
difficult to discern his attitude toward either text. But even if the above narrative does not
represent, precisely, the historical progression of Chaucer’s reception of Boccaccio’s 
frames, really only two tenets from it are necessary to my ultimate argument: 1. that 
Chaucer was familiar in some measure, with the Decameron and 2. that Chaucer 
understood Boccaccio’s use of framed narrative as a response to the same sort of Dantean
phenomenology he had first grappled with in the House of Fame.  The Ameto’s overt use 
of Dantean imagery recommends it as a sort of “bridge source” that clued Chaucer in to 
this deployment of the frame and that Chaucer turned to in the absence of a more 
complete knowledge of the Decameron, but Chaucer could have read this sort of dialogue
into the text even without a knowledge of it. Moreover, I will argue in my next chapter 
that Chaucer engages with the sort of allegorical modes of meaning Boccaccio deploys in
the Ameto; he had certainly engaged with allegories in other settings, but the Ameto’s 
unique characteristics resemble Chaucer’s project in several striking ways.  In particular, 
the way in which Chaucer’s Retraction reframes the allegorical texture of the work 
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closely resembles the ironic attitude of Boccaccio’s conclusion to the Ameto, and I will 
argue that it is one source of the Retraction.  However, Chaucer obviously knew many 
frame narratives, and could have fashioned his dialogue with Boccaccio’s use of framing 
using any number of sources; the above represents what I consider to be the most likely 
scenario for Chaucer’s reception, but my ultimate argument will not hang on where 
Chaucer got his ideas about framing, but rather how he uses frames. In any case, the 
Ameto was certainly on Boccaccio’s mind as he began to compose the framework of the 
Decameron, and analysis of it yields insights into the way he conceptualized the 
phenomenology of the frame; to such an analysis, I will now turn.
Allegories of Matter in the Ameto
The Ameto rightfully begins under the sign of Cupid, the capricious god of erotic 
desire—Boccaccio’s narrator invokes him with a fanatical devotion, recounting all the 
positive effect he brings about in his adherents.  However, despite the poem’s setting in 
an ancient, pastoral version of Italy, Cupid is far from the traditional god of ancient 
mythology here; Boccaccio deliberately conflates him with the creator God of the 
Christian tradition, thereby amplifying the position of erotic desire in his world 
considerably.  Eros is like gravity in the Ameto: more than just a principle of sexual 
attraction, it is what brings objects into relation with one another, allowing them to 
mutually constitute one another’s being.  As the narrator informs us, Cupid’s 
effetti tengono in moto continuo li piacevoli cieli, dando eterna legge alle 
stelle e ne’ viventi potenziata forze di bene operare[.] I quali, se uditi da 
Creso nel fuoco o da Ciro nel sangue o nella povertà da Codro o nelle 
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tenebre da Edippo, piaceranno; e Marte, ascoltandoli, o darà all’arme 
quiete o più fervente l’opererà ne’ bisogni.  Pallade la dolcezza de’ suoi 
studi, i costui fatti sentendo, d’animo divenuta maggiore, gli lascia alcuna 
volta; e Minerva robusta si fa mansueta intendendoli; e la fredda Diana ne 
‘ntiepidisce; e Apollo più focose porge le sue saette. Che più? I satiri, le 
ninfe, le driade e le naiade e qualunque altro semóne, seguitandolo, se ne 
abbelliscono ed udendoli piacciono a tutti. (904-5)
[effects keep the pleasant heavens in continual motion, giving to the stars 
eternal law and the power to act well upon the living.  The which, if heard 
by Cresus in the fire, or by Cyrus in the blood, or in poverty by Codrus, or 
in the shadows by Oedipus will be pleasing; and Mars, listening, will 
either give his arms to quietness or use them more fervently at need. Pallas
learning of these deeds, abandons the sweetness of her studies for a time 
and becomes greater in spirit; and robust Minerva, hearing, is made tame; 
and cold Diana grows warm; and Apollo shoots his hotter arrows. What 
more?  The satyrs, the nymphs, the driads and the naiads and any other 
demigod, following him, become more beautiful and hearing of him, all 
are pleased.]
Cupid here becomes the Prime Mover of Aristotle and Aquinas, acquiring a drastically 
increased theological scope than he enjoyed as the diminutive avatar of infatuation.  In 
medieval cosmogony, the heavens were the part of God’s creation that moved in an 
orderly and rational procession; where the lower, sublunar reaches of the cosmos were 
subject to all manner of convolutions and upheavals, the stars and planets remained 
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distantly mechanical.  In Dante as in the theologians, cosmic bodies are receptacles of 
God’s love as are all things, but their manifestation of that love is governed in equal 
measure by God’s reason such that they never stray from their courses.15  It is this 
constant motion of the spheres that allows us to perceive time as a more or less ordered 
passage, divisible into the units of calendar and clock. But by instituting Cupid at the top 
of the universal hierarchy, Boccaccio suggests that the love moving the planets is the 
same that inspires the capricious and temporary lusts of human beings and even animals.  
The implications of this move are more startling than they might seem at first: 
Boccaccio’s transmutation of Cupid into God reverses the dynamic of the dolce stil 
nuovo’s poetics. Stilnovist poets insisted that erotic love could offer insight into 
metaphysical and even religious problems.  As Dante did, the poet had to largely 
allegorize his love relationship to understand the veiled, divine message it encoded. The 
directionality of this allegorization always moved from the human realm to the divine; 
the particular love was transformed into the universal.  At the outset of the Ameto, 
however, Boccaccio begins to transform the universal into the particular; prefiguring the 
final move of his allegory, he infuses the image of God with a deeply human sense of lust
rather than infusing lust with traces of divinity. The most basic universal movements and 
really the principle of time itself is based on the erotic energy God projects out onto the 
universe; this energy is not the impassive, patrician love expressed in, for instance, an 
icon of the Madonna and Child or a saint’s martyrdom, but an unreasoning, fetishistic 
impulse toward flesh.  Boccaccio suggests, in this image, that the cosmos shapes itself in 
response to a cupidic fetishism; love inspired by Cupid’s arrows is irremediably specific 
15  This cosmic theology has as its source Aristotle’s Metaphysics; see, in particular, XII.7 on the necessary 
being of the planets and stars as contrasted to the temporary and accidental being of sublunar bodies.  For a 
critical perspective on Dante’s use of such astrological imagery, see Cornish 12-25.
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to the point of being unreasoning and obsessive.  All the desirability pregnant in the 
universe contracts itself into a single body, a movement opposite to Dante’s 
democratization of desire; but for Boccaccio, this fetishism is the only way objects can 
appear. And despite being imbalancing, irrational, temporary and particular such desire 
finds a sort of tenuous equilibrium in the physical world.
In fact, such love seems to inspire a sort of arete in those who hear of it—love 
summons heroes and gods alike to be what they are, but in an increasingly intense way.  
Boccaccio asks us to understand cupidic desire not simply as sexual attachment, but as 
the force which spontaneously integrates a being into the unity that defines it; this 
integration occurs as a response to the external stimulus of a desire that Boccaccio so 
drastically broadens as to make it virtually synonymous with perception itself.  In the line
following the equation of Cupid with the creator, we thus see the God inspiriting the great
figures of history and of the Greek pantheon with the principle that defines them. Cupid 
literally gives them all the capacity to “operare bene,” most simply to operate well; he 
seems to oppose only the principles of inertia and irrelation—the chariness of Minerva 
and the coldness of Diana.   Ironically, the “goodness” of these deeds has been shorn of 
the connotations of Christian morality with which Cupid has just been imbued: one can 
hardly say that any of these figures would be exemplars of Christian virtue, yet they are 
exemplars of the desire that moves the heavens.  In the world of the Ameto, the energy 
behind one’s desire and the absorptiveness of its object outstrips all other concerns and 
configurations; thus even as Boccaccio frames the allegory in terms of Christian morality,
he shears away its potency—all become more beautiful if they hear of the God of Love, 
whatever their specific poison might be.  Cupid does not reserve his influence for those 
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who behave in a manner in keeping with his divine directives, but rather stirs everyone in
the cosmos to become more beautiful as whoever and whatever they are; his erotic energy
structures the ontological substrate of Boccaccio’s world, making everything more 
gracious by inspiring them with cupidic desires.
At the end of his Proem, Boccaccio begins to associate these ecologies of desire 
with the textual ecologies that comprise his work.  Directly addressing Cupid, the 
narrator aligns his vision of the aesthetic surface of the text with the surface 
consciousness of grace and the spatiotemporal ecology of the Ameto’s world:
e ‘l bel parlare e gli atti lieti e snelli
e l’operata già somma salute
da voi ne’ campi amorosi e novelli
com’io posso comincio, tua vertute
superinfusa aspettando, che vegna
tal che per te le mie cose vedute
in quello stile, che appresso disegna
la mano, acquistin lode e il tuo valore
fino a le stelle, si come di degna
donna, si stenda con eterno onore. (908)
[and your beautiful speech and your acts happy and elegant and the 
highest health already worked by you in the fields amorous and new; I will
begin as I can, waiting upon the infusion of your virtue from above, may it
come such that through you the things I have seen, manifest in that style 
which the hand now designs, might acquire praise and your merit might 
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extend up to the stars with eternal honor, if my lady will see fit to make it 
so.]
The basic contours of this passage come from the poetic self-definition Dante offers to 
Bonagiunta in the 24th canto of Purgatory: like Dante, he awaits the spiration of love to 
descend upon him.  Where Dante goes signifying “a quel modo ch’e’ ditta dentro” [in the 
mode which Love dictates], Boccaccio’s narrator seems to take more ownership of his 
“cose” and perhaps his “stile” as well—the owner of the hand designing this style is left 
ambiguous.  But though the things being narrated are associated with the narrator, the 
speech itself belongs squarely to Cupid as it does in Dante, along with his gracious acts 
and the natural world, infused with desire and novelty. Both poets imagine themselves as 
translators of a preexistent discourse of love; however, Boccaccio makes explicit what 
Dante cautiously left implied: namely that this discourse of love is made manifest in the 
tangible world.  Dante’s Love retains the safe, disembodied quality of deity—he spirates 
and dictates into Dante; likewise Dante’s poetics, which are ostensibly about the world 
around him, make no contact with the external world in his own self-definition, aside 
from, perhaps, the physicality of the text upon which he writes: the abstraction breathes 
into Dante and he takes note and goes signifying.  For Boccaccio, it is this emphasis on 
the mediation of the sign in both of Dante’s self-referential verbs that seems a bit 
bloodless, given the phenomenological thrust of the rest of his narration—the most 
prominent alteration he makes in the passage is to shift from Dante’s symbolic register to 
an ontological one of physical things, “cose” occupying the spatial grid of the “campi 
amorosi e novelli.”  Dante’s poetic self-definition anticipates his allegorization of the 
world: to Boccaccio’s mind, he literally sign-ifies the world around him, transforming 
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everything within it—including himself—into a monovocal sign of divine love.  
Boccaccio’s Cupid is not such a disembodied figure, nor is Boccaccio’s narrator detached
from the physical world; the divine source of poetry in the Ameto does not shelter behind 
theological abstraction, but is fully incarnational.  Cupid is himself a participant in grace, 
not just its source—his own acts are gracious, he is both example and source of grace—
and it is Cupid’s own embodiment that mediates between the two linguistic poles of the 
frame narrative: the surface apprehension of beautiful language and the perception of a 
physical narrative space, beautiful in a different sense.  The unrepentantly incarnational 
quality of Cupid locates the source of meaning in Boccaccio’s text within the grace-
bound body, which manifests in both an aesthetics of language and an ontological 
aesthetics of bodies.  The flexibility of the frame—coupled with the fluidity of Dante’s 
terza rima, which Boccaccio uses for the poetic sections of the text spoken only by his 
framing characters—will render up the surface consciousness of its linguistic aesthetic; 
this construction of the amorous fields in which spatiotemporal objects appear because 
they are objects and agents of narrowly defined desires will occupy the narrator 
throughout much of the frame.
These amorous fields are imagined as an ecology of desire that governs the 
appearance of all objects within the world of the Ameto; that ecology is best represented 
by the pastoral landscape in which the poem takes place. Pastoral poems generally 
imagine a rustic, semi-domesticated world wherein the landscape—when the shepherd 
engages in it with practices of proper husbandry—generously provides for human 
subsistence.16  The form, from its early examples in Virgil and other Latin poets, was 
nostalgically archaic, hearkening back to an imaginary time before the intrusions of 
16  On Boccaccio’s use of the pastoral as compared to Dante’s and Petrarch’s, see Smarr and Padoan.
275
culture and empire had complicated life.  The objects populating the environment, rather, 
seemed to occur in a spontaneous network of harmonious interaction; the subsistence 
desires of humans, animals, plants and all manner of living creatures operated within a 
closed, self-sustaining pattern, each object within the landscape providing and requiring 
some feature of its fellows. Each being found its form within the context of the other 
beings inhabiting the landscape, all of whom operated according to an only partially 
conscious sequence of desire and satiety.  Boccaccio explicitly comments on this feature 
of pastoralism in the debate between the shepherds: there, two shepherds—Achaten and 
Alcesto—argue about whose methods of shepherding are the most sensible.  Achaten 
pastures his flock in the open fields where they can easily find food, but where they are 
also prey to wolves; his sheep, as Alcesto argues and Achaten tacitly admits, tend to be 
fat, lazy and sickly as a result of this easy life.  Achaten, however, is unconcerned with 
the physical state of his sheep—a true entrepreneur, he only points to the vast quantity of 
his herd as the aim of shepherding. As he describes their subsistence, “come le piace 
ognuna ha di sé cura,/ vicine a molti rivi, che correndo dintorno vanno a loro, ove la sete 
spenta, poi la vanno raccendendo” [each one cares for itself just as it pleases near the 
many rivers which run around them, and when their thirst is spent, then they go off to 
reignite it] (937). Alcesto, by contrast, pastures his sheep in the hilly country surrounding 
the fields; both his life and the life of his sheep is harder as a result of the terrain they 
must navigate—he must actively force them up the slopes with his crook and be more 
careful in seeking out places offering good provender.  His flock tends to be small as a 
result, but his sheep also tend to be hardy due to the physical strain of the landscape.  
They are also not prone to being eaten by wolves.
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There’s a sort of proto-Darwinism at work in the debate between the shepherds—
Alcesto actively shapes the genetic destiny of his sheep by placing them in more 
demanding environments, while Achaten’s lasseiz faire shepherding subjects his sheep to 
the more random depredations of wolves and the general fat that plenty brings.  As 
Achaten himself argues, the desires of his sheep are easily evoked and sated on the 
abundant plains—his sheep casually cycle between thirst and fulfillment with scarcely an 
interval between the two; one would imagine the same holds true of the wolves, who sup 
on the sheep easily and often. Alcesto’s sheep, by contrast, are subject to more 
demanding conditions; their desires—for rest, food, water and the like—are evoked by 
their treacherous movement through the hills, but they are not so easily sated.  Rather, 
they must engage more thoroughly with the landscape to maintain their subsistence. 
Alcesto’s form of husbandry knits the animals and himself more intricately into the 
landscape that birthed the animal, and as a result his sheep are somehow more real—
more ontologically stable—than Achaten’s; Achaten’s sheep become subject to the 
entropic forces of disease and predators which dissolve the sheep’s identification as a 
discrete being. Of course, disease and depredation are also elements of any ecology—
they shape the form of an animal as much as any other force—but in this case, these 
forces don’t seem to shape the form of the sheep, only to entropically prey upon a 
degraded version of an unrealized form. Even when they appear in the fields, their fat, 
diseased state anticipates their dissolution: it is only by dint of numerical magnification 
that Achaten’s perversion of the sheep can be sustained.  The nymphs unanimously 
approve of Alcesto’s practices and quickly quiet Achaten’s protests.  In valuing Alcesto’s 
shepherding, Boccaccio defines the pastoral landscape as one where intense physical 
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exertion and interaction defines a collective ontology wherein stable objects delimited by 
a total ecology can appear.  The broadly defined Cupid of the opening reigns over the 
dialectic of intense desire and satiety that characterizes this landscape wherein objects 
summon one another into being.  The pastoral landscape of the Ameto is a perceptual 
weave in which sensory experience structures the ontology of the objects inhabiting that 
landscape; they persist within a harmonious matrix that, even if it is not easy, summons 
malleable matter into distinct forms.
Prior to the shepherds’ debate, Ameto emerges out of this landscape—specifically 
located in Etruria, the same region in which the Decameron will take place—not as a 
shepherd, but as a hunter; his initial depiction characterizes him as a perfect exemplar of 
the hunter, skilled in all the practices of the chase and always carrying game home from 
the abundant landscape he inhabits.  At first, the predatory connotations of hunting would
seem in conflict with the pastoral landscape; but the Proem’s invocation of Cupid has 
recast the cardinal tool Ameto uses—the bow and arrow—as an implement of desire.  
Even at this early point in the allegory, Ameto is conceptualized as a type of Cupid who 
fails to comprehend his own significance; yet he still responds to the world he appears in 
with a sort of uncomprehending reverence. As Boccaccio describes his appearance, 
Era di piacevoli seni e d’ombre graziose la selva piena, di animali veloci, 
fierissimi e paurosi; e in più parti di sé abbondanti fontane rigavano le 
fresche erbette.  In questa selva sovente Ameto, vagabondo giovane, i 
fauni e le driadi, abitatrici del luogo, solea visitare; ed egli, forse dagli 
vicini monti avuta antica origine, quasi da carnalità costretto, di ciò 
avendo memoria, con pietosi affetti li onorava tavolta, perché egli, 
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favoreggiato da loro, le timide bestie per li nascosi luoghi del monte, 
mentre sopra la terra dimorava Appollo, con sollicito passo furibondo 
seguia; e rade erano quelle, che ‘l suo occhio scorgesse, che per velocità di
corso o per volgimenti sagaci, o che dal suo arco no fossero ferite o da’ 
cani ritenute o ultimamente vinte dalle sue insidie e nelle sue reti 
incappate, in breve da lui si trovassero aggiunte: per la qual cosa di preda 
carico tornava sovente alle sue case. (909-10)
[The wood was full of pleasant glades and gracious shade, of swift 
animals most proud and fearsome; and in many parts of it abounding 
fountains drew lines in the fresh grasses.  In this wood Ameto, the 
vagabond youth, would often visit the fauns and the dryads—the 
inhabitants of the place; and he, who perhaps had his ancient origin from 
the nearby mountains, having memory of it as if compelled by carnality 
and, sometimes honored them with pious tenderness, so that he, favored 
by them, would pursue the timid beasts through the concealed places of 
the mountain with eager and furious step while Apollo dwelt above the 
earth; and few were the beasts his eye detected which, either through 
running speed or wise turning, would not be wounded by his bow, or held 
by his dogs or ultimately defeated by his snares and caught in his nets, that
were not quickly caught by him: for which reason he often returned to his 
house laden with prey.]
As he introduces us to Ameto, Boccaccio figures him as a type of Apollo, whose hunting 
has more destructive connotations; however, the mention of his keen eyes anticipates the 
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use he will make of vision once he sees Lia—his predatory vision will be turned toward 
the object of his affections who will, in turn, refract that consuming vision back onto him,
intensifying it in the process.  Prior to his encounter with Lia, Ameto is solely predatory; 
his hunting knits him into the landscape—few activities require the sort of sensory 
acumen that hunting does—and it elicits desires—hunger, bloodlust—but his arrows kill 
their targets where Cupid’s inspirit them with a manic desire.  Uncomprehending of love, 
Ameto understands his desires as one-directional: the arrow of his desire has a target, but 
that target is not capable of reciprocating that desire and so redoubling it in the hunter 
himself.  The objects that Ameto desires can only flee at his coming, as Apollo’s own 
nymph, Daphne, flees from his relentless onslaught; but one way or another, they will be 
subjected to the desire they avoid and, in doing so, they will manifest the being and 
personality of Ameto within the destruction of their bodies.  Hunting is the matrix 
through which Ameto, initially, interacts with his environment.
Perhaps even more interesting in this introduction to Ameto is its subtle reference 
to Dante; the “selva” that forms the perceptual matrix from which Ameto seems to 
spontaneously arise is characterized by its materiality, as the natural deities that inhabit 
the place and the reference to Ameto’s “carnalità” indicate.  Moreover, the wood is 
dappled with “ombre graziose;” these details collectively associate the passage with 
Dante’s wandering through the “selva oscura” at the beginning of the Inferno.  As has 
long been noted, Dante’s term “selva” is related to the term “silva,” the Latin term that 
translates the Greek “hyle,” or matter.17 In Dante’s allegory, the selva oscura acts as a 
non-allegorical space; it is the material world Dante inhabits before his initial summons, 
17  Landino’s commentary on the Comedy is the first text to note this association; for a modern critical 
application of the concept, see Hallock.
280
one which—even if it is pregnant with symbolism—Dante is unable to read.  The selva 
oscura is an allegory of its own uninterpretability.  Dante is trapped in this materialistic 
worldview by the death of Beatrice’s physical body; only when her spirit summons him 
can he begin the long interpretive trek back to her.  Boccaccio also begins his text in a 
dark, deeply material forest, but unlike Dante he does not code this locale as negative; the
pastoral impulses of the poem precariously cross its Dantean references, validating the 
simple primitivity of Ameto.  Most criticism of the Ameto and the figure of Ameto in 
particular focus on his movement from a primitive “bestiality” to a Christianized 
“humanity” at the end of the allegory,18 but that limited trajectory runs contrary to the 
pastoral impulses we can note here.  The unprepossessing engagement of Ameto with the 
natural world results in an uncluttered ontology—Ameto is birthed spontaneously from 
the plenty of the wood that surrounds him.  He even yields a primitive sort of reverence 
to the local deities of the place, not for any theological insight they might offer, but for 
his simple cousinship with the place that summoned him into being.  Even if, for a 
Christian audience, these might be the wrong gods, the reverence they inspire in Ameto is
not reproved here, and even seems to be validated; and ultimately, even the rarefied 
Christian God that intrudes at the culmination of the allegory is crossed with the image of
the local, cultic goddess Aphrodite.  The terror of Dante’s uninterpretable matter 
becomes, for Boccaccio, a precondition of our appearance in the world; the basic sensory 
engagement of Ameto in the pastoral landscape is what defines the contours of his being
—the physical contact of hunting is what has shaped both his own body and the bodies of
his prey. While the selva admits a number of allegorical interpretations—in fact, reading 
it as a symbol of uninterpretable materiality is itself allegorical—Ameto’s initial 
18  For a contemporary reading of the Ameto that views its allegory as authentic, see Poole.
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engagement with it is not interpretive but simply perceptual, and this is not a feature of 
the forest that the narrative censures. Ameto is not so much rendered bestial as all human 
beings are rendered up to the material conditions that structure their being.
Boccaccio draws attention to this renovated materialism in describing one of 
Ameto’s curious customs shortly after the passage just cited.  After a particularly rigorous
hunt, Ameto “alle soavi aure aperse il ruvido seno; e, cacciatisi dal viso i sucidi sudori 
con la rozza mano, l’arida bocca rinfrescò con l’umide frondi delle verdi piante; e 
ricreato alquanto, colli suoi cani, ora l’uno ora l’altro chiamando, cominciò a ruzzare” 
(910) [opened his coarse chest to the sweet air; and, chasing away the dirty sweat from 
his face with a rough hand, he refreshed his arid mouth with the moist leaves of the green
plants; and having rested somewhat with his dogs, calling first one then another, he began
to romp.] The sumptuousness of the description again seems to provisionally validate the 
primitivity of Ameto—we see here a spontaneous conjuration of desire born of Ameto’s 
hunting that now results in a very pleasant seeming rest.  Boccaccio characterizes that 
rest as a re-creation, a bodily rejuventation brought on by a new set of physical 
interactions with the landscape surrounding him.  Yet Ameto moves fluidly from one set 
of desires into another; as soon as he is re-created, he arbitrarily wishes to play roughly 
with his dogs.  Boccaccio goes on to describe this play for some time, detailing how their 
playful tearing of his clothes inspires an angry energy in Ameto.  Ameto’s romping again 
underscores his relational physicality; his being within the landscape is formed from a 
series of tangible relationships that flow seamlessly from one to the other.  Even in his 
play, Ameto evokes the same sort of energies within himself as when he works at his 
hunting; he is a purely material being, and his materiality arises through the diverse forms
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of physical contact he engages in and feels in a level of detail Boccaccio’s description can
only approximate.
Though we can hardly call Ameto bestial, he does possess that pristine primitivity 
endemic to the pastoral.  Boccaccio’s real challenge in the poem is to wed the ease and 
simplicity of that unconscious primitivity with the interpretive self-awareness of allegory.
He wants to retain the simple materiality of Ameto and the world he inhabits, but he also 
wants to render that materiality profound both to his own character and his audience.  For
this, he deploys the same essential tactic as Dante: tangible love, the most perfect 
expression of the perceptual ontology implicit in the world surrounding Ameto.  As 
Ameto romps with his dogs, he hears an otherworldly music from deep within the forest; 
he recognizes the song as divine, speculating that only goddesses could make such a 
sound.  The divinity of the singers manifests itself in an intensification of the 
environment: Ameto says that “i boschi più pieni d’animali si sono dati che non soleano e
Febo più chiari n’ha pòrti i raggi suoi, e l’aure più soavemente m’hanno le fatiche levate 
e l’erbe e i fiori, in quantità grandissima cresciuti più  che l’usato testimoniano la loro 
venuta” [the woods were given a greater plenitude of animals than usual and Phoebus 
offered brighter rays, and the breezes, more softly, have taken away cares from me and 
the grass and the flowers, grown in greater quantity than usual, attest to their arrival] 
(910).  Certainly those who sing this song are Cupid’s creatures; they inspire the same 
ontological intensification of the pastoral landscape that the narrator associated with the 
God of desire in the Proem. Like the song of Beatrice, their song seems to simply inspire 
a deeper fullness of being in the world in which it unfolds and to which it refers; the 
simple multiplication of animal and plant life testifies to this, but Boccaccio inflects that 
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multiplication, first by the use of sun imagery, and second by his casual slip into a 
Christian religious register.  In the first case, not only are there more perceptible objects 
in the world as a result of the divine song, but they somehow become more visible; the 
light of Phoebus—characterized as a sort of visual medium here—is simply brighter and 
clearer, objects within it becoming more perceptible.  These tangible effects act as 
testimonies to the divinity of the singers.  Ameto’s simple habitation of the pastoral world
inspired a sort of prevenient worship of satyrs and dryads, but the song and its attendant 
intensification of the environment become proper objects of worship; as such, the song 
here already foreshadows the conclusion of the allegory that Ameto can only dimly and 
unwittingly sense here.
The beauty of the song is such that Ameto must see its singer; indeed, sight is the 
operative sense, for the desire inspired by the song is quite explicitly drawn as a visual 
one.  As Ameto characterizes it, “Io non ne vidi mai alcuno; e, disideroso di vederli, se 
così sono bella cosa come si dice, ora li andrò a vedere, il sole guidante i passi miei” [I 
have never seen any god; and, desirous to see them, if they are such a beautiful thing as is
said, I will go now to see them, the sun guiding my steps” (911).  Lest there be any doubt 
of the physicality of the goddesses, Boccaccio refers to them three times as visible 
bodies.  In one sense, Ameto’s insistence on the visibility of the goddesses is a 
consequence of his crass materiality.  As a creature fashioned from a distinctly visible 
world, Ameto can only conceptualize the divine as visible.  But in this case, Ameto is 
actually correct, though for all the wrong reasons; as was the case for Dante in a 
somewhat more qualified sense, the principal way human beings experience the divine is 
through sensory experience.  The Dantean reference is clarified by the final image of the 
284
sun guiding Ameto’s footsteps—particularly in Purgatory, the sun is an important symbol 
of the divine realm, and footsteps are a recurrent symbol of Dante’s journey throughout 
the Comedy.  The rumors of divine beauty Ameto has heard will prove true in a way he 
cannot possibly envision before experiencing it; feminine beauty will renovate his 
experience of the sensible world he  has only half-consciously and habitually inhabited 
up to this point.  The beauty of the nymphs will disclose the supplemental dimensions of 
being of which Ameto has been hitherto unaware; it will enmesh him in a new perceptual 
matrix that does not end with the destruction of its object, but the progressive 
intensification of it.
Again like Dante, Boccaccio registers a sense of foreboding at the way he has 
conceptualized his project—this project of rendering the divine visible entails a deep 
threat of transgression.  The threat is even greater for Ameto, since he encounters divine 
being directly before he has had any instruction; Dante had his journey through Hell and 
Purgatory—as well as Vergil—to prepare him for the task of spatializing Paradise, but 
Ameto lacks all such resources.  For this reason, he is simply stupefied when he sees the 
nymphs for the first time.  Ameto again relies on unwitting acts of worship rather than the
theological rationalizations of the Comedy: “ne più tosto le vide che, loro dee stimando, 
indietro timido ritratto, s’inginocchiò e, stupefatto, che dir si dovesse non conosca” [no 
sooner did he see them but, judging them goddesses, he retreated timidly and knelt down,
stupefied, such that he did not know what he should say] (911).  The longed for sight of 
the nymphs outstrips all of Ameto’s expectations; upon seeing them, he immediately 
registers his presumption in seeking them out and resorts to worship.  He falls into a sort 
of humble, ineffable prayer; Ameto’s own ignorance becomes the means by which he 
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overcomes his own presumption.  Whereas for Dante, the ineffability topoi of Paradise 1 
require the massive theological mechanics of the prior two books, Ameto falls into them 
unwittingly as he does everything else.  The experience of the nymphs themselves 
supplies its own appropriate response.  Understanding his hubris, Ameto attempts to 
withdraw, but the nymphs’ own dogs prevent his retreat.  Deploying an Ovidian reference
we might not have thought him capable of, Ameto likens himself to Actaeon, the hunter 
who witnessed Diana bathing and so was transformed into a hart and torn apart by his 
own dogs.  Like Apollo in the contest with Marsyas, Diana resents being rendered visible,
being denuded by the eyes of Actaeon in such a way as to disclose her flesh.  And like 
Marsyas, Actaeon has his own fleshliness imposed on himself viscerally as the dogs tear 
him apart.  But the nymphs are unlike Diana—rather, they silence their dogs and console 
Ameto, welcoming him into their fellowship.  The nymphs, in fact, revel in their own 
visibility—Ameto’s hubris is principally overcome by the divine’s own celebration of its 
tangibility than by any act of reverence on Ameto’s part.
Within the group, Ameto is able to more clearly hear the song that compelled him 
to see the nymphs.  The song is sung by Lia, who recounts the tale of her violent birth to 
the group: as she tells it, her father was the river Cephissus, who fell in love with the 
nymph Liriop.  Liriop did not reciprocate  his love, but Cephissus, with startlingly little 
attempt at courtship, “co’ suoi ravvolgimenti vinse e prese/ con nuova e disusata 
maestria,/ e sì per lei di Venere s’accese/ che, totale la sua virginitate,/ non valendole 
prieghi nè difese,/ m’ingenerò, la quale tante fiate,/ quante io veggio onde, tante son 
costretta/ di mio padre onorar la deitate;/ avvegna che ciò ch’in esse riguardando/ mi 
rendon la mia forma leggiadretta” [overcame her in his twists and turns and seized/  her 
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with new and seldom used mastery,/ and he was so enflamed with Venus for her that, 
taking all her virginity,/ her begging and defenses availing her nothing,/ he conceived me,
so that every time I see waves, I am constrained to honor the deity of my father;/ it since 
happens that looking in them they return to me my graceful form] (912).  Perhaps the 
most startling fact of this narrative is that Lia doesn’t seem to resent the fact that she was 
a product of rape—she doesn’t even really register that she could be resentful.  If 
anything, the fault seems to lie with her mother for resisting her father—Cephissus 
correctly perceived her beauty and so naturally gravitated toward it.  Cephissus’s 
conquest of Liriop is tacitly celebrated in the mildly incestuous honor Lia offers to the 
waters; unlike her mother, when Lia looks at the waters she perceives her own beauty—
significantly through the tempestuous motion of the stream—and thereby becomes 
complicit with her father’s erotic attachment to her mother.  She sees herself in the way 
Cephissus saw Liriop and so recognizes a sort of perverse justice in rape—to withhold 
beauty from the sensory experience of its admirers is a deeper sin  than seizing it against 
the beautiful being’s will in the world the Ameto constructs.  Such a refusal defies the 
erotic texture that summons everything into being within that world; while Cephissus’s 
rape is rationalized, Liriop’s attempt to withdraw from him is not—she simply attempts to
refuse the erotic energies with which she is herself infused.  As a result, she is forcibly 
reintegrated into that texture—within this world, everything takes part in the erotic play 
that discloses the sensory quality of the objects and subjects occupying it; if they fail to 
do so willingly, they are destined to be forcibly reintegrated into that play as mute objects
of another’s erotic fancy rather than as willing participants in it.
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We should note that the violence within the story of Lia’s lineage contrasts 
jarringly with the beauty Ameto finds in the song.  Nowhere in the poem does the 
inherent metrical  beauty of Dante’s terza rima feel so out of place as it does when it 
describes the scene of Lia’s conception.  Now, the beauty Ameto finds in Lia’s song could
be a consequence of the masculine wish fulfillment it entails—Lia becomes complicit 
with her father’s violence, and so gives sanction to all unmeasured masculine desire.  
However there are clues, which we will explore shortly, that Ameto doesn’t really register
the deep complicity her tale involves; he doesn’t really seem to register much of her story
at all.  Rather, Ameto’s experience of the song as beautiful implies that he doesn’t really 
imagine what its words represent; he enjoys the sound that Lia makes while singing, 
enjoys watching her mouth make the song’s sounds, but becomes so engrossed in the 
present situation that he can’t devote any attention to much else.  This disjunction 
between form and representation is Boccaccio’s first deployment of the linguistic 
structure of the frame narrative; for Ameto, the language of this framed poem is first and 
foremost a material manifestation of Lia’s beauty.  Only at the end of the poem—when 
the Divine Venus is revealed—does Ameto register that he has attended to her song here.  
His distractedness participates in Lia’s veneration of herself—it proves that she could say
virtually anything and still captivate Ameto with the music of how she has said it.
Of course, the danger of Lia’s reflective self-worship is that it could conceivably 
become self contained—it is in this sense that she is both the literal and metaphorical 
sister of Narcissus.  Both were born of the same act of violence, as she goes on to 
describe in her narrative; but where Narcissus becomes the sole, fetishized target of his 
own erotic gaze, Lia, in admiring herself, actually offers herself to others.  Her veneration
288
of her own beauty entails a realization that it should be available to others who share in 
that veneration.  Lia thus announces herself as available to her admirers in a way that 
likely would have disturbed Boccaccio’s medieval audience: 
Chiunque fia per sua virtù colui
che degnerà al mio bel viso aprire
gli occhi del core e ritenermi in lui,
io gli farò quel diletto sentire
che più suol essere agli amanti caro
dopo l’acceso e suo forte disire.
Nè per me sentirà mai nullo amaro
tempo chi con saver la mia bellezza
seguiterà come già seguitaro
color li qua’, dopo lunga lassezza,
lieti posai appresso i loro effetti
nel ben felice della somma altezza. (913)
[whoever it is who through his power will deign to open the eyes of his 
heart to my beautiful face and to contain me in it, I will make him feel that
delight which is most dear to lovers after its kindling and its powerful 
desire.  Nor will he ever feel any bitter time on account of me who with 
wisdom will pursue my beauty as those who have already pursued it and, 
after a long period, afterward I placed their contented effects in the happy 
good of sublime fulfillment.]
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Lia explicitly makes herself sexually available to Ameto in this passage; what is more, 
she also states that she has made herself available to others in the past—she refuses to 
make her love exclusive to one man, but welcomes all who will pursue her with “saver” 
to her delights. The allegory will eventually attempt to tame the implications of Lia’s 
speech here—after the revelation of the divine Venus, the narrator tells us that “con vista 
serene conosce l’udita prima canzone della sua Lia [with serene vision he understood the 
first song heard of his Lia] (1051).  As a type of the active life,19 this allegorization 
suggests that Lia’s sexual freedom was only a cloaked metaphor of a neutered vision of 
grace.  Like Dante, Ameto’s vision is rarefied until he sees sexuality as a metaphor for the
universal duration that inheres in all physical objects.  But this allegorization ultimately 
fails to satisfy the explicit sexuality of Lia’s first song, nor does it answer that song’s 
complicity with her father’s rape of her mother. Lia’s generation from a literal act of rape 
is hard to square with any allegory the end of the frame might expound—the Christian 
type of active love is supposed to emerge from an act of lust by a divine being unable to 
control himself with his reason; Lia’s complicity with that love suggests that Christian 
love has to condone unbridled lust or to convert it in an allegory so rarefied it would 
vitiate its own symbolic mode.  The allegory attempts to purify the sexual connotations of
the song, but ultimately the song contaminates the allegory more than the allegory 
purifies the song.  The allegorical generalization of grace applied by Dante to the 
universe is reimagined—to put it in the tasteless terms Boccaccio demands here—as a 
sort of celestial orgy wherein many lovers are allowed to enjoy the full, sumptuous 
19  The biblical characters Rachel and Leah were types, respectively, of the contemplative and active lives 
of clergymen.  This association stems from the story of Jacob in Genesis, in which Jacob works for his 
Uncle Laban for seven years in order to obtain Rachel as his wife.  On the night in which the marriage is 
consummated, Laban substitutes Rachel’s older sister Leah; Jacob only discovers the duplicity in the 
morning, and must subsequently work seven more years to finally obtain Rachel.
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charms of a single beloved.  The bitterness and continually reimposed distance that acts 
as the engine of medieval romance is effaced by Lia’s explicit promise—the lover need 
not experience the dithering self-doubt that sustains romance.  Lia offers herself up for 
total perceptual contact; as in the pastoral space she inhabits, perceptual contact is what 
defines the ontology of both lover and beloved, and so Lia freely makes her surfaces 
available for mutual perception—as she says, she makes fully sensible what the vision of 
her beauty only implies.
Lia thus reimagines love as a sort of reciprocal narcissism: where Narcissus 
appreciated his own beauty only through the uninspirited mirror of the river, Lia 
appreciates her beauty in the mirror of her lovers’ eyes.  Those eyes recall her father’s 
overmastering lust in the phrase “ritenermi in lui;” the preposition “in” imagines the sort 
of drowning containment within the lover’s heart to which Cephissus subjected Liriop.  
The eyes of Lia’s lovers are the mirrors that recall her liquid father; but unlike the placid 
waters in which Narcissus perceives himself, Lia perceives those eyes first as the media 
of desire before seeing her own reflection in them.  She perceives those eyes perceiving 
her, and within the desire she witnesses there, her own desire is redoubled.  The result is a
complex matrix of desire that Boccacio’s pastoral world could only tepidly shadow forth: 
Lia desires herself through others and thereby desires the other as well; the other desires 
Lia desiring herself through their eyes, and so desires his own desire.  Both Lia and her 
lovers are mirrors that intensify the eros that constantly circulates between them.  Where 
traditionally medieval romance conceived of consummation as the end of this process of 
circulation, Lia reconceptualizes it as the beginning; the beloved is not exhausted in the 
sex act—she is not fully used and experienced such that she loses the engrossing novelty 
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that characterized her; rather, sexual contact intensifies this mutual gaze, allowing 
perception to pass across more surfaces and so progressively disclose the bodies of both 
lover and beloved. This sort of complete perceptual contact, to Lia’s mind, was best 
imagined in her father’s total containment of her mother—disturbingly, his liquidity 
would have allowed him to become a complete negative of her body, all its nooks and 
crevices included. But even as those bodies are disclosed, rendering them progressively 
more known to one another, the limitations of perception itself are also disclosed—in 
perceiving more of the beloved, we come to understand our prior acts of perception as 
somehow deficient, and so suspect that our current ones are similarly deficient.  As in 
Dante, perception becomes the asymptote approaching the complete and infinite presence
of the beloved; but whereas in Dante the lover’s gaze must ultimately turn toward God at 
the limit point of that asymptote, Boccaccio’s and Ameto’s gaze will remain fixed on 
lovely female figures.
Thus, in addition to being a beautiful target of male affections, Lia becomes 
herself an agent of those affections; she bends the gender roles of the love situation by 
really becoming the aggressor trying to spur Ameto into a Romantic encounter.20  Lia can 
do this because she sees herself as a man sees her—Boccaccio suggests that Dante’s 
perception of grace must be cast upon the self first in a consummate act of narcissism that
structures all other perceptions of grace. The other becomes engrossing because we are 
first engrossing to ourselves; this mutual attachment that progressively reveals the grace 
of the beloved is what knits us into the perceptual matrix in which we become more fully 
20  In the terms of Madeline Caviness’s Visualizing Women in the Middle Ages, Lia turns a masculine 
“scopic economy” back onto Ameto—in becoming complicit with the male objectifying gaze, she 
challenges Ameto’s failure to readily deploy it.  But where in Caviness’s work, as in so many feminist 
readings, objectification can only be understood as a negative, patriarchal act, the Ameto demonstrates how 
both objectification of the other and the self is a precondition of perception.
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what we are; it defines the subject position from which we can effect perception of the 
other. While Lia occupies the traditionally male perspective, Ameto himself is relegated 
to a more feminized position—as though completely missing the literal import of her 
song, he dithers endlessly about whether or not he is worthy to pursue her.  Lia is a mirror
for Ameto, but in her beauty Ameto is only able to perceive the unworthiness of his own 
crude appearance; he reimposes the distance from the beloved that structures Romance 
despite the fact that Lia has just collapsed that same distance.  That distance structures the
space in which Ameto becomes self-aware of the dynamics of love; he intuitively 
understands that his own desire finds a paradoxical rest and intensification in Lia’s eyes 
as they watch him watching her: though new to matters of love, Ameto 
già conosce il suo disio dagli occhi di colei ricevere alcun conforto.  Per la
qual cosa, più e più fiso mirandoli, credendosi forse porre fine a quello col
riguardarla, più forte gli apparecchia principio e più  l’alluma; e non 
sappiendo come, bevendo con gli occhi il non conosciuto fuoco, s’accende
tutto.  E, sì come la fiamma si suole nella superficie delle cose unte con 
subito movimento gittare e, quelle leccando, lecate fuggire e poi tornare, 
così Ameto, colei rimirando, s’affuoca; e, come da lei gli occhi toglie, 
fugge la nuova fiamma; ma, per lo subito più mirare, torna più fiera. (915)
[already understands that his desire receives some comfort from her eyes.  
So that gazing at them more and more fixedly, he thinks perhaps to put an 
end to his desire by looking at her, though the more strongly the source of 
his desire nears him the more it inflames him; and not knowing how, 
drinking with his eyes the unknown fire, he ignites entirely.  And, as a 
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flame rushes along the surfaces of oily things with rapid movement, 
licking them, and having licked them, flees and then turns back again, just 
so Ameto, watching her again, is set aflame; and, when he removes his 
eyes, the new flame flees; but, looking again immediately, it returns more 
fierce.]
The operative word in this passage is “più”; by staring at Lia’s eyes, Ameto’s own gaze 
undergoes a sort of agitated intensification that is only provoked when he temporarily and
furtively removes them from her.  Where Ameto looks for a final satisfaction in 
subjecting Lia to his gaze, he finds instead a deeper desire than that which prompted him 
to look in the first place.  Ameto’s initial gaze is predatory:in the medieval physiognomy 
of sight, the eyes shot rays that probed the contours of whatever they looked at, 
imprinting them in the memorial wax; these rays are much like the huntsman’s arrows, 
piercing a material object that they render inert, colonizing the object within the 
memory.21  But Apollo’s arrows are here replaced with Cupid’s, for Ameto sees Lia 
seeing him; it is this reciprocal sight that progressively ignites Ameto’s desire.  He sees in
Lia’s eyes not a target for his gaze, but a reflection of that gaze which constitutes Ameto 
as he has constituted the world around him through his particular angle of vision on it.  
Their vision of one another is a mutual act of self-constitution wherein both lover and 
beloved appear and are defined by the perceptual activity of the other.
Lia’s eyes are also another transparent reference to Dante, who was similarly 
obsessed with the eyes of Beatrice.  However, Beatrice’s eyes were forensic in a way that 
Lia’s aren’t; Dante’s interest in Beatrice’s eyes entailed a sort of masochism, since her 
21  On medieval theories of vision see the entry on Optics in Medieval Science Technology and Medicine: 
An Encyclopedia.  Most medieval thinkers ascribed to various theories of “extramission,” believing that the
eyes must emanate rays that contact the body being perceived in the outside world.
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penetrating perception violently denuded him in the Earthly Paradise.  While in Paradise 
proper those eyes turn to smiling, they never lose that forensic quality as Beatrice 
instructs Dante in his moral and philosophical shortcomings.  Lia’s spiritual predecessor 
is, rather, the Siren that Dante encountered in canto 19 of Purgatory.  As I have noted 
earlier, the Siren imagines Beatrice’s physical body, which Dante had fetishized in his 
early years; upon her death, that fetishization of her earthly flesh prevented him from 
prosecuting the sort of allegorization of her beauty that forms the philosophical backbone
of the Comedy.  When the Siren appears to Dante in a dream, she refers invariably back to
her own physical body; Lia’s reflective self-desire does much the same, using whatever 
mirrors are available to narcissistically celebrate her own beauty.  But where the Siren 
represented the consummate threat Dante had fallen into—the threat that, in essence, 
stranded him in the selva oscura in which he begins the poem—Lia’s self-reflexivity is 
the very essence of the material allegory Boccaccio attempts to prosecute.  He collapses 
the figure of Beatrice and the Siren; the poignancy of the material relationships that 
Beatrice forces Dante to disavow are the substance of what Lia has to offer Ameto; it is 
within the progressive unveiling of those bodies by constantly renewed acts of perception
that Ameto will discover the grace-bound object of his desire.
Or we should say, rather, objects, since Ameto’s love—like Lia’s—is far from 
exclusive, though each new love possesses its own poignant particularity.  While Ameto 
will return to Lia as the touchstone of his amorous education, he diverts the same 
attentiveness he has offered her onto each of the other nymphs as they come onto the 
scene.  The majority of the frame narrative is, in fact, devoted to long, painstaking 
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descriptions of the physical characteristics of all the nymphs.  One such description will 
suffice to demonstrate the larger trend:
E, poichè così ha detto, lasciando il tutto, a considerare le particularità di 
lei si rivolge…. E la non coperta fronte dalla ghirlanda di bella grandezza 
e di luce commenda; della quale nella estremità inferiore, di colore di 
matura uliva, quanto conviensi eminenti, sottili e partite, non diritte ma 
tonde due ciglia discerne, soprastanti a due occhi ne’ quali, quanta bellezza
dipinse natura già mai, tanta in quelli ne giudica Ameto, pensante, quando 
volessono, alle loro forze non potere resistere alcuno iddio; e se, con 
soavissimo moto verso di sé li vede levare, tanto, quanto a lui fissi sopra 
dimorano, gli pare gli ultimi termini della beatitudine somma toccare; 
credendo appena che altrove che in quelli paradiso si truovi; li quali 
neretti, soavi, lunghi, benigni e pieni di riso tanto a sé il tengono sospeso 
che le bellissime guance, nelle quali con bianchi gigli miste si dirieno 
vermiglie rose, il dilicato naso, a nessuna altro stato similie, e la vermiglia 
bocca con grazioso rilievo vermiglietta mostrandosi, e ciascuno per sé solo
potente a fare maravigliare ogni uomo che li mirasse, quasi nol muovono a
riguardarsi. (943)
[And, since he has said these things, leaving the whole, he turns to 
considering her particularities…. And he commended her forehead, 
uncovered by the garland, for its beautiful size and light; in its lowest 
extremity, the color of a ripe olive, he discerns two eyebrows agreeably 
high, thin and parted, not straight but rounded, placed above two eyes in 
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which Ameto judged was as much beauty as nature ever painted, thinking 
that, when they should will, no god could resist their forces; and if, with 
sweetest motion he sees her raise her eyes toward him, so long they stayed
fixed on him, he thinks he touches the ultimate end of the highest 
beatitude, scarcely believing that there is another place in which paradise 
is found; the eyes, black, sweet, long, benign and full of laughter hold him 
so suspended that the most beautiful cheeks, in which one would say white
lilies were mixed with scarlet roses, and the delicate nose, which was 
similar to no other, and the vermilion mouth showing itself in gracious 
crimson relief, and each in itself alone powerful enough to make any man 
marvel who gazed on them, almost did not move him to attend to them.]
The above passage represents only a fraction of the description of this particular nymph, 
and each nymph has a good deal of description devoted to her; the effect is a bit like 
Chaucer’s lists in the House of Fame—conceptually these descriptions have a number of 
interesting features, but artistically they are quite monotonous.  The monotony of the 
description, ironically, belies its purpose in the narrative: namely, to describe not only the 
nymphs themselves, but the engrossment Ameto feels at the sight of them.  After 
describing the general effect of her beauty, Ameto begins to anatomize it in an attempt to 
discover its essential grammar.  This movement itself is interesting—the intensification of
Ameto’s gaze has the effect of slowing the narrative to a crawl, placing the audience in 
the same position as Ameto as his perception of the nymph tries to approximate the grace 
within her, the temporal duration she makes manifest.22  The details of her appearance 
22  The shifting verb tenses of these descriptions also bears some comment: whereas much of the narrative 
in the Ameto uses the preterite to reflect occurrence in the past, these moments of intense feeling often shift 
into the present.  In a sense, they collapse the various narrative shells Boccaccio has erected between 
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pile on top of one another toward the end, crowding his ability to perceive and describe 
them; each new feature Ameto witnesses discloses his alarming near-failure to perceive it 
as a result of his engrossment in the last one.  Each feature is capable of an indefinite 
attention in and of itself; what is more, we can assume that each feature is divisible into 
sub-features that are equally worth of attention: the curve at the edges of the nymph’s 
smile, the plumpness of her upper left-hand lip, etc.  This progressive attention to the 
parts of the aggregate nymph are what push Ameto toward an experience of presence: the
fear of missing the poignancy of some feature terrifies Ameto into focusing his attention 
more perfectly on her existence through time.  That duration is again manifest in the 
“soavissimi moto” of her eyes being raised to perceive him; whereas Ameto’s description 
of the mutual gaze he experienced with Lia was fairly static, he has begun to dwell more 
on the aesthetics of motion. 
As such, his gaze shifts into an artistic and religious register here; whereas in 
earlier portraits Ameto dwelt more on simple physical description, here he assesses the 
composition of the nymph’s face as a sort of natural painting.  In the same movement, he 
also describes his perception of her in terms of ecstatic, religious adoration; Ameto’s 
rather bombastic rhetoric here far outstrips any rhetoric Dante applied to Beatrice and it 
further contaminates the poem’s ultimate allegory: while Ameto’s perception of the 
nymph is, in one sense, a failure to imagine true beatitude, he nonetheless establishes his 
lustful, materialistic perception as a form of ecstasy in opposition to the bloodless 
religious ecstasy of the poem’s ending.  Before Ameto has acquired a religious 
understanding of the significance of his own story, he already begins to shift into a 
himself, his narrator, Ameto and the reader; his intense descriptions place all perceivers in the same 
temporal moment that Ameto himself occupies.
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religious register; but instead of foreshadowing the allegory, it suggests that the purpose 
of the narrative is already being fulfilled, that ecstasy is already being achieved without 
the help of any deus ex machina or ex caelo.  Ameto makes this explicit with the 
seemingly unnecessary contrasts he draws—no “other” paradise could compare to this 
one, its beatitude being the “summa” of all possible beatitudes.  Ameto’s perception of 
the nymphs—which his secondary description can only approximate, just as that 
perception itself can only approximate the actual ontological reality of the nymph—
already succeeds in bringing him to a much more concrete revelation than the allegory 
could ever provide.  It enmeshes him within a perceptual web in which he, like Dante, 
gets to witness the grace in which objects persist and are constituted from perfect 
presence; but unlike Dante, Ameto gets to witness objects persisting in time; he retains 
the partiality and intentionality of vision through which he himself appeared.  Like 
Dante’s vision, Ameto’s is intensified, but it is not thereby rarefied or abstracted such that
it is only fit for peering into an infinite, obscure deity.
While his description of the nymphs distracts Ameto from the ultimate allegory he
is supposed to participate in, it also distracts him from the framed narratives of the 
nymphs (though after reading a fragment of that description, we might excuse Ameto for 
being otherwise occupied).  The two, really, are synonymous—like Lia’s initial song, 
each of the stories told by the nymphs supposedly possesses some didactic purpose which
ultimately leads Ameto to a proper understanding of love.  However, again like Lia’s 
song, Ameto continually fails to really attempt to interpret the nymphs’ tales; so, after 
Agapes’s tale, “Ritornato s’era Ameto a’ pensieri dolci; e in quelli, con non meno diletto 
che mirando le donne, si stava contento” [Ameto had returned to his sweet thoughts; and 
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in those, with no less delight than in seeing the ladies, he was content] (1008).  Ameto 
almost undoes the project of the allegory in his admiration of the bodies of the 
personifications; he is occupied by his own, self-reflective thoughts as his initial Lia 
would likely want him to be.  When he does return to the tale telling, he uses Agapes’s 
story only to express his fear that he will be abandoned by these particular ladies—he 
laments his fate that he was not present at Agapes’s wedding so that he could have 
married her instead of her aged husband.  Ameto’s response is a perversion of allegory—
he does reassemble the story by applying it to himself, but rather than taking a 
generalized lesson from it he vainly inserts himself into its particular circumstances.  
Even when Ameto imagines the narrative of the story, he still refers it back to his present 
circumstances, in the overmastering presence of these beautiful women.  His 
representational awareness is almost as superficial as his indolent distraction; the 
language of the nymphs can only be part of their particular aesthetic existence.  The grace
of the nymphs shears that language of its allegorical force and instead associates the 
tangibility of the signifier instituted by the frame with the temporal experience of grace.
This particularized grace is the real allegory of the Ameto: after all this ornate and 
intense machinery of desire, the final allegorization the text provides feels abrupt and 
deeply inadequate. After Lia tells the final tale, Ameto becomes agitated that the nymphs 
will soon depart.  In the midst of this fear, all look up at a strange battle ensuing in the 
sky between seven white swans and seven storks.  Ameto remains unable to interpret this 
celestial sign, so a pillar of fire descends from the heavens and begins speaking to the 
group in a soft voice.  While the battle of the birds remained within the symbolic lexicon 
of the Greek pastoral world, the intrusion of a patently Hebrew symbol of deity sits in an 
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incredibly uncomfortable relationship to it. For one, it is theologically untenable—the 
poem takes place in a mythological setting well before the birth of Christ and so salvation
would have been unavailable to its characters.  Only a choice few prophets from the 
Hebrew Bible were destined to be saved before Christ’s coming, and only because they 
exhibited great virtue and played a substantial part in salvation history.  Ameto has none 
of these qualities, and yet seems to receive a revelation beyond that which even Moses 
receives: the light reveals itself as the Trinity, which the Hebrew Bible never formulates 
(1046).  Moreover, it tells Ameto that “Chi di me parla, alle cose superne/ la mente 
avendo con intero core,/ spregiando il mondo e le cose moderne,/ ch’hanno potenzia di 
trarre in errore/ gli animi puri,/ io son sempre con loro,/ loro infiammando più” [For those
who speak of me, having  their minds on higher things with a whole heart, despising the 
world and modern things which have the power to draw pure minds into error, I am 
always with them, inflaming them ever more] (1047).  The injunction to despise the 
world here feels very odd considering the erotic web the rest of the poem has been at 
pains to draw, and with the deity’s reconceptualization as Venus; the rest of the poem has 
demonstrated that the world appears as the result of Cupidic desires shaping and 
disclosing beings to one another, but at the end, Venus herself instructs Ameto to turn 
away from such desires.  She promises to inflame him even more, but Ameto’s flames 
have been stoked all along by the description of material bodies and at this point we can 
hardly imagine how a disembodied trinity could occupy his attention more than the 
sensuous form of the nymphs or the pastoral space they inhabit, teeming as it does with 
life. Pairing this traditional contemptus mundi motif with an injunction against “moderne 
cose” is equally baffling—for the world Ameto inhabits, the stale patristic doctrine 
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expounded by the pillar of fire would be a modern thing.  In the Renaissance ideology 
Boccaccio eventually adopts in his own life, the ancientness of the pastoral is, in a sense 
modern; but Boccaccio’s God asks us to break from the internal logic of the poem for the 
sake of the tired Christian truisms which that God has to offer.
In the midst of his poem, Boccaccio has staged a Dantean ascension, but he has 
done so not to authentically recapitulate Dante’s doctrines, but rather to demonstrate a 
tension beneath the surface of the Comedy’s phenomenology. That he has Dante’s final 
ascension in mind is quite evident in the imagery he uses—Ameto’s deficient sight 
becomes progressively purified by gazing at a luminous divine being. Throughout the 
Comedy, Dante attempts to ally the sensuousness of the material world with the 
transcendence of the divine.  Boccaccio’s pastoral landscape has reproduced the sensuous
quality of the world so central to Dante’s vision; but Boccaccio makes the theological 
allegory of the poem seem shrill, intensifying the natural conclusions that Dante tries to 
deftly skirt.  The allegory is a profound non sequitur, missing the point of the poem 
entirely and trying to pretend that the reinterpretation it so jarringly enforces is somehow 
philosophically important. The foremost of these Dantean disjunctions is his 
abandonment of Beatrice in the upper reaches of Paradise; ultimately, Boccaccio 
demonstrates that, when Dante had to choose between his sensuous phenomenology and 
his immaterial allegory, he chose the allegory.  Though he retained a sensuous space and 
time within the Empyrean itself, in the final moment Dante turns to look upward at a sort 
of empty space.  He sees an incarnational body within the infinite reaches of that highest 
heaven, but it is ill-defined, hardly capable of manifesting the grace that his Beatrice does
down in her place in the divine congregation.
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Boccaccio’s God is similarly vague at first, being described as a “luminoso corpo,
vincente ogn’altra chiarezze” [luminous body, conquering any other brightness] (1047); 
but as the divine Venus, this God is also coded as feminine.  As Boccaccio’s vision 
becomes more capable of peering into her light, he sees not the insubstantial opposite of 
his earlier material description of the nymphs, but the greatest exemplar of the feminine 
beauty he began to examine earlier.  The highest divinity is a jiggly, broad-foreheaded 
Venus sparkling with a sort of divine jewelry like a solid gold dancer.  The light 
metaphor, which for Dante signalled the abstraction of deity as the precondition of 
visibility but not a visible object itself, here renders the Divine Venus more material.  
Where Dante turned from Beatrice to a vaguely defined divinity at the end of his journey,
Boccaccio looks through divinity back to his Lia and all the other nymphs that had been 
so poignant for him.  By transforming God into an embodied, feminine figure, Boccaccio 
has referred us back to the engrossment of the material world; the rhetoric of material 
abandonment cuts against this feminization of deity.  Boccaccio provokes the same crisis 
as Dante’s text, but Ameto’s eyes never swerve from the feminine form—deity becomes 
more a medium through which to perceive the grace of that tangible form.  While Ameto 
professes to love that form only intellectually after being transformed, the text itself 
offers few resources for understanding what an intellectualization of love could mean; 
Dante offers a similar intellectualization of love, but he spends the bulk of Paradise 
explaining what it means, how love implies theological truths, what it reveals about God 
and the world, etc.  The Ameto has excised the transitional space of Paradise; the erotics 
of his earlier love have not been eroded away by theological speculation and so the 
interpretive foothold they offer into the text remains more stable than the half-hearted 
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allegorization offered by the ending.  The God who reigns over that allegory herself feels 
like a part of the erotic texture introduced by Cupid in the beginning; she and Ameto 
constitute one another through their mutual perception of one another and as that 
perception becomes more and more engrossed in the physical quality of the bodies it 
roves over, it increasingly approximates the experience of time as a graceful duration in 
which both bodies move.  Boccaccio and Ameto will not turn away from those bodies at 
the last moment to contemplate their medium; rather they will gaze, along with whatever 
God might inhabit that medium, at the aesthetics of his creation, appreciating their 
infinitely generative complexity.
From Passion to Compassion in the Decameron
While eros is the essential precondition of the world’s appearance in the Ameto, 
the Decameron opens by showing the dissolution of ontological structures that occurs 
when that eros is withdrawn from the world.  Eros describes an inherently limited form of
perception; in becoming erotically attached to an object, we bring certain features of it to 
our present awareness, but, as Heidegger noted, in doing so we also render ourselves 
unaware of every other feature of the object—its total valence.  At the limit point of 
erotic attachment, we attempt to recuperate as many features of this fetishized object into 
the simultaneity of present awareness, but as Ameto’s eye discovered while roving over 
the bodies of the nymphs, perception must leave more unsensed than sensed.  This is not, 
as Heidegger suggests in his critique of presence, a lamentable condition; rather, it is the 
only way objects can organize themselves into objects and then appear in the world.  All 
ontological structures depend on objects perceiving the being of other objects in limited 
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ways; otherwise, they cannot contract into the habitual patterns of relation that organize 
progressively larger object systems.  The only way to bring the totality of the beloved 
into absolute simultaneity is to allegorize the grace inhering in her as Dante did; but in 
doing so, all of the additive particularity that perception originally sought to arrest, all at 
once, is abandoned by being abstracted.  For Boccaccio, Dante could only ever stare up at
God—his putative return to the world at the end of the Comedy is a sham.  Even if he 
moved through the world, all the objects persisting through it would only be transparent 
symbols of God’s presence, lacking any visibility and specificity of their own.  Boccaccio
insists that it is God, rather, that must become transparent so that, peering through the 
looking glass of grace, our senses can rove over the world along with God.
Boccaccio’s immature response to Dante’s phenomenology is to replace a supple 
Beatrice in the very Godhead itself.  But as he dwells more on Dante’s text, he realizes 
that the abandonment of Beatrice isn’t the only or even the cardinal sin Dante commits in 
allegorizing grace.  His offense refracts to every corner of creation; by democratizing 
Beatrice’s grace onto the entire creation, he undoes the limitations of erotic attachment 
which structure that creation.  By allegorizing the beauty of Beatrice, Dante found a way 
of apprehending the meaning of every part of her, of every minute gesture she makes as 
she persists through time, all at once; but in finally reaching the simultaneity that beauty 
always promised, Dante loses sight of that very beauty.  Every particular of the beautiful 
object can be interpreted in a single way, as can every component particular that 
structures the progressive organisms of the beautiful body.  Dante’s radical vision of 
beauty harrows every fiber of the material body of Beatrice, transmuting them into an 
infinite number of mirrors reflecting divine grace; but the mirror Beatrice can no longer 
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really appear, no longer act as Dante’s fetishized muse.  God becomes Dante’s muse, or 
rather the Love that narcissistically spirates through him without a discernible target 
beyond its own divine source.  Dante’s vision becomes a contagion that infects the entire 
cosmos, rendering up to every object and every component object its full grace.  The 
Dante who returns to the lived world must necessarily be left bereft of the rituals—the 
automatic habits of perception—that make the world cohere.
While Boccaccio will always admire Dante’s breathtaking allegorization of the 
world, he refuses to be swept away in it.  His mature response to the dangers of Dante’s 
vision is the plague of the Decameron; the plague represents a world that has been 
denuded of all its rituals, a world in which the progressive levels of material objects 
discover their radical being and so refuse the compacts that knit them into organisms.  
Boccaccio’s description of the plague indicates that he understood the nature of a cancer 
long before medical science: in a cancerous system, the component parts of an organism 
cease to function in their usual, habituated patterns with the other component parts of the 
body.  They become narcissistically autonomous, replicating their own experience 
uncontrollably; they perceive the materials around them in new ways not conducive to 
total, organismal health.  They swell into new and strange forms that the logic of the 
organism cannot anticipate and so it falls apart.  Its decay is the retraction of its 
component organisms to a prior scale of temporal organization—they become 
independent objects possessed of the radical being that their participation in the organism 
denied them, or at least bracketed.  In Boccaccio’s plague this decay moves in two 
directions:  first, the materials that compose bodies are reduced to primal matter in the 
Aristotelian sense; their component parts break down into independent objects whose 
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component parts similarly break down into independent objects on down the line of 
physical creation until they dissolve into a perfectly present nothingness.  Second, the 
social organisms that coalesce when autonomous human beings agree to perceive one 
another according to ritualized patterns begin to break down, reflecting the more 
elementary decomposition of matter; Boccaccio systematically describes the way in 
which the plague dissolves religious, legal and familial relationships.  None of these 
organismal institutions has the resources to interpret the plague or to counter it; the 
plague demonstrates the fallacy of the particular angle of vision they open upon the 
world, showing how the moral and behavioral patterns they authorize are temporary 
assemblages with no ultimate grounding in reality.  As a result, the members of these 
groups become themselves cancerous—they fend solely for themselves, realizing that the 
conventions which they believed structured their identities are really immaterial.  When 
those ritualized conditions break down, human beings become capable of doing anything,
perceiving the world in new and strange ways, but the consequence of this opening of 
vision is that the subject position from which they perceive is eradicated, being 
susceptible to the same opening up of radical being that afflicts the entire world.  
Boccaccio’s plague demonstrates that when the habituating bonds that limit perception 
are opened up and we see everything thrumming with its own strange music, the world 
ceases to be; if every fiber of the cosmos perceived every other fiber in the same way, 
they could never knit themselves together into any larger organism.
But before we dive fully into the dark waters of Boccaccio’s plague, we must 
begin where he begins: with the autobiographical self-depiction that positions him in 
relation to his text. At the poem’s outset, Boccaccio’s narrator announces a curious 
307
thematic that will govern the entire work: “Umana cosa è aver compassione agli afflitti” 
[It is a human thing to have compassion for the afflicted] (3).  As Teodolinda Barolini has
argued in her reading of the Decameron’s frame narrative, this line “signals its non-
transcendence… locating us in a rigorously secular context and defining its parameters” 
(521).  Against Dante’s claims to have found the transcendence inherent in the physical 
world, Boccaccio modestly opens his masterwork with his preoccupations over human 
things, the diverse afflictions to which people are subject.  As Barolini suggests, the 
compassion that Boccaccio introduces here is a master trope for the entire text; but in 
order to serve as a guiding principle for such a polyglot text, the scope of this virtue must 
be expanded considerably.  The tales which the members of the brigata will tell each have
their own topic, and they can hardly all be said to depict compassionate characters even 
in an oblique or cautionary sense;23 what is more, the plague describes a radical loss of 
compassion in the world, and the brigata’s abandonment of the city is, in some sense, a 
failure of compassion however much they might prevaricate about it.  
For Boccaccio, compassion is the literary virtue par excellence; it is the 
preeminently ethical faculty that allows us to invent and inhabit other perspectives within
a narrative. As a form of empathy, compassion is a reflection of our representational 
capacities, or perhaps a precursor to them—in exercising empathy, we inhabit the subject 
position of another person, we reconfigure the world of our own perception into the 
world of another's perception, replete with the significance they have attached to the 
23  Robin Kirkpatrick describes the way in which the Decameron seems to repel totalizing interpretive 
schema:  “At no point does Boccaccio offer or even seek the whole truth—which Dante is always confident
he can find—even about the phenomena that the author is most interested in.  Love, Nature, Fortune and 
Magnanimity are themes that are all proposed in the Decameron.  Yet none is ever brought to a final 
definition” (207).  Only a literary virtue like compassion can subsume the multiple thematics the frame 
brings to the fore.
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objects which afflict them.  It is precisely this virtue which allows a sequence of words on
a page to reassemble themselves into a character, invested not simply with the crass 
perspective of the person reading, but with her own animus, her own separate integrity as 
a subjective object perceiving a world that surrounds her.  Literary empathy activates that
subjectivity, inhabits it not to infect that subjectivity with the reader's own 
preoccupations, but to authentically experience the imagined subject's own 
preoccupations, its angles of vision, habitual object-relationships, etc.  Of course, the 
reader remains trapped, to some degree, within her own hermeneutic—as Boccaccio 
notes, compassion is primarily conferred when people “già hanno di conforto avuto 
mestiere, e hannol trovato in altrui” [have once had need of comfort and have found it in 
others] (3)—and that palimpsest of our own hermeneutic underlying our experience of 
the narrated subject's hermeneutic renders us aware of the constructedness of both. The 
detachment engendered by such awareness is, paradoxically, a precondition of empathy, 
since to attach true empathetic significance to the objects a narrated subject perceives we 
must first relativize our own perceptual hermeneutic; we must recognize that the 
significance we attach to objects differs from the way other people and things perceive 
those objects and certainly does not approach the ontology of the object as it is in itself, 
but only approximates a particular angle of vision. As we will see shortly, Boccaccio’s 
narrator possesses precisely such a detachment.  But though we remain trapped in our 
own hermeneutic, the twin movement of empathy—the initial detachment from our own 
perceptual angles of vision and our reattachment to other angles of vision—broadens that 
hermeneutic without allegorically effacing the objects perceived thereby; unlike the 
plague, empathy leaves its target’s preoccupations intact, along with all the unreasoned 
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rituals through which that target identifies herself. Fully realized, this empathetic 
awareness would result in the God-hermeneutic, the capacity to simultaneously witness 
the total valence of each object enmeshed in the ontological web on every scale of its 
organization, to inhabit those almost-infinite perspectives without collapsing them and 
yet remain detached from them.
Boccaccio’s narrator is uniquely capable of accomplishing this literary aim: he 
has himself  “dalla mia prima giovanezza infino a questo tempo oltre modo essendo 
accesso stato d’altissimo e nobile amore” [from my earliest youth until the present time 
been set aflame with a most high and noble love” (3) for a woman whom he significantly 
describes as rejecting him on account of her “crudeltà.”  This term reappears to describe 
the ravages of the plague once the narrator begins the frame; as Barolini goes on to note, 
"Crudele, the word contrasted with compassione throughout the plague description, 
signifies for Boccaccio a destructive autonomy, an inhuman desire to preserve the self at 
all costs" (522).  The Boccaccian narrator’s beloved is pictured as the diametric opposite 
of Lia from his earlier frame narrative; whereas Lia engaged freely in the love acts that 
defined both lover and beloved, the unnamed beloved of the Decameron—probably 
Fiammetta, if we take the narrator’s story to be autobiographical, as Boccaccio usually 
encourages us to do—refuses that relationship and also the demands of the barest 
compassion.  She is unable to even identify with the suffering she causes the narrator; 
like the plague, she is indifferent to human structures of feeling, occupying only her own 
subject perspective and so becoming cancerous.  Of course, in a sense she participates in 
a relationship structured by medieval discourses of courtly love; however Boccaccio is 
unusually unrelenting in decrying her pitilessness. The narrator’s response is to become 
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likewise cancerous in his passion: Boccaccio describes his love as being wholly without 
measure—it “a niuno convenevol termine mi lasciava contento stare” [will not let me rest
contented with any suitable goal] (3), but rather causes him a continual pain.  The love 
Boccaccio’s narrator describes bears some striking resemblances to both Ameto’s love 
and to Dante’s love for Beatrice, especially as it finds expression in the Vita Nuova; 
though Dante’s love differs in being thwarted by the death of his beloved rather than her 
willing refusal, it is similarly out of measure and threatens the paradoxical death of the 
lover.  In both texts, the desire that is supposed to summon the lover into a distinct 
identity threatens to erode the bodily basis of that desire; in perceiving his beloved, the 
lover should enter into the reciprocal self-identification that Ameto found in Lia, but the 
autonomy of her body—equally cruel in either death or willing acts—refuses the rituals 
of courtship.
As I have noted, Dante’s response to the unreceptivity of the beloved is allegory.  
Though Boccaccio clearly understood this tactic and his love is similarly consuming, he 
avoids it here. Rather, he tells us that the only thing that prevents his death is “i piacevoli 
ragionamenti d’alcuno amico e le sue laudevoli consolazioni” [the pleasant reasonings of 
some friend and his laudable consolations] (3). Boccaccio finds consolation in the 
compassion of friends who simultaneously identify with his state, but remain separate 
from it.24  Their reasoning is the reasoning of all literature—they empathetically identify 
with the afflictions of the subject, Boccaccio; they reconfigure the world, to an extent, to 
see it as he sees it with a cold Fiammetta at its center, but remain themselves and not 
24  Robert Hollander argues that Boccaccio’s friend here is an admittedly oblique reference to the “alcuno 
amico” in the Vita Nuova 23.6 who informs Dante of Beatrice’s death (101).  The phrase is surely common 
enough to make such an identification somewhat suspect; however, if Boccaccio is deliberate in this 
invocation of Dante’s text, it would be opportune: the diametric reversal of the role of the friend 
corresponds well with the ways in which Boccaccio responds to Dante’s vision of love in the text.
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Boccaccio; they remain detached enough to reason about the harm such an erotic 
attachment causes.  The Boccaccian narrator can, in his turn, inhabit their perspectives as 
they work to empathize with him. His narration indicates that it was not so much the 
content of their reasonings that he found helpful, but the good sentiment behind it and the
distraction it provided him from his consuming passion. He recognizes that other angles 
of vision onto his situation are limited—they can never perceive his beloved with the 
same devouring, fetishistic gaze that Boccaccio himself did; the fact that they can still 
reason about her indicates that they aren’t sufficiently empathetic, offering the platitudes 
and commonplaces in circulation within their world to counter an experience that, by its 
very nature, transcends the commonplace.25  But it is their very ploddishness—the 
inadequacy of their attempts to empathize—that is comforting to a love-lorn Boccaccio; 
their good natured detachment renders his overmastering desire another more or less 
trivial concern in a world full of trivial preoccupations.  It disrupts the impending 
allegory of love and locates him back in the petty history of Florentine society.
History is, in fact, what ultimately rescues Boccaccio from his love rather than the
well-meaning advice of his friends.  As the narrator recounts it, 
Ma, sì come a Colui piacque, il quale, essendo egli infinito, diede per 
legge incommutabile a tutte le cose mondane aver fine, il mio amore, oltre
ad ogni altro fervente, e il quale niuna forza di proponimento, o di 
25  In reading the Decameron as a sort of encyclopedia of conventional medieval wisdom, I follow Charles 
Singleton and the older tradition of criticism on the novel, which more or less takes the narrator’s Proem at 
face value; later generations of critics have more often read the Proem as ironic, concealing the 
philosophical and ideological depth betrayed in the novel’s interrelations of tales—in his recent study, 
Boccaccio’s Naked Muse, Tobias Foster Gittes provides a succinct defense of this position (though his 
rendition of the older criticism is something of a straw man).  Certainly, Boccaccio, like Chaucer, makes his
tales outstrip the intents of their utterers, but that does not necessarily mean that we have to read the Proem 
as ironic; distraction and compassion, in the wake of the plague, become the work’s most substantive 
philosophical investigations, and the cardinal way in which the text reacts to Dante’s Comedy.
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consiglio, o di vergogna evidente, o pericolo che seguir ne potesse, aveva 
potuto né rompere né piegare, per sé medesimo in processo di tempo si 
diminuì in guisa, che sol di sé nella mente m’ha al presente lasciato quel 
piacere, che egli è usato di porgere a chi troppo non si mette ne’ suoi più 
cupi pelaghi navigando. (3-4)
[But, just as it pleased him, who, being infinite, set down as an 
incommutable law that all earthly things would have an end, my love, 
fervent beyond any other, and the which no force of argument, or counsel, 
or obvious shame, or the danger that could follow from it had the ability to
either break or bend, by itself diminished through the process of time, such
that at present it has left of itself only that pleasure in my mind that it 
usually extends to those who do not start navigating too much on its dark 
waters.] 
Boccaccio’s self-presentation here contradicts his earlier presentation as someone who 
has loved from his earliest youth to the present; the temporal position of this passage is 
central to his response to Dantean love.  Dante’s allegorization of love resulted in a 
progressive intensification of presence that ultimately, for Boccaccio, threatened to 
unmake the physical world. But Boccaccio implicitly counsels his readers to not embark 
upon this sort of allegorization—his comment on love’s “cupi pelaghi” may be a veiled 
reference to the “pelago” of Paradise 2.4, which Dante cautions his reader against sailing
on in her “piccioletta barca” [little boat]. Boccaccio’s God has decreed the ultimate 
decomposition of love along with all other historical structures—this, and not the plague, 
is the real image of death Boccaccio offers in the Decameron.  Death is a historical 
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process operating within the divine scheme of creation; it acts upon a world that preexists
it and that remains afterward, a world whose objects have already appeared and engaged 
in erotic patterns of perception that shape other objects within the world.  No such object 
is eternal—the angle of vision it opens upon the world is only one of many possible 
angles and so must ultimately be subsumed to make way for the new; it thus wanes, 
withers and eventually dies out altogether.  The plague, by contrast, is a condition of a 
chaos that threatens ultimately to prevent the appearance of anything; it is the threat of 
the sterile present wherein perception has no limitations and so no intentionality. 
Dante’s God decrees a similar death—it is Beatrice’s death that forces Dante to 
stop fetishizing her alone and discover the principle implicit in her beauty; however, that 
death is ultimately undone by the vision of presence that grace affords Dante.  For 
Boccaccio, the necessary and healthy decay of his love occurred through the additive 
processes of history that underwrite death; history piles new experiences atop old ones, 
generating a constantly new parade of sensations that, even if they are less intensely felt 
than the fetishized beloved, nonetheless have their own limited beauty.  The narrator 
catalogues the little, distractive rituals that men undertake when suffering through love: 
after, astoundingly, saying that amorous afflictions “il che degli innamorati uomini non 
avviene” [do not happen to men who are enamored], Boccaccio recounts the various 
diversions they have to distract themselves.  They are able to “andare attorno, udire e 
veder molte cose, uccellare, cacciare, pescare, cavalcare, giucare o mercatare” [walk 
around, listen and see many things, hawk, hunt, fish, ride, gamble or conduct business].  
The superficial mundanity of these pasttimes hardly seem sufficient to counter the love 
that Boccaccio professed earlier—and now seems almost to disavow—or the Dantean 
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love it invoked.  They are the petty, distractive rituals one imagines the narrator’s earlier 
friend advising him to engage in; while each has the potential to be entertaining, none 
offers the same sort of engrossment of the love they are supposed to remedy.  However, 
they have power in their very mundanity; they all entail forms of perception and physical 
engagement that interrupt the fetishization of the beloved with a self-contained activity to
which she is irrelevant.  These pasttimes implant the lover in ritualized, habituated 
patterns of behavior with the world surrounding him, a world whose meaning and beauty 
has otherwise become contracted only to the body of the beloved.  The lover becomes, 
again, an organ in a functional historical organism; the very intellective quality of 
historical time that, for Bergson, constituted a sin against duration becomes the cure for 
the threat that temporal vision entails.  These pasttimes force new, historical engagements
to be reimposed on the lover, adding a progressive series of perceptual experiences whose
very overlapping assures that none will ever become consuming.  They integrate the lover
back into a compassionate world, one in which objects coalesce spontaneously into 
organisms, where the lover himself participates in those organisms by failing to perceive 
the objects around him as he perceives his beloved, and finally, where the lover can 
remove himself from the love world in which he is enmired and empathetically 
reorganize his interests around different sets of arbitrary, signifying bodies in these 
mundane games of identity.
It is this compassionate distractiveness that the Decameron takes as its stated aim;
the narrator now occupies the position of an empathetic reader of love, detached from 
lovers’ afflictions but still deeply sympathetic to them.  He is explicitly non-Dantean—
where Dante dictates Love’s spiration, Boccaccio’s fictional surrogate says that the ladies
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to whom he writes should “ad Amore ne rendano grazie, il quale, liberandomi da’ suoi 
legami, m’ha conceduto il potero attendere a’ lor piaceri” [let them render thanks to Love,
who, in liberating me from his chains, has given me the power to attend to their 
pleasures] (5).  The position from which Boccaccio writes his narrative is one of detached
concern; that concern may be fueled by the narrator’s experience and the empathy 
deriving from it, but it can only take place once his bondage to Love has ended.  Like 
Dante, Boccaccio writes to reduplicate his experience in others, but his experience does 
not allegorically colonize the mind of the reader as does the Comedy; rather, it opens the 
reader to the multiplicitous pleasures of the superficial. Boccaccio wants the reader’s eye 
to rove across many variegated surfaces, to dip temporarily into imagined worlds and the 
ideological debates those world imply without becoming overly engrossed in them; the 
frame structure Boccaccio deploys throughout the Decameron is perfectly suited to do 
this, since it draws readers into stories—into limited empathetic engagements—but then 
overlays those stories with other ones.  It builds the detached empathy Boccaccio sees as 
the mandate of literature into the form itself: it imagines the word as a material object 
being used by people to empathetically imagine spaces and times that are not their own.  
The materiality of the word gestures toward the constructedness of those narratives 
without foreclosing their capacity to represent; unlike in the Ameto and even in the 
Comedy, the word-as-object does not signify the lover’s absorption in the gracious world 
that surrounds him, but rather her lack of an absolute, destructive absorption in the world 
the narrative imagines; it signals the compassionate absorption of literature.  In this 
movement away from the absorption in the beloved, Boccaccio finally repudiates the 
allegory of love that is the hallmark of stilnovist doctrine and that came to its fullest 
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fruition in the Comedy; he favors instead the little, limited desires that structure the 
sensible world and the history that moves through it.
The audience most in need of these pleasures are, Boccaccio says, love-lorn 
ladies, since
 dentro a’ dilicati petti, temendo e vergognando, tengono l’amorose fiamme
nascose, le quali quanto più di forza abbian che le palesi coloro il sanno che
l’hanno provato e provano; e oltre a ciò, ristrette da’ voleri, da’ piaceri, da’ 
comandamenti de’ padri, delle madri, de’ fratelli e de’ mariti, il più del 
tempo nel piccolo circuito delle loro camere racchiuse dimorano, e quasi 
oziose sedendosi, volendo e non volendo in una medesima ora, seco 
rivolgono diversi pensieri, li quali non è possibile che sempre sieno allegri. 
(4) 
[within their delicate breasts, feeling fear and shame, they have concealed 
the amorous flames; how much more force they have than those which are 
exposed, those who have tried and experienced love know. Besides this, 
restricted by the wishes, by the pleasures, by the commandments of fathers,
of mothers, of brothers and of husbands, the majority of the time they live 
confined to the little circuit of their rooms, sitting in seeming leisure, 
wishing and not wishing in a single selfsame hour, they turn over within 
themselves diverse thoughts, the which cannot possibly always be happy.] 
 Boccaccio suggests that the desires young ladies keep pent up within themselves are 
actually more intense than those which threatened to kill him; unable to find any 
expression or release, that desire circulates uncontrollably within the composed body of 
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the young lady, intensifying until it devolves into a sort of mania that wholly envelops 
her. The fact that such ladies are contained, both literally and metaphorically, only further
serves to exacerbate the problem: as the lady is progressively confined either by rules of 
decorum or physical walls, her opportunities for distractive perceptual experience narrow 
drastically.  They are thus almost coerced into the fetishism that opens upon the allegory 
of grace because they cannot participate in any other organisms of meaning; not even 
able to share the intensity of their desire with friends, their unexposed afflictions lack 
even the most basic form of compassion—the awareness of one’s suffering by another 
person. Such ladies likewise cannot exercise their own compassion, since they are unable 
to see any narratives taking place within the world; they lack the empathetic habitation of
other perspectives that distract from love and foster a healthy detachment from one’s own
schema of feeling.  
At face value, the task of Boccaccio’s work is to supply a literary supplement to 
these ladies’ experience; the act of reading alone—of transforming the words that a frame
literally imagines into embodied perceptual entities—already begins to force the sort of 
empathetic engagement that acts as antidote to consuming love.  Now, to most readers, 
this seems like a rather inadequate, maybe even ironic goal to set at the outset of a work 
as complicated and rich as the Decameron; further, we can hardly imagine that Boccaccio
could have truly become so engrossed in such a limited project—the undertaking alone 
demands a deeper rationale than Boccaccio’s narrator is willing to give.  The plague also 
seems to set the stories as possessing an almost cosmic poignancy, as though the 
members of the brigata are somehow rebuilding an embattled civilization with their tale-
telling.  Ultimately such intuitions are true, but they should not lead us to believe that 
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Boccaccio is being disingenuous in his initial formulation of the Decameron’s purpose.  
The consuming love that infects these ladies is, at least in the narrative’s logic, the direct 
antecedent to the plague; it liquidates the subjective world of these ladies by organizing it
around a single beloved who is, for whatever reason, unavailable to them.  As it did for 
Dante in the Vita Nuova, the absence of the beloved produces a direct inversion of the 
grace within the ladies: whereas time becomes an endlessly fascinating duration in the 
presence of the beloved, it becomes an endlessly dreary duration in his absence.  Time 
becomes unbearable; everything becomes only capable of representing its continuing 
difference from the beloved.  Structures of meaning break down in an inversion of 
beatitude—the objects that populate the physical world cease to really be objects, cease to
be themselves in the eye of the distraught lover.  Nothing within them can force the sort 
of mindless, habitual relationship that makes them coalesce into distinct objects from the 
cloud of particles that comprises them; their meaning thus disintegrates in a cascade that 
leaves the lover inhabiting a vacant presence.  In reality, the shift in one’s angle of vision 
required to discover a Dantean beatitude is fairly minor—it requires only a turn from a 
fetishism to allegory; but both leave the world vacant of its particularity. Boccaccio’s 
work does set about recuperating a sort of civilization for these ladies—as its title 
suggests in recalling the Hexameron motif of Ambrose, Basil and other patristic authors, 
it recreates the perceptible world from the ravages of pure temporal division.26  In writing
26  Boccaccio’s alternate title, of course, is “Prencipe Galeotto,” referring to both the Lancelot-Guinevere 
legend and to Dante’s Paolo and Francesca.  As Dante did, Boccaccio seems to conceptualize Galehaut as a 
figure of representation—in recounting her tale, Francesca says that the book she read with Paolo served as 
a Galehaut to their love, motivating a disastrous first kiss.  By exercising a compassionate imagination too 
much, Francesca completes the work of mimesis, actualizes the represented world of the text, and falls into 
sin.  But for Boccaccio, the progressive imagination of multiple such episodes—and their compassionate 
imagination in the mind of the reader—is the antidote for the consuming passion the text itself can inspire; 
so long as the Galehaut of the text keeps pressing the reader into multiple scenes, each with their own 
distractive erotics, no one scene can become too engrossing.
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it, Boccaccio looks down at the world along with the God in Genesis; he gazes from the 
perspective of presence his own consuming love has afforded him and recreates the world
through the material word that the frame exposes even as it enfleshes that word with 
representation.
The plague is thus Boccaccio’s metaphor—albeit an exceptionally vivid one that 
cannot be fully contained by its metaphorical identity—for the world devoid of desire, a 
world produced when the lover is separated from her beloved. Robert Hollander has 
noted the connection between the Proem’s conceptualization of erotic desire and the 
plague; the term that Boccaccio uses most frequently for both is “noia,” a term Hollander 
calls a pervasive “demon of the Decameron” (97).  The term recurs throughout the 
entirety of the work, insinuating a relationship between “sexuality and pestilence.”27  
Under the plague’s influence, the various scales of temporal being fall apart as objects 
and component objects radically fail to desire one another. In this sense, it is the anti-
Ameto: the Ameto, perhaps naively, assumed that a constantly circulating erotic energy 
would spontaneously produce the perceptible world within it; objects would naturally 
coalesce into habituated, perceptual organisms at every scale of being, developing certain
rituals of interaction whose shape is determined by instinctive desires. Human erotic love 
is the apex of this play—it brings the fetishistic vision of the particular to beatitude, to the
vision of temporal grace that ignites all these various scales of being into relative motion. 
At its Dantean limit point, Boccaccio sought to preserve the particular within the 
allegory, and so to preserve the stilnovist insight brought about by intense love.  But the 
27  Significantly, Hollander also notes that “noia” is also the term used by Vergil to recall the wayward 
Dante from the selva oscura in Inferno 1.76; Boccaccio’s Proem translates the pestilential metaphor of 
Dante’s wood into a literal reality.  If the selva oscura describes a purely material world left devoid of the 
grace of the beloved, Boccaccio’s plague transforms this subjective phenomenon into an objective, 
historical one.
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time between the Ameto and the Decameron is precisely the distractive time Boccaccio’s 
narrator describes: within that span, Boccaccio seems to have gained a fuller appreciation
for the threat of Dante’s temporal phenomenology that he only provisionally 
demonstrated in the Ameto without really solving. Both the Comedy and the Decameron 
have the same starting point—the world devoid of meaning, which is to say devoid of 
individual grace—but Boccaccio ultimately came to conclude that Dante’s allegorization 
of grace ironically brought him back to the selva he began in; that forest is no longer a 
selva oscura but a selva luminosa, yet it is equally empty, each object within it having 
been liquidated by its transformation into divine presence from the presence of despair.  
In the Decameron, Boccaccio sets out to repopulate that space; to do so, he recognizes 
that the aim of his work cannot be, as it was in the Ameto, the vision of grace, but rather 
vision without grace, the partial, habituated, superficial and almost unthinking encounters
with the world that distracts one from the vision of presence and that distracts all objects 
from the presence in which they inhere.  From the absorptive erotics of the Ameto, he 
arrives at a more measured ethics of compassion which retains the basic structure of 
desire, but seasons it with detachment.
Boccaccio’s use of the plague thematic to frame his tales thus derives from the 
critique he offers of stilnovist love poetics and Dante’s vision in particular.  That he has 
Dante in mind in his development of the plague is made quite clear at the outset of its 
description: “questo orrido cominciato vi fia non altramenti che a’ camminanti una 
montagna aspra ed erta, presso alla quale un bellisimo piano e dilettevole sia riposto, il 
quale tanto più viene lor piacevole, quanto maggiore è stata del salire e dello smontare la 
gravezza.  E sì come la estremità della allegrezza il dolore occupa, con le miserie da 
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sopravvegnente letizia sono terminate” [this horrid beginning will be like nothing short of
walking up a mountain rugged and steep, beyond which a most beautiful and delightful 
plain is secreted, which becomes to them more pleasurable the greater the difficulty of the
ascent and descent.  And just as the extremity of happiness involves pain, miseries are 
concluded with unanticipated happiness] (7).  The reference to Purgatory here is quite 
transparent: in particular, Boccaccio’s use of the verb “camminare” to describe the ascent 
recalls Dante’s ambling way up Purgatory.  The “bellisimo piano” that is hidden at the 
end of the climb recalls Dante’s Earthly Paradise and the mixture of happiness and pain at
the limit point of Purgatory recalls his experience of seeing a shrill Beatrice again for the 
first time.  Purgatory, in particular, was the otherworldly realm wherein Dante purified his
desire; Purgatory is the divine machine that produces the beatific vision from the various 
fetishistic pleasures of sinners.  Its contrapasso is to lodge sinners within the material 
preoccupation that prevented them from seeking the divine, but to locate it on a 
continuing road; where the sinners took their fetish to be a sufficient end to existence, the 
ongoing road indicates its participation in a larger allegory whose terminus is not the 
particular fetish. The phrase “dello smontare la gravezza” gestures toward their particular 
fetishization—it refers to the gravity of their sin, its literal weight which Augustine uses 
as a metaphor for sin throughout his works.28  The materiality of their preoccupations 
locates them in a particular locale within Purgatory; but the dead end of that weighty 
desire which caused their fall becomes a waypoint on a larger road that stretches up to 
divine presence.  The fetishism of sin obtains, in Purgatory, an exit from itself that 
repurposes that very fetish into an element of the allegory of grace.
28  See especially Book 7 of the Confessions, 23-27.
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Boccaccio thus associates the plague space with the purged vision of Dante; the 
plague literally and metaphorically liquidates desire from the world, demonstrating the 
ultimate, putrid destiny of all material objects.  The plague reveals that no material object 
is what it is—rather, it is a fragile compact between organs that must tacitly desire to 
remain within their organismal configuration.  But while Boccaccio associates the plague 
with Purgatory, the “bellisimi piani” to which the Decameron leads are of a wholly 
different character than Dante’s Earthly Paradise; in the Earthly Paradise, the contemptus 
mundi learned on the difficult ascent up Purgatory is supplanted with the allegorization of
the fetish.  Once material objects are purged of their absorption, the Purgatorial pilgrim 
can begin to recuperate the physical world and the presence that their sinful experience of
beauty implied; for Boccaccio, the purgation of these particular desires creates the plague
space, the limit point of the contemptus mundi tradition in which matter begins to hold 
itself in contempt.  The plague allegorizes the evacuation of desire from the world that 
the Purgatorial pilgrim has been forced to effect by divine justice and that Boccaccio’s 
ladies have been forced to reduplicate by the absence of their beloved.  The Decameron’s 
gardens, however, are hardly the Earthly Paradise; they offer only distractions, relocating 
the pilgrim who has climbed away from their fetishistic desire within the superficial, 
preoccupied spaces they just left.29  While they evoke the pastoral world of the Ameto 
along with its erotics, that eros is now conceptualized as an embattled island in the 
chaotic sea of the plague.  Moreover, there does not seem to be any possibility of 
29  Giuseppe Mazzotta reads the gardens as places where “catharsis can occur” (117) as a sort of restitution 
for the plague; the tragedy of the plague is reintegrated into a world of play that lifts its burdens.  Rather 
than acting as the penitential restitution for sinful desires, the Decameron allows those desires reign to 
playfully undercut the idea of penitence; the threat of death becomes a part of the stories the brigata tells to 
stave off the chaos of the plague.
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transcendence within these pastoral settings—perhaps as a result of the plague’s ravages, 
simple continuance now seems an act of transcendence.  In a world where things are 
falling fantastically apart, the distraction of inhabiting a space that seems to exhibit 
ecological harmony within a limited web of erotic desires seems preferable to the sort of 
purgative vision Dante is subjected to atop his mountain. The erotic play of these pastoral
spaces does not foster abject absorption but rather distraction from such attachments.
The plague demonstrates how perilous such attachments can be: it reveals the 
tenuous conditions of the bodily strata to which we affix our desires.  The objects of our 
affections are temporary assemblages that manifest different scales of time; as such, they 
depend on the interpretive and perceptual schema that the objects surrounding them have 
applied to shape the textures of their being.  But the plague specifically dissolves all such 
schema; it demonstrates the basic uninterpretability and imperceptability of primal 
matter.  This is evident from Boccaccio’s initial description of the plague:  “o per 
operazion de’ corpi superiori o per le nostre inique opere da giusta ira di Dio a nostra 
correzione mandata sopra i mortali, alquanti anni davanti nelle parti orientali 
incominciata , quelle d’innumerabile quantità di viventi avendo private, senza ristare, 
d’un luogo in altro continuandosi verso l’Occidente miserabilmente s’era ampliata. E in 
quella non valendo alcuno senno nè umano provvedimento” [either through the operation 
of heavenly bodies or through our iniquitous deeds from the just anger of God for our 
correction sent on mortals, beginning some years before in Eastern parts, an innumerable 
quantity of the living having been killed, without rest, it extended miserably, continuing 
from one place to another across the West. And in this no judgement nor human prudence
mattered” (7).  As all the residents of Florence will do, Boccaccio begins his narration of 
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the plague by attempting to read it allegorically.  He turns to transcendent structures of 
meaning like astrology and religion for resources that will allow him to comprehend the 
plague within some ordered interpretive schema.  He even turns briefly to mathematics, 
searching for a way to describe the tragedy.  But the number of the dead is innumerable; 
the platitudes of human foresight and common sense have been of no avail in hindering 
its progress.  The plague does not kill everybody at once, but that only makes the lives of 
those who remain more senseless—there seems to be no set law to why some survive and
others do not.  If the plague has some obscure divine origin, it must necessarily proceed 
from an unjust God, since its misery does not respect the attempts of the righteous and 
humble to assuage that God; it does not even respect the division between Orient and 
Occident, heathen and Christian. The plague inflicts a sort of penitence, but it is one that 
does not respect moral categories; the plague is the penitential demand of ontology, 
whose structures of being persist away from perfect presence.
Most of Boccaccio’s narration of the plague explicitly aims at describing its 
uninterpretability.  It renders all the spheres of human action unintelligible; it is within 
those spheres that the objects that populate the human world should appear, defined by 
the habitual perceptual patterns in which they become relevant. Even the life of 
moderation—a mainstay of pragmatic wisdom literature—comes to seem immoderate in 
the face of the plague:
Ed erano alcuni, li quali avvisavano che il vivere moderatamente, e il 
guardarsi da ogni superfluità, avesse molto a così fatto accidente resistere; 
e fatta lor brigata, da ogni altro separati viveano; e in quelle case 
ricogliendosi e rinchiudendosi dove niuno infermo fosse e da viver 
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meglio, dilicatissimi cibi e ottimi vini temperatissimamente usando e ogni 
lussuria fuggendo, senza lasciarsi parlare ad alcuno, o volere di fuori, di 
morte o d’infermi, alcuna novella sentire, con suoni e con quelli piaceri 
che aver potevano si dimoravano.  Altri, in contraria opinion trattie, 
affermavano, il bere assai e il godere, e l’andar cantando attorno e 
sollazzando, e il soddisfare d’ogni cosa allo appetito che si potesse, e di 
ciò che avveniva ridersi e beffarsi, essere medicina certissima a tanto 
male. (9)
[And there were some who advised that living moderately and keeping 
themselves from all superfluity might have done much to resist this 
accident; and they made a brigata and lived separate from any other; and 
recusing themselves in those houses and withdrawing where there was not 
a single sick person and in order to live better, employing very temperately
very delicate foods and excellent wines, avoiding any luxury, without 
permitting themselves to speak to anyone, or wishing to hear anything 
from outside, any news either about death or the sick, they dwelt with 
music and with those pleasures that they might have.  Others, holding the 
contrary opinion, asserted that drinking heavily and enjoying themselves 
and walking about singing and amusing themselves and satisfying any 
thing for which they might have an appetite, and laughing and joking 
about anything that happened was the most certain medicine for such an 
evil.]
326
In this description, Boccaccio does not contrast two polar opposites—an ascetic lifestyle 
and a profligate one—but rather makes moderation itself seem ascetic.  The moderates 
withdraw themselves into encloistered communities, significantly termed “brigata,” like 
monks fleeing the evils of the world.  They take pains, not only to avoid luxury, but to 
avoid the avoidance of luxury as well—Boccaccio’s description seems to cross itself 
when he describes the luxurious food and drink enjoyed by these people but then suggests
that they avoided all excess.  The overwhelming impression of this first portrait is of 
avoidance: these people avoid any extreme such that they even contradict themselves.  
The consequence of their cloistered lifestyle is that they close themselves off to the 
distractive experiences that will be the remedy of novel’s signature brigata: they close 
themselves off to all external stimuli, retaining only those sensory experiences they have 
brought with them into their seclusion. Their music and undefined pleasures operate 
within the distractive logic of Boccaccio’s proem, and they remain an important 
counterpoint to the brigata, constantly reminding us of the threat of the plague even as the
text encourages us to forget it; Pampinea’s initial speech to the ladies of the brigata will 
recollect the moderate response evoked here, placing the brigata under the same threat.  
But whereas these brigate emphasize their withdrawal from the world, the brigata will 
emphasize their engagement with the pastoral spaces in their gardens.  They foster 
contact with external stimuli, surrounding the enclosed space of their storytelling with a 
vibrant, if ordered, natural world. Boccaccio does not necessarily foreclose that 
possibility here, but he places the moderate solution’s emphases elsewhere, in detachment
and seclusion rather than engagement.30
30  Cf. Joan M. Ferrante, who argues that “the Decameron exalts love and related virtues in a well-regulated 
order, and condemns all excess.  This is a morality directed more towards life in the world than towards 
salvation” (85).  Given Boccaccio’s description of the moderate reaction to the plague, it is hard to say that 
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Another important feature of this passage is the way it frames these alternatives in
the terms of medieval disputation; even the reckless response to the plague constitutes an 
attempt to rationally respond to it.  The verbs “avvisare,” and “affermare”, to advise and 
to affirm respectively, frame all responses in terms of a debate in which propositions are 
advanced, reasoned through, challenged and judged.  This disputational logic was the 
foremost method the medieval world used for resolving interpretive problems: it allowed 
them to categorize phenomena into convenient syllogisms.  The cavalier, ironic attitude 
of the second group would seem to hold such disputations in contempt, but Boccaccio 
emphasizes that irony is a rationalist interpretive schema just like moderation.  The 
plague does not, therefore, depict the sort of ironic Ovidian chaos we explored in Dante, 
but rather precedes that chaos; it reveals Ovidian chaos to be an interpretive schema 
applied to bodies.  While the plague recalls Ovid’s chaos from the Metamorphoses, that 
chaos is depicted as just another rationalist response to the material condition the plague 
represents.  Ovidian irony still supplies an attitude and a set of behaviors; it still 
structures a basis for habitual engagement with the objects in the world, one in which the 
perceiver contemptuously understands the impermanence of the world surrounding her.  
Ovidian chaos is still structured by desire, however—the changes through which Ovid 
expresses universal flux are products of desire like that Apollo shows for Daphne, or 
Cephissus for Liriop—and so it really bears more in common with the erotic space of the 
Ameto.  The Decameron’s physical dissolution occurs through the loss of desire, and so 
reduces the world—through a chaotic procedure—to a pre-chaos, a void presence in 
which the most vestigial form of matter cannot summon itself into historical being; it 
the novel condemns excess, or really that it condemns anything—the plague throws all worldly and 
spiritual morality into chaos.
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thus, cannot even manifest the change of Ovidian metamorphosis, since such motive 
change requires a historically organized body to render itself legible.  
No such behavioral response has any impact on what the plague represents, or it 
would be better to say, on the plague’s failure to represent. As Boccaccio goes on to note: 
“che questi così variamente opinanti non morissero tutti, non per ciò tutti campavano; 
anzi, infermandone di ciascuna molti, e in ogni luogo, avendo essi stessi, quando sani 
erano, esemplo dato a coloro che sani rimanevano, quasi abbandonati per tutto languieno”
[not all who variously opined these things died,  and not all lived; in fact, many from 
each group got sick, and wherever they were, having given the example, when they were 
healthy, to those who remained healthy, they were likewise left to languish] (10).  Again, 
Boccaccio does not simply dwell on the fact that all these various behavioral assertions 
can result in death, but rather he also emphasises that continuation itself becomes 
senseless in the wake of the plague. Those who survive recognize, however tacitly, that 
their action had no impact whatsoever on their survival; the plague thus entails a radical 
loss of will, since all acts of will were proven arbitrary and purposeless in the context of 
the plague.  In the absence of will, the world of desire dissolves; the tragedy goes beyond 
the designation of tragedy, since it unwinds the very generic patterning through which we
understand something as tragic. The result is a profound indifference that resists tragedy, 
an indifference that counters the compassion that opens the Decameron; that indifference 
manifests itself, in the social organism, by the simple abandonment of social ties, the 
radical failure of Christian charity in which people will not even witness one another’s 
suffering.  The limit point of this indifference, for Boccaccio, is parental neglect: “il padri
e le madri i figliuoli, quasi loro non fossero, di visitare e di servire schifavano” [fathers 
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and mothers their children, as though they were not, they were disgusted to visit and to 
serve] (10).  The compression of the two subjects and their object in Boccaccio’s clause 
structure underscores how tightly knit they should be—they should comprise a single 
group subject, but one member is forcibly converted to an object by the subsequent 
grammar.  The “quasi loro non fossero” which indicates something like “as though they 
were not their own,” actually enforces the ontological dissolution that precedes the 
familial one—it describes the loss of familial identities in which mothers, fathers and 
children cease to be defined by these roles and so lose their being entirely.  Basic 
interaction becomes repulsive as the familial organism dissolves; its members do not 
simply refuse these essential forms of contact, but they are actively repulsed by them.  
That which they should instinctively desire—the familial bond upon which their 
foundational identities are structured—instead acquire a motion antithetical to that desire;
centrifugal becomes centripetal and the family falls apart.
This dissolution of the family results in a cascading failure of social institutions:
“le più delle case erano divenute comuni, e così l’usava lo straniere, pure 
che ad esse s’avvenisse, come l’avrebbe il proprio signore usate; e, con 
tutto questo, bestiale, sempre gl’infermi fuggivano a lor potere.  E in tanta 
afflizione e miseria della nostra città era la reverenda autorità delle leggi, 
così divine come umane, quasi caduta e dissoluta tutta, per li ministri ed 
esecutori di quelle, li quali sì come gli altri uomini, erano tutti o morti o 
infermi o sì di famigli remasi stremi, che uficio alcuno non potean fare; 
per la qual cosa era a ciascuno licito quanto a grado gli era d’adoperare.  
(9)
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[most of the houses had become common property, and so strangers 
frequented them, who had just happened upon them, has their own master 
used to do; and with all this bestial intent, they always avoided the sick 
when they could. And in such affliction and misery of our city, the 
reverend authority of the laws, divine and human alike, had almost 
dissolved and collapsed entirely, for the ministers and executors of them, 
who just like other men, were either all dead or sick or so short of help, 
that they could not do any duty; for which reason was everybody free to to
act in whatever way he wished.]
The institution of property is perhaps the most essential concept of the law; even 
injunctions of physical violence are grounded in the assumption that the body is one’s 
own property.  Property links the concept of space to that of will; the owned space should
become a reflection of the movements of the owner’s will—property is shaped by its 
owner and reciprocally shapes that owner, giving her will a set of perceptible objects on 
which to act.  But during the plague, the wrong people are in the wrong places.  The 
habitual relationships that are manifested in the owned space do not proceed from the 
appropriate will that originally shaped them; strangers who obviously do not respect the 
concept of property enter into it, and their lack of respect for the concept becomes a lack 
of respect for the object shaped by that concept.  The tragedy of the commons destroys 
the space.  All such legal institutions in Florence have begun to decompose; the law 
establishes patterns in how human beings can relate to others and to the world around 
them, but those limitations have been suspended by the plague.  All such laws are 
revealed as temporary and human institutions—even the divine law is exposed as reliant 
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on human enforcement when the enforcers are subjected to their own material condition.  
The language Boccaccio uses to describe the law reflects the physical bodies afflicted by 
the plague—an anthropomorphized law is “caduta e dissoluta” just as a human body, 
fallen from its erect posture, begins to decay.
But the plague does not cause these social institutions to simply dissolve: it makes
the human elements within those institutions become explicitly repulsive to one another.  
The social contact that usually facilitates those institutions now becomes solely a 
mechanism for communicating the plague:
“E fu questa pestilenza di maggior forza per ciò, che essa dagl’infermi di 
quella per lo comunicare insieme s’avventava a’ sani, non altramenti che 
faccia il fuoco alle cose secche o unte quando molto gli sono avvicinate. E
più avanti ancora ebbe di male; chè non solamente il parlare e l’usare con 
gl’infermi dava a’ sani infermità o cagione di comune morte, ma ancora il 
toccare i panni o qualunque altra cosa da quegli infermi stata tocca o 
adoperata pareva seco quella cotale infermità nel toccator trasportare. (8)
[And this pestilence was of such force that it was communicated from 
those sick with it to the healthy who came into contact with them, not 
unlike the way a fire does to dry or oily things when they are brought very 
close to it.  And its evil went still further; not only speech and customary 
contact with the sick yield sickness to the healthy or the cause of common 
death, but also touching the clothes or any other thing that had been 
touched or used by the sick seemed to transport this sickness to the person 
touching.]
332
Boccaccio significantly reuses a metaphor from the Ameto in describing the plague’s 
transmission—that of fire consuming oily surfaces; but what, in the Ameto, was a 
Dantean metaphor of consuming desire has here transformed into a metaphor of terror.  In
the Ameto, the metaphor describes the progressively intensifying desire that Ameto feels 
for Lia; as his eyes rove over her body it ignites a flame that spreads quickly to vivify his 
entire being like a rapidly spreading fire.  The fire and oil metaphor described the positive
consequences of perceptual—and specifically sexual—exchange.  It is the paradigm 
instance of the erotics of the Ameto, the moment that most defines who Ameto will 
become after his experience of love.  But in the Decameron, that very erotics has become 
a source of contagion; the lack of control over the fire leads that form of intense erotic 
contact to consume the entire world.  Every object within the world becomes impregnated
with it—any simple touch from a sick person installs the plague within that object.  
Boccaccio again inverts Dante’s democratized vision of grace into an image of the 
contagion that is instilled into objects by intense desire.  Dante’s allegory inspirited every
vibrating fiber of the world into a transparent medium for grace; in the Decameron, all of 
those same fibers—by their very status as particulate fibers—become carriers for the 
plague.  
Even language—the most essential medium of human perceptual interchange—
becomes a transmitter for the plague.  The brief image of linguistic transmission 
constitutes an existential threat to the world of the Decameron; it impregnates the very 
words we read with the contamination of the plague.  Boccaccio obliquely recollects 
Dante’s temporal vision as applied to speech, which made the sibillant phonemes of 
Paradisiacal speech significant moments of presence in their own right.  Speech, before it 
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represented its object, signified the beatific joy of the speaker; every instant of sonic 
enunciation vocalized a present that ultimately marginalized whatever it intended to say.  
In Dante, this actualized the aesthetic quality inherent in his verse form—his terza rima 
always pressed its listener toward a surface apprehension of itself that accompanied the 
representations of the poem.  For Dante, this aesthetic language manifested the presence 
of the divine throughout the entire world imagined by the poem; the shiver of grace was 
the manner in which God could be said to present in Hell without actually being 
imagined there.  For Boccaccio, this was the consummate act of violence effected by 
grace; while supremely beautiful, Dante’s poetics always threatened to liquidate the 
perceptual spaces his poem imagined.  While Boccaccio experiments with terza rima in 
the Ameto, by the time he writes the Decameron he has moved to prose as his exclusive 
mechanism for representing his poem.  His prose—while at times very beautiful—
imagines itself as its representational targets with less friction than poetry; it is capable of
distracting readers more readily into the spaces and times it imagines.  The contamination
of language is relegated to an image, written within that prose and occuring within the 
imagined world.  It still constitutes an existential threat to the poem: as delimited objects, 
language too is subject to the material conditions the plague unmasks and therefore 
breaks down into its inert substance.  Just as human beings lodged in their social 
institutions spin apart, all forms of temporal organization begin to dissolve, losing their 
identities as independent objects and becoming mere signs of the plague and its imminent
threat. But the prosaic quality of that world already enacts the distractive remedy that will
be the brigata’s antidote to the plague’s ravages.
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Unlike Beatrice in the Earthly Paradise, the members of the brigata have no 
special insight that can help them to counter the threat of the plague—they are not 
philosophers or theologians, artists or poets; they are not even, as we might expect, 
particularly good lovers—while the male characters are enamored with several of the 
female characters, they can hardly be said to profess the same sort of absorptive, debasing
love that afflicts the narrator and his ladies, or even Ameto.  Pampinea’s speech that 
inaugurates the formation of the brigata sounds suspiciously like the conventional 
wisdom that the plague defies:
“e fuggendo come la morte i disonesti esempli degli altri, onestamente a’ 
nostri luoghi in contado de’ quali a ciascuna di noi è gran copia, ce ne 
andassimo a stare, e quivi quella festa, quelle allegrezza, quello piacere 
che noi potessimo, senza trapassare in alcuno atto il segno della ragione, 
prendessimo. Quivi s’odono gli uccelletti cantare, veggionvisi verdeggiare
i colli e le pianure, e i campi pieni di biade non altramente ondeggiare che 
il mare, e d’alberi ben mille maniere, e il cielo più apertamente, il quale, 
ancora che crucciato ne sia, non perciò le sue bellezze eterne ne nega, le 
quali molto più belle sono a riguardare che le mura vote della nostra città.”
(18) 
[and fleeing like death the dishonest examples of others, we should go to 
stay honestly at our country houses, of which each of us has a great 
number, and there we should take that merriment, that happiness, that 
pleasure that we can, without surpassing in any act the sign of reason.  
There the birds are heard singing, the hills and plains are seen growing 
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green, the fields full of grain rippling just like the sea, and a full thousand 
types of trees and the heavens more openly, which, even though they still 
may be angry, nevertheless do not deny us their eternal beauties, which are
much more beautiful to see than the empty walls of our city.]
Pampinea tries to displace the threat of death onto the responses others have advanced to 
the plague, but she essentially proposes one of the failed responses we have already seen. 
While she is careful to note that none of the members of the brigata have any family 
members left whom they would abandon, the compact that binds them together feels 
suspiciously like the other solutions that unknit social institutions and foster 
disengagement from the perceptual world. Other responses to the plague have 
participated in its reduction of bodies to their material strata, and the brigata’s will do this
too in a sense, by allowing them to avoid witnessing the ravages of Florence.  Yet 
Pampinea insists on its practical difference from others’ responses, and in essence it is her
specious naivete that constitutes the brigata’s response to the plague.  The brigata’s 
members are consummately distractable; they situate themselves in a space that is 
explicitly designed to distract them from the plague: in the lost pastoral gardens of the 
Ameto.  The pastoral space is now an embattled island, but it still possesses the erotic pull
it did in Boccaccio’s earlier poem.  In it, objects are engaged in dynamic processes of 
mutual identification; Pampinea describes its essential ecology without ever becoming 
too absorbed by one element of that ecology.  Even the heavens—the planets and stars of 
Dante’s Paradise—become an element of this distractive ecology, capable of amusing the
Florentine youths for a moment before they move on to new pleasures.  None of those 
pleasures, as Pampinea comically insists, can transgress the sort of conventional 
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reasoning the novel has radically called into question; the brigata will stubbornly, and 
somewhat ironically reimpose the basic standards of Florentine society.31  So Filomena, 
immediately after Pampinea’s speech, will insist that they be accompanied by well 
behaved men, based on the misogynist medieval commonplace that women can’t get 
along without men to keep them rationally ordered.  It is this stubborn denial and 
avoidance of what the plague has unleashed into the world that allows the world to 
become perceptibly ordered again; while Boccaccio will always hold his brigata in a 
semi-ironic regard, he approves of their general strategy.
That strategy manifests itself, primarily in the framed narratives they tell to one 
another.  Boccaccio has already allied the absolute dissolution of the plague with a 
surface understanding of language, and it is the plague that forms the backbone of the 
novel’s frame.  As I have suggested elsewhere, framed language automatically entails the 
sort of present apprehension of language that so occupied Dante and subsequently 
Boccaccio; frames imagine acts of language as material objects, and so they threaten to 
unwind their coherence as integrated objects just as the plague does.  The brigata shows 
little consciousness of this fact—as, given their general tactic for resisting the plague, 
they shouldn’t—though the plague thematic itself indicates that Boccaccio was thinking 
in these directions; but the threat that the plague poses to language makes their tale-
telling externally poignant, even when it is not internally poignant to the members of the 
31  Unlike Chaucer’s pilgrims, the brigata’s reinstitution of culture is remarkably harmonious; as Janssens 
notes, “here is an astonishingly high degree of obedience and agreement among the ten narrators involved.  
They agree without any discussion with the proposal concerning the story-telling as a very useful pastime 
during their deliberate exile in Paradise on earth.  They agree also in a remarkable way with the 
anthropological views underlying the stories” (140).  Where Chaucer will develop his microcosm of late 
medieval culture through additive discord, Boccaccio effects his through an almost unrealistic concord that 
defies the cancerous quality of the plague.
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brigata itself.  The continued speech of the brigata shows material acts of language, but 
rather than dissolving, they cohere into progressively more complex temporal units.  
Where the plague reduces the word to its material conditions, the brigata’s feckless, 
distractive tale telling begins from the material word only to delimit it as a grammatical 
object, coordinate it with other such objects, and use them to reimagine the world that is 
falling apart around them.  They do not try to recuperate Dantean vision as the Ameto did,
but rather they show how the limited materialism that Dante’s text so stridently resists 
can itself be poignant.  For Dante, that materialism was the selva oscura that threatened a 
meaningful perceptual existence; for Boccaccio, the allegorical vision of grace threatens 
an incoherence that a simplistic materialism can resist.
In one sense, Boccaccio takes the pedagogical orientation of the frame narrative 
genre and turns it on its head: the brigata’s tales are mere entertainments that distract the 
group from the moral quandary of the age.  Where a pedagogical frame narrative should 
try to assemble some allegory to counter and interpret the plague, the brigata avoids it.  
But to say that the tales are merely distractions is reductive; many readers of the 
Decameron have the intuitive sense that more is going on in the text than Boccaccio’s 
narrator will admit.  Their tales invoke an exhaustive, practically encyclopedic set of 
commonplaces about medieval life and social organization; they comment on the social 
institutions that the plague has already rendered moot.  In this sense, the brigata bears the 
essence of culture out of the plague, and a core part of that essence is its ability not to 
probe too deeply into the dark waters of phenomenal experience.  They fluidly inhabit a 
world that depends on a sort of cosmopolitan ignorance; they have no real philosophical 
desire to probe the uttermost underpinnings of ontology; they are content to briefly view 
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the realities that come before them in the ways that those realities are conventionally 
constituted.  They may question certain aspects of those representations, but they accept 
their general contours without thinking.  They are precisely the sort of materialists that 
Dante would probably decry.  But though they never experience the sublime heights of 
beatitude, neither do they have to undergo the ravages of the beloved’s absence.  Such 
experience is simply not in their vocabulary.  But for Boccaccio, it is their limited, 
automatic mode of perceiving that is the groundwork of perceptual existence, and not the 
profound vision of grace offered by Dante and the theologians.
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CHAPTER V
GROTESQUE TEMPORALITY IN THE CANTERBURY FRAME
Frame narratives imagine, within their structure, both audiences and authors that 
differ from the work’s actual audience and author.  It is a critical commonplace to say that
the internal audience of a frame acts as a sort of proxy for the narrative’s actual audience;
Bonnie Irwin notes that frames embed a residue of oral traditions by imagining both 
author and audience directly within the work’s imagined space.  The audience, in this 
conception, acts as a bridge between the reader and the author; the response of particular 
members of the work’s internal audience is supposed to cue the literate audience in how 
its own members should receive the text. By imagining this internal audience, frames can 
partially restore the vast amount of nonverbal communication that occurs in an oral 
performance which guides audience response (27-28).  Such a theory works admirably 
well for the vast majority of frame narratives Chaucer likely knew; Boccaccio actually 
makes it explicit in the Decameron by naming his literate audience as ladies in need of 
distraction, then imagining an internal audience of distractable youths.  In other frame 
narratives, this bridge function of the internal audience usually aligns with the frame’s 
didacticism; so in allegorical frames like the Ameto, Gower’s Confessio Amantis and, to 
the extent that it is either an allegory or a frame narrative, the Divine Comedy, the internal
audience of a framed narrative learns the lesson that the author wishes to impart to a 
reader.  Other allegories that use framing techniques like the Roman de la Rose, the 
Consolation of Philosophy, Alain de Lille’s De Planctu Naturae and even Piers Plowman
deploy a similar structure; the main character in such works impersons both the author 
and the audience; the author himself becomes the audience of allegorical narratives being
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performed in front of him which he is supposed to assimilate into his own understanding. 
In all such cases, the rhetorical aims that drove the author to include a particular framed 
narrative are enacted within the internal audience of the frame itself; the potential 
polyvalence of the narrative is, to whatever extent, contained  and directed by our explicit
witness of a response to that text.  In a sense, the frame responds to its own texts often 
before a reader has herself fully responded.  We can say, especially in the cases of the 
Decameron and Piers Plowman, that a sense of the polyvalence of the text’s stories is 
restored by the inadequacy or incompleteness of the text’s own, supplied response—
indeed, the internal audience itself often registers a vague sense of this incompletion—
but the internal audience’s understanding still forms the basic groundwork of the reader’s 
complication of it.
If such a theory helps to explain the framing techniques of Chaucer’s sources, it is
doubly striking that it fails utterly to explain his own text.  We cannot say, even in the 
most oblique sense, that the internal audience of the Canterbury Tales models the way in 
which Chaucer wants the texts contained within it to be read; the angles of vision they 
supply onto any given tale are too specific and idiosyncratic.  As Jill Mann has 
demonstrated, the Canterbury pilgrims rely on estates satire for their characterization; as 
such, they each embody a stereotyped member of a particular social class.1  As 
stereotypes, they lack the ideological plasticity that would make them a suitable proxy for
a reader; they present caricatures, albeit detailed and vivid ones, who are largely 
1  More specifically, Mann argues that the characterization of the pilgrims derives from both “idealized” 
details and “normal” details; that is, certain features derive from a type figure while others derive from the 
way in which real, normal practitioners of an estate fail to embody that type.  However, in his recent article 
“The Universality of the Portraits in the General Prologue,” Gerald Morgan has called this distinction into 
question, arguing that ultimately all of the details of the portraiture derive from universalized types—the 
“normal” characteristics of the pilgrims arise from equally extreme depictions of an estate, they are simply 
not the positive features of that estate.  The pilgrims are thus types through and through; any reference to 
realism in the portraits is out of place.
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incapable of moderating their stock ideologies to see from any other point of view or to 
be persuaded by any of the other pilgrims.  Estates satire, as a form, tended not to 
represent a functioning social organism, but rather lamented the disfunctions of the 
medieval caste system; it did not present sympathetic versions of its stereotypical 
characters, but rather took the various ideologies and interests that more or less typified a 
particular group to their extremes (8).  Besides being unsympathetic, such characters are 
emphatically not exemplary—they are cautionary, examples of how one should not think 
and behave. Chaucer essentially mashes together two genres with antithetical aims: in 
estates satire, an author presents characters meant to caution the audience against 
becoming like them while in frame narratives, characters are supposed to serve as proxies
within the narrative.  Estates stereotypes are next of kin to the allegorical personification, 
which presents a character so possessed by its own manic idea that its body can register 
no other idea, at least, not willingly.  The principle difference between an allegorical 
personification and an estates stereotype is that the personification represents a single 
idea from a coherent philosophical system while the stereotype can possess multiple, 
sometimes even contradictory, ideologies; those contradictions, far from opening the 
stereotype to the possibility of other ideas and arguments, usually make her dogged 
persistence in a set of rigid ideologies all the more marked.
Though Mann effectively demonstrates that Chaucer did deploy the stereotypes of
estates satire in his frame characters, she never fully explains why he would do so.  It is a 
mystery that bears some comment, first because it creates an internal audience that is 
very atypical for a frame narrative and second because it must have pained Chaucer to 
commit his stories to some of his pilgrims. For Chaucer, the Canterbury Tales must have 
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been a work of sighs, as much as laughter; in writing the Tales, Chaucer takes a vast store
of his literary output and commits their generation to lesser lights.  Such a move would 
have, I suspect, been somewhat painful because it made his intensely complex and 
polyvalent narratives proceed from intellects that had vastly narrowed their concerns.  In 
their passage through the mouths of the pilgrims, Chaucer’s stories are reduced to 
whatever dogmatic perspective the estates stereotype opens within them; their internal 
reception by the other pilgrims does reopen them to a certain extent, but only insofar as 
they are digested into another, equally narrow and typed interpretive pattern.  Though 
many critics have lauded the “realism” of the Canterbury pilgrims,2 they ultimately lack 
the sort of plasticity that is the hallmark of the human mind; though the text is obviously 
charged with rhetoric, its audience lacks the most basic precondition of rhetoric: the 
willingness to change one’s mind.3  As such, we can scarcely even say that the point of 
the text is to demonstrate the inadequacy of the perspectives it opens into itself: though 
2  While earlier generations of Chaucerians praised Chaucer for his realistic characterization of the pilgrims,
subsequent critics have more commonly labeled him a nominalist, though, as Robert Myles has shown in 
Chaucerian Realism, Chaucer did not subscribe to the sort of extreme nominalism many associate with the 
term (6-10).  It is ironic, however, that though many have ascribed nominalist sympathies to Chaucer, few 
of his pilgrims could be called such; the ironic nihilism of the Pardoner and the Manciple may betray a sort 
of relativism associated with extreme nominalism, but Chaucer forecloses the possibility of such a 
nominalism by establishing the intentionality of objects in his world.  Ultimately, even the nihilistic 
characters on the pilgrimage contribute to this intentionality.  It is one of the paradoxes of the Tales that, for
the fictional world to seem realistic, the characters who perceive it must not seem realistic, not fully human.
3  In rhetorical terms, the text most obviously resembles the medieval form of the disputatio, in which 
people with opposing viewpoints debate before an audience.  However it differs from the diputatio form in 
three ways: first, the purported audience of the disputation are also the participants in it; Harry Bailly is a 
sort of judge arbitrating between the various poles of the argument, but he can hardly be said to be a 
reliable arbiter. Second, Chaucer presents a sort of headless disputation, a disputation without a clear goal 
in mind; the contest promises to reward the “best” tale with a fancy dinner, but the very definition of what 
would constitute the best tale is under constant redefinition within the Tales.  Disputation is supposed to 
discover a synthesis between the most reasonable points raised in the course of the argument, but the 
Canterbury Tales doesn’t move clearly or invariably toward such syntheses, preferring to let the 
irreconcilability of its perspectives remain intact.  On Chaucer’s use of disputation, see Delasanta 149 and  
Laskaya 104-111; for a more general exploration of disputatio as a form, see Novikoff.
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Mann refers us to estates satire, the Canterbury Tales itself can hardly be called satirical;4
Chaucer rarely works to explicitly undercut any of his pilgrims, and the sort of tolerant, if
sometimes ironic, inclusiveness of the General Prologue seems to forbid our supplying 
such a critique of our own. And unlike even the more polyvalent frames mentioned 
above, Chaucer’s internal audience rarely registers that it might be missing something, 
that the text might exceed the interpretive constraints that the pilgrims struggle to place 
on one another’s tales; when the text does register that possibility, it is usually through 
wordplay that seems to outstrip the intentions of the character uttering it.
A brief look at the example of the Nun’s Priest’s epilogue suffices to demonstrate 
the point: at the end of his infinitely complex and productive tale—wherein Chaucer, 
among other things, articulates an entire theory of his art—the Nun’s Priest announces 
“Lo, swich it is for to be recchelees/ And necligent, and truste on flaterye” (VII.3436-37).
The Nun’s Priest’s pronouncement is laughably reductive: the tale itself accomplishes so 
much more than this simple caution against recklessness and flattery.  The tale—as all of 
Chaucer’s poetry—is not reducible to a singular “moralite;” it is, as many critics have 
noted, about the chaff, the necessary generativity of the sign that exceeds its narrowly 
defined signified.5  The Nun’s Priest says as much: he tells his listeners to “taketh the 
fruyt, and lat the chaf be stille” (VII.3443); fruit and chaff are, of course, both exteriors to
a seed that never appears, and the pun on “stille” leaves us questioning whether the chaff 
should remain intact or fade into a quiet stillness. The Nun’s Priest’s pronouncement is 
4  Gerald Morgan is likewise uncomfortable with this characterization of Chaucer as a satirist, arguing that, 
though Chaucer often uses irony to poke fun at the follies of his characters, this hardly makes him a satirist 
(“Rhetorical Perspectives,” 133).
5  E. Talbot Donaldson provides the most oft cited rendition of this argument when he pronounces that the 
fruit of the Nun’s Priest’s Tale, “is the chaff” (150); Peter Travis likewise argues that the tale is, in many 
ways, designed to frustrate our critical impulses to explain it—the allegorical metaphor here thus points to 
an interior that only refers us back to its exterior (4-5).
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thus perfectly appropriate to his tale and yet in seeming tension, if not outright 
contradiction, with his earlier, limited moral.  The fruit and chaff metaphor is more a 
mistaken maxim that greatly outstrips its speaker’s intent; Chaucer leaves open the 
possibility that it has no content at all for the pilgrims, that its depth of meaning might be 
discarded by all the pilgrims as a datum irrelevant to their narrower agendas.  The bland 
prayer with which the Nun’s Priest ends the tale further suggests that his insight has been 
accidental: “Now, goode God, if that it be thy wille,/ As seith my lord, so make us alle 
goode men,/ And brynge us to his heighe blisse!” (3444-46).  The sentiment of this brief 
prayer bears only the loosest relevance to the tale or its limited moral about recklessness; 
it suggests that the Nun’s Priest is unaware of the deep insight he has just offered into his 
own text, that he only meant to make a pious, and perhaps a bit nervous, summary of its 
import from his own, similarly limited perspective.  Unable to account for what he has 
himself said about his own tale, he stutteringly tries to reassert the nervous, reductive and
conventional piety that he originally applied to the tale, but read through the matrix of its 
accidentally deeper moral, that piety comes off as general and bewildered. As his 
metaphor suggests, he tries to allegorize his own tale, to find the wheat within the chaff, 
but in doing so he inadvertently reveals that it is not susceptible to his, in this case rather 
crass, allegorization.
Chaucer deliberately embeds the sort of interpretive narrowness the Nun’s Priest 
displays into all his pilgrims;6 while Mann terms them “stereotypes” when describing this
feature of their characterization, for strategic reasons, I will be calling them “grotesques” 
6  The only two pilgrims who escape the characterization I offer here are Chaucer himself and Harry 
Bailley; they do display a sort of plasticity and receptivity to the ideas, arguments and aesthetics raised by 
the other pilgrims.  Their function within the Tales is complicated enough to merit a separate chapter, which
will be part of the longer project stemming from this dissertation.
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here, invoking both sense from classical drama and the modern sense deployed by 
Sherwood Anderson in his novel, Winesburg, Ohio.  Where a stereotype is more aptly the 
recipient of someone else’s limiting characterization, the grotesque is an agent projecting 
a limited angle of vision into a narrative space.  Anderson uses the term to refer to people 
who dogmatically adhere to a singular vision of the world around them; they take a 
limited truth and refract it onto every situation that demands interpretation, whether that 
truth is well suited to the situation or not.  In its Greek tragic roots, the term “grotesque” 
describes that reduction of the infinite emotional and ideological plasticity of the human 
face to a single, particular grimace; the mask worn by the grotesque freezes her face in a 
single attitude, rendering it capable of expressing a limited perspective on the matter 
playing out before her.  Grotesqueness describes a deliberate artistic restriction of range 
such that, wherever the grotesque appears, we instantly understand her attitude toward 
whatever matter is being played out on the stage.  A grotesque still, of course, requires 
interpretation—historical distance, for one, can render its grimace less legible, such that 
we must learn the attitude it represents before it can serve its function within the text.  
But the interpretive act it necessitates is of a different order than other interpretive acts; 
for a reader who is a part of the culture that produced it, the grotesque is understood 
before it presents itself, and only recognized rather than interpreted when it appears.7  As 
such, it is not styled as an an object to be interpreted, but as a subject position embedded 
within the text from whose vantage point we can witness other events and objects within 
the text.  Though the grotesque offers readers a vantage point into the text, the very fact 
7  Paul Ricoeur terms this sort of pre-narrative understanding Mimesis1, arguing that certain figures that 
narrative later borrows are organized by a sort of automatic reference to experience. We do not have to 
reflect on such figures, because they imperson some intrinsic aspect of “the sign system of a society” 
(Dowling 3). Chaucer’s reversion to this sort of effortless narrative should stand in stark contrast to the 
House of Fame, where he deliberately obstructed this sort of automatic mimesis.
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that a reader can accommodate multiple grotesques simultaneously within her mind 
signals an essential difference between the two: the reader retains an emotional and 
ideological plasticity, while the singular grotesque does not. The grotesque expresses a 
common mode of intentionality toward the text, even as it participates within the text; it 
disallows indifference or meaninglessness at the expense of plurality—interpretive 
plurality can only be achieved by populating the text with more grotesque figures.
   One of the most salient pleasures of reading the Canterbury Tales is inhabiting 
its various subject positions as the tales are being told, imagining how the Wife of Bath 
would scowl at the Man of Law, or the patrician facade the Knight must present to the 
Shipman, or even—to refract these perspectives further—how the Wife would respond to 
the Knight’s response.  We imagine their responses, not so much because we wonder 
whether or not they will be persuaded by the implicit ideas represented within the tale—
their persuasion, or better their affirmation or denial, will be determined by how well a 
given tale can be assimilated within their preexisting belief structure—but because we 
already know, more or less, how they would respond, and that knowledge gives us 
multiple points of access into the tale being told.  They form a microcosm of medieval 
English culture only insofar as they represent its various grimaces, the prefabricated 
response patterns that, in their totality, comprise any culture.  The ways in which these 
grimaces play across the texture of a tale is incalculably complex, not only because of the
multiplicity of perspectives available, but because—as in the Nun’s Priest’s epilogue—
Chaucer builds ambiguous and duplicitous details into his texts that threaten the ability of
any given grotesque perspective to account for them; just as the most ideologically driven
text exceeds and betrays the intent of its author, so do the pilgrims’ tales exceed the 
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grotesque perspectives of their speakers and listeners. And though particular details can 
be received in radically different ways based on the interpretive vector each grotesque 
pilgrim offers, some details seem to exceed and defy all the interpretive resources 
provided to us by their various grimaces. To the pilgrims, such moments are almost 
always accidents and embarrassments, moments where their grimace is, for a brief 
moment, transformed into a look of bewilderment.
The kinship between these grotesques and allegorical personifications is ironic, 
since the rhetorically based criticism that has dominated Canterbury Tales scholarship 
over the past fifty years began as a reaction against allegorical readings of the Tales.  
Earlier generations of critics like D. W. Robertson argued that the pilgrims and their tales 
proceeded from medieval delineations between vices and virtues.  Subsequent critics 
have justly challenged such reductive systems, exploring in various ways how the text 
voices other perspectives that often subvert the dominant ideological paradigms that were
institutionalized in allegory. Reader response critics like Leonard Michael Koff and 
Stewart Justman argue that the strenuous rhetorical appeals voiced by the pilgrims leave 
readers in a unique position of authority and judgement.  Historicists of all stripes have 
explored the historically situated arguments embedded within the text, puzzling out its 
participation in theological, political and other social disputes in the Middle Ages.  
Poststructural critics have, in a somewhat different direction, argued that the conflicting 
codes articulated within the poem announce a new relativistic understanding of the world;
Robert M. Jordan explicitly calls this Chaucer’s “rhetorical poetics,” which term 
describes his vision of poetry that struggles to expose the conventionality of language 
and, by extension, of all lived, social experience (25).  All such approaches share a basic 
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conception of the reader Chaucer imagines for his Tales: a deft, intelligent, learned, and 
perhaps even a bit cagey reader who is above all open to all the overlapping perspectives 
voiced within the text.  Chaucer’s text is constantly at the work of disclosing its 
polyvalence to us, the same polyvalence that the pilgrims themselves seem so intent on 
ignoring.  
But if this rhetorical strain of criticism has outlined the type of reader Chaucer’s 
text demands correctly—and I think it has—it has failed to answer, or largely even to ask 
the questions that such an open reader begs in relation to the Tales: why would a poet 
who is so sensitive to the complex rhetorical and interpretive dimensions of human 
experience—and who is so notoriously evasive about pronouncing his own agenda in the 
poem—make the primary, tale-telling characters in his greatest work so dogmatically 
rigid?  Why would he attribute such demonstrably polyvalent texts to characters whose 
most basic conception requires them to ignore polyvalence in their own text and any 
other they hear? Why would Chaucer imagine the intense hold that the pilgrims’ various 
ideologies have on them while seeming to curtail the power those ideologies can exert on 
others already possessed of their own ideology?   Or, to put these various questions more 
simply, why is the sensitive and receptive reader the Tales as a whole seems to demand so
devastatingly absent from its world? The Canterbury Tales gives voice to myriad ideas 
and opinions, becomes almost, as many of us have intuited, an incomplete compendium 
of medieval perspectives on life; it is a text about the ways in which language and 
narrative express those perspectives, making meaning arise from the otherwise lifeless 
matters of words, objects, people and ideas.  Yet just as insistently as it voices those 
particular opinions, it curtails their power to have any real effect within the text itself; 
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Chaucer certainly does not advocate any of the ideologies he allows to be voiced in his 
text, and his pilgrims—each possessed by her own ideology—seem virtually incapable of
being really persuaded by one another. If Chaucer’s text were about remaining open to 
the discourses that surround us—if it took even that most nebulous of ideological 
groundworks as its base—we might presume that Chaucer would provide us with better 
exempla of this behavior, or with a clearer indication that he is offering us negative 
exempla.  But Chaucer doesn’t really censure or sanction this static quality of his 
pilgrims: it is a means in his text, rather than an end in itself.
These questions that the Canterbury Tales poses to readers are not easily solved, 
and I want to stress that the answers I propose to them here are by no means exhaustive.  
This disjunction between the internal and external audience of the poem could provide 
much fruitful tillage for future criticism.  The conceptual narrative I have been laboring 
toward throughout this dissertation, however, does go some way to explaining the 
conundrums Chaucer has presented us with. The Canterbury Tales is Chaucer’s 
reconstitution of the project he set out upon in the House of Fame: its frame renders us 
aware of the pure, sonic passage of language that thrusts us toward an authentic presence,
but the  limited perspective imagined by each pilgrim onto that language forces it to 
cohere into a fully imagined narrative.  The static, limited quality of the pilgrims ensures 
that readers will never lose sight of language’s intentionality—there is too much at stake 
for the pilgrims in these transactions, and they react too violently to one another.  Even 
the irony of a character like the Manciple or the moral nihilism of the Pardoner come off 
as sincere in this structure;8 as another grimace being communicated into the poem’s 
8  In his chapter on the Manciple in Chaucer’s Italian Tradition, Warren Ginsberg argues that the 
Manciple’s irony does not threaten to undercut the possibility of meaning within the Tales, but is rather 
folded into the procession of different meanings offered by different pilgrims.  No pilgrim—not even the 
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internal audience, it loses its relativistic potential and becomes another intentional mode 
in the poem’s chorus of grotesques.  The urgency and consistency with which the 
pilgrims articulate those perspectives into the poem makes all of its matters thrum with 
significance.  The objects that populate its world are constantly being perceived, with 
certain of their features being foregrounded according to the trajectories offered by any 
given pilgrim.  Chaucer avoids, however, the stagnant, settled quality that would 
normally accompany such concrete acts of perceptual imagination by making them 
overlap and stutter over one another; the ideological perspective that any given pilgrim 
would posit onto an object, theme, etc. is unsettled—but not undermined—by the 
perspectives of the other pilgrims.  The settled quality of those perspectives is thus 
Chaucer’s means to unsettling them; by inhabiting each perspective, we ultimately gain 
an overriding sense of the strangeness of everything that populates the text, the way it 
exceeds whatever interpretation we apply to it.  This strangeness intimates the 
supplemental dimensions of their being, the transversal associations between objects 
mutually defining one another across an indivisible time; any given act of perception can 
only witness a single facet of an object’s total being, yet as they aggregate, they orient us 
toward that totality.  As we begin to see the overwhelming interest inspired by these 
textual matters, we glimpse the shiver of grace that animates them, underwriting their 
fiction; we begin to experience everything that populates its world as a fetish, inhabiting 
the temporal horizon leading to presence. 
By thematizing this sort of narrative strangeness in his text, Chaucer struggles to 
effect a reconciliation between Boccaccio’s insistent focus on the distractive particular 
Parson—can really have the last word in the poem; every perspective onto the poem is relativized, but not 
nullified, by the framing structure’s use of multiple grotesque perspectives.
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and Dante’s allegorization of grace.  As I argued in the previous chapter, Boccaccio must 
ultimately repudiate Dante’s stilnovist understanding of perceptual experience; for 
Boccaccio, Dante ultimately resorts to the same sort of allegorical tendencies that he 
himself criticized in the theologians; Dante’s project was to recuperate the experience of 
beauty in the material world, to make space and time the primary categories through 
which we understand the divine.  He demonstrates the sinuous way in which all beings 
distend from God’s presence; their persistence through time cannot be reduced to a series 
of broken, functionalist events.  Dante showed how an engrossed attachment to the 
physical world pushes us into the infinitesimal spaces between moments in which God 
resides; when each object within the world achieves the self-sustaining rationale of the 
fetish, their lover enters into an ecstatic experience of time that breaks upon the mystical 
vision of the divine.  But, to the love-sick mind of Boccaccio, Dante’s new vision only 
really pays lip-service to the physical world; its crass totalization of the physical world as
“the physical world” is precisely the problem—Dante’s revaluation of physical objects 
renders them all univocal.  Fetishism, ironically and paradoxically, transforms into 
allegory and so things lose the particularity that should make them engrossing.  The only 
solution is a literary ethic of distraction that must struggle to keep this allegorization of 
grace from erupting into the world and so liquidating everything within it.  In essence, he 
resorts to something akin to the Heideggerian solution with an entirely different emphasis
—he presses presence back into an unconscious background so that he and others can 
continue to operate within it.  The tales told by the brigata’s members are conceptually 
complex in a way that outstrips their utterers’ intentions, but the emphasis in Boccaccio is
on the ways in which they are rendered intelligible to and by members of the group.
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Chaucer learns Boccaccio’s lesson well and he will himself take this emphasis on 
interpretive intelligibility to a much further extreme than Boccaccio did—whereas the 
members of Boccaccio’s brigata are generally plastic and pliable as characters, Chaucer’s 
grotesques much more vividly depict interpretive work.  But in radicalizing Boccaccio’s 
procedure, he curves it back to something more closely resembling Dantean grace: he 
realizes that, in showing the often dogmatic and limited ways in which people reduce one
another and the world around them into an easily digestible ideological pattern, he can 
progressively reveal the deep particularity of those objects, the deep particularity that 
Boccaccio believed was ultimately unrepresentable and certainly irreducible. As these 
partial perceptual schema begin to overlap and stutter over one another, they 
simultaneously demonstrate the fallacy common to all such perspectives—their 
incompleteness—while also still progressively disclosing some feature integral to the 
object’s ontology.  Chaucer realizes that ideological contradiction—the narrative 
ingredient that Dante suppresses with his starkly monologic universe and that Boccaccio 
largely ignores in his search for an ontology of distraction—is capable of synthesizing the
seemingly opposed temporal phenomenologies of these two authors.  The grotesque 
contradiction implicit in Chaucer’s frame reveals the narrative objects of his world as 
strange: it establishes certain clearly unified poles of exchange, discloses certain features 
of those poles that help us to define and perceive them, but it equally renders each of 
those purportedly definitive conceptions incomplete.  Objects and ideas—words—
become phenomenological artifacts which people clamber over one another to understand
and appropriate; they become fetishes all, slowing readers’ perception of time as they 
begin to realize the vast complexity of the object passing across the surface of the text.  
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Yet those objects do not thereby lose their particularity; in fact, it is the particular ways in
which the pilgrims perceive them that disclose their renewing strangeness to us.  Though 
a full awareness of any such object remains wholly beyond our capacities, they do not 
thereby become ineffable but hypereffable.  
In what follows, I want to prosecute this essential argument through a reading 
which, for reasons of space and time, I have confined to the General Prologue alone.  
First, I will examine how Chaucer self-consciously opens the time and space of the poem 
within the first 34 lines.  From the outset of this introduction, Chaucer is thematizing 
strangeness in his poem—he begins by describing the natural world through a very 
strange pattern of relation and interaction that defies our expectations.  All the traditional 
elements of a description of Spring are present, but they do not unfold in the way we 
expect: rain falls upon flowers, but wind inspirits them rather than the sun; the sun is 
removed to the cosmic sphere of the zodiac instead.  By evoking then disrupting 
traditional patterns of association in these images, Chaucer gestures toward the 
strangeness in them that both incorporates and exceeds those patterns. Second, I will 
examine why Chaucer disrupts this time and space to construct his characters 
synchronically outside the narrative.  The pilgrims’ characterization does not occur in the 
Tabard Inn, but rather outside a consistently imagined time and space.  Finally, I will 
argue that these extra-temporal portraits reflect the procedures of temporal recombination
required to create a historical self—it is for this reason they are not elaborated within the 
frame chronotope itself.  They arrest duration into paradigmatic events to convey the 
grotesque angle of vision that codifies those events. We understand the pilgrim’s grimace 
because we see typical moments of it in a rapid succession that at once summarizes the 
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pilgrim and renders us conscious of the temporal procedures through which we have 
understood her.  The portraits demonstrate how each pilgrim’s organism is formed 
through a series of limited perceptions in the past that culminate in her grotesque 
perspective on the poem.  In this sense, the portraits act as a microcosm of the Tales as a 
whole, whose alternating narrative levels incite the same surface awareness of their 
language.  But the text neither leaves us lodged at the babbling surface of the text, nor 
within some puerile, grotesque perspective; rather, as it renders us conscious of our 
constitution of progressively defined objects within the poem,and  of the various 
perspectives which open a perceptual angle on those objects, we begin to glimpse a 
narrative world enlivened by its own strangeness.  As we aggregate those perspectives, 
we begin to experience the full, ecstatic temporality of his world that pushes us toward its
transcendently novel presence.
Aprille’s Consonant Dissonance
From its beginning, the Canterbury Tales sets out to thematize strangeness as a 
preeminent concern in the narrative.  The frame narrative that he initiates from the 
poem’s first “whan” generates a time and space within which objects thrum with their 
own, multifaceted natures.  Frames always force us to attend to the conditions of an 
object’s production, which conditions intimate their supplemental dimensions.  Frames 
construct a historical grid that mimics the way we construct history in lived reality.  They 
subsume disparate acts of narrative imagination into a single timeline, filled with 
hermeneutic linkages and allegorical resemblances.  As all narratives do, they open a 
space wherein we can imagine objects into being; they open a time by setting those 
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objects into motion relative to one another.  Each of these interrelations, however slight 
or tangential, whether they are explicitly voiced in the narrative or only implied by two 
objects’ coexistence, mutually defines the contours of each object’s being.  Typically, for 
such narrative objects to become convincingly imagined, they must mimetically draw 
upon the habitual patterns of relations that characterize their counterparts in lived reality; 
an author, thus, does not need to recount every minute interaction between objects as they
define one another, but can leave a vast majority of the activity occurring within her 
world unspoken.  In Heideggerian terms, the objects populating a narrative must remain 
tools; their assumed patterns of relation must remain beneath the surface of the narrative, 
lest its world fall into the abyss or become so absorbed in the minutiae of constituting 
itself that it accomplishes nothing.  
This insight into the tool-being of narrative objects reveals a temporal dimension 
to their imagining as well: the interrelations between narrative objects—and subsequently
themes, ideologies, etc.—are events that contract spans of time into paradigmatic 
instants.  Were we to try to imagine the full being of any one of these objects, the 
narrative would paradoxically halt—an author would become bogged, not only in 
describing the contact occurring between an object and all its fellows in a single instant, 
but also its radiation outward through time, in the infinitely divisible moments in which 
those objects approach one another.  Even beyond this, the relations between the organs 
and particles that comprise the object would have to be described in a likewise infinitely 
receding particularity. A text like Alice in Wonderland demonstrates these principles in 
violating them to an extent: Carroll restores a radical strangeness to every object 
inhabiting his world by never allowing it to persist in its expected pattern, by forcing 
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transversal associations and interactions between objects that forces us to glimpse the 
potentiality of what it could be—but never is—in our own lives.  He unravels the habitual
patterns of relation that define an object such that it can no longer simply inhabit that 
background of narrative tool being, but rather must be regarded as a unique existent 
fraught with supplemental dimensions of its being to which we have no access; these 
supplemental dimensions, perceived in their totality across time, locates that object on a 
temporal horizon that unwinds the very being it manifests, that reveal the inherent 
illusory quality that suffuses Carroll’s Wonderland.
Of course, no narrative ever approaches this limit point of absolute presence, nor 
do they really attempt to do so.  Even the danse macabre of Carroll’s characters assumes 
a minimal temporal awareness where their strangeness is manifested in the contracted and
calcified events of the text’s internal history; it can thus only suggest a radicality of 
awareness that it never achieves. As we have seen elsewhere, narrative, as a mode, is 
antithetical to the philosophical discipline that would lead to presence; the entire 
apparatus of any narrative renders perceptible certain features of its world and certain 
events wherein those features are manifested while marginalizing others. In other words, 
they reflect the pragmatism of perception, its categorical denial of the radical strangeness 
of an object that allows it to appear both in space and time.  Narratives are microcosms of
the machinery of history, and so they must invariably ignore the ontological point of 
presence from which they proceed.  Frames, however, orient us to this procedure of 
narrative production concurrently with whatever they imagine; they install an awareness 
of the presence that exceeds their text and undoes its various fictions within the 
superstructure of the text itself.  As we have seen in Boccaccio, frames make words 
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imagined objects as well as agents of further imagination; it is their materiality as 
imagined objects that the plague threatens.  In a frame, the word represents itself to us 
first as a word, operating within an imagined space and time to produce other spaces and 
times.  It restores to the imagined objects that populate it their grammatical dimension, 
which is synonymous with their radical being, their persistence through an infinitely 
divisible time.  The diverse contractions of sound into grammar through which an object 
is knit into an integrated being become the first layer of our imaginative consciousness; 
words are not simply intermediaries that convey some imagined object into another mind,
but are themselves the objects of their own mediating action; they are perfectly 
onomatopoeic, representing exactly what they are.  Frames discover a mimesis beyond 
mimesis in making the mechanism by which they are produced both their mediating 
subject and object: they change only media, transforming from letters on a page to letters 
proceeding from a mouth.  Each grammatical particle has its own, integrated, material 
existence as a voiced sound within the imagined space; like any narrative, they define 
their being in relation to other sounds, by resemblance and irresemblance, by their mutual
action upon one another. Those material sounds contract into various grammatical 
organisms that, in their turn, interrelate on larger scales of interaction. Frames reveal that 
any narrative encodes within itself, first, the narrative of its own transformation into its 
imagined world, the narrative of its words interrelating as objects themselves.  Every 
word—and every particle of every word—has its full strangeness restored to it at this 
signic waypoint, as it is poised to mean something particular within the text yet resides 
also in its own imagined space, with its own inherent materiality.
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For Boccaccio, this sort of perfect mimesis was the plague condition of language
—it imagines the word as a divided, disunified body; one cannot say, in an onomatopoeic
mimesis, that the word coheres into a unit at all, since each moment of each articulation 
fully accomplishes the work of representation it tries to effect.  If the brigata’s members 
make something more of that material language, it is a result of their infinite and partially
laudable capacity to be distracted.  Such perfect mimesis is also what Chaucer had sought
in the House of Fame— it uses the very linguistic and narrative means by which we 
normally calcify temporal succession into historical events to effect the dream of a 
perfected experience of time.  But where, in his earlier poem, Chaucer restored 
temporality to the speaker at the expense of the object spoken, in his frame, he resituates 
the narrated object itself within its temporal horizon. When we transform any word into 
its final referent in the framed tale, we remain aware of the intermediate layer of voicing 
that composes whatever object or action is being imagined; the objects that comprise the 
framed narrative are not merely physical beings, but are the products of speech acts, 
imagined simultaneously with their referents, that have been subjected to the rigors of 
grammatical subordination and coordination. Boccaccio enforced a similar meditation in 
his Decameron, but he did so largely to distract his reader from the plague-ridden 
preconditions of linguistic recombination; the coherence of words into discrete unities 
was poignant but devastatingly tenuous.  For Chaucer, however, the frame’s exposure of 
the linguistic preconditions of narrative are actually what enforce their coherence as 
discrete objects.  The interactions by which any object’s being is defined in the narrative 
are overlaid with this consciousness of the conditions of their production; their bodies are
suffused with the acts of grammatical coordination that render the linguistic sounds or 
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written representations of sound that compose them into a harmonious, enfleshed unity.  
Those conditions of an imagined object’s production run parallel to the historical 
grammar through which we apprehend objects and the moments through which they 
persist. Even if the object or character narrated is oblivious to this linguistic dimension of
its composition, and even if it acts in a fashion wholly consistent with its habitual 
patterns, it becomes strange again to us through this forced meditation on the linguistic 
transactions that produced it.  It regains those supplemental dimensions of its being that 
narrative—in relating particular, limited perceptions of that object by its fellows—
inevitably elides to some extent, that is relegated to an invisible tool-being.  Our sense of 
the strangeness of an object relies on recognizing the strangeness of all its component 
parts, each of which has had to deny its own strangeness in order to contract into some 
larger organism acting on a more complex scale of being; frames explicitly code this 
component strangeness into themselves by making the linguistic matters of which their 
worlds are composed appear.
In the Canterbury Tales, Chaucer announces this sort of strangeness as a 
preeminent theme from the outset; his effortlessly enigmatic introduction opens upon a 
scene that would be trite, were its expression not so odd:
Whan that Aprill with his shoures soote
The droghte of March hath perced to the roote,
And bathed every veyne in swich licour
Of which vertu engendred is the flour;
Whan Zephirus eek with his sweete breeth
Inspired hath in every holt and heeth
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The tendre croppes, and the yonge sonne
Hath in the Ram his half cours yronne,
And smale foweles maken melodye,
That slepen al the nyght with open ye
(So priketh hem Nature in hir corages),
Thanne longen folk to goon on pilgrimages. (1.1-12)
Chaucer’s initial “whan that” accomplishes two ends: first, it forces a self-conscious 
reflection on the narrative’s opening of a time—from its first word, Chaucer renders us 
aware of the referential procedures through which we spontaneously generate an internal 
time within his narrative;9 second, it introduces a hypotactic clause that will culminate in 
the “thanne longen” line.  However, the culmination of the clause is interrupted by four 
paratactic clauses that almost re-begin the hypotactic clause.  In essence, Chaucer 
confuses the expected associations between the paratactic elements of the sentence and 
aligns them with a seemingly unrelated association in the final then clause.  The image of 
April showers was wholly conventional even in Chaucer’s England; its generation of 
flowers likewise describes a habitual pattern of relation between rain, earth and flower.  
The space and time introduced in the Canterbury Tales thus, in its first image, seems to 
rely on commonplaces from our own experience that we can easily reflect into its 
imagined space, creating a simple set of agents and limited causal relationships between 
them.  But in his second, paratactic “whan,” these simple associations are deeply 
9  Katherine Slater Gittes, citing Ralph Baldwin, remarks on the explicitly temporal nature of the opening 
lines: “Chaucer makes interesting use of various Western grammatical and rhetorical devices so as to 
enhance the sense of motion, the passing of time.  As Baldwin observes, the first two words of the General 
Prologue, ‘Whan that,’ place the pilgrimage in time.  This initial temporal clause fixes at the outset the idea 
that time will play a significant role in the work…. Moreover, the sense of movement implicit in the 
pilgrimage is enhanced by the Prologue’s sketches of the pilgrims riding on their journey, although they 
have not yet actually embarked” (124)
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unsettled.  The second “whan” itself is stark in its refusal to relate the breath of Zephirus 
to the natural scene introduced immediately prior—clearly the wind is a component of 
the same scene, but it is not subordinated into the hypotactic logic of the initial clause 
instead introducing a second hypotactic clause still lacking the then clause that will make 
sense of each.  In general, hypotactical grammar—which subordinates one clause to 
another so as to clearly announce their relationship—tends to produce more coherent, or 
at least detailed, narrative spaces and times within a narrative.  It relates the objects and 
actions introduced by one clause to another in a more specific way than paratactic 
grammar, which tends to simply use “and” to string sentences and clauses together.  
Chaucer had experimented with an extreme form of parataxis in the lists of the House of 
Fame: there, at the limit of paratactic coordination, naming objects actually frustrated our
capacity to imagine them.  Chaucer introduces them into the same space, even the same 
pile of interrelating objects, but their bare coordination didn’t imagine a specific 
engagement between any two, and the proliferation of undeveloped relations actually 
frustrated our capacity to imagine them.  Here and throughout the General Prologue, 
Chaucer uses a play of hypotactic and paratactic arrangements not to disrupt his world’s 
imaginative potential, but to break the objects he sets in motion out of their habitual 
patterns of action and put them, instead, in relationships of indefinite potentiality.  We are
left to fill in the gaps that his parataxis leaves intact, to imagine the relationship between 
the scenes introduced and the objects inhabiting them.  
These paratactic elements do relate—they do, after all, inhabit the same space and
act upon one another within the same time—but after the first image of April rains, they 
relate only to disrupt one another’s habitual associations.  Rather, their habitual patterns 
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of behavior are confused and transposed onto one another.  Zephirus takes on a role that 
would be traditionally associated with the sun: inspiring the tender crops in every holt 
and heath.  The sun imagery should participate in the engendering of initial flowers, 
should, in fact, be the co-agent with the April rain in producing the flower; but Chaucer—
taken, perhaps, by a free association on the Latinate verb “inspired”—displaces the sun 
and puts a seemingly irrelevant wind into its place.  Inspiration is no longer conceived as 
generation as it was in the first image, as the harmonious mingling of elements into a 
Platonically informed flower;10 rather, the inspiration of the plant world is transformed 
into an image of wind moving through them, manifesting their casual persistence through
time.  Even in the natural science of Chaucer’s day, wind is almost ancillary to a flower’s 
generation when compared to rain, sun or the once draught-ridden earth.  Its inspiration, 
rather, is to set the imagined plants into motion, to restore an aesthetic dimension to the 
utilitarian “croppes.”  Like the images of the sea from the House of Fame, this tangential 
image of moving grain briefly encodes the sort of random movement that most closely 
imagines duration; it does not allow us to fix on any event, any particular stalk rubbing 
on one of its fellows, but still suggests a sinuous time.  From the manifest generation of 
his world using conventional, natural associations, Chaucer has slid into an image that, at 
once, unsettles those habitual interactions and re-renders them in terms of an aesthetic 
perception of time.  Perhaps what is most surprising about this effect is that he uses 
conventional imagery to unsettle the conventions by which we usually understand their 
10  In the Republic, Plato likens the sun to the Good (508 B,C); as the sun casts light onto sensible things, 
thereby rendering them perceptible, so does the Good make intelligible things intelligible. This relationship 
to a Platonized divinity was a commonplace in Medieval thought, transmitted principally through St. 
Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius; Dante makes frequent use of it, delineating between the physical and 
spiritual sun in Paradise.  While Chaucer’s line is too brief to really invoke the perhaps cumbersome 
apparatus of this symbolism, his deliberate choice to disassociate the sun from the inspiring action of the 
wind testifies to the pains he is taking to disassociate his imagery from its conventional associations.
363
component objects: the wind blowing across a field of grain is almost as conventional as 
the rain birthing flowers in Spring, but its situation in the paratactic assemblage of images
here render it again poignant and unexpected.
The sun imagery introduces a further tangent to this mix: where we would expect 
it to participate in the natural scenes previously imagined, Chaucer instead relocates the 
sun into a larger, cosmic grid; this image would be conventional as well, were it not for 
the earlier scenes that constructed their objects using earth-bound interactions rather than 
cosmic ones.  The scope of these heavenly interactions actually makes the sun—which 
Chaucer has led us to expect from practically the first line—a non sequitur, indifferently 
moving through the zodiacal heaven that dictates fate from afar, with little regard for the 
very particularized scale of being which the initial flower or the subsequent bird inhabits. 
The procession of the sun through the heavens, instead, marks out a cosmic and 
calendrical time whose scope starkly contrasts the minute duration imagined in the wind-
blown wheat.  While its “and” is a less stark conjunction than the previous “whan,” its 
irrelation to the world of wind, rain, flowers and crops is almost more poignant: its being 
is defined in relation to the outermost reaches of the cosmos, the fixed stars.  Yet despite 
this poignant detachment from the earthly sphere Chaucer has just described, the sun is 
unexpectedly anthropomorphized as a young runner; the stars, likewise are named in their
zodiacal, allegorical forms as analogues of earthly beings.  These analogical images are 
enough to tie the sun’s scale of existence to the more minute creations it should inform, 
but it only does so indirectly, without explicitly voiced, narrative relationships between 
the two objects.  The effect is, again, that Chaucer renders us aware of facets of the sun’s 
being as an object that the earlier images would have elided; those associations still exist
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—if the flower is to grow, the sun must light upon it—but those habitual patterns of 
interaction are not how it is introduced into the narrative.  Rather, another conventional, 
but unexpected aspect of its being—its movement through the larger sky—is imagined to 
make us again aware that the sun’s being exceeds the narrow constraints of the earthly 
organisms in which it takes part.
The final image of the open-eyed birds would likewise have fit quite 
harmoniously with the initial flower imagery, were it not for all the intervening material.  
It could even serve as the much-awaited “then” clause to either of the initial “whens.”  
But especially after the cosmic scale of the zodiac-traversing sun, the little birds seem 
like another non sequitur, abruptly pulling us back to a scale of being and temporal 
organization that we had just as abruptly left.  Chaucer, in fact, explicitly establishes them
as a non sequitur by detailing their odd custom of remaining open-eyed during sleep.  
This descriptive tidbit takes us to a scale of narrative detail not approached even in the 
rain-soaked flower—we must imagine not just the group of birds singing and sleeping, 
but the component parts of an individual face of an individual bird.  Yet Chaucer 
explicitly draws attention to the inexplicability of this detail, and he does so in the very 
natural terms whose causality has generated everything else in his world up to this point.  
Causal interactions occurring in the natural world have defined the contours of every 
named object in the space Chaucer has opened to this point, but the final detail 
characterizing that world seems to have no explicit cause; it is a facet of the birds’ being 
that exceeds any of the relations that have or could be articulated within the narrative.  
Instead, it is chalked up to a vaguely defined, allegorical Nature.  But Nature itself, in this
case takes on a dual significance: Nature, as the totalized organism of interconnected 
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entities in the world—the same Nature that permutates a flower out of rain and, 
implicitly, earth, wind and sun in the second line—might motivate this behavior, but 
equally it is an inexplicable, uncaused feature of the bird’s own internal nature, its 
individual quiddity.  Nature, in this latter sense, is an extremely odd allegorical figure, 
since it does not relate the idiosyncrasies of its appearance to a larger conceptual system 
as allegories usually do; in fact, it does precisely the opposite, sequestering the physical 
form the bird takes from any other system of relation by making it a circular consequence
solely of its own nature.  In this final image before the then clause, Chaucer has created 
an odd allegory of strangeness where allegory normally constrains an object into habitual 
patterns of behavior understood by a limited interpretive perspective; this is confirmed by
the bird’s irrelation to the prior images: rather than explicitly situating the birds among 
the flowers or crops, in the rain, blown by the wind or warmed by the sun, the birds only 
“maken melodye,/ and slepen al the nyght with open ye.”  These birds fit well within the 
various scenes described, but their description gestures toward the ways in which they 
exceed the scenes that they inhabit.  While their relations with one another may shape the 
being of each object named, it does not exhaust that being—in Chaucer’s narrative, as in 
lived reality, they exceed the ways in which they are perceived by one another and 
ourselves.
Critics who have associated the introduction to the General Prologue with the 
Genesis account of creation are thus, at once, entirely right and entirely wrong to relate 
the two stories.11  Chaucer is self-consciously meditating on the temporal creation that he 
11  See, in particular, Nitzsche and Willard.  The association with Genesis may be a nod to the Decameron, 
itself a play on patristic “Hexameron” literature providing exegesis on the Genesis creation story.  Not 
knowing exactly why Boccaccio selected that title, Chaucer might have understood it as a self-conscious 
meditation on artistic production and so opened his own work with a similarly reflective allusion.
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effects with a few casual and sparsely related terms organized into progressively larger 
images inhabiting a cohesive space; but whereas the Genesis creation details the 
construction of the various scales of time from the top down and in a very ordered 
fashion that proceeds from the basic creation of spatial directions to the generation of 
different kingdoms of living beings, Chaucer jumbles the various scales of creation 
around to make their habitation of the same space poignant and miraculous.  The Genesis
account of the Creation essentially describes the emanation of the varying scales of 
temporal organization from God’s presence.  The cosmic scale of time is imagined in the 
creation of heaven and earth, and light from darkness; this act defines the most minimal 
spatial grid through which cosmic objects can move and thereby manifest time.  The 
earthly scale is imagined in the separation of ocean from land, which creates another 
spatial grid within the larger cosmic one for beings to manifest a different scale of time.  
The various plants and animals that populate the earth install their own temporal scale on 
progressively more local levels.  Finally, Adam and Eve introduce the specifically human 
scale of time and the beginning of the span of human history.  Where the Genesis account
is remarkable for the order with which it sets out these scales of being, Chaucer’s brief 
revision of the creation meditates, instead, on their cohabitation of the same time and 
space, their mutual persistence through a common duration.  Where objects that are 
typified by a particular scale of temporal organization must be perceived in terms of their 
habitual patterns of interrelation, those objects nonetheless exceed those narrow patterns 
and manifest a being that impinge upon other scales, and that exceeds any given 
perception of it.  Chaucer’s carefully composed jumble of associations and narrative 
images imagines the strangeness of the objects that inhabit his world rather than their 
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habitual patterns; his space and time is suffused with this strangeness through which they 
all manifest a sinuous, unfolding time.
A more interesting, if less certain, creationist analogue to Chaucer’s opening lines 
can be found in Boethius’s De Institutione Musica, wherein he likens the harmony of a 
musical composition to the constitution of material objects.12  In the first chapter of that 
text, Boethius takes great pains to describe the moral consequences of music:  complex, 
inharmonious music can incite listeners to all manner of perversions, while simple, 
harmonious music generates individual and social harmony.  For Boethius, the behavioral
consequences of music results from the intrinsically musical nature of our being; as he 
notes of the Pythagoreans, “they knew that the whole structure of our soul and body has 
been joined by means of musical coalescence” (7).  The physical, behavioral, and moral 
attributes of a person are tantamount to the notes that, when perceived in their totality, 
converge into the whole of her being; if those elements are consonant, there will be a 
harmony and unity in the resultant form, if they are dissonant, the form will be 
inharmonious.  I will return to the application of this principle to the human individual in 
a moment, but more pertinent now is Boethius’s notion that this musical logic coheres in 
other naturally occurring objects as well.  In describing “cosmic” music, Boethius asks 
if a certain harmony did not join the diversities and opposing forces of the 
four elements, how would it be possible that they could unite in one mass 
and contrivance?  But all this diversity gives birth to variety of both 
seasons and fruits in such a way that it nevertheless imparts one structure 
to the year.  Whence, if you imagine one of these things which supply such
12  Chaucer’s description of the “music of the spheres” in the House of Fame very likely refers to this text, 
though the idea was widespread by Chaucer’s time; moreover, the jumbled effect of the House’s music 
seems an early predecessor to this more measured and coherent presentation of ontological harmonization.
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diversity taken away, then all things would seem to fall apart and, so to 
speak, preserve none of their consonance. (9)
In this statement, Boethius succinctly describes the contraction of component objects into
organisms persisting through progressively larger scales of temporal being: every such 
object thrums its own music into space, parts of which resonate with other notes from 
other objects.  As these consonant musics blend, they form new movements within the 
larger opera of the creation itself; they define one another’s contours as varying cells 
determine one another’s function.  The component parts of this music are infinitely 
divisible, even past the level of the unified note:  “one should not think that when a string
is struck, only one sound is produced, or that only one percussion is present in these 
numerous sounds; rather, as often as air is moved, the vibrating string will have struck it” 
(11).  But insofar as they remain constant, exposing particular facets of themselves to 
particular facets of their fellows, they can contract into unities that form the constituent 
parts of progressively larger unities: notes, refrains, movements, compositions, etc.  
Boethius’s music articulates the contraction of duration into the instant that is the basis of
material bodies.  
If we are to understand the true import of Boethius’s musical creation, however, 
we must not imagine the creation as a single song, the pattern of whose notes is clearly 
discernible to the knowing listener.  Rather, the music of the spheres is a multiple music, 
a music where a single note can participate in many compositions simultaneously.  This is
the mystery of existential music that Chaucer grasped so thoroughly throughout his poetic
career: any given note-body possesses a host of transversal associations simultaneously; 
as a given note can operate in a virtually infinite number of harmonious relations between
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other notes in different musical pieces, so too do objects within the world emanate a 
being to which any other object can only partially respond.  We rely on processes of 
perceptual selection to make the note cohere exclusively into the music it takes part in; 
such a note must be divorced from all the other noises surrounding it, the embarrassed 
cough from an audience member at a concert for instance. We must elide the relationship 
between those two sounds in order to make the desired relationships that constitute the 
musical piece function.  No single song ever captures the radical potentiality of the notes 
that comprise it; if they attempted to do so, they would paradoxically become 
cacophonous, each note struggling to become all notes such that all relations would be 
present at each moment within the singular song.  Clearly this is absurd: a given note 
only begins to achieve its potentiality across the entire history of musical composition, 
and even then it is not exhausted.  Just so, the varying organisms in which an object 
participates account for only a small facet of its total being; but its mystery is not lost, 
since even as it participates in one song, one organism, it can simultaneously participate 
in others that go unperceived; its tool being resides in the indefinite musics it participates 
in, even though no single music can understand its multiplicity without becoming 
cacophonous.  These transversal relations occur at every scale of temporal organization 
and, conceived in their totality, constitute the strangeness of the object, its constituent 
parts, and its larger organism-objects.
The space that Chaucer opens is of this Boethian, transversal order; its brief, 
episodic images are notes sounding within the texture of a larger creation.  Those notes 
participate in harmonious organisms, but Chaucer does not let us simply constitute those 
organisms on a particular, fixed scale of temporal being.  Rather, his beginning opens 
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onto several different melodies whose lateral consonance is deepened by the text’s 
witness to the diverse and varying compositions in which they take part.  The music 
Chaucer announces is a music of the multiple, a music that will knit together a larger 
creation by showing the inherent strangeness of the notes which comprise it.  That 
strangeness cannot be constituted as I must, of dubious necessity, attempt to constitute it 
myself: strangeness cannot be theorized within a totalized, abstract term without making 
the term a caricature of what it attempts to represent.  Rather, the strangeness that leads to
fuller temporal awareness can only be approximated by showing the limited habitual 
patterns in which any object participates; it is expressed by dint of the multiplicity of 
these limited perspectives, which multiplicity does not make any given relation somehow
more ephemeral, but actually more substantial.  The transversal musics in which those 
notes take part—even when those musics might seem antithetical to one another’s 
purposes—expose the supplemental dimensions of that object which make it a unified 
object; it likewise implies the strangeness of every other song and component part of 
every song that, in their unimaginably complex totality, form the weave of being.  When 
each song, note and percussion of each note achieves its own special resonance without 
detracting or distracting from the resonance of its fellows, our attention, rapt in their 
infinite meaning, peeks beyond the temporal horizon they all inhabit to glimpse the 
superabundant presence behind them.
All this Chaucer’s opening intimates before it has even reached the “then” of its 
first hypotactic clause; the deferred expectancy of all these paratactic “whens” is part of 
how Chaucer generates his staggering vision of the creation he has opened up.  When we 
reach its actual “then” clause, it too feels almost like a non sequitur: the above causes 
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seem to have little to do with the idea of pilgrimage, aside from the tenuous fact that 
pilgrims traverse the natural world, and so prefer to walk about once the weather has 
brightened up.  In reality, Chaucer plays the same trick he has been playing for the past 
11 lines, confusing expected hypotactic relationships by placing them with paratactic 
ones.  We learn a few lines later that English Pilgrims wend especially to Canterbury, “the
hooly blisful martir for to seke,/ That hem hath holpen whan that they were seeke” (1.17-
18).  Ultimately, this detail should be the when clause: when pilgrims have recovered 
from illnesses that the martyr of Canterbury helped to cure, then they long to go on 
pilgrimages.  This rather dull rendition captures a much clearer habitual logic behind the 
social organism of pilgrimage: its music is that of a rather bloodless piety, easily digested 
and soon forgotten.  But Chaucer, instead, puts the detail at the end of another series of 
paratactic clauses that seem only to reiterate and elaborate upon the line that spawned 
them: 
Thanne longen folk to goon on pilgrimages,
And palmeres for to seken straunge strondes,
To ferne halwes, kowthe in sondry londes;
And specially from every shires ende
Of Engelond to Caunterbury they wende. (1.12-16)
Though these details about the longing folk from line 12 are again placed in a simple, 
paratactical correspondence with one another, the details that each elaborate seem again 
to stutter: the palmers seeking “straunge strondes” and the “ferne halwes” of “sondry 
londes” accords well with the vision of springtime recounted above, but seems to conflict
somewhat with the relatively local, national pilgrimage site of Canterbury toward which 
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so many of them tend.  The “straunge strondes” thematizes a sort of wanderlust 
appropriate to the strange description of springtime offered initially: what summons the 
pilgrims from their mundane, habit driven lives is the inherent strangeness of objects in 
the world; that strangeness is most accessible once we have escaped our familiar 
surroundings, which are encrusted with our preconceptions of them.  
Pilgrimage thus describes the urge for a deeper perceptual experience within the 
material world.  In most of the religious literature of the time, this model of pilgrimage 
was censured as inspiring a transgressive curiositas;13 the physical journey of pilgrimage 
was supposed to be a metaphor for one’s journey toward deeper religious understanding 
in life—it subordinated all of the experiences one had on the road to their function as 
guideposts to a singular site of religious significance.  In its metaphorical aspect, 
pilgrimage articulates an essentially ascetic form of spirituality: it reduces the being of 
the objects one encounters on the road, transforming them from superabundant things 
into singular signs; in its most intense, fatalistic aspect, events occurring on the road 
could be “read” in spiritual terms, as they are in a text like Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress.  
In that later allegorical work, curiosity was, in a sense, the only form of transgression; 
Christian’s journey is only diverted when he himself forgets to read the world around him
in terms of its allegory.  When he treats the obstacles he encounters as physical beings 
within the imagined space of the world, they prove insurmountable; but when he reads 
them as limited signs pointing to a renovated, transcendent awareness—when the 
pilgrimage site itself, is only a sign gesturing toward a spiritual awareness that fully 
surpasses the material world—he tends to progress rather painlessly.14  Christian’s 
13  See Dyas 151; Zacher 4.
14  On this use of allegory in Pilgrim’s Progress, see Hill 160.
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pilgrimage most fully articulates a model of pilgrimage that had been operative hundreds 
of years before Bunyan wrote his text, from almost the inception of the social practice of 
pilgrimage: namely, that the spatial journey of the pilgrim is, in itself, meaningless; the 
objects encountered along the way are purposeful, only insofar as they can be subsumed 
within a larger interpretive context that transcends awareness of the material world.
In this institution of pilgrimage, Chaucer had thus found a succinct way of 
framing the problem that Dante’s entire physical-metaphysical apparatus labored to pose: 
why must signs exist if their only purpose, their only being, is to point toward something 
they are not?  Pilgrimage offers Chaucer a way to explore the inherent absorptiveness of 
material objects in the space and time he has created, as the eros of Beatrice had led 
Dante to a renewing fetishism of the entire cosmos.  In other words, Chaucer’s text 
presents a renewed vision of curiosity: it treats every object and idea that populates his 
world as a relic.  The relic, in essence, summarizes the problems of pilgrimage: it offers 
transcendent understanding only insofar as it prompts reflection on and imitation of the 
life of the saint to whom it belonged.  Saints are considered holy largely in proportion to 
their transcendence of the material world; the worship of relics is thus paradoxical, if not 
outright contradictory, since they became holy by surpassing their material bodies and 
possessions, which objects pilgrims worship by fetishizing.  The relic embodies the 
internal struggle of interpretation that resides in every object: we venerate it for 
instantiating a religious point of view, yet its very appearance signals the existence of 
supplemental dimensions of its being that have nothing to do with that point of view.  We 
must suppress the strangeness of a relic to transform it into a sign, yet its apparent 
materiality is what makes it so valuable as a religious artifact.  Chaucer’s ultimate goal in 
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the Tales is to make the maligned materiality of the object itself sacred, or rather to make 
the relic not sacred at all, but strange.  Whatever the Pardoner might say to the contrary, 
the materiality of relics, of the pilgrimage site, or any of the objects encountered along 
the way do not render them meaningless.  We are not simply duped when we locate 
meaning within these objects, dressing up, as Harry Bailly will suggest, turds.  Rather, we
participate in the miraculous generation of their strangeness, they in ours; we organize a 
scale of temporal existence that manifests the transcendent novelty of the presence 
through which we persist.  The spiritual dimension of the relic does not lie in its 
particular, historical relationship to a saint, but rather in the fascination that it prompts, 
the experience of time that it provokes within us as we try to absorb its full, incarnational 
radiance.  Like the eros of Beatrice, this radiance is not confined to any single relic, nor is
its alternate experience of time: it is inherent within everything.
Chaucer’s palmers—incited by the renewal of a strange spring—seek out these 
unfamiliar sites so that they can bask in just such a radiance.  The nebulous quality of 
Chaucer’s “straunge strondes” and “ferne halwes” allows him to distill strangeness into a 
narrative theme where his earlier, disjointed grammatical relationships had only been able
to imply it.  However, as I have noted, strangeness itself should never be formulated in 
the abstract, or at least, it should only be so formulated with a consciousness of the 
violence one does to the concept.  Strangeness, in reality, should not have a name in 
itself, since its entire rationale is based in the particular; its conceptualization must not 
frustrate the very absorptive attention to an object’s being that it should prompt.  It is this 
allegorization of grace that Boccaccio found so problematic in Dante.  In Chaucer’s 
Prologue, announcing strangeness as a theme tends to efface the particularity of objects 
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when it should prompt a more studied consideration of their particular attributes; we run 
the danger of rendering all objects contradictory signs of their own strangeness, which 
again reduces them.  Just so, Chaucer stutteringly reframes his strange conception of 
pilgrimage into something wholly local, explicable and particular.  But in explaining the 
impulse to pilgrimage that his hypotactic structure has promised from the very beginning,
he deliberately suggests an explanation that does not exhaust all possible reasons for 
embarking on a pilgrimage; notably, it does not seem to explain the rationale prompting 
any of Chaucer’s own pilgrims to embark on their own journey toward Canterbury.  
Rather, it presents a particularly intimate relation between pilgrim and shrine that the text 
seems to explicitly sequester from universal significance.  The pilgrims prayed to their 
patron saint for simple bodily sustenance—for the continuance of their embodied lives 
rather than the escape from them which we would expect from a metaphorical 
pilgrimage.  The saint “hath holpen” them, aids them not in the showy terms of a miracle,
but in the mundanely intimate terms we might expect from a kind neighbor.  Chaucer 
refuses to even say that the holy blissful martyr cures them, that his miraculous 
intercession had a direct historical effect visible to all; rather, he suggests that the faith 
they placed in him—the meaning with which they invested his image—sustained them in 
whatever fashion.  Chaucer does not exclude the miraculous, but he certainly does not 
insist on it.  
The almost domestic feel of the interaction between pilgrim and saint makes the 
pilgrimage irreducibly personal; the explanation hardly suffices for all pilgrims, and those
who do journey for this reason seem to do so, not so much to venerate the saint’s 
awesome, cosmic powers, but rather to express gratitude for a particular event which 
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made that saint personally meaningful to them.  The local pilgrimage shrine dedicated to 
that saint offers the pilgrim a physical locale at which she can consecrate this singular 
meaning she has generated; it allows that meaning to become visible, not as a total 
expression of the saint’s power or an all-encompassing explanation of why pilgrims 
journey to his shrine, but as a singular, particular aspect of that saint’s meaning.  
Pilgrimage, in this sense, also becomes an overarching metaphor for the social 
construction of the meaning of an object or agent, but Chaucer forces us to attend to the 
particular events that comprise that totalizing concept.  The saint’s meaning is the totality 
of its effects upon the world; like any object, his relationships define his contours—more 
so, in the saint’s case, since he has no physical body but only fragmentary relics—but 
those relationships cannot be abstracted without losing the particularity that defines them.
The “straunge strondes” sought by the palmer will be empty without the personal 
dimension of the Canterbury pilgrim; their strangeness consists not simply in their 
defiance of expected, habitual patterns of relations, but in their engaging in many habitual
patterns of relation, none of which exhaust the totality of their being.
Within the first eighteen lines of his poem, Chaucer has deftly announced a local 
and particular strangeness as a preeminent theme in his text; it is the theme that 
undergirds all poetic creation, since it describes the miraculous qualities of space and 
time.  The lines following this opening seem, by contrast, posititvely utilitarian:
Bifil that in that seson on a day,
In Southwerk at the Tabard as I lay
Redy to wenden on my pilgrymage
To Caunterbury with ful devout corage,
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At nyght was come into that hostelrye
Wel nyne and twenty in a compaignye
Of sondry folk, by aventure yfalle
In felaweshipe, and pilgrimes were they alle,
That toward Caunterbury wolden ryde. (1.19-27)
Chaucer’s “bifil” again almost seems to re-begin the Canterbury Tales, running parallel 
to his initial when; but this beginning presents a scene that is much more coherently 
imagined.  The same play of paratactic and hypotactic elements that made the earlier 
images stutter atop one another here function precisely as they should, almost as though a
virtuouso Chaucer has shifted into a mundane narrative mode to set his earlier lines in 
relief.  Like the earlier “whan,” “bifil” introduces a temporal hypotactic clause, though 
Chaucer here starts with the “then,” the result of an action to be described.  His paratactic
“in” clauses situate us within an easily defined time and space, reconfiguring the complex
“seson” described earlier into something much more explicitly functional.  Chaucer’s 
proxy appears as the “I” within the text, offering an explanation for the scene being 
described through his well-defined motives.  After these wholly explicable, paratactic 
explanatory clauses, Chaucer simply fulfills the promise of his initial “bifil” in describing
the pilgrim group that has coalesced in the Tabard “by aventure.”  Chaucer allows a more 
simple narrative mimesis to shape the images within the scene he defines now; the 
objects and agents within the narrative contract easily into the habitual organism of the 
Tabard Inn, which structure was built for such occurrences.  After pulling his reader 
between various scales of temporal organization and suggesting transversal associations 
between seemingly irrelevant objects within his world, Chaucer settles more comfortably 
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into the scene imagined by his frame. However, the earlier material is enough to send a 
shiver of strangeness even into this casually imagined scene; the “by aventure,” in 
particular, suggests the same sort of tangential relations that have typified the 
introduction up to this point.  The pilgrims are chance companions, each with a particular 
angle of vision they open onto Chaucer’s world.  Only the happenstance of occupying the
same relative space and time knits these characters into an organism; they do not all 
proceed from a single, monolithic, institutionalized background that might homogenize 
the way they perceive their shared road.
Within such a group, transversal, conflicting, overlapping perceptions are 
inevitable; the space they occupy will thrum with its own strangeness, now, by virtue of 
how thoroughly we invest within the consistent scene he imagines.  Chaucer shifts modes
here to avoid a sort of poststructural bind: were he to persist in fostering the sense of 
strangeness about all his narrative objects, they would, paradoxically, not cohere very 
well into objects.  Chaucer’s genius is to make the grammar of the imagination break us 
out of the habitual patterns of thought which that grammar itself fosters.  His earlier 
conceptualization of pilgrimage is sufficient to fracture the scene he imagines by virtue of
making it more comprehensible; if pilgrimage describes a journey toward any meaning—
if it is a matter of a fetishizing curiosity—Chaucer will have embedded many worlds into 
the single, cohesive space he opens here.  Insofar as a fictional character perceives the 
world she inhabits, she will open up a particular angle of vision upon it that overlaps, 
without simply duplicating or negating, the angles of vision opened by all her fellow 
characters and objects; this is simply inherent in the structure of a narrative that creates 
space by defining different perceptual positions within itself.  But in his pilgrimage motif,
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Chaucer manages to codify and calcify those angles of vision to put them into sharper 
relief with one another; the pilgrimage site is a foil for the total schema of the journeying 
pilgrim that forces her to clarify and systematize, to some extent, the basic tenets by 
which she perceives and interprets the world around her.  By organizing his frame around
pilgrimage, Chaucer essentially transforms his characters into grotesques perceiving 
aspects of the people, objects and institutions around them while ignoring others.  In the 
aggregate of their particular logics, they intimate the way in which their world exceeds 
them; they even partially give the lie to one another’s limited identities by transplanting 
one another’s modes of meaning into different registers, the Knight’s chivalry into the 
Miller’s fabliau.  It is to the text’s grotesque portraiture we must now turn to develop a 
more nuanced understanding of how Chaucer composes these limited, but well defined 
angles of vision upon his world.
Arrested Time
Given the lengths to which Chaucer’s opening has gone in order to imagine a 
convincing time and space, his next move in the narrative seems inexplicable: he arrests 
the very time and space he has composed.  The frame narrative essentially derails into the
descriptiones of the portraits, which do not take place in the cohesive time and space 
imagined by the frame.15  Chaucer makes this explicit, while simultaneously drawing 
attention to the spatiotemporal thematics that preceded the break:
But nathelees, whil I have tyme and space,
Er that I ferther in this tale pace
Me thynketh it acordaunt to resoun
15  On Chaucer’s use of the literary and rhetorical technique of the descriptio, see Mann 176-86.
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To telle yow al the condicioun
Of ech of hem, so as it semed me,
And whiche they weren, and of what degree,
And eek in what array that they were inne. (1.35-41)
We should pause for a moment to consider the road Chaucer has not taken, the 
compositional road that he in fact leads us to expect, only to swerve from it at the last 
moment.  The Tabard Inn would have provided a sensible and simple vehicle for 
introducing the pilgrims within the narrative time and space that Chaucer has already 
composed; in fact, though he explicitly tells us that he is breaking from that narrative, 
many readers still retain some sense of Chaucer the observer, digesting barroom 
conversations into his portraiture (though he includes many details that he couldn’t 
possibly have gleaned from such encounters in his portraits).  The device of the Inn 
seems almost explicitly designed to allow Chaucer to adhere to the unities of time and 
place while still producing a portrait much like those he actually writes.  
But Chaucer does not take this opportunity he has supplied himself; he instead 
steps out of that narrative space, carving out a unique role for himself in doing so.  
Chaucer’s casual commonplace, “whil I have tyme and space,” actually places him in the 
position of the creator, a position he has assumed since his originating “whan;” as he 
often does, Chaucer uses an almost trite platitude—what my advisor once lovingly 
termed a “throw-away phrase”— to articulate some of the most important ideas running 
through his text.  This recurring strategy runs parallel to his initial description: it takes a 
phrase that something like Orwell’s “Politics and the English Language” would deplore, a
phrase simply that acts as unthinking mental gum gluing one canned phrase to another, 
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and locates the deeper significance of the narrative within it.  In a sense, such phrases are 
simply compositional tools—they are usually situated within the tectonic shifts of the 
narrative as it transitions from one important section to another; they are almost 
automatically digested into the narrative’s machinery, easing the friction between one 
element of that machinery and another.  But Chaucer offers this compositional glue 
deeper dimensions if we slow down to look at it; these most basic tools—which generally
have little or no imaginative potential in themselves, serving rather to segue between 
other acts of imagination—have their own strangeness that mimics the strangeness of the 
objects represented in the text.  Of course, this is true of any word whatsoever in a broad 
sense, but Chaucer takes special pains to make these canned phrases, whose component 
words seem to have very set relationships with one another, exceed themselves and the 
patterns that have joined them together.
In this particular instance, his throw-away phrase identifies the spatio-temporal 
generation of his narrative with the surface level of its grammar; “time” and “space” here 
are understood first as the time and space of Chaucer’s composition, the physical space 
on the pages in front of him and the time it would require to read or write a consistent 
line of text.  This sense is reinforced when Chaucer makes “pacing” a textual image: his 
literal pacing imagined in the pilgrimage frame is accompanied by an authorial pacing 
across the page.  While his first introduction locates us immediately within the creation 
that the Canterbury Tales imagines, Chaucer here redacts its narrativity to enforce a brief 
recognition of the conditions which undergird that creation’s production.  In a sense, he 
briefly enforces another frame that enframes the pilgrimage itself: the image of Chaucer 
with blank sheets of parchment spread out before him.  This textual sense overlaps with 
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the image of Chaucer as a creator figure who literally has the imagined time and space of 
his fiction under his command at its outset, before it has taken on the habitual patterns of 
its genre.  Even the narrative imagined within the frame—which will unsettle our 
capacity to imagine the tales spoken within that frame by enforcing a simultaneous, dual 
imagination of speaking pilgrim and tale told—is itself unsettled by this awareness of our
constitution of that frame narrative from words on a page.  This same tactic will recur in 
later mentions of the textuality of the Tales, perhaps most famously in Chaucer’s 
interruption of the Miller’s Prologue wherein he instructs readers directly to “turne over 
the leef and chese another tale” (1.3177).16  Such seeming interruptions actually just 
extend the logic prosecuted by the frame at large: they use single terms to enforce 
multiple, simultaneously imagined scenes.  They implicate each linguistic act within 
multiple imagined scenes, using each imagined scene to imagine a further one within 
itself. In doing so, they not only render us aware of the procedures by which they are 
produced, but they reveal the multiple nature of the words used to compose them.  They 
draw us back to the physical word on the page as it begins to coalesce into the 
progressive grammatical units that give us meaning. However, unlike the House of 
Fame’s word bodies, they do so by enacting multiple levels of imagination; likewise, as 
16  Such scenes run parallel to what Donald Howard has called the “unimpersonated artistry” that occurs 
occasionally and at varying intensity within the Canterbury Tales. Howard notes that many lines that are 
purportedly spoken by a pilgrim actually seem to reflect the ideas and attitudes of Chaucer the author or 
narrator; the frame seems to deliberately break its fiction, making the words that proceed from a characters 
mouth unlikely or impossible for them to actually speak.  H. Marshall Leicester has justly criticized a too-
frequent recourse to this solution, arguing that very few such moments unequivocally break the fiction, but 
even he admits that there are moments within the tales when the narrative shell of the pilgrimage becomes 
more translucent, as it were, allowing us to see the shadow of the author manipulating his characters.  In 
reality, this does not break the fiction at all—it simply reinstalls us at a prior shell that the text itself has 
imagined, the frame of Chaucer sitting before his papers while he has time and space. The Canterbury 
Tales is continually at the work of reminding us of its narrative shells, never allowing us to become to 
comfortably situated in any one of them; these techniques of implausibility recollect the frames that 
surround the frame proper, not taking us out of the poem’s imagined space but reminding us that the 
imagined spaces of the tales are multiple and simultaneous.
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we imagine the objects populating the narrative world, we remain aware of the perceptual
grammar we apply to them and the ways that they exceed that grammar.
Thus, to say that Chaucer has really arrested the movement of his narrative in this 
moment is already too great a claim; to say that time is ever arrested or calcified is 
likewise too great a claim, though its floes and eddies do vary in different places and at 
different depths.  Every object, imagined or real, is fraught with the varying frames which
render it strange; framing describes a multiplicity of perception and possible perception 
operative in any imaginable world; it indicates that the most basic temporal grammar by 
which we compose ourselves and others into coherent entities implicates us in other 
potential modes of imagination, other lives, other spaces and times.  A singular narrative 
tends to prioritize one such grammar at the expense of others (though no narrative can 
ever fully consummate the singularity of its grammar); the radical strangeness of the 
object can of course be intimated in other literary modes, as in Realism’s tip-of-the-
iceberg aesthetics or Postmodernism’s aesthetic of incoherence, but generally such 
approaches frame that strangeness as something ineffable, something which narrative 
constitutionally cannot incorporate within itself.  In this sense they align with 
Heidegger’s refusal of presence within his tool-ontology: Heidegger essentially refuses 
the narrativity of the world, making its true ontological core some vastly 
incomprehensible mesh of relations.  Once we have picked at a single strand of that 
mesh, we have lost “sight” of the whole; insofar as we can compose the narrative of any 
given set of relations between objects or within a single object, we have restricted the 
being of each object we have defined. The philosopher, like the mystic, can only operate 
by dint of silence, by a refusal of narrativity.  Most literary modes, when they self-
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consciously reflect on the ontology of the objects they compose, imply their strangeness 
by one of these two extremes: by making them exceptionally concrete, thereby gesturing 
toward the limitations of the way we have conceptualized their concreteness, or by 
rendering them almost incoherent, frustrating our capacity to imagine them in the first 
place.  Both operate on an apophatic methodology that leaves the supplemental 
dimensions of the object not just unsaid, but unsayable.
Frames, by contrast, operate on a logic of the hyper-effable; certainly, they leave 
much of the strangeness of their objects unsaid, but they do not thereby suggest that they 
are unsayable.  On the contrary, everything about them is radically effable; they are shot 
through with their own narrativity, and each angle of vision opened up through their 
narration is affirmed, though none ever exhausts their being. Frames assume the virtue of 
pragmatic perception while also demonstrating that simple perceptibility itself implicates 
the perceived object in a larger network of relations that exceeds the individual 
perception.  The ascetic logic of ineffability, on the other hand, results almost in a covert 
form of nihilism, where the radical being of objects marginalizes any single relationship 
between them.  But if we deny that the narrativity of objects is central to their being, we 
are left with nothing, or rather with an unbridgeable epistemological gulf between the 
ignorance of pragmatic perception and the inaccessible inner life of everything around us.
But objects are what they are by virtue of their partial exposure to other objects; they 
themselves admit as much by contracting into habitual organisms that defy the radical 
strangeness of their most basic physical and temporal building blocks.  Frames assume 
the narrativity of their objects—their knowability—but they make that very narrativity 
the means by which objects exceed the narrow confines set for them by any given 
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narrative pattern of relation.  Any enframed object is implicated in a mesh of imagined 
scenes each governed by its own sustained temporality; the word becomes the object par 
excellence, composed into various literal and imaginative grammars that do not exhaust 
the word’s simple materiality at any level of its organization: beneath it, the syllable, 
phoneme and lesser linguistic particles; above it, the sentence, paragraph, work and so 
on. The word is not just imagined as a literal object by itself, but it is imagined as 
multiple literal objects implicated in multiple scenes; the word’s phonemic matters cohere
by virtue of these scenes’ intelligibility, but that intelligibility is superceded by the other 
equally intelligible scenes which coexist simultaneously with it.  Each particle of 
language thrums with its own strangeness, but that strangeness does not manifest itself as 
incoherence—incoherence is the Boccaccian plague that would fully frustrate the limited,
habitual organism into which these particles contract, but in rendering them inertly 
material, it would frustrate another aspect of their being, precisely their significance, their
grammatical narrativity.  The frame leaves those phonemic patterns of relation intact, but 
it demonstrates that the grammar binding linguistic particles together can itself be used to
imagine multiple, simultaneous scenes.  Each such particle discloses its radical being by 
means of this simultaneous imagination.
Chaucer breaks from the temporality established by his initial frame to expose the
grammar of its objects; he renders the strange objects populating his brief world yet 
stranger by enframing them with the imagined scene in which they are themselves 
imagined.17  The very linguistic matters by which they are composed betray a multiplicity
17  Leicester notes that this surface consciousness of the poet behind the fiction persists throughout every 
moment of the tales by the simple fact that the pilgrims’ allegedly impromptu tales are told in a 
premeditated verse (“Art of Impersonation,” 213).  But while Leicester sees this again as an instance of 
unimpersonated artistry in the Tales, I would argue that it participates in the larger framing action of the 
poem: Chaucer does not somehow escape narrativity with such contradictions, but rather makes the 
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of meaning that exceeds their use in imagining even the complex patterns of relation that 
open the poem. Chaucer thus introduces language and grammar as itself a master trope 
for poetic imagination and the procedure of temporal recombination effected in any 
object.  He begins to establish this outermost frame in his succinct association of the 
text’s imagined world with his authorial action.  Time and space shift from the natural 
world to the material page itself, across which Chaucer paces.  Following this metaphor, 
Chaucer fully announces his departure from the temporality of the opening by articulating
an alternate “resoun” than that which governs the opening: the reason of the portraits, 
which self consciously construct the characters whose relations will define the 
temporality of the frame.  As Chaucer puts it, this alternate resoun is “To telle yow al the 
condicioun/ of ech of hem, so as it semed me,/ And which they weren, and of what 
degree” (1.38-40).  From his deific position as master of time and space, Chaucer makes 
a promise only God himself could hope to fulfill: he promises to disclose the full valence 
of each pilgrim, everything about each of them.  Almost as soon as he has offered this 
promise, he tempers it by acknowledging his own subjectivity—only their seeming to 
Chaucer himself will be disclosed by the portraits; yet he cautiously reasserts it with the 
bland ontology implied by “which they weren.” Their “degree” places them within some 
limiting, comparative rubric, but it fails to inform the reader what that rubric is, whether 
their degree is determined by social standing, religious merit, or some other metric.  The 
mention of their degree anticipates Chaucer’s vestigial ordering based on social class—a 
imagined scene a framed palimpsest wherein we see the ghosts of other imagined scenes hovering through 
whatever scene we are currently imagining.  Were we to simply turn our attention to that frame, the 
spatiotemporal narrative of Chaucer laboring at his desk composing lines of verse, the other imagined 
scenes would themselves become the ghosts; Chaucer wants the language through which we activate some 
imaginative event to only be a partial perception of the total activity of that language.  In the Canterbury 
frame, we retain a vestigial awareness of the scenes we must push into the background in order to bring one
particular scene into the foreground; in this sense, the poem is constantly enacting the partiality of 
perception.
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remnant from estates literature—whereby he begins the portraits with the Knight, but that
ordering is quickly muddled into a more or less random pattern; the order of the portraits 
becomes a Rorschach test wherein we see what we want to see. Chaucer announces the 
logic behind his portraiture with this impossible promise, whose impossibility is, as it 
were, underscored by his admission of his own subjectivity.  He promises to achieve what
his opening could only intimate: to describe the total strangeness embodied within the 
characters that will populate his narrative.  
Yet in the same word he uses to announce that promise—“condicioun”—he again 
undermines it; a “condicioun” is also a restriction in the logical sense, a precondition or 
qualification upon some rule.  A “condicioun,” in Middle English as in Modern, is the 
“if” clause anticipating a subsequent “then” clause; it describes a restrictive prerequisite 
to the truth of its counterpart which will, if its condition is not met, rob the “then” of its 
force.  Chaucer has invoked this logical sense by announcing the new, rational order of 
his narrative.  It is within this sense of condition that Chaucer first articulates the 
grotesque logic that will govern the Canterbury Tales: the condition—the state of being
—of each pilgrim is tantamount to the conditional perception they will open upon his 
world.  The pilgrims are restrictions placed upon Chaucer’s world that render it 
perceptible; each provides a limited “if” clause that organizes all of that world’s diverse 
matters into a cohesive and limited “then.”  Such conditions are inherently grotesque: 
they take a collage of objects linguistic, physical or otherwise and set them in a fixed 
pattern of relation wherein each defines the others; they begin to narrativize experience 
by defining the basis for an ontology that will restrict the radical being of those objects.  
No such condition is, in and of itself, final within Chaucer’s world—not only are they 
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enframed by other ways of imagining them, but even within the single imagined space of 
the frame, they are divulged simultaneously with other, complementary or antithetical 
conditions.  Ultimately—even beyond the grammatical logic outlined above—Chaucer 
might diverge from the temporality of his frame solely to ensure the simultaneous 
application of those perspectives to his narrative world; were they to unfold within a 
consistent space and time, we would be perceiving something within that space and time 
without the full benefit of those overlapping perspectives; the strangeness of his world 
would seem to be developed and unfolded over time rather than present at every moment 
of that time, preexisting time and everything that persists within it.  No single condition 
ever needs to be countered or challenged within his narrative: it is always already 
implicated within a framework that absorbs it into something larger than its limited truth. 
The condition announced by each pilgrim must be limited, lest Chaucer’s world fall into 
the veiled nihilism of ineffability; yet the limitation that outlines the contours of its 
narrative can never seem final.  Rather, it must direct us toward the general perceptibility 
of what it discloses without simply abstracting away the particularity of the acts of 
perception that constitute it.
For Chaucer, such conditional points of view arise from a process of temporal 
selection and recombination: a consciousness is reciprocally shaped by the events it 
defines; a discernible personality subsequently prioritizes those defined events in relation 
to one another, integrating them into the historical pattern of a self.  These procedures are 
not necessarily arbitrary—in fact, they generally conduct a highly complex pattern of 
relations that, should we try to trace it, recedes into the dim mist of our earliest histories; 
they are, however, incomplete, overlapped by other patterns that have shaped other 
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personalities from similar materials.  The matters from which we compose ourselves—
the events we define and our prioritization of them—are limitations of duration and 
strangeness that could be reframed indefinitely; any given historicization of that duration 
is carried forward by its own inertia, which bubbles up into a personality that instantiates 
it.18  It is precisely this process of recombination that Chaucer shows us in his portraiture; 
his promise to disclose “al the concicioun” of the pilgrims recollects the attempt of the 
House of Fame to show a speaker as she distends through time—Chaucer knows too well
that the total vision of any object or agent is the temporal vision of them persisting in an 
indivisible duration.  But in the redefined project of the Canterbury Tales, “al the 
condicioun” becomes precisely the limited angle of vision that each character reductively 
imposes on the perceptible world, or the collage of events that have structured a pilgrim’s
grotesque viewpoint.  
Thus, even as Chaucer suspends the time and space of his frame, he generates a 
dizzying succession of other times and spaces in the narrative details elaborated by the 
portraits; these rapid-fire narratives are the paradigmatic events that have calcified into 
the personalities of the pilgrims. The portraits do not simply construct their characters by 
progressively unfolding details of their material appearance—such a mechanism would 
be able to operate within the frame narrative which Chaucer has disrupted.  Rather, they 
narrate brief details of their characters’ past lives, constructing furtive narratives that 
often only persist for a line or two before breaking onto a new narrative detail.  Chaucer 
18  This inertia follows an Augustinian logic of habit; for Augustine, habit was the mechanism through 
which the will became enslaved to sin.  Habit has both a historical and personal face: historically, the sin of 
Adam ensured that we could never singlemindedly desire God again—it introduced another motivating 
rationale to human behavior, precisely our will to self-constitution; personally, the actions that we engage in
without any real purpose acquire their own persuasive force.  The story of the pear tree in the Confessions 
is Augustine’s clearest articulation of this personal manifestation of habit, though he more commonly 
expresses it in his ungovernable sexual impulses.
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summarizes the details of these brief narrations into pithy notationes that abstractly 
define his characters’ moral qualities; they articulate—often through the ironic optimism 
that discloses Chaucer’s own character to us—the settled perspective that typifies the 
pilgrim, defining the grimace she casts onto the world around her.  That grimace, for 
Chaucer, arises from the character’s own limited perception of her past; the definition and
prioritization of certain events from the unbroken duration of that past—events populated
by strange objects and agents that exceed the pilgrim’s narrow understanding of them—
reinforces itself as it is applied to subsequent events. It achieves its own inertia that 
assures its reapplication; when that reapplication becomes automatic, the character has 
fully contracted into a habituated organism, a grotesque whose patterns of relation to and 
conceptualization of the world are foregone conclusions.
As grotesques, the Canterbury pilgrims are inversions of the readers that Chaucer 
wants us to become; their bodies encapsulate a predefined personal history, a past that has
been calcified into paradigmatic moments of time, whose objects and agents have been 
given strictly defined valences they cannot transgress.  None of his pilgrims perceive the 
world in which they sojourn, the strange world of the opening that pulses with 
supplemental dimensions of being, transversal associations between objects and the 
multiple frames that encompass them.  But in another sense, they are the only way that 
we can read: the strangeness of his world is an aggregation of limited angles of vision, 
not a refusal of them; Chaucer asks us not so much to transcend the petty preoccupations 
of his pilgrims that bends and distorts the world around them into a more or less coherent 
vision as to fully inhabit all of them simultaneously.  Chaucer’s framing strategy is a 
more specifically elaborated form of Dante’s fractured fetishism, which sought to 
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recuperate the temporal experience of his desire for Beatrice in everything around him; 
through his reading of and reaction to Boccaccio, Chaucer extends this logic to suggest 
that objects should be comprehended not just as targets of an allegorical, universalizing 
desire, but as targets of multiple simultaneous desires that interpret it in radically 
different ways.  To effect this vision, we must become complicit with each interpretive 
pattern presented to us—we must ourselves become grotesque.  We must fully enter into 
each character’s transgressive, limited mode of perception; as Dante did, we must 
intensify transgression until the fetishized object of our affections presents a renovated 
vision of time.  But in Chaucer’s framed world, we must simultaneously fragment such 
transgressions as we intensify and enact them within the imagined space; like Boccaccio, 
we must become compassionately complicit in their partial, puerile, specific concerns.  In
simultaneously impersonating these perspectives, we transcend their inherent limitations 
without undermining their particularity; our transcendence of them, in fact, will be in 
proportion to our intensification of them, since they will imbue the passing matters of the 
text with a significance that increasingly approximates its radical strangeness.  The 
conventional modes of perception that Husserl bracketed, that Heidegger decried and that
Bergson atomized will become the very mechanism of the temporal vision they all, in 
various ways, struggled toward.  As we begin to perceive the strangeness of Chaucer’s 
narrative world, we will begin to experience the durational time that thrusts us toward 
presence; we will do so, however, not by dint of the disintegration of the object, but by 
virtue of its superabundant integrity; duration itself will seem insufficient to disclosing its
superfluity.
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The Eventful Grimace
As Chaucer recounts the carefully selected narrative details of the portraits, he 
thus asks us to become complicit with their temporal recombination even as we remain 
aware of the conditions under which those recombinations are effected.  But Chaucer’s 
characters are not constituted for us in the way that they have presumably constituted 
themselves: the process of temporal recombination that required a fictive lifetime to 
effect is represented, to us, in a few spare lines of Chaucer’s textual time and space.  He 
does this, first, because those events do not require a full duration as the pilgrims have 
constituted them; as we can see more fully in a tale like Sir Thopas, any genre, once it has
perfected its tendencies, paradoxically renders the details of its narration unnecessary.  
We can preunderstand the perfectly generic text, anticipating the destiny of any character 
or object who comes onto the scene.  The pilgrims themselves have already encapsulated 
the significance of their past lives into events, codifying them into their grotesque genre.  
But beyond this pragmatic rationale, Chaucer requires readers to enter and exit fleeting 
temporalities with such dizzying rapidity that he almost frustrates our ability to actually 
imagine any one of them; we have no time to settle into the casual patterns of relation 
that structure the narrative, to populate its world with objects defining one another’s 
contours.  Rather, the rapidity of these narrations and their removal from a consistent 
space and time again renders us aware of the conditions by which the characters they 
inform are produced; it approaches duration from a second direction, by demonstrating 
the integrity of the surface level of the text that occurs simultaneously with our 
imagination of the characters defined there.  The imaginative blur of the portraits delivers
us, again, to the surface of the text where the grammar of the pilgrim’s being is defined.  
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This rapid narration, in one sense, intensifies the scheme of the frame at large—it situates
us within a narrative world for a certain period, then draws us back to a different world 
that coexisted with what we have imagined, an alternate world constituted by precisely 
the same stream of words; but the portraits have no frame outside them except the textual 
space and time described above.  They are proximal to this physical and grammatical 
dimension of the text itself; only the narrative of words cohering into progressive units of
meaning enframes them when we are shunted out of one narrative and into another. 
Perceiving the strangeness of Chaucer’s world entails seeing its radical being at each 
enframed level of its organization; we must sustain our grammatical awareness of the 
words of the text in concert with the scenes they imagine, just as we must simultaneously 
imagine a pilgrim’s speech and the tale it imagines.  Chaucer’s tactic of rapid narration 
intensifies our imagination of his text by partially frustrating it: he makes us imagine the 
text as text alongside the text as pilgrims.  At this surface level of the text, the pilgrims 
have restored to them a measure of the strangeness which Chaucer has denied them, and 
that, within the fiction, they have denied themselves.  They exceed the narrow definitions 
which they have set themselves; they exceed the condition they put upon the world even 
as that condition is represented to us.
Three examples will suffice to demonstrate the different ways in which these 
patterns manifest themselves within the text: the Knight, the Prioress and the Miller.  In 
the Knight’s case, the catalogue of wars he has participated in provides a dizzying series 
of narrative details that define his character:
A Knyght ther was, and that a worthy man,
That fro the tyme that he first bigan
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To riden out, he loved chivalrie,
Trouthe and honour, fredom and curteisie.
Ful worthy was he in his lordes werre,
And therto hadde he riden, no man ferre,
As wel in cristendom as in hethenesse,
And evere honoured for his worthynesse;
At Alisaundre he was whan it was wonne.
Ful ofte tyme he hadde the bord bigonne
Aboven alle nacions in Pruce;
In Lettow hadde he reysed and in Ruce,
No Cristen man so ofte of his degree. (1.43-55)
The Knight’s portrait begins with Chaucer’s total evaluation of him: the sum of his life 
experience is embodied in the term “worthy” and its complex of related ideas.  In its 
broad sense, the term introduces the pattern of grotesqueness that governs all the 
portraits; it simply describes a generic, value-driven behavior: any action is motivated by 
a desire to be perceived as worthy, as meritorious.  Worthiness, however, looks different 
within different genres and registers: the Miller’s parodic value-system opposes and 
upsets that of the Knight, though both equally frame their practitioners as grotesque.  It is 
in this sense that Terry Jones’s reading of the Knight as mercenary is permissible, if not 
particularly plausible—the economic sense of worth derives from its protean character 
and its connection to a merit-driven will.  In the next line, however, the specifically 
political dimensions of the term overtake the broad sense.  The Knight’s model of 
worthiness is that of the official, medieval political culture.19  This elaboration of the term
19  For general background on the model of worthiness Chaucer’s deploys here, see Brewer 65-68.
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is the portrait’s first micro-narrative: Chaucer elaborates on the Knight’s specific vision 
of the world by locating us back in his most remote youth.  It imagines a young man 
riding on a horse, playing at knighthood—an image whose inertia is carried into the 
portrait of his son, the Squire; the abstract values that define the knight’s worthiness
—“chivalrie,/ Trouthe and honour, fredom and curteisie”—are presented as the juvenile 
ideologies of a child, struggling to compose an identity.  This brief narrative arrests the 
knight into his grotesque personality; it already begins to suppress the details of his life 
that do not conform to the perceptual pattern authorized by those ideals.  The Knight, like
the rest of Chaucer’s pilgrims, is incapable of suffering any great existential crisis 
because his history literally begins at the time when the chivalric value system produces 
him; he becomes integrated as a character at this primal event that effaces any detail of 
his youth that does not pertain to the courtly ethic.  Chaucer’s presentation of the Knight 
presents the caricature that the Knight has made of himself—the Knight perceives the 
world and everything within it in terms of the secular values of the official culture.
Such values act both prospectively and retrospectively, and always at the same 
time: the young Knight’s playing at chivalry determines his participation in future events;
it makes him perceive the time he occupies from a proposed point in the future in which 
he would be looking back on that time, composing it into events based on its conformity 
to his chivalric value system.  This is, in a very real sense, the only way to perceive time
—our reaction to any given event is determined by our extrapolation of the self who will 
retrospectively compose that event into a personal history.  The event itself cannot be 
defined unless we remove ourselves from its duration and project a future self who, 
having behaved according to a consistent pattern of action and perception, understands 
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what that span of time and the objects moving within it meant.  Chaucer’s tableau of the 
worthy knight and the callow, ideologically driven youth imagines this temporal 
compression: it makes the physical character of the Knight a projection of his past self 
that reciprocally imposes a chivalric understanding of his life’s duration.  As all the 
pilgrims will, the Knight becomes an apparatus for defining a vision of history; his self 
projection fixes a particular perceptual identity on everything he encounters, opening a 
highly conditioned angle of vision upon it.  Such histories define the identity of the 
objects that populate them without exhausting the radical being of those objects.  In the 
portrait, this procedure of historical production the Knight embodies is almost exclusively
rendered in terms of international politics: the official culture that he impersons quite 
literally carves up the world, setting boundaries upon it, effecting a vision of its rule by 
destroying or dominating anything that does not reflect that vision.  A nation is a clear 
instance of the types of organism I have described above: it circumscribes a space 
wherein all objects and agents collectively engage in a process of mutual definition; each 
object and person within the nation is subject, in however loose a way, to its total vision 
of the world, the ideologies through which it constitutes itself; in the phenomenological 
sense, they are united by a tendency to perceive one another in limited, habituated ways.  
As they carve up space, they also carve up time, defining the almost mythical historical 
events that will project a future from which the present can be retrospectively understood.
The Knight’s participation in the international wars described in the portrait—
which his youthful complicity with the chivalric code has made a foregone conclusion—
imagines this scene of international politics on a personal scale; it encapsulates the 
procedure by which a nation contracts into an organism by portraying a man who has 
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made himself fully complicit with its vision, who has become grotesquely unable to 
perceive the world in any other way.  Incidentally, it is this feature of his character that 
makes him so suited to reconciling Harry Bailly with the Pardoner—at the point when the
pilgrim group is closest to fracturing, the Knight reinscribes the relation between its 
members that makes them a unified organism.  In his portrait, the same, strange world 
that has been represented in the opening—the world populated by flowers, rain and 
singing birds who exceed their relations to one another—is reimagined as a series of stark
proper names; history, likewise, is typified by the events at which those names were 
constituted or reimposed.  Those events hold a singular significance for the Knight; they 
are a series of temporal contractions that define the organism of the Knight’s character, 
which in turn is subsumed by the organism of the nation and its chivalric ideal.  The 
Knight carves the indestructible duration of his life into these events.  Yet though we see 
this process of selection and become complicit with it, insofar as we imagine his 
character, the rapidity with which we imagine these various wars rob them of the singular
significance the Knight attaches to them.  The very means by which these events are 
constituted and contracted into a history makes the vision they impose seem almost trite; 
the ceremonies honoring the Knight’s worthiness collapse into one another; the name of 
one nation blurs into the next, Pruce into Ruce.  Each name draws us into an entire 
narrative world, as the winning of “Alisaundre” imagines an epic struggle for control of 
Alexandria; it invokes an entire genre along with its patterns of relating characters to the 
people and objects around them.  The entirety of those narratives are, however, exhausted
by their contribution to the Knight’s honor and worthiness; the narratives, as the Knight 
has recomposed them, do not even need to be told, since all their details would reflect 
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that single, grotesque truth.  We are left, instead, with an epic catalogue of narrative 
details that resurrects Chaucer strategic use of boredom from the House of Fame—even 
as they draw us sequentially into their narratives, the duration of their worlds is exhausted
by a chivalric mode of perception.  The rapid narration locates us back at the surface of 
the text even as it opens imagined worlds; the place names that define the Knight’s 
identity shift fluidly into one another as the single pattern that undergirds all these events,
compressing them into the totalized event of the Knight’s life.  The pattern that effaces 
the particularity of these events—the strangeness of the objects that populate them that 
could push a perceiver toward a vision of their full duration—is precisely what inflates 
the Knight’s skin.  Like an allegorical character, he impersons an ideal; but unlike an 
allegorical character, he has had to effect that ideal through history, by struggling to tame 
the continuity of time and the multiplicity of the object.
Of course, though the narrative details here are exhausted by the Knight’s 
conditional perception of the world, that does not mean that his character is exhausted 
along with them—on the contrary, their tiresome unfolding is the means by which he 
appears in the world.  The narrative details of the Knight’s portrait require very little 
elaboration; they draw upon generic competencies that allow us to almost preunderstand 
them.  Even as the unfolding of those details refers us back to the surface of the text, they
starkly define the character of the Knight, offering a clear pattern for how he will relate to
Chaucer’s world.  The preunderstanding elicited by these details will hereafter form a 
particular angle of vision onto Chaucer’s world and the stories told within it, which angle 
will seem almost automatic; by and large, we will know what the Knight thinks about any
passing textual matter without the bother of asking him.  The very fact that the Knight is 
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not queried for his perspective, though we know that perspective is constantly instituted 
on every passing matter, signals a core feature of the design of the Canterbury Tales: the 
intentional patterns of perception that shape the objects of his world are allowed to recede
into the background after they have been raised within the text; we retain a vague sense 
of the fact that each passing matter is being digested into interpretive paradigms that our 
minds cannot fully constitute in their simultaneity.  We must inhabit a single perspective 
while remaining eerily aware of the eyes that lurk behind us. We can instantaneously shift
to any other such perspective because they are so precisely defined.  Especially for a 
person living in Chaucer’s time, the template of the Knight’s chivalric ideals can be 
superimposed onto any event within the narrative; it can interpret those events, laud or 
censure elements within them.  Its defined angle of vision will, in fact, be partially 
responsible for contracting such events into events from an unbroken duration.  He will 
provide a condition upon the world, acting as an “if” that necessarily entails a “then.”  
But as we shift perspectives, we invariably force other perspectives into the background; 
the intuition of that radically intentional background demonstrates the partiality of any act
of perception we effect within the text.  This tableau of shifting foregrounds and the 
background from which they bubble to the surface is how Chaucer discloses the vibrating
temporal strangeness of his narrative world.
Certainly, even the Knight’s portrait escapes Chaucer’s limited characterization of
him and his limited characterization of himself—when Chaucer says that he is, “of his 
port as meeke as is a mayde” (1.69) he transgresses the standard characterization of a 
knight by conflating him with his lady; this feminine meekness contrasts starkly with the 
martial virtues embodied in worthiness, demonstrating an inconsistency at the heart of the
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chivalric code that intimates the strangeness its practitioners try to suppress.  It is 
ultimately that strangeness that Chaucer will try, through the aggregation of grotesque 
perspectives like the Knight’s, to recuperate in his world; a tale will be produced by one 
grotesque perspective, but will simultaneously have all the others applied to it even as it 
unfolds its limited vision.  In doing so, it will restore duration to the narrative world; 
unlike the narrative details of the portraits, its tale will have to be told, since the textual 
matters that comprise it will ultimately admit to multiple angles of vision upon them.  
The objects, agents and events within the enframed narratives will become charged with 
meaning as they are fractured into these different modes of apprehension; but this 
fracturing itself will effect the unification of those objects into objects, selves into selves, 
by making them loci of the different patterns of relation that each grotesque mode 
organizes.  Grotesque modes of understanding do not unite the object into a perceptible 
whole, but the strangeness that overwhelms and incorporates those modes of 
understanding does. Perceived in their full strangeness, such objects unfold in a pure 
temporal duration, defining the constantly new unfolding of a presence that surpasses 
them.
Chaucer’s selection of narrative details in the Knight’s portrait seems entirely 
complicit with the details the Knight would likely use to typify himself; the knight thus 
presents a rather simple picture of the process of temporal recombination required to 
effect a grotesque persona.  Unlike many of the Canterbury pilgrims, he seems to lack an 
existential crisis—he inhabits his own courtly paradigm without any self-conscious 
dithering about its ultimate worth or whether he has adequately followed its precepts.  
The Knight simply is what he is.  In many of the portraits, however, Chaucer picks 
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narrative details that demonstrate the pretense of the persona the pilgrim attempts to 
display.  Such personae never quite feel comfortable—their practitioners don’t seem 
entirely comfortable in their own skins; their outlook seems a mask composed atop 
deeper insecurities. The ascending sequences of events that ultimately typify them feel 
less ideologically secure; they seem petty expressions of a petty ideal, whose integrity 
they undermine as much as they legitimate. For that reason, their personae become all the
more grotesque: as common experience will attest, the most rigidly grotesque, unilateral 
people are those who are somehow insecure about their philosophical outlook; their 
unsurety leads them to prosecute that outlook all the more vigorously, as though the 
performance can legitimate its patterns for understanding their experience.  They wrap 
themselves in a caricature because, ultimately, they know they are not that caricature; 
their own strangeness and that of the people and objects around them threaten to 
overwhelm the strict perceptual schema they apply to the world. The events that 
characterize them are always threatening to unwind as events, and so they must tidy them
up.
The Prioress is a good example of this type of grotesque portrait.  Despite 
Chaucer’s fawningly complimentary notatio, the narrative details he includes partially 
gives the lie to the urbane, devoted figure she professes to be.  Most critics who have 
explored the Prioress’s portrait have centered their discussion on the incompatibility of 
her portrayal with even the most lax monastic codes of the Middle Ages.20  The narrative 
details Chaucer selects derive almost exclusively from French Romance, and so sit in an 
uncomfortable relationship to her relatively exalted ecclesiastical position.  Certainly this 
20  See, for example, Daichman 140.  By contrast, in his article “The Living Witness of Our Redemption,” 
Lee Patterson has argued that the Prioress’s emotional orientation actually stems from the type of piety she 
is supposed to practice (509).  I will comment on this seeming contradiction below.
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is a fair appraisal, and one that Chaucer wants to evoke; however, his mood here—as it is 
throughout the Canterbury Tales—is not one of censure so much as inclusive indulgence.
The point of these inconsistencies is not to inspire distaste for her hypocrisy or critique an
effete clergy, but to highlight the grotesque seeming she effects within her own character. 
Her romantic sentimentalism is not undercut by the deep ideological inconsistencies in 
her character;21 on the contrary, that sentimentality is only intensified by her rather 
superficial religiosity: her religious status consecrates that sentimentality while curtailing 
any attempt to interpret it further.  Sentimentality comes to seem sacred, which is the 
dream of any grotesque—to render its perspective beyond reflection, to make it a matter 
of irreproachable faith. The Prioress’s simplistic piety shares much in common with her 
sentimentalism from this perspective: the sentimental object is imbued with a largely 
unspecified emotional intensity; like the object of faith, its integrity depends on our 
willingness to not entirely know it, to cease our inquiry at a certain point and simply 
become complicit with its constructions.  The opposite pole is a nihilistic mockery of the 
object of sentiment that casts it as inert.  Her tale ultimately demonstrates her unwittingly 
deft synthesis of the two, seemingly opposed ideologies invoked by her portrait—her 
precious presentation of the little clergeon depends on our lack of reflection upon it, 
particularly its bigotry.  That presentation begins to unwind when we press on it: little 
Hugh sings the divine service without any real idea of what it means; his miracle is to 
continue parroting the song even after he has lost all capacity for rational thought; he 
manifests this miracle from within a toilet, in which his body must be covered in filth.  
But if we don’t press on it—if we take the Prioress’s portrayal at face value, becoming 
complicit with her sentimental faith—the figure is imbued with an intense emotional 
21  For recent studies on the Prioress’s affective characterization, see Calabrese 77. Cf. Eaton 496-98.
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energy that is made all the more intense by our refusal to think too much about it; Hugh 
only coheres into an object of our sentimentality when we become at least provisionally 
complicit with the Prioress’s unreflective mode of perception.  
Chaucer cannot disavow her sentimentalism because the faith it requires makes it 
a sort of shadow of the strangeness within his world; when we push too hard on objects 
or their relations, any pattern will ultimately begin to unravel.  All of the pilgrims seem, 
from a certain remove, ridiculous; their jostling, overlapping ideals, in one sense, ensure 
that they cancel out the urgency of one another’s grotesque ideologies.  Even within the 
Prioress’s own portrait, we might say that her combination of sentimentalism and the 
sacred renders both absurd: both become overwrought in the presence of the other.  But 
Chaucer’s attitude in the Canterbury Tales is not the ironic nihilism of Ovid; rather, the 
humorous dimension that such conflicting ideologies expose is productive, not 
destructive.  The people, objects and events that populate his narrative world do not 
become an empty, chaotic swirl simply because no single perceptual perspective can fully
comprehend them; on the contrary, they become ontological loci because they admit to so
many perspectives, so many patterns of relation.  In its limited way, the Prioress’s 
sentimentalism stands in for this feature of the Tales: she seems to move through the 
world simply and unreflectively, investing everything around her with an unspecified 
emotional intensity.  As Chaucer’s notationes put it, she is “charitable” and “pitous,” full 
of “conscience” and “tendre herte” (1.143-50).  She devotes weeping to the mean things 
of Chaucer’s world, to “a mous/ Kaught in a trappe” (1.144-45), or her “smale houndes” 
(1.46) when she finds one dead.  Both of these animals are characterized by their lack of 
utility: the mouse is explicitly considered vermin, while the small hounds she keeps are 
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“toy” dogs, the yipping companions of the wealthy who can afford to maintain useless 
creatures.  In their lack of utility, they are cousins to the open-eyed birds of the opening—
their relation to the world is unspecified, despite their appearance in it.  That lack of 
utility, on the one hand, makes the Prioress’s regard for them laughable; but in another 
sense, it shadows the strangeness of Chaucer’s world, the appearance of objects that 
cannot be reduced to a single pattern of understanding.  Such objects do have a sort of 
sentimental energy attached to them, but rather than leaving the nature of that energy 
unspecified, Chaucer shows how it is generated by disseminating an object’s significance 
into the manifold perceptual patterns that, in their unimaginable aggregate, comprise it.
But even more than her precious concern for the small things of the world, the 
Prioress’s sentimentalism is characterized by her adherence to ritual; these rituals appear, 
ironically, not in the Christian idiom but in the idiom of manners and etiquette.  The 
Prioress is fastidious where manners are concerned; the first narrative details we are 
offered note “that of hir smylyng [she] was ful symple and coy;/ Hire gretteste ooth was 
but by Seinte Loy” (1.119-20).  The coy manner of her smiling immediately and 
unreservedly removes the Prioress from the religious register, casting her rather as a 
demure, perhaps even coquettish Romantic lady; the coyness of the smile almost evokes a
sexual dimension to her character, which would fully transgress her religious identity.  
However, Chaucer redirects this transgressive potential into her petty oath.  Much critical 
ink has been spilled over the incompatibility of this oath, in particular, with the 
Benedictine code of conduct.22  However, perhaps the more interesting incompatibility 
the line presents us with is internal to the portrait—the narrative detail seems a non-
22  For an excellent summary on the critical history of this line—with particular emphasis on the identity of 
Seinte Loi—see the note on it in the Variorum Chaucer’s edition of the General Prologue, 126-30
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sequitur to the line that immediately precedes it.  It playfully exchanges the transgressive 
sexuality that the coy smiling intimates and submerges it beneath a minor transgression.  
This non-sequitur is heightened by its reference to Seinte Loy, whom most scholars 
identify as St. Eligius, the patron saint of smiths and carters.  Clearly, the Prioress has 
only the loosest association with such a figure—her retinue would be called upon to 
handle most of the trials that would necessitate such a pragmatic saint’s intercession.  
This transgression of monastic code begins to seem more a prefiguration of her weeping 
over mice and dogs: it betrays a mannerly investment in the physical world and the 
events occurring in it that monastic discipline is supposed to excise.  The erotic charge of 
that investment, though, is absent from the petty oath, and now is absent from the coy 
smile as well; the carefully placed non-sequitur scrubs the potentially intense, conflicting 
erotic energies from the figure of the Romantic woman, leaving only her air-headedness, 
her vapid obsession with appearances and the observence of form.  Chaucer’s “ful 
symple” inscribes a sort of ritual intensity, ironically immediately before the “coy” alters 
its register—she fully and unreflectively inhabits her persona, even when she must do so 
within the confines of the seemingly incompatible ritual systems of the convent. Her 
smiling thus foreshadows the superficial formality with which the subsequent narrative 
details of her portrait are concerned. 
All of these narrative details are typified by their fastidiousness: the Prioress 
“soong the service dyvyne,/ Entuned in hir nose ful semely” (1.122-23); she speaks 
French “ful faire and fetisly,/ After the scole of Stratford atte Bowe,/ For Frenssh of Parys
was to hire unknowe” (1.124-26); “At mete wel ytaught was she with alle;/ She leet no 
morsel from hir lippes falle” (1.127-28).  The first detail takes the core religious ritual she
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should participate in—the liturgy—and makes the rubric by which its performance is 
judged aesthetic rather than devotional; Chaucer applies—perhaps with tongue slightly in
cheek—a social standard to the music that values a nasal sound.  The sound produced is 
“semely,” as her colloquial French is spoken “fetisly;” both adverbs emphasize a 
superficial adherence to the customs the Prioress knows.  She puts on the airs of her 
“countrefete cheere” (139), even though—in the case of her French—those airs 
themselves often betray her lack of urbanity even as she tries to seem urbane.  However, 
the point in these brief narrative images is not that the Prioress is faking a sophistication 
that is ultimately beyond her. Her seeming doesn’t hide something deeper within it, but 
rather describes her sentimental attachment to the world of appearances, the world in 
which the petty rituals of table manners hold an urgent, inexplicable significance. The 
details of her table manners stretch for a full 10 lines after the two cited; they occupy 12 
lines of her 44 line portrait, taking up over a quarter of the space devoted to her.  Such 
narrative details betray an insistent sensitivity to the mundane—whereas the Knight was 
typified by the grand, starkly defined events of battle, the Prioress shapes the most 
humdrum details of her daily existence objects of intense, ritual significance.  Such 
rituals are the habits which bind together temporal organisms at each scale of their 
organization; they define the objects and agents around them, constraining each into its 
ritualized role.  In this sense, they restrict the capacity of their participants to see the 
radical being of those ritualized objects—a ritual, like a habit, fixes a particular 
perceptual schema, defining a certain pattern of relation between objects.  The ritual 
thereby constitutes an organism from objects and agents agreeing to perceive one another 
in a particular way, to bracket one another’s strangeness; it fixes a particular identity onto
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each participant that integrates it into a unity.  The ritual thus also defines a temporality, 
imbuing defined patterns of action with a sacred significance that justifies itself within 
the hermeneutic circle of the ritual itself.  Unlike the Knight’s portrait, the Prioress’s fixes
our attention on the details of the ritual event’s performance; it takes us inside the ritual 
organism she operates within, showing the minute events that comprise it as they unfold 
and contract, progressively, into that organism. The Prioress’s simplicity thus presents the
grotesque, sentimental particularity with which we must read the Canterbury Tales; her 
ritualism is an analogy of reading, which also constructs a world out of matters that 
unravel when we press on them, when we attend too much to their materiality and not 
their simple narrativity.
Of course, we run the risk of missing the joke in reading the Prioress’s portrait 
thusly—certainly, her portrait parodies the urgency with which the Prioress engages in 
her petty rituals.  However, the parodic elements of her description do not so much 
undercut her ritual sensitivity as they playfully frame it; Chaucer’s mode is, as ever, 
parody, not satire.23 Chaucer’s parody, in the Prioress’s portrait, enacts a certain indulgent
objectivity that can coexist with the Prioress’s naive sincerity; in fact, for parody to do its 
work, such sincerity must remain intact.  This parodic attitude in her portrait suggests 
what Chaucer wants to accomplish in the Tales: he wants to allow the grotesque, ritual 
sincerity of his characters to infuse his world with overlapping, superabundant meaning; 
he wants overlapping modes of meaning to be generative, not conflicting or nullifying.  
23  In the sense of parody Mikhail Bakhtin develops in Rabelais and His World, parody is generative while 
satire is destructive; parody reduces the airs of cultural rituals to their lower material bodily stratum; it 
demonstrates their basis in the same matter that comprises everything else, and so denudes the 
sanctification placed on them by the official culture.  However it is from that lower material bodily strata 
that everything emerges, and so parody really rejuvenates the ritual’s form.  Satire, by contrast, denudes the
ritual only to leave it nullified and demonstrate its purposelessness (75).
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In doing so, he will inspirit his poetics with a mimesis deeper than mimesis, a mimesis 
that uncovers a strangeness within his narrative objects that runs deeper than any 
particular mode of perceiving the world.  The aggregation of these grotesque perspectives
must not efface their particularity, but rather must press us to inhabit particular modes of 
vision simultaneously.  In so doing, we perceive the object in its indivisible temporality, 
on the horizon of presence wherein all those objects persist, where they aggregate and 
disintegrate into temporal organisms.  The Prioress’s naive sentimentalism is only a type 
and a shadow of this authentically temporal vision; while her obsession with purely 
formal, superficial rituals thrusts her toward certain minutiae of time—causing her to 
attend to passing circumstances and parsed events—and while she invests those minutiae 
with an unspecified urgency that intimates their strangeness, such obsession can 
ultimately only open one, singular grotesque perspective onto the ritual objects it 
perceives.  It is a model of a particular vision, but not the strange, aggregate vision 
Chaucer aims at in his frame as a whole.
If there is one character in the General Prologue who resists the sort of temporal 
reading I have offered of the Knight and Prioress, it is surely the Miller; as the Miller’s 
Tale opposes the Knight’s chivalric idiom, so too does his portrait resist the narrative 
patterns of his predecessors.  In many ways, it constructs the Miller much more simply 
than the other characters: Chaucer elaborates his character by sequentially describing his 
physical features, constructing an image of the materials that make up his body.  Earlier 
portraits have offered a physical image of their characters—the Knight and the Prioress 
do so—but that physical image always emerges from the rapid narrative details that 
define the pilgrim.  In both the Knight’s and the Prioress’s portraits, we are not offered 
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any sustained effictio until the end of the portrait; we have already had to situate a body 
within a shifting sequence of events before we know exactly what that body looks like.  
The body and character thus emerge from a pattern of temporal and narrative relations, 
contracted into brief, paradigmatic events.  Certainly Chaucer includes brief narrative 
details in the Miller’s portrait: “at wrastlynge he wolde have alwey the ram,” (1.548), 
“Ther was no dore that he nolde heve of harre” (1.550); likewise, some of the 
descriptions use narrative analogies: “His mouth as greet was as a greet forneys” (1.559). 
But to say that our sense of the Miller’s identity arises from these compressed narratives 
would vitiate the analytical tools we have been using to this point.
Rather, the Miller derives much more of his personality from his inertly physical 
characteristics.  From the beginning, his portrait calls him “a stout carl for the nones;/ Ful
byg he was of brawn and eek of bones” (1.545-46). Unlike the other portraits, the Miller 
is simply represented into being in the General Prologue; we do not begin to understand 
him through a network of physical relations taking place in time, but by a simple, one-to-
one correspondence of word to thing.  Chaucer emphasizes this by constructing him from
the inside out, describing the physical innards of his skeleton and musculature that 
comprise his stoutness.  His brawn and bones are not fundamentally narrative details—
they do not operate in a moving time, but rather in a frozen moment of perception; more 
than any other character, Chaucer uses simple expressions of the “to be” verb in the 
Miller’s portrait, saying only that certain physical features exist amalgamated in his body.
As a result, the Miller seems to lack event; he is not composed by the procedures of 
temporal recombination that typify the other portraits but through a simpler, less self-
conscious narrative mode.  When his body is put into relation with other objects, the 
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resulting narratives seem to only emphasize its crass materiality—in both his wrestling 
and his breaking and entering, the Miller makes contact with the world around him in the 
most literal fashion imaginable, by crashing the stuff of his body into other stuff.  These 
instances constitute events of sorts, but only as rocks crashing into one another constitute 
an event—they manifest the materiality of two objects, but they do not place the resulting
bodies in any sort of interpretive context; such objects seem to lack genre, or a perceptual
schema through which they attain some sort of significance.
 The Miller’s portrait elaborates on this strategy throughout: after the brief 
narrative, the portrait returns to simple physical description.  As Chaucer tells us, 
His berd as any sowe or fox was reed,
And therto brood, as though it were a spade.
Upon the cop right out of his nose he hade
A werte, and thereon stood a toft of herys,
Reed as the brustles of a sowes erys;
His nosethirles blake were and wyde. (1.552-57)
The descriptions here do place the Miller’s physical features into a metaphorical relation 
to the world around him, especially the animal kingdom; however, it explicitly refuses to 
compose temporalities for those metaphors.  Vivid as they are, the metaphors reinforce 
the static inertia of the Miller’s physicality—Chaucer could have easily integrated these 
details into brief narratives as he did others, but he simply doesn’t. Instead, they produce 
the Miller as a static mass within the narrative, one that can certainly be set into motion, 
but which does not begin in motion. In a sense, the portrait’s incessant refusal of 
narrativity presages the threat he poses to the pilgrim group: his willingness to break their
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“foreward” in his Prologue is anticipated by his failure to be composed in the same 
manner as the others.  He resists not only the Knight’s overblown chivalric idiom, but the 
entire procedure of event-making that makes it possible; the brawny Miller is a 
materialist who strips away the significance from all objects until they are nothing more 
than their physical mass.  For the true materialist, the event cannot be produced—there is 
no ritual significance attached to any object, so the system of their relations is ultimately 
just a meaningless relative motion.  Time is a chaotic amalgam of matters that blur into 
one another—without clear, ritualized roles, objects cannot be defined as interactive 
unities.  Thus instead of the narrative details that have typified other pilgrims, we are left 
with metaphors that statically exchange the Miller’s substance with some other substance 
without placing the two in temporal relation; there is nothing that delineates his physical 
mass from that of animals or anything else for that matter—even as the vivid metaphors 
help us to imagine the Miller, they rob him of a specific identity, even a bodily one.  We 
get an overwhelming sense of his substantiality; we know there is some thing birthed into
being here, some rough, slouching creature; we are even given a gruesomely detailed 
account of its physical features. However, those features are elaborated through 
metaphors that exchange his substance with something else entirely such that the two 
images are overlaid with one another.  The bestial imagery is so sustained and vivid 
throughout the portrait that it dominates the way we imagine his body—it almost 
becomes more than a metaphor.  Though the Miller is overwhelmingly material, down to 
his most minute tuft of hairs, his refusal to assign ritual significance to any of the objects 
around him leaves his materiality inert.
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Of course, the Miller is not nearly so inert as his portrait might lead us to believe; 
on the contrary, his materialism produces some of the most memorable events recorded in
the Tales.  Chaucer reserves for the Miller’s tale one of his most ingenious comic devices
—the dual climax described so well by Thomas D. Cooke in his classic study of the tale.  
The Miller is unexpectedly deft at constructing a precisely crafted narrative; he 
coordinates the events of two separate fabliau such that the climax of the one precipitates 
the climax of the other.  His deftness at coordinating narrative events is an open question 
posed by the Tales; the inert materiality of his portrait should preclude such a capability
—the Miller might resemble the Shipman, for instance, who largely lacks that capability
—but Chaucer restores narrativity to him, along with the unique pattern of perception that
narrativity requires.  Certainly, the events he narrates only exist to demonstrate the 
foolish, deluded manner in which their characters have constituted themselves; in the 
dark night of that climax, Alisoun is exchanged for the Knight’s Emelye, Nicholas for 
Alisoun and John, ass for lips.  Each character in the tale is fluidly substituted for the 
others, just as the metaphors of the portrait substitute one configuration of matter for 
another.  Such materialistic exchanges confound the generic patterning through which 
each character seeks to define the events within the tale.  John thinks himself in a 
retelling of the Bible in which God’s wrath will finally culminate in a second flood; 
Absolon thinks himself in a Romance until he feels the bristly touch of Alisoun’s nether-
beard; even Nicholas thinks himself in a parody until he is viciously scalded in the toot.  
The Miller is relentless in his undermining, not solely of the Knight’s chivalric elevation 
of women, but of all the ritualistic procedures through which identities are constructed 
and events are made.  The elements of those rituals always betray their participants; 
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against the Prioress, the Miller suggests that the inert materiality of the ritual object will 
always give the lie to those relying on it for their identities—at precisely the moment 
when they hope to consecrate those identities, the ritual object will betray them, 
exchanging itself for something else in a nullifying metaphor of its materiality. 
Chaucer’s genius, in this particular problem and throughout the Tales, is to fold 
insights that seem to threaten his project, to threaten the possibility of narrative even, into
the texture of his fiction; the Miller is such a capable storyteller because his materialism 
itself constitutes a grotesque angle of vision upon the world surrounding him.  In 
vigorously disabusing the other pilgrims of their airs and pretenses, he installs meaning 
into the void he thought to discover within them; relativism becomes a coherent position 
with its own metaphysics of vacancy; nihilism becomes allegory.  The objects that 
populate the world are representations of that vacancy, but in order to be representations 
at all, they must first be integrated into coherent objects.  Only from this position of 
coherence and integrity can they mobilize the materialistic nihilism the Miller prosecutes 
through his narrative.  Thus, in seeming to differ from the other pilgrims the Miller 
actually becomes like them: he becomes another grotesque in Chaucer’s chorus of 
grotesques..  Even as he uses their narrative mode to critique the possibility of 
meaningful narrative, his anti-ritual takes on its own life and exceeds its ideological 
mandate.  Chaucer’s seeming refusal to comprise his personality from paradigmatic 
events itself constitutes his angle of vision upon Chaucer’s world; the incessant reference 
to his physicality itself constitutes his response to the other pilgrims’ rituals of 
significance.  As a response, it becomes a ritual—a parodic ritual, to be sure, but a ritual 
nonetheless. Otherwise, the Miller’s materialism would render the language of which he 
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is composed inert along with everything else—the Miller, in this sense, stands in for the 
House of Fame’s model of inert language.  This is true of him especially because he is a 
literary creation, but it is true of materialists in general—their ideology, taken to its 
radical extent, unwinds the rationale behind its prosecution.  In divesting people and 
objects of their culturally inscribed significance, he would seem to lead back to a purely 
unfolding temporality in which the relations between things are no longer contracted into 
events; but in reality, the materialist world is static because it dissolves the object even as 
it tries to name its substance.  No materialist—not even the Miller—can be so radical 
however; as a codified “ism,” it becomes a perceptual mode competing with others to 
effect a significant vision upon the surrounding world.  Even as it sets out to unmask the 
grotesque perspectives of others, it ironically collects into a new grotesque perspective.
For time to authentically move, such grotesqueness is necessary—we cannot 
expect to remain captive at the surface of a narrative and gain anything from it.  The 
House of Fame attempted to recuperate a vision of presence through such a certain 
negation and ultimately was only marginally successful in doing so; it had to constantly 
strain its own vision, privileging its own language as simply representational in order to 
bracket all other language.  By subtracting meaning from language, Chaucer did locate 
readers in a sort of fluid temporality, but without representation, his project always 
threatened to collapse into the static materialism promised by the Miller.  The frame of 
the Canterbury Tales, however, takes up many of the same phenomenological problems, 
but with an entirely novel solution to them. Chaucer’s strategy in the General Prologue, 
as throughout the Tales, is to distill every perspective that might undermine his poetics—
whether through its seriousness, preciousness, outright falsity or inertia—into its most 
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grotesque form then fold the threat they pose into his world.  He refuses to refuse in his 
Tales; any mode of perception is open in his world precisely because any perception 
constitutes a part of the strangeness of the objects that populate that world.  Even an 
ideological schema like the Miller’s that reduces everything to its most base form places 
a perceiver in relation to a perceived object; such reductive ideologies begin with the 
integrated object, which they must then disintegrate and disavow. But ironically their own
assignation of the object to its base materiality possesses its own urgency; the Miller’s 
parody infuses his inert materiality with a life and purpose he should not be able to 
muster. It has a certain sentimentality and nobility to it because it opens him onto a world 
that the pilgrim group collectively constitutes.  This world is not primarily a social 
construct, though, but a phenomenological one, a strange world wherein every object 
achieves an indefinite resonance that can only be intimated, not fully defined.  Particular 
patterns of perception and interaction must aggregate within those objects without losing 
their poignant particularity.  Tales must unfold across the surface of the text, the matters 
of their words and images, themes and ideas being simultaneously refracted across all 
those patterns; at the center, objects will begin to cohere, persisting in their own potency 
and participating in larger, contracted organisms of perception.  When the world of the 
Canterbury Tales begins to thrum this way, we are transported to the temporal vision 
Chaucer groped toward throughout his career, but this time through a superabundance 
rather than a dearth of meaning.  He restores a Dantean vision of time to a world 
disfigured by limited visions of time that parse it into truncated events, and he does so 
using the very means of its original disfigurement.  
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